THE SHI'IS OF JABAL 'AMIL AND THE NEW LEBANON

COMMUNITY AND NATION-STATE, 1918–1943

TAMARA CHALABI

FOREWORD BY
FOUAD AJAMI



The Shi‘is of Jabal ‘Amil and the New Lebanon


This page intentionally left blank

The Shi'is of Jabal 'Amil and the New Lebanon

Community and Nation State, 1918–1943

By
Tamara Chalabi

palgrave
macmillan



THE SHIʻIS OF JABAL ʻAMIL AND THE NEW LEBANON

First published in 2006 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS
Companies and representatives throughout the world.

PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin's Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries.

ISBN 1–4039–7028–9

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Chalabi, Tamara.
The Shiʻis of Jabal ʻAmil and the new Lebanon : community and nation-state, 1918–1943 / by Tamara Chalabi.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and Index.
ISBN 1–4039–7028–9
1. Shiites—Lebanon—ʻAmil Mountains Region—History—20th century. 2. ʻAmil Mountains Region (Lebanon)—Politics and government—20th century. 3. Lebanon—Ethnic relations—History—20th century. I. Title.

DS80.55.S54C48 2006
305.6′97′095692—dc22 2005049301

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.

First edition: January 2006


10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed in the United States of America.

To my parents Leila and Dr. A,
and in the loving memory of
my grandfather Adel Bey

Contents

PART II IN THE NEW LEBANON: SOCIOCULTURAL TRANSFORMATION



Map 1 Jabal ʿAmil and Its Environs



Map 2 Select Localities of Jabal ‘Amil

Foreword

Come the Shia Stepchildren

For a historian, no task is as noble or as difficult as retrieving the lives of forgotten peoples. The Shia of Lebanon were on the margins of history, cut off from the great ideas. They were on no one's itinerary. No travelers on the "grand tour" wandered into their midst, no authors who celebrated the "Arab Awakening" in culture and letters turned up in their beaten villages. There was surliness in their world and wounded pride, and crushing poverty. Their history was told in fables, the presumed glory always worlds away. There had been muskets, they said, but they had been confiscated by the gendarmes, there were noble Arabian horses but they are gone to be replaced by mules, there had been massive libraries, full of books of learning, but some governor in Acre or in Sidon, had them confiscated and burned.

Dr. Tamara Chalabi, a young historian of exemplary talents, has done her craft proud. In a book of luminous writing and exacting research, she has told the history of that forgotten people. Hers is no small accomplishment. She has gone against the mighty currents of Arab and Lebanese historiography. Arab nationalism had looked past—and through—the "compact communities" of the Fertile Crescent; the Shia, in particular, had made that Arab historiography squirm and look away. The historiography of Arab nationalism had been urban, and the Shia of that impoverished hinterland rarely figured in it. As for Lebanese historiography, it was in the main centered on Mount Lebanon, the home of the literate Maronite community, and on the city of Beirut, the world of the Sunni Muslims and the Greek Orthodox. No great history blew through the beaten villages of the Shia hinterland.

Other historians have told of the making of the Lebanese republic in 1920—the French project of *Grand Liban* that pushed beyond the Maronite heartland into the Shia provinces of the south and the Bekaa Valley and the Sunni cities of Tripoli, Beirut, and Sidon. But Tamara

Chalabi now joins the best of them with a work of real accomplishment: she fills a historical void by bringing the Shia stepchildren into that narrative. She has raided all the relevant archives and available written records to give voice to a people who had not been particularly literate. There is quiet passion in her work: it is there beneath the exacting scholarship and the archival work that drew on all that could be had on this subject by way of French, English, and Arabic material. That Shia world, I should add, is the maternal world of Dr. Chalabi; her mother's family is one of the great political families of southern Lebanon, the Usayrans. The historian does not tell us so, and does not have to. But the sympathy for that world, the urge to do it justice, and the felt need to give it a written, dignified history, inform this splendid book.

Nearly two decades ago, I had set out to write a book, *The Vanished Imam*, on the great Shia cleric Musa al-Sadr, and the role he had played in the 1960s and 1970s in the political awakening of the Shia. I had gone into a scholarly void; there was no full narrative of the Shia past. There were fragments, and I stitched them together as background for my contemporary story. Reading Tamara Chalabi, I now have a rich portrait of the Shia world. I know the religious scholars, and the political notables of consequence, and I know the ambivalence of the Shia of Lebanon, caught as they were between the call of a new country and the wider claims of Arab and Syrian nationalism, between the big political claims and the facts of their marginality and poverty.

Henceforth, no history of Lebanon can be written in the old way, as a grand compromise between the Sunnis of the coast and the Maronites of Mount Lebanon. It will have to be "corrected" with this unforgettable tale of a people hurled into a history made by more skillful, more worldly, players.

In the world of modern Lebanon, the Shia were "appendages." The ennobling Phoenician myth of modern Lebanon was not theirs. It belonged to seafarers, to the coast, and to the Maronite mountain that hovered over the Mediterranean. Dr. Chalabi recalls the influential ideologist of Lebanese nationalism, the banker and publicist, Michel Chiha. It was this Catholic thinker of Beirut who gave Lebanese nationalism its raison d'etre. He conceived Lebanon as a merchant republic on the shores of the Mediterranean, the heir of Phoenicia. In that grand vision—part romantic, part a banker's shrewd compromise between the Maronitte mountain and Muslim Sunni Beirut—the Shia countryside was an afterthought. It was not sufficiently loved or sufficiently known, Chiha had said of the southern

hinterland. He was to make his first visit to that forlorn territory in 1944, Dr. Chalabi tells us. He talked vaguely about "obligations" to the south, he spoke of its "spiritual riches" and he took note of its growing strategic importance on the borders of an emerging Zionist political enterprise. There wasn't much that could be done for that hinterland. Even the waters of the region's Litani River couldn't redeem it. The Litani would be used to provide electricity to the people of Beirut. It would flow by thirsty villages that forever dwelled on the bounty of that river, that forever pleaded for the use of the river to develop the south.

History came with velocity. There was a time, two decades or so ago, when Israel and the Palestinians, and Iran, blew into the world of south Lebanon. The forgotten villages and towns were visited by mighty storms. Urbanization too, had come. It had closed the gap between city and countryside; the south, it seemed, emptied into Beirut. Overnight, the villagers had become city people, and West Beirut, the home of the Sunni bourgeoisie was overrun by Shia villagers. The latter brought with them both their old ways—and doubts—and the desire to cast themselves, and their children, in the city's image. Radicalism—religious and political—was not far behind. It empowered the newly urbanized, it helped them conquer the old fears and feelings of inadequacy. But it was not easy, and the historical unease of the Shia is a great fact of Lebanon's life.

Nowadays, the Shia are Lebanon's largest single community. In the midst of the "Cedar Revolution" that pushed Syria out of Lebanon in early 2005, the Shia appeared uncertain and hesitant. The majority of them did not rush to the banners of this most fashionable and stylish of revolutions. But nor did they want to be left out of the making of a new Lebanon. A reader of Tamara Chalabi's book can fully grasp the ambivalence of the Shia. They hadn't been there, fully there, when Lebanon was put together in 1920; they were not Francophiles, and the diplomacy of The Powers was beyond them. Nor were they there in 1943 when the Sunnis of Beirut and the Maronites of Mount Lebanon fashioned an independent republic.

Like the best of historical writings, this work speaks to its time and place, but also to broader themes and settings. Tamara Chalabi does not address in this book the subject of the Shia of Iraq, nor of the Shia of the Gulf. But in doing the work she did, she throws a floodlight on the tensions between Arab nationalism and its Shia stepchildren, on the unfinished task of national integration among the communities of the Fertile Crescent. In the hands of this historian, the story of the Shia of Lebanon—and the wider malady and challenge of Arab

Shiʿism—is handled with great care, and with artistry. The scribes and the activist clerics and the self-styled historians and poets of this people come forth to tell of their people's burdens and hopes. Any scholar would be proud to write an account of this care and devotion. It is a wonder that this is a young scholar's first book. She has knocked boldly at the door of the scholarly citadel of Middle Eastern historiography.

And she has delivered a tale told with singular integrity.

Fouad Ajami

Preface

This book is based predominantly on manuscripts, private papers, and archival documents, in private libraries in Lebanon and archival centers in France respectively. Access to primary sources within the Shi'i community in Lebanon was a great challenge during the course of my research there and is reflective of a level of self-protection and distrust on the part of the custodians of these resources as a general statement on their status in Lebanon. The fundamental issue that I have discussed in this study is the methods by which an identity transforms; in this case the transformation of a community from being passive based to active based. How is agency restored or adopted for the first time in the history of a community that is intersecting with dramatic political and socioeconomic change? What is the impact of the modern nation state on communities contained within it? This interaction in the case of the Shi'is has strengthened their communitarian identity, within the nation state of Lebanon.

The Shi'i community of Jabal 'Amil moved from the diffuse community-based order of pre–World War One to the nation state–based system through a recognized and self-conscious sharpening of communitarian lines.

An 'Amili component is absent from the standard narratives of Lebanese histories. This book is about developments in the 'Amili community as a function of the 'Amili community Primarily, and therefore fits into regional history. It takes an empirical approach, and at the same time is informed by the extensive political and social theory literature; it does not take any one formulation as its starting point. Although the book concludes by demonstrating the importance of local agency in the history of Jabal 'Amil, it does not start by assuming it.

This book is a contribution to the growing effort toward addressing the current shortcomings of scholarship on Lebanon and Arab Shi'ism respectively. It both analyzes the historical narrative and provides a methodological model. At the historical level, it surveys and provides an account of the evolution of the Shi'i 'Amili community,

politically and culturally, during the course of the Mandate period, and discusses its most salient events. Methodologically, it presents a model for the transformation of this community from being marginal to an active, politically participating one, through its use of *matlabiyya*, a politics of demand. This book also highlights the transformation of Arab nationalism from an ideology of opposition, protest, and empowerment of marginal communities (whether Arab Muslim, Christian, or rural) into a tool for the assertion of political domination by the majority.

There are two parts to this study, part I is an examination of the narrative of this community experiencing change imposed by external but definitive factors, and part II is an analysis of the actual change undertaken by the community in adapting to the new reality of the Lebanese state, through the evolution and creation of new and existing institutions. The main outcomes of this study are: to present a framework for the periodization of Mandate 'Amili history and identifying its main episodes; to detail the interplay between the various components of 'Amili society—political leadership, emerging political, economic, intellectual, and religious elite, and the workers' movement; to describe the cumulative effect of the agendas of these various groups pushing the community toward integration; to highlight a process of negotiation within the community for an identity that transcends the two available options—Lebanese or Syrian/Arab; and to demonstrate the primacy of the role of the community in shaping its integration and sociopolitical and cultural evolution during this period.

A derivative result of this book has been to demonstrate partially the limitations and shortcomings of a unitary nationalist history, as has been the case in Lebanon.

I have addressed the perennial problem of transliterating colloquial Arabic contextually. For personal names and work titles that predate the French Mandate period a simplified *IJMES*-based transliterated system is used. Diacritics are omitted and the initial hamza is not shown. The 'ayn character is represented by ('), and Arabic words in common English usage, such as ulama and sayyid, are treated as English words.

All place names and personal names from the Mandate period onward, that is, 1920, are rendered in their most common Latin script usage. This is often the Gallicized form, with allowances for English usage. However, most such names have no uniform spelling in the Latin script. One form, often the most popular and/or the most convenient has been adapted consistently throughout this dissertation for each one of them. The form of place names included in the maps can

be used as a reference to determine the spelling in usage in this study. The names of authors and political figures that have been in usage by their owners and/or contemporaries are used as such. For example, Osseiran appears as such and not in the formal classicized transliteration of ʿUsayran.

Also, unless otherwise noted, all translations from French and Arabic are my own.

This book is based on my Ph.D. dissertation at Harvard University. It is however a work on its own. Whereas the dissertation is formalistic and thoroughly annotated, this book emphasizes narrative as opposed to the demonstration of research. In the course of my years at Harvard, I have benefited from the knowledge and assistance of many professors and colleagues. The resources that were made available to me, both academic and human, have helped me shape and define my interests and work. For this I have to express my utmost gratitude.

I would like to thank my thesis committee, Roger Owen my thesis advisor, Roy Mottahedeh, and Fawaz Traboulsi. I also thank Fouad Ajami who thought my thesis valuable enough to help me publish it, and Abbas Kelidar who patiently walked me through the steps of transforming a thesis into a book.

I was fortunate to gain access to many library collections. I wish to thank the staff of the Middle East Division of Widener Library and the staff of the Inter Library Loan office (Harvard University), the staff of the French Ministère des Affaires Etrangères in Paris and Nantes; special thanks to the Middle East archivist at Nantes, the staff of Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre at Vincennes, and the staff of the Archives Adminstratifs at Fontainebleau. In Beirut I benefited from the library and hospitality of the German Orient Institut and the Cultural Council for the South. In Oxford and London respectively, I benefited from the Public Record Office and the collections of St. Anthony's College. Nadim Shehadi made available to me the resources of the Centre for Lebanese Studies and diligently answered my repeated queries.

In the course of the year spent in Lebanon collecting materials for my research and well beyond, I benefited from the extensive generosity and knowledge of Dr. Munzer Jaber of the Lebanese University, who selflessly accorded me assistance beyond what I could have imagined. Dr. Jaber, Mrs. Anja Muqaled Jaber, and their children, Sarah and Mahmoud, welcomed me to their home throughout this year. For their friendship, patience, and hospitality I am grateful.

I thank the many individuals who gave me access to the wealth of material from their private collections, especially in Lebanon. In all

cases, I was given the generous gift of their time and expertise; they can scarcely be covered in this brief section.

I am especially grateful to my friend Hassan Mneimneh whose critical reading and comments on this manuscript have been invaluable. He has always been generous with his knowledge and friendship. Fabio D'Andrea's unwavering support and encouragement has been a great source of strength and inspiration. I have also enjoyed the support of many friends from Beirut to Paris to Cambridge, Massachusetts and many places in between. Long hours of discussion with many of them have challenged me and helped me clarify my thoughts and writing.

I am also grateful for the island of Ponza for its beauty and serenity, which sustained me in persevering through the reincarnation of this study into a book.

This work could not have been accomplished without the support of my parents, Ahmad and Leila, my siblings, and extended family. I would especially like to thank my sister Mariam for her relentless patience over the past years and for her unswerving love and support. My uncle Ali Osseiran in addition to being a sounding board for many of my ideas was invaluable in opening doors for me and providing me with many useful contacts. My uncle Dr. Hassan Chalabi discussed my topic with me and introduced me to many learned members of the community.

Many others have helped me in countless ways. To all of them I express my gratitude. The opinions and facts presented in this work remain, naturally, my responsibility.

Introduction

This is the story of a narrative. The narrative I write about was in many ways so hidden, so obscure, so denied that even its own participants have frequently not accepted or acknowledged its existence. Searching for it has been an adventure and this adventure itself—the challenges of self-denial and disenfranchisement associated with the ‘Amilis of South Lebanon—has been probably the most illuminating feature of this book, which is about the formation of the Shi‘i Lebanese identity throughout the turbulent 1918–1943 period.

When I decided to write my Ph.D. dissertation on the Shi‘is of Lebanon, I had several doubts, as many students do, and faced a variety of obstacles along the way. The most striking of these obstacles at all times was the negative reaction of many people, both scholars and laymen, to my choice of topic. “The Shi‘is haven’t contributed anything to deserve in-depth research . . . There are so many more important and interesting subjects . . . Is there really anything to write about? Why are you wasting your time on these people?”

Often I found myself, particularly when hunting for precious manuscripts in Lebanon, adapting my topic to my audience, since people were so passionately opinionated about the worthiness of these Shi‘is. In one instance, I had to listen to a theory on the genetic make up of the Shi‘is from a “respected pillar of society” who said “their descendants are all savages, just look at how they live.”

Ironically, some of the most disapproving were well-heeled educated Lebanese Shi‘is who embraced traditional urbane Lebanese formulas and prejudices with even more francophone fervor than their Christian compatriots. These people were disturbed by my choice of topic because it touched an unhappy chord in their own identity. The phrase that kept being repeated in outraged French was, “Mais comment peux-tu écrire une thèse sur ces gens quand tu es a Harvard. Et pourquoi?” These reactions played a key role in informing me of

the attitudes and prejudices toward Shi‘is generally, attitudes that seemed so embedded, at times unconsciously, in the mental landscapes of people high and low—Shi‘i, Sunni, Christian, and Western—across the spectrum of this story.

But then there were the guardians of the manuscripts, in very humble houses in small villages in the South, quietly living their lives on the periphery of Lebanese life, in full knowledge of their state of neglect and hardship, curious enough to offer me tea and listen to me tell them about my project and what I needed to realize it. These conversations alone are worthy of a story, a story of the subtle attempts to identify me as a friend or a foe, an outsider or one of them. Could they trust me with their papers? Would I do them justice?

It was a continuous process of negotiation, a connection to my neglected Lebanese roots, a rite of passage as a researcher and as a Shi‘i too. I could not understand why these people were so secretive—old shaykhs, school teachers, public servants, and farmers—I was not researching some cultish movement, but rather what I thought to be a straightforward history of their community. Not only was there no theory or established chronology to navigate with, but there were no texts to guide me. I was like an archeologist in the early stages of a dig, fumbling through the mud. When I didn't miss, that is, whenever I found some of these texts, diaries, and letters, I saw that the ‘Amilis subterranean behavior was in perfect harmony with their outward identity as Lebanon's forgotten citizens. Those documents—the hand written diaries, faded letters in pencil, copious notes in margins of account books, and newspaper clippings—were their power, and they revealed a truth that was openly rejected by the authors of Lebanon, that did not exist in the standard narratives, that nobody seemed to want to learn were indeed part of narratives such as the Arab revolt and World War One; however, they were recounted from the long-buried, long-ignored perspective of a marginal people. This hidden history differed from that written by history's victors.

For a community traditionally considered backward, the emphasis that many individuals I met placed on their documents, oral stories, and messy notes struck me as quite the opposite of backwardness—betraying a deep sense of culture and history that is more than often obscured.

The Shi‘i ‘Amili experience as produced and presented by them through a historical narrative did not come in reaction to intellectual, cultural, and theoretical challenges, but came from actual social and political conditions that emerged with the formation of the nation state of Lebanon. It was a process they started over a century ago that

underwent several transformations and refinements under the nation state. It is an ongoing process. One can argue that this process has preceded the current trend in historical research of indigenous and autochthonous narratives.

In the context of local histories, it is possible to reexamine what I call "identity negotiation" through subnational, national, and nationalistic narratives. This book presents local history as a new component of a much wider experience.

At the end of World War One, the Shi'i community of Jabal 'Amil, along with other communities of the Arab Ottoman provinces, found themselves without a clearly defined political allegiance. Challenged by the breakdown of the Ottoman state and the rise of contending power dynamics between colonial powers and emerging local players such as Amir Faysal, the 'Amilis needed to establish a new identity to represent themselves. By 1943, this identity had developed within the newly formed Lebanese state. This is a discussion of the evolution of the Shi'i 'Amili identity in the period of the formation of "new" Lebanon. It underlines the impact of local and regional politics as well as cultural influences, both Muslim and Christian, on the formation of this identity.

The choice of the 'Amili Shi'is as the focus of this book stems from the fact that they truly represent the plurality of the Shi'i population of Lebanon, from the depth of their historical and cultural experience, as opposed to the other main Shi'i Lebanese group, the Baalbek/Hermel Shi'is, who are relatively recent converts to Shi'ism. The sociopolitical organization of the 'Amili community is based on the traditional Shi'i *muqati'ji* leadership, which is supported by a clerical entourage with a sedentarized rural constituency, unlike those of the Baalbek/Hermel, where the population is predominantly tribal.

This book discusses the process of evolution of the Shi'is as a function of the new conditions the community was subjected to during the 1918–1943 period, and also exposes the limited efforts at emulating other communities. Further, it also shows the community's limited ability to integrate with the nationalist (Arab) or national (Lebanese) narrative, leaving it with the option of a subnational narrative focused on South Lebanon. The interests of the internal centers of power in South Lebanon, whether religious or political, do not necessarily match those of the community as a whole; even so, communities are able to use established patterns of discourse in order to mobilize their constituents and preserve their positions of power.

This book is one component in a growing effort to address the current shortcomings of scholarship on Lebanon and Arab Shi'ism.

A major prerequisite for this effort is the expansion of monographic literature, which is currently sparse. In the course of the research for this study, I consulted many private libraries with considerable collections of manuscripts. In doing so, I faced many obstacles to securing even limited access to these works. A major service for scholarship in this field would be to bring forth the wealth of material in these libraries and to make it accessible to a wider audience. This remains a difficult task as far as convincing their custodians to making them available is concerned, and also in terms of finding the resources, both human and financial, for such a project.

Despite the paucity of sources mentioned earlier, some monographic works of varying length have appeared. A synthesis of this body of works to offer a comprehensive regional history is still due, together with a thorough revision of general Lebanese history to acknowledge and accommodate Lebanese ‘Amili and Shi‘i history.

Finally, there remains the need for a reassessment of the implicit model in Lebanese historical writing and in nation state histories.

Whether the history and experience of Shi‘i communities in the Arab world are archetypal and symptomatic remains an issue that needs to be addressed. There are a number of affinities to be alluded to here, within an examination of the reaction of these communities under the nation state system. Unlike Lebanon, in the case of Iraq, for example, the Shi‘i community is a comfortable majority. Its dynamics are more complex because of its heterogeneity and socioeconomic disparities and because of successive attempts on the part of the Iraqi central government (whether led by King Feisal I, Abdul Karim Qassim, or Saddam Hussein) to make Iraq a unitary state. The Shi‘is of Iraq followed a trajectory of structuring and empowerment similar at times to the experience of the Shi‘is of Lebanon. However, some of the cultural elements injected into these dynamics (whether Iraqi or Lebanese) are derived from a common Shi‘i heritage; however, these dynamics were not necessarily uniquely Shi‘i and can be applied to other communities as well, ethnic and religion-based ones. For example, the Kurdish experience in modern nation states in various parts of the Middle East can be a parallel. The Shi‘i element can be considered as a garnishing and the real thing is the community experience in the nation state.

In the course of the formation of “new” Lebanon, the status of the Shi‘i ‘Amilis evolved from one of a peripheral rural Ottoman community to an active political Lebanese one. This evolution endowed the Shi‘is with a communitarian identity that competed and negotiated with other geographic, ethnic, and religious identities, such as

Syrian, Arab, Muslim, Lebanese, and, later, *Mashriq* minoritarian, in the Lebanese and Near Eastern contexts. Although the various levels of identity were interchangeably used depending on specific circumstances, the Shi'i 'Amilis developed communitarian structures through an evolving process of political participation, education, and culture within the general framework established in Lebanon during the Mandate.

The experience of the Shi'i 'Amili community exemplifies the reaction and evolution of a Middle Eastern political minority community adjusting to the new nation state system, making use of the specific conditions it was faced with. The particular nature of French Mandate politics in Lebanon was based on the distinction of identities with a particular attempt to enhance a specific identity, that of the Maronite Christians. The purpose of this book is to demonstrate that even under unfavorable conditions, a marginal minority community was not simply a recipient but an active agent of change.

The general sociopolitical and intellectual culture in Lebanon had always reflected the absence of any active role for the Shi'is. This assessment has been shared by non-Shi'is and Shi'is alike. Justifications for such views varied from references to the presumed political quietism linked to Shi'ism, to a reflection of urban disdain for "backward" peasants, to the Sunni paternalism toward the "lesser" Shi'i. The Shi'i community of Jabal 'Amil in this respect is interesting because it has suffered from inferiority through much of the twentieth century. The very word *mitwali*, the traditional way of referring to the Shi'is of Jabal 'Amil, has a severely pejorative connotation as a label of backwardness and lack of "class." In this stereotypical rendering, *mitwali*s were viewed as incapable of contributing to the nation-building process and even to their own advancement. Such usages, however, have to be understood in the context of the social and cultural stratification that the new Lebanese governing class had engendered. This examination (and others) of internal development in the Lebanese Shi'i domain demonstrates that in fact Shi'i agency and action were at no point absent. The derogatory use of the word fell out of fashion by the 1980s with the emergence of potent Lebanese Shi'i forces and with the integration of the Shi'i middle class and elite into a wider Lebanese context.

In comparison with neighboring communities, Leadership of the 'Amilis at the end of the Ottoman era was concentrated in the traditional framework of hereditary local leaders supported by the Shi'i ulama. By 1943 however, this community had established an increasingly institutional base and had already witnessed a remarkable change in the

nature of its political and religious leadership. The community had demonstrated its willingness for integration into the Lebanese state by making use of all the mechanisms made available by the state, as well as through its own internal dynamic, especially with reference to historiography and self-representation.

In the specific context of the Arab Near East, the experience of the 'Amili community reveals the extent to which Arab nationalism has been an expression of the ideological enframent of the Sunni majority. There is an implicit hierarchy in the Arab national community, the criteria for the top level being Arab, Sunni, and urban. The Shi'i community, lacking two of the three criteria, is explicitly patronized by Arab nationalist intellectuals and politicians. This nationalist hierarchy became pervasive despite the fact that many of the original proponents of Arabism were not Sunnis. Arabism, originally a reaction to Ottomanism, eventually established its own dominant ideological framework.

This book operates on two levels: the historical narrative and the methodological model. At the historical level, it surveys and provides an account of the evolution of the Shi'i 'Amili community politically and culturally in the course of the Mandate period, and determined the most salient events of the community during this period. Methodologically, it presents a model for the transformation of this community from a marginal politically participatory one to its use of *matlabiyya*, a politics of demand. Allusions are made to the transformation of Arab nationalism from being an ideology of opposition, protest, and empowerment of marginal communities (whether Arab Muslim, Christian, or rural) to becoming a tool for the assertion of political domination by the majority. This was particularly well illustrated in the Arab government period 1918–1920, which witnessed the 'Amili community shifting its focus away from the Arab/Greater Syria nationalist discourse in favor of a Lebanese national integration approach.

The two approaches used in this study (historical narrative/methodological model) are applicable beyond the Shi'i 'Amili community. Components of this approach to 'Amili history are readily applicable to many Middle Eastern communities with similar socioeconomic and/or historical development such as the 'Alawis and Druze in Syria, the Berber in Morocco, and the Kurds of Iraq. Common factors include a rural way of life, clerical dependence on traditional political leadership in exchange for the benefit of legitimacy that such leadership derives from clerical endorsement, regional tribal rivalries, internal minority tension, and Shi'i doctrine.

An examination of an Arab Shi'i community outside the double assumption of Irano-centrism and the primordial importance of the

religious institution is also provided in this book. This book approaches the ‘Amili community as an independent entity that has relations to neighboring communities, rather than viewing this history primarily in relation to the Iran or Najaf connection, which has been the conventional approach to the study of Shi‘is.

Shi‘ism in the Arab world during the modern period has not received the same scholarly attention as Iranian Shi‘ism. While there are clearly similar points of reference between Persian and Arab Shi‘ism, there are also substantial differences that have not been adequately examined. This question gains importance during the twentieth century particularly during the period spanning the fall of the Ottoman Empire to the mid-1950s, when Arab nation state building was in full swing. The themes of Mandate colonial rule and Arab nationalism are particularly relevant to the development of Shi‘i communities in countries with majority Shi‘i populations such as Iraq, Lebanon, and Bahrain. In Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait there are minority Shi‘i communities whose political participation is either weak or nonexistent.

Another important difference between Arab and Iranian Shi‘ism is that whereas Shi‘i political tradition is well established in Iran and goes back five centuries, the opposite is the case in the Arab context. In Iran, Shi‘ism was both the faith and ideology of the state, whereas in the Arab world, it was minoritarian, even in Iraq. Despite the historic presence of a strong Shi‘i tradition in Iraq, mass conversion to Shi‘ism took place in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, more recently than in Iran. This lack of an active political culture continues to affect Iraqi Shi‘i political culture till today. In Lebanon, Shi‘i political recognition came with the French Mandate, as one of several communitarian groups.

The traditional historical literatures on Lebanon written by Lebanese historians reflect either “Lebanese,” often Maronite, nationalist interpretations, or alternative Arab nationalist ones, which negate Christian dominance and emphasize Arab and Islamic interpretations. The central theme is usually of the Druze–Maronite conflict. Hourani’s essay, “Ideology of the Mountain and the City,” summarizes this approach by schematizing Lebanese history and reducing it to a bipolar dialectic. The model for this type of history is best seen through the national history curricula in Lebanese schools.

Although Christian and Muslim historians have had different agendas, both have succeeded in excluding the Shi‘is from their history—they are at best allocated a few sentences in contemporary school books. The Maronites’ need to emphasize their strong roots in Lebanon led

them to ignore the other inhabitants of this land. As for the Arabist interpretations, the Shi‘is’ perceived lack of involvement in the dominant political focus of the time, Arab nationalism, was used as a justification by those who pursued Arab nationalist interpretations of the modern Middle East to ignore the political presence of this community. This book has avoided this exclusion and has shown how local ‘Amili history is a key element in any understanding of Lebanese history.

This book contests the assumption implicit in much of the scholarship of the twentieth century about minorities and agencies in the Middle East. According to this prevailing assumption, a number of “privileged minorities,” such as Christian Arabs or Isma‘ilis, are represented as agents in capacities disproportionate to their numbers. This is against the background of majorities that are underrepresented and other communities, such as the Shi‘is, that are ignored.

By scrutinizing the narratives native to Lebanon’s Shi‘i community, often wrongly assumed to be subservient, this book shows that community to be both reactive and proactive in seeking the forms of political participation that ultimately served its best interests. In addition, the book presents an example of an approach to Arab Shi‘ism that is not consumed by a narrow focus on ideological and doctrinal developments, but instead considers the evolution of a Shi‘i community in its multifaceted social and political aspects along lines that have largely been used for the examination of other communities. Such actions, continued well beyond the time span of this study, have delivered the Shi‘i community into a position of recognized power-sharing in Lebanon today.

This book is in two parts. Part I covers the narrative of Lebanon’s Shi‘i community chronologically, beginning with the demise of the Ottoman Empire, and discusses this community’s adaptation to the rapidly changing terrain. Part II investigates how these changes, both sociopolitical and cultural, actually happened.

Part I

With the New Lebanon: Political Evolution

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 1

In the Beirut Vilayet: A Description of Jabal ʿAmil

The Shiʿis of Jabal ʿAmil are one example among many of a Muslim religious minority under orthodox Muslim Ottoman rule that lasted more than four centuries (1516–1918). Although the Ottoman Empire disintegrated following its defeat in World War One, its dominant Sunni political culture was transferred to the Arab nation states that were born of the empire's former provinces. The case of Jabal ʿAmil is significant, as it fell within the jurisdiction of a French-created state, Lebanon, which underwent a distinct experience due to its multi-communitarian nature.

The development and experience of Arab Shiʿi society in the *Mashriq* has been as equally affected by the impacts of Arab nationalism and its derivative forms as other Arab societies. The trend in historical research in the Middle East has tended to focus on the politically dominant societies and has thereby neglected some minorities, among which are the Shiʿis, despite being a demographic majority in Iraq and a plurality in Lebanon. The problem of lack of information—due to lack of research—further emphasizes Jabal ʿAmil's marginality and, in fact, has further encouraged its marginalization.

The history of the Shiʿis of Jabal ʿAmil has been neglected on many levels: Muslim, Ottoman, Arab, and Lebanese. This is a vicious circle: the Shiʿis of Jabal ʿAmil are a marginal community, so their history is unknown and unimportant; their community therefore remains insignificant, because it has no history. This perception was best highlighted by European travelers to this region, who in their idyllic accounts of picturesque Orientals did not find the ʿAmilis to have the same allure as the brave men of the Mountain or the mysterious desert dwellers.[1]

The ‘Amilis, although Ottoman subjects, were not recognized as a separate community, in religious or social terms. Unlike other religious-ethnic minorities in the empire (*millet*), such as Jews, Christians, and Armenians, the Shi‘is were not given any distinct legal status. Historically, the Arab Shi‘i communities under the Ottoman realm were caught in a centuries-long struggle for power between the Ottomans and the Safavids and Qajars in Iran. While Shi‘ism served as a useful political weapon in the case of Iran, it was problematic for the Shi‘is of the Ottoman Empire.

A community such as that of Jabal ‘Amil suffered from a common religious identity with that of the Ottomans’ rivals the Persians, without benefiting from Persian patronage or a protected status similar to that extended by European powers to Ottoman Christian minorities. The end result was one of political and economic marginalization for this community.

Defining Jabal ‘Amil geographically is complex; it is a land-based definition that is principally meaningful to its inhabitants. Jabal ‘Amil is the name of a region that is inhabited by Arab Twelver Shi‘i Muslims who referred to themselves as ‘Amilis and to their mountain as Jabal ‘Amil, Bilad ‘Amila, and Bilad Bishara (the southern part of the Jabal). With the establishment of the Grand Liban, the former administrative structure of the Vilayet of Beirut was replaced by the province of South Lebanon, which many ‘Amilis lamented as a reduction of Jabal ‘Amil, with some villages now being located in other provinces and others going to Palestine and Syria. However the land referred to as Jabal ‘Amil is also inhabited by other communities: Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Sunnis, and some Druze.

In a reference in 1930, Sulayman Dahir, a leading Nabatieh intellectual, describes Jabal ‘Amil in his *Dictionary of Jabal ‘Amil Villages* as a larger entity than the newly formed administrative province of South Lebanon that included a large part of Jabal ‘Amil, but not all. He refers to a cohesive land (*bilad*) that extends beyond the boundaries of the Grand Liban, including parts of Mount Lebanon, such as Jezzine and its environs, as well as Baalbek and al-Hula; the largest parts of these lands were incorporated into the Lebanese state. He adds that the province was an artificial division.[2]

In the late Ottoman period, Jabal ‘Amil was a hinterland of the empire, and was so regarded by the central authority. As part of the Vilayet of Damascus until 1863, Jabal ‘Amil was on the direct route to Damascus from Saida, which was still an active port. This direct link was lost by the late eighteenth century when Jabal ‘Amil was dwarfed by the larger Jabal, Mount Lebanon, and its thriving Maronite

community. The reorganization of the provinces that created the Vilayet of Beirut in 1864 included Jabal ʻAmil. The new Vilayet emphasized Beirut's emergence as a metropolitan hub and the economic development of Mount Lebanon to the north and Jaffa to the South. Saida lost its maritime relevance and was reduced to a minor coastal city, and the route to Damascus from Mount Lebanon took precedence.

Up to the late eighteenth century, Jabal ʻAmil had to define itself politically within the perennial Maronite–Druze conflict that punctuated Lebanon's history from the fifteenth to the late nineteenth centuries.

At a much greater disadvantage than its neighboring Christian and Sunni communities, with a high level of illiteracy due to a lack of official schools and a scarcity of economic opportunities, Jabal ʻAmil faced the dramatic modernizing Ottoman policies of the mid-nineteenth century, namely the Tanzimat, which thrust it into a new world order.

Access to information on Jabal ʻAmil prior to the Mandate period is problematic as far as the sources that provide it. Of the categories that could be useful, Ottoman court records, European travelogues and surveys, the first is largely unavailable. As a non-Sunni rural community that did not have a recognized legal status or representative legal body, details on administrative issues and cases of conflict resolution are not distinguished separately, but are within the official Hanafi Ottoman court records. Therefore, access to them depends on a prior knowledge of Shiʻi names of villages and families. The nature of Shiʻi adjudication, with ulama authority extending from lineage and prestige, and not from the state, was *ad hoc* in nature and was thus not conducive to written records.

Nineteenth-century accounts from European consuls and travelers (mostly French) en route to the Holy Land and Egypt who passed through the region provide some information. In addition to the limitations of orientalist literature, the problem with descriptions of Jabal ʻAmil is that they tend to be limited, as they do not take the larger sociopolitical questions into consideration such as their lack of a legal personality as a community. In a land of different Christian communities, the ʻAmilis generally failed to appeal to Europeans' curiosity. A notable exception is David Urquhart, a nineteenth-century British traveler, who offered a depiction of the Shiʻis of Bilad Bishara noting the annomality of being "in race Arabs." He added that "they are remnants of the Alides, driven from districts bordering on Persia; hated by the Persians as Arabs, and by the Turks and Arabs as Shiites."[3]

At the turn of the twentieth century, the Shi'is' position had changed little from the time Uruqhart encountered them before the outbreak of civil war in Mount Lebanon in 1860. The essence of Uruqhart's description of the 'Amilis is accurate, but his description notwithstanding, their link to the Persian Shi'is has become a historical myth that remained popular among certain European and Ottoman publics.

The third category of work is Ottoman and local. One example of an Ottoman commissioned survey, *Wilayat Bayrut*, is an essential source as far as numeric data is concerned. Such studies are undertaken first of geographical entities and second of communities, so that general assessment is applied without real consideration of specific circumstances. As a source of reference, its authors rely on European travel accounts predominantly. More importantly, the Ottoman surveys are studies conducted by a political majority on a minority, where there is no interest in changing an established opinion. It reaffirms prejudices of insularity and ignorance on the part of the 'Amilis.

Local ('Amili) descriptions of Jabal 'Amil in the form of histories emerge after the Mandate period as part of an effort of communitarian nation-building, which is discussed later. Unpublished journals and diaries also provide details of the 'Amili mindset and 'Amili life, for example, Shaykh Sulayman Dahir's diary.

Wilayat Bayrut was commissioned in the 1910s to two Ottoman officials, Muhammad Rafiq and Muhammad Bahjat, who were Arab Sunnis. Their task was to survey the Beirut Province (Vilayet Beirut), which included Jabal 'Amil. They devoted a section to the Shi'is, and presented the urban educated and Sunni attitude of the day: "As for the Mitwalis living in the province of Tyre, their social life tends to be absolutely vile. This is because the Mitwalis are very extreme in their support of their leaders, for they don't mind giving up everything they have for them."[4] To the authors, the Shi'is of Jabal 'Amil were completely trapped under *iqta*' holders' power, but also socially backward. In sum they had no redeeming qualities for the authors to note.

Despite an academic attempt to describe various aspects of *Mitwali* customs and traditions, there is a strong tone of condescension in the authors' descriptions. For example, the practice of contract marriages—what they refer to as pleasure marriages[5]—as a bizarre practice of this community has many more lines of text devoted to it than their schools and ulama. Their living conditions are also the subject of some marvel: "We must not forget to mention their strange habits. In every house, there is a basin they call *jabiya* or *umm kura*. They do not believe in the cleanliness of anything unless it enters this

basin and leaves it. And if we considered these basins are left as they are for a period of time, we know the harm they create."[6]

Further on, in a subsection entitled "Mitwali Literature," the two authors recognize the existence of refined individuals within this society. However, they claim that, in order to flourish, these people need to be detached from their milieu, due to the "depravity of the people."[7] They also admit the difficult position of this Shi'i community, existing amidst other groups: "One of the glaring truths of this human mass that is surrounded from all sides by Sunnis, Jews and Christians is the fact it has invested its utmost energy and time to preserve its existence in any form possible."[8]

Of the prominent elements within Mitwali society, Bahjat and Tamimi focus specifically on the ulama as pillars of that society:

> This class of people [the ulama] is well known; standing between confined knowledge and great power. They like to have publications that describe in detail God and the sanctity of the twelve imams and welcome the arrival of the Mahdi and praise their leaders . . . this is the goal that the Shi'i ulama seek; in fact they have nothing else to do. If they don't do this, they lose their power vis-à-vis the leaders, *al-bakawat* and their elevated position in society. Based on this, what these write does not go beyond this parameter. However there is no one else who can value writing.[9]

After surveying the writings of the leading ulama through ten centuries, Bahjat and Tamimi proceeded to debunk all their intellectual contributions by lumping them under the rubric, "personal writing void of any scientific distinction."[10] Nevertheless, they persevere in their exercise of listing the different types of Mitwali literature and its main authors and again conclude that this community, referred to as the *Mitwali* nation, has no particular characteristic that distinguishes it, not even a song:

> Let us not forget that the fact that there is no simple song for the Mitwalis to represent their natural spirit as it exists in all other nations . . . In any case I state that the Mitwalis have no literary art that represents their temperament, manners and specificities.[11]

This conclusion, besides being severe, is also misguided in failing to observe the particularities of Shi'i theology and the many works produced by the ulama of this region. Bahjat and Tamimi's reduction of all literary works to mediocre panegyrics at best for the contemporary leadership is quite evident from the tone of their language. Ironically,

one of the most popular proverbs in Jabal 'Amil, one that is still cited today, is "Look under any stone in Jabal 'Amil and you will find a poet."[12] Folk songs and proverbs are also widely present in everyday life. But more significant than the negative image that *Wilayat Bayrut* casts on the cultural output of Jabal 'Amil is the general low opinion about this community as a whole, its poor level of development and cultural evolution, and the banality of its inhabitants' existence. Sulayman Dahir pertinently noted in his diary:

> I leafed through a book on *Wilayat Bayrut* and found in it many inaccuracies and misinformation about peoples, their social, economic, literary and religious lives. Its authors are collectors of sensational oddities (*al-mustaghrab al-mustatraf*). It is strange how this book goes contrary to its intention. Is it the aim of such a book to insult specific peoples/communities?[13]

The attitudes toward the Shi'is of Jabal 'Amil by the early twentieth century was both disdainful and pessimist. More important, it was reflective of an entire class of people in the Ottoman bureaucracy familiar with this region, from which many Arabs, such as al-Tamimi, joined the ranks of the Arab government that emerged in the wake of World War One.

Geography: The Physical Description of the Mountain

It is difficult to define Jabal 'Amil as it did not exist as an independent political or geographical entity. As previously mentioned, its name derives from its inhabitants, and the few descriptions of the region by French travelers provide mistaken locations and limited information.[14] Speaking of Vilayet Beirut or the southern region of Lebanon is problematic, given the many different communities that lead distinctly separate lives in that area and which overlap geographically. 'Amilis discuss the demarcation of the Jabal, and their definitions are important as they reflect a definition of their land. Most agree that the Jabal begins at the Awali River, just north of Saida, and extends south to the Qarn River in Palestine. The sea is to the west and al-Hula, Wadi al-Taym, and the Bekaa are to the east.[15]

According to the *Jabal 'Amil Newspaper*, in 1912, the area of Jabal 'Amil was 1,200 square miles. Its roads were mountainous and most were unusable by cars or trucks. The main roads were those between Saida and Tyre and Saida and Marjayoun.[16] The newspaper highlighted

the problem: the main town of each of the three cazas in Jabal ʻAmil was located in the peripheries of each of these cazas causing difficulty in access. It could take between nine or ten hours to travel between one center and another.[17]

Information on the population of Jabal ʻAmil is scant. The Ottoman 1882 census excludes women and children. In 1912, the authors of *Wilayat Bayrut* estimated the population of Jabal ʻAmil including Christians at 126,759.[18] In the same year, the *Jabal ʻAmil Newspaper* printed an estimate of a 150,000. The 1932 official government census counts the Shiʻis of the South at 92,681 and another census in 1964 puts the Shiʻis at 404,425. The number of villages counted in the 1932 census was 60, which was probably limited to villages with a population above 200 inhabitants; a more accurate estimate would be 250 villages.[19]

While traveling in the region in 1870, Louis Lortet, a French doctor, wrote that there was much evidence, such as remains of ancient mills, olive presses, wells, and sarcophaguses, that agriculture had been practiced in the area for a long time.[20] However, agricultural techniques in the area were not highly developed. One explanation of why there were no serious attempts to develop more advanced techniques was its pleasant climate and arable land, unlike neighboring Mount Lebanon, where more creative attempts were made, especially in the terrace technique of vine growing.[21] Indeed, *Wilayat Bayrut* notes that out of 540 square kilometers in the caza of Tyre, 301 were arable.[22] As three rivers flow through this area—al-Awali, al-Litani, and al-Zahrani and their subsidiaries—no attempts at irrigation had to be made, except for water reserve tanks and pools used for tobacco culture.[23]

Grain was the single most important crop in Jabal ʻAmil. It was also the main source of supply for these commodities to Mount Lebanon, which grew fewer cereals. In 1912, 46 percent of cultivated surfaces in Tyre were wheat fields, while in Marjayoun grain cultivation covered 42 percent of cultivated land.[24] There are no records available to show when grain agriculture took hold in Jabal ʻAmil, but wheat was cultivated intensively in Hawran in the mid-nineteenth century, facilitating the control of the urban classes over the peasants in Hawran.[25] A similar situation developed in Jabal ʻAmil although on a smaller scale.

Tobacco cultivation was successful at an early date in Jabal ʻAmil and it is mentioned as early as 1765 during a battle between the ʻAmilis and the Druze. The importance of tobacco culture in Jabal ʻAmil was noticed early by Orientalist travelers who spoke positively of it: "Tobacco constitutes one of the most important exportations of Bilad Bichara" and "it grows with remarkable vigor"; "due to its good

quality, it was used in the court of the Ottoman sultans."[26] In 1862, one traveler, Henri Guys, noted that the total weight of tobacco grown in Saida and Tyre was 191,208 kilograms. Ahmad Rida also mentions 300,000 *uqqa*, ≈385 metric tons, of tobacco production before the Ottoman Tobacco Régie was set up in 1883.[27]

The most important breakthrough for tobacco cultivation and trade in the region was Ibrahim Pasha's campaign in 1840, which opened the Egyptian market to 'Amili tobacco.[28] But tobacco agriculture was hindered again when, following treaties between France and the Ottoman Empire over monopolies in return for debt payment, it began to be exploited by the Tobacco Régie. Under the stringent regulations on cultivation enforced by the Régie, peasants could not benefit from all their land; furthermore, it limited tobacco culture to specific areas only, such as Latakiya, the Alawi Mountains, Saida, Tyre, and Ayntab. Any peasant who wanted to plant tobacco had to get special permission from the Régie, which was often not feasible because of the very heavy regulations imposed. For instance, a plot had to be at least one-fifth a hectare to be cultivated, and it had to be more than three kilometers away from a town. This meant that to obtain permission to cultivate tobacco, a peasant often had to rent supplementary land at extortionate prices, which usually meant that he became indebted or that he had to bribe those in power to decide that his land was suitable. Under such stipulations, tobacco culture greatly declined.

The consequent fluctuations in production and the conditions of tobacco culture affected the economic life of Jabal 'Amil. Tobacco was potentially the most lucrative of crops for Jabal 'Amil's economy, had it not been a monopoly. The establishment of the Tobacco Régie's control in Jabal 'Amil in the late nineteenth century took place before there was any feasible capitalist structure from within 'Amili society to invest in an industry. Jabal 'Amil did not have a developed sociopolitical structure with which to fight the Ottoman state against imposing this monopoly, as Mount Lebanon had done due to its special status under the *Mutasarrifiyya* (the Mount Lebanon autonomous region).[29] Ahmad 'Arif al-Zayn wrote that the Régie's effect on the 'Amili peasant was devastating: "It robbed him of cultivating the tobacco plant in which he saw a lot of promise."[30]

Despite the Mediterranean climate, olive trees were not cultivated in Jabal 'Amil in the nineteenth century. Lortet, several decades after Jazzar's military campaign in 1780, suggests that the troops destroyed olive groves. He wrote that the "first act of the occupying troops was to cut trees."[31] Other trees were plentiful in Jabal 'Amil, though many

forests had diminished by the nineteenth century. They still existed, but little attention was given to preserving them or to developing a thriving wood industry. Orchards could be found near the region of Jezzine, in Juba‘ and Marjayoun, and produced many types of fruits.[32] However, further cultivation was discouraged due to the high taxes imposed on these goods. In addition, Mount Lebanon had thriving orchard cultivation, and was therefore competition.

Society: Peasants, Ulama, Zu‘ama, and Wujaha’

Peasants

The strata of society most difficult to document is the peasants, as they tend to be silent on paper, only transmitting their history orally. This is certainly the case in Jabal ‘Amil where very little is known about the life of the ‘Amili peasant who stood at the base of the social pyramid. The local chronicles scarcely discuss the details of peasant life; they record only their interactions with those in power and the payment of taxes.

The condition of being a peasant has often been commented on, "to be a fellah is to be a fellah in one's nature and entire place in the world; it is the name of an essence of the person, not of an occupation, and that essence is defined by exclusion from the honorific universe of the beys and aghas."[33] The ‘Amili peasants fit this description, and it can be assumed that peasant life in Jabal ‘Amil did not differ significantly from the rest of the Syrian hinterland: peasants spent their lives in labor, weighed down with debts and taxes. In fact, the tax burden was greater in Jabal ‘Amil than in neighboring regions. This was due to the political power of its *zu‘ama*’ and their delicate relations with neighboring rulers, such as the emirs of Mount Lebanon and the pashas of Acre, Saida, and Damascus, who regularly dipped into Jabal ‘Amil's agricultural riches for taxation.[34] Furthermore, as a cereal-producing region, after 1882 Jabal ‘Amil paid proportionally higher taxes (50 percent) for this crop than for instance silk production (25 percent) in Mount Lebanon. Whereas regions such as the Jabal Druze and Jabal Nablus were often in revolt, and the Hawran was impenetrable, Jabal ‘Amil was easily accessible because it occupied an intermediary space between the power centers to the North and South.[35]

Jabal ‘Amil peasants in this period can be classified into three categories. The first and largest group was landless peasants, who were at the very base of society. They were illiterate and the most exploited

group in 'Amili society. The second group was rapidly diminishing at this point: small landowners who survived in debt. They were ill-prepared to function in the new commercial setting, and gambled future harvests at discounts to buyers. This often led to them losing their land and other belongings according to market price fluctuations.[36] The exemption fee for the army was another source of their impoverishment. Because of this precariousness, peasants from this second group found themselves joining the ranks of the landless peasants.

The rich peasants were the third group. The majority were heads of villages, sheikhs and *mukhtars* (village mayors), who exploited their social position to reclaim "dead land" according to *'urf*.[37] They were the link between the peasants and the *iqta'* holders, from whom they differed by being on a lower social stratum. They did not tend their land, but exploited the labor of the landless peasants.

In addition to the three groups of peasants listed here, there were also many who tried to escape this harsh reality by abandoning the land to become small merchants known as *mukaris*, who traveled between the market towns of Jabal 'Amil. This type of work increased during the early years of the Mandate, due to the contraband trade of arms in Palestine.[38]

Arrangements between the peasant and the landowner in Jabal 'Amil followed the established mode in rural Ottoman Syria. Categorized as *muraba'a*, it is a sharecropping agreement between peasant and landlord whereby the peasant was permitted to keep a share of the annual harvest, though this was usually an absolute minimum, barely sufficient for survival.[39] In addition, the peasant usually had to pay land tax to the owner and cover all farming expenses.[40] Peasants got greater shares from politically weaker notables, and lesser shares from more powerful notables. Several forms of sharecropping agreements existed and were applied in Jabal 'Amil. The basic sharecropping arrangement was *muzara'a*, a contract according to which the owner of the land comes to an arrangement with the peasant for the latter to use the land in exchange for a division of its proceeds.[41]

The heaviest burden for the peasants was not the taxes but the modalities of its collection, as the tax was often determined before the harvest. It should be noted that there was no uniform tax system in application throughout the region. Taxes could be collected in cash or kind. In some instances, the process of assessing the tax was itself a liability since it required them to delay taking their crops to market. Peasants lived in the uncertainty of the harvest yield, which was affected by the weather, price fluctuations, and delays in payment.

This was endured collectively by each village. Another problem is that villages were not taxed equally, but according to the power and influence of the landowners. Accordingly, peasant owners were taxed the most, since they exercised the least power.[42]

Muhammad Jabir Al Safa mentions four types of taxes in Jabal ‘Amil following the land regime changes in 1858:[43] nonnegotiable settled money over a piece of land; the ‘*ushr* (tithing) tax; *masqafa*, a tax on houses and built structures; and a tax on merchants.[44]

Peasant unrest, such as uprisings under al-Jazzar and Sulayman Pasha, surfaced periodically before 1858, but it did not have a lasting impact on the established order. The main trigger for unrest was, understandably, increased taxation. While travelling in the region in 1870, Louis Lortet aptly commented: “The miserable Mitwalis, like other neighboring groups, were absolutely ruined by crushing taxes that were most often collected with a revolting ferocity.”[45]

As these were periods of political tension for the Jabal, the implementation of the new land regime in the nineteenth century was not immediate. Furthermore, the stringent regulations of the Tobacco Régie caused much suffering among the peasants who could not meet them easily. It is possible that there was more expressed frustration toward the Régie because it was perceived as an oppressive tool of state exploitation.[46]

Ulama

Historically, the ulama were the social component with the greatest external visibility in Jabal ‘Amil. They also had the largest literary production and educational influence and have been, therefore, the most studied. The ulama of Jabal ‘Amil are well known for founding the religious schools in Safavid Iran.[47] As a result of this imbalance of information, most scholarly work done on Jabal ‘Amil has been done within a religious sphere, to the neglect of other dimensions, such as socioeconomic layers, urban versus rural and tribal, and regional differences.

The ulama cannot be defined as a distinct socioeconomic class. They assumed a “professional” function within this society. They also played a key role in the social and cultural life of Jabal ‘Amil but were affected by economic changes as individuals belonging to varying socioeconomic classes and not as one cohesive socioeconomic element. Several ulama families became “dynasties,” in the sense that the tradition of becoming a scholar was passed from father to son. This was the case of the al-Amin, Sharaf al-Din, Safi al-Din, Mughniyya, and

Sharara families, among others who feature in this period. However, this did not signify political power for the ulama and they did not develop independent religious political parties during this period. Lescot, a French military officer posted in Damascus, wrote in 1936:

> There is a strange thing in Shi‘i country, the religious authorities did not enjoy the authority that one expected. The influence of the "sayyids" or the "cheikhs" remains for the most part local. If they have some credit among the peasants, then the more evolved classes were increasingly outside their control and merely represented external symbols of respect.[48]

Political power was relegated to the *zu‘ama*’, leaders of the community. There were always, therefore, political alliances between *zu‘ama*’ and ulama. In particular, there were specific ulama families who maintained traditional alliances with a particular leader and his clan that often continued from one generation to the next. The religious scholar of Jabal ‘Amil traditionally provided the link with the larger Shi‘i world of Iraq and Iran, and there are many tales of poor villagers selling their entire belongings to send a son off to be educated in Najaf.[49]

In the absence of recognized Shi‘i religious courts in the region, the ulama acted as civil arbitrators in ‘Amili society throughout the Jabal, and they conducted the religious-legal affairs of the community without an officially acknowledged status. The hierarchy within this group was clearly defined, with the *mujtahid* at the top and the village shaykh at the bottom. There were few *mujtahids* in Jabal ‘Amil, as most chose to reside in Iraq's holy cities. In many instances, the declining state of religious education in Jabal ‘Amil following al-Jazzar's campaign and the reimposition of direct Ottoman control meant that the village shaykh could barely read and write.

The welfare of local religious men was safeguarded according to Shi‘i law, with the *khums*, a fifth, of whatever revenue was produced by the community, although there was no mechanism to ensure regular payment.[50] In addition, *zakat* or alms given by the community was controlled by the ulama who had the power to receive and distribute alms for the poor without scrutiny from any authority.

Zu‘ama’

The *zu‘ama*’ of Jabal ‘Amil were the leading families of Jabal ‘Amil, and they trace their origins to the Arab tribes of Yemeni origin. As

multazims for the Ottoman state, they exercised control over large regions of Jabal ʻAmil. Until the Ottoman reforms of the mid-nineteenth century, their position of power was uncontested within Jabal ʻAmil. However, with the modernization of the land regime, which allowed greater access to land, these families lost their leader monopoly. As a result, the power of some *zuʻama*ʼ families such as the al-Fadl and al-Abdallah diminished dramatically. The power of the al-Assaads (al-Saghir) was reduced too, but they succeeded in maintaining a position within the new hierarchy by transforming themselves and adapting to the new status quo and remained the leading ʻAmili political family through the nineteenth and early twentieth century.[51]

The Ottoman reforms took the *zuʻama*ʼ and transfered their social position into a bureaucratic one. The prestige of the *zuʻama*ʼ was channeled through the Ottoman bureaucracy. This was also the case for *zuʻama*ʼ families in Akkar and the Bekaa, such as the Mirʻibi and Hamadeh respectively.[52]

It was by this mechanism that the Assaad family became civil servants. Kamil Bey's father, Khalil Bey, was *mutasarrif* of Nablus. Another, Najib Bey al-Assaad, was *qaʼimmaqam* of Latakiya, while Shabib Pasha al-Assaad was born and raised in Istanbul. Kamil Bey became representative for Vilayet Beirut in the Ottoman parliament (*Majlis al-Mabʻuthan*).[53] The engagement of the Assaad traditional leadership in Ottoman bureaucratic functions translated partly into a relative absence from running the daily affairs of their local domain. This absence may have helped the newly emerging urban landowning families in their expansion toward the ʻAmili hinterland.

Wujahaʼ

By the end of the nineteenth century, Jabal ʻAmil had witnessed the emergence of a new group of notables, the *wujaha*ʼ, issued from families not linked with the traditional political power. The mechanism of this emergence is still a subject of debate. It has been generally assumed that the expansion of European capital, land registration, and the land regime of 1858, were factors in this emergence. However, this linkage is often speculative.[54] The *wujaha*ʼ were primarily urban bourgeois, and their rise altered the sociopolitical composition of Jabal ʻAmil. Their entry into the political arena constituted a challenge to the traditional *zuʻama*ʼ. The new families of *wujaha*ʼ thus began to share the status of notables (*aʻyan*) of Jabal ʻAmil with its traditional *zuʻama*ʼ leadership. These *wujaha*ʼ acquired further prominence in the larger Ottoman regional society due to their mercantilist and cultural associations.

The actual process that allowed for social movement in this clan-dominant society was enhanced by the nineteenth-century Ottoman reforms, regardless of whether this process was precipitated by the Ottoman authorities or not. The political leadership of Jabal 'Amil was weakened as a result of a series of bad choices it made in confrontations between regional powers and the central Ottoman authorities. The al-Saghirs aligned themselves with the rebellion of Dahir al-'Umar in Northern Palestine in the late eighteenth century.[55] They sided with the Azm family of Damascus in its rivalry with the Shihabis of Mount Lebanon, and participated in hostilities against the Christian population of Mount Lebanon in the 1860 civil war. Eventually, Dahir al-'Umar was defeated, the Azm family was pacified, and the civil war ended with a further protective role by the European powers for the Christian community of Mount Lebanon. The *zu'ama*' of Jabal 'Amil had therefore exhausted their political credit.[56]

The 'Usayran family's history in Saida began in the late sixteenth century as landowning grain merchants who came from Baalbek. They sought power through an unexpected avenue, the Qajar rulers of Iran, and became Persian consuls in Saida in the context of what Muhsin al-Amin has referred to as "the poor condition" of the Shi'is in Jabal 'Amil.[57] In 1848, they were appointed by a firman as "Shahbandars" of Iran to Saida, which gave them access to commercial privileges due to their diplomatic clout.[58] By the turn of the century, they had become the leading Shi'i notables of Saida.[59] They also enjoyed good relations with the Christian community. During the 1860 civil war, they sheltered Christians fleeing Mount Lebanon.[60] They were tied to both the Zayn and Khalil families through marriage and their lands were in Saida with large portions on the coastal area, south of al-Zahrani river, and near Jezzine.

The Zayn family claim descent from the Khazraj tribes in Medina.[61] They trace their presence in Jabal 'Amil back to the sixteenth century in three areas of the hinterland—Kfar Ruman (Nabatieh region), Jibshit, and Shhour (Tyre region)—before eventually forming a base in Saida. There they established themselves as merchants and held several administrative positions before Ibrahim Pasha's campaign. Later they were appointed to the administrative boards of Saida and Grand Liban, which brought them access to land. The Zayn family, like the Usayran, provided shelter for fleeing Christians in 1860 and thus enjoyed good relations with them, which provided Yusuf Bey al-Zayn (d. 1962) with future links to the capitalist networks in Mount Lebanon.[62] Among the Zayns were also several ulama with links to Najaf. They, most notably Shaykh Ahmad 'Arif al-Zayn, played an

important role in the cultural development of Jabal ‘Amil through his journal, *al-‘Irfan*, the initial capital for which came from the family’s mercantile resources.

The Khalil family, who are originally said to be of a branch of the Zayn family, began in Shhour and eventually settled in Tyre in the late nineteenth century to become a leading, notable Shi‘i family.[63] According to one source, they were supported by the ulama in their climb to prominence in an effort to undermine the unpopular dominance of the Sunni al-Mamluk family of that city.[64] The leading figures were Hajj Abdallah Yahya and Hajj Ismail al-Khalil, both of whom were merchants and pro-Faysal sympathizers, holding administrative positions in Tyre.

Along with the traditional Assaad leadership, these three Shi‘i families came to represent the new face of Jabal ‘Amil’s notables. From this point forward, the nature of ‘Amili politics was defined by its polarization between pro- and anti-Assaad forces. It is important to note that these Shi‘i families had their power base in Saida and Tyre, the coastal cities of Jabal ‘Amil, as well as in the interior region of Nabatieh (al-Zayn). This represented a firm shift in the direction of capitalism and new markets and an emergence of isolation for the hinterland domains of the old *iqta’* holders such as the al-Assaads.

The impact of assimilation in a larger capitalist entity, as merchants, intellectuals, and civil servants, also implied a loosening of the “spirit of kinship” or subcommunity (*asabiyya*) as ‘Amilis,[65] an example of “primordial” affiliations that cannot be chosen or shed.[66] This process of integration weakened the distinct and defining identity as ‘Amilis of the newly emerging social strata and undermined their cohesive communitarian and regional unity, the form in which they had previously interacted with the outside world. This pattern of political identification, to the detriment of a unified ‘Amili identity, continued throughout the twentieth century. This explains the large number of ‘Amilis who embraced a wide spectrum of often contradictory secular ideologies. The ‘Amilis were the least empowered in both Ottoman and later Lebanese societies. The sense of backwardness the ‘Amili community felt was expressed early on by its literati. Emerging notables and literati, the *wujaha’*, were the product of the fragmentation of the ‘Amili community.[67]

These families integrated into the larger political, social, economic, and cultural networks extending from Beirut, Egypt, Damascus, and Istanbul to Najaf, Tehran, Aleppo, and Jaffa. For example, before its monopolization, tobacco produced in Jabal ‘Amil was exported to Egypt, Istanbul was the center for the Arab associations and clubs, and

al-'Irfan, the principal 'Amili periodical, was initially published in Beirut. Some members of the al-Assaad family worked for the Sultanate in Tartus or Latakiya. The Golan and the Hawran were the markets for seasonal crops, and many farmers and workers moved to Jaffa.

This sociocultural opening, while strengthening certain social and economic networks, also weakened the potential for a general group cohesion by catering to different political and cultural tastes.[68] The ulama and notables near cities, as well as some clans, steered toward collective identities, for example, as Arabs within the context of an Ottoman condominium. Notables of the littoral or large cities linked to the coast leaned toward an Ottoman federalism, a modernism that promised progress and did not threaten the disintegration of historic groups.

Economy: Relations with Mount Lebanon

The agricultural life of Jabal 'Amil was strongly linked to that of Mount Lebanon. Jabal 'Amil has always been politically and economically defined in terms of its interaction with Mount Lebanon in particular.[69] The crop-growing capacity in Mount Lebanon was limited, it could only provide four months worth of meat and cereal, which forced it to look elsewhere for supplies. It therefore looked south to Jabal 'Amil whose wheat was one of that mountain's main staples.

Determining the relationship between Jabal 'Amil and Mount Lebanon is crucial to understanding the political dynamic of this region. Political events in Mount Lebanon determined political power in Jabal 'Amil. During conflicts between Maronites and Druze (which, prior to the 1860 civil war, can be considered as tribal, not religious, conflicts), the clans of Jabal 'Amil were affected as a consequence of their alliances with the clans of Mount Lebanon. These alliances were defined in terms of an older Arab/Yemeni origin that these different clans (with different confessions) claimed descent from.

The geographical location of the region, with a large number of fortresses in its peaks and entryways, was a factor that defined the relationship between the two mountains. This relationship began with the problematic interaction with Amir Fakhr al-Din Ma'n and continued with his successors, whether Ma'ni or Shihabi amirs. This interaction could not be avoided whether in war or in peace, due to the proximity of the two mountains. During the *Mutasarrifiyya*, Jabal 'Amil enjoyed poor relations with Mount Lebanon, but was forced to submit to the political and economic power base of the Mount, with its European investments and sectarian composition.

The impact of Western capitalist expansion on Jabal ‘Amil negatively affected its commercial life. Interior towns such as Tibnin and Bint Jbail had been traditional trading posts for caravan trade for several centuries;[70] however, the increase in maritime trade in the Mediterranean put the focus on new trade routes, the development of the port of Beirut, and the building of the Beirut-Damascus road in 1859–1863. The new network that emerged was among Mount Lebanon, Palestine, and the Syrian interior and it rendered regions such as Jabal ‘Amil inconsequential, despite its geographic proximity to all three regions, as it was bypassed by both road and sea.[71] The existence of markets throughout Jabal ‘Amil has been mentioned by several sources.[72] They emerged at boundary points with Mount Lebanon (the souks of Jebaa and al-Khan) and Palestine (Marjayoun, Bint Jbail), as well as in the interior (Nabatieh, Khiam). These souks were also the gateways through which the Beiruti bourgeoisie, who were interested in agricultural production, not in industrial or infrastructural development of the region, entered Jabal ‘Amil. Unlike Mount Lebanon, Jabal ‘Amil would not attract any industrial development or major financial investment. The dependency of Jabal ‘Amil on these intermediaries subsequently increased and was particularly visible during World War One. However, it never evolved beyond the scope of import/export toward an industrial development that could counterbalance this absolute dependence on Mount Lebanon and Beirut. The ‘Amili bourgeoisie worked in reverse. While their Mount Lebanon counterparts were linking up to the global economy, the ‘Amilis were buying land instead due to the internal sociopolitical mechanism of their society and convoluted relationship with their leaders.[73]

Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, Jabal ‘Amil was subjected to property speculators coming from the Mount, as well as the interior and port cities, who profited from its cotton, tobacco, and grain. It was also an avenue of real estate investment for the leading families of these places, such as the Francis, Abella, ‘Abla, Jawhar, and Sulh families. This real estate investment in Jabal ‘Amil gained significance during the Mandate period, as it was used as the argument for including Jabal ‘Amil as an agricultural pillar in the Grand Liban scheme by leading mercantile families. Furthermore, the Sunni landowning families from Beirut and, more importantly, Saida developed links with specific groups in Jabal ‘Amil, which permitted them to represent Jabal ‘Amil politically at a later stage in the development of Lebanon. Whether through the lack of a developed French policy toward this region or of a politically evolved Shi‘i leadership, the

relationship of a Sunni family with the region, the Sulhs, became one of political brokerage.

Political Leadership: The Bey and Parliamentary Representation

Being part of the Ottoman Empire, in 1911 the 'Amilis had a representative in the Ottoman parliament, which was established in 1877 but was fully activated only in 1911. However, this parliamentary representation had little to do with Jabal 'Amil as a politically acknowledged community and more to do with the person upon whom this position was bestowed. As noted earlier, Kamil Bey al-Assaad was a descendant of the al-Saghir family, who claimed descent from Mohammad Bin Hazza' al-Wa'ili, who is said to have inherited the emirate of Jabal 'Amil, in the early sixteenth century, from Amir Hussam al-Din Bisharra of the Wa'ili principality.[74]

Many of Kamil Bey's ancestors died in battle defending their land and faith, and as a result his words and actions carried great weight within his community. People saw his lineage as a symbolic projection of the Shi'i notion of their history as one of struggle and martyrdom in the face of injustice, the life and death of the imams being the confirmation for this history of struggle. According to Shi'i legacy, all of Ahl al-Bayt, the descendants of the Prophet through his daughter Fatima and Ali bin Abi Talib, were either killed or poisoned. In Jabal 'Amil's history, the deaths of the illustrious ulama Muhammad Bin Makki (d. 1384), known as the First Martyr (*al-Shahid al-Awwal*), and Zayn al-Din bin Ahmad (d. 1558), the second martyr (*al-Shahid al-Thani*), only encourage such a historic perspective. By the seventeenth century, the al-Saghir family had come to represent political martyrs. The 'Amili understanding of martyrdom, embedded in the essence of Shi'ism, came to be embodied in the al-Saghirs. Through them, as well as the two Shahids, Jabal 'Amil could live a more direct Shi'i experience parallel to the historical experiences of the imams and Karbala.[75]

In the framework of the local political martyr and the legacy of his clan, Kamil al-Assaad was born to rule over his people. In Muhsin al-Amin's biographical dictionary, *Shi'i Notables*, Kamil Bey al-Assaad's entry is a long series of eulogies and acclamations about his uniqueness among men. Among these tributes is Amir Shakib Arslan's obituary for him, in which the elaborate and embellished descriptions give an indication of the position people attributed to the Bey. Arslan, who was neither a Shi'i nor an 'Amili, combines saint and savior in a

familiar set of images in Shi'i tradition, yet the Bey family's social status and sphere of influence transcend religious identification. In the obituary, Shakib Arslan writes:

> The latest news mourned the Complete Moon (al-Badr al-Kamil) and Hope of the Hopeful (Amal al-Amil),[76] the *za'im* of Jabal 'Amil, the late Kamil Bey al-Assaad whom no one denies was one of Syria's notables, one of the notables of all the Arabs . . . He left behind him an emptiness that no one can fill, oh that should time bring someone like him, but alas time will be greedy with one like him.
>
> Kamil Bey al-Assaad was unique in many qualities. He was generous, gentle, grand, courageous, and large of spirit, a visionary, and a great mind as if he was born to become a leader, to become a man of men and leader of leaders. All the qualities of leadership and *za'ama* united in him . . . His place in Taibeh, in Jabal Hunin was a base for delegations from everywhere. He built a large house on a high peak where we used to see it full of men and warriors of all creeds, Sunnis, Shi'is, Arabs, Christians and foreigners. All of Jabal 'Amil, Hula, Qunaytira and Marjayoun were his children and he was the father of their orphans and the refuge for their weak and the just for the oppressed . . . He inherited the *za'ama* from one great man after another. No one can deny that this house of al-Saghir is of the first class of Syria's clans . . . Their *muqata'a* was all of Jabal 'Amil, south of the Litani to the borders of Safad, and from Tyre west to Hula in the east . . .[77]

This flowery hagiography, along with the wide geographic references, however exaggerated, reflects the position Kamil Bey had within his community.

He was born in 1870 in Taibeh, the seat of the dominant branch of the Assaad clan, to Khalil Bey al-Assaad, who was Mutasarrif of Nablus.[78] Hence, from an early age, Kamil saw the Ottoman government as an ally in which his father enjoyed an official appointment. It is said that Kamil al-Assaad's education and early exposure was Ottoman, an influence that came to define his political tendencies. Although it is generally believed that Kamil Bey did not receive a formal education, 'Abd al-Mushin Dahir, the Wa'ili (Assaad) family historian, claims that he was educated in various schools in the region: elementary school in Nablus and the Patriarchate School and the Ottoman secondary school in Beirut, where the principal was the Egyptian reformer Muhammad Abduh. He then supposedly went to Istanbul to continue his education, but it is not clear where. By the time of his father's death in 1900, Kamil was director (*mudir*) of the administrative district of Nabatieh (*nahiya*) before it became a

qa'immaqamiyya. He was elected to the parliament in the byelections of 1911 in the place of Sulayman al-Bustani. Along with Rida al-Sulh, he represented the province of Beirut. He was first elected as a Unionist, a member of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1911, and then reelected in the 1912 elections as a member of the conservative and monarchist Entente Libérale (*Hurriyet ve Itilaf Firkasi*)—an opposition party to the Unionists.[79] Kamil Bey was one of five Unionists who resigned and joined the new party.[80]

Kamil Bey's political affiliations were defined more by a need for self-preservation than ideology. Thus, after firmly opposing the Unionists, by 1912 he had decided to join their ranks once again.[81] According to a biography of Kamil Bey in ‘Abd al-Muhsin Dahir's history of the Assaad family, *History of the Wa'ili Family*, he was asked upon his return from the Majlis in Istanbul about the state of affairs. He replied in verse, "There is no profit from a people that have no good in them, as there is no gratitude in a people who are grateful for a monkey."[82] This statement, however flippant, reflects Kamil Bey's canny political sense at that point: he supported the Ottoman state regardless of any ideological position.

Kamil Bey's political allegiance throughout the rest of his political career was, however, constantly shifting: he was pro-Ottoman and later hesitated between the pro-Arab group and the French government in Lebanon. This behavior was typical for notables whose main concern was preserving their position, as opposed to subscribing to a particular political ideology. As the late leading historian of the Middle East Hourani pointed out: notables "must have some social power of their own, whatever its form and origin, which is not dependent on the ruler and gives them a position of accepted and 'natural' leadership."[83]

Among the Parliament members from Vilayet Beirut, Kamil al-Assaad alone derived his power purely from his lineage and not from any personal achievement, unlike the other members: Rida al-Sulh, Salim ‘Ali Salam, and Sulayman al-Bustani. Rida al-Sulh was an Ottoman bureaucrat who was a successful example of Midhat Pasha's reforms. As an Ottoman civil servant, he benefited from these reforms and rose up the bureaucratic ladder to implement some reforms in Jabal ‘Amil in the late 1880s. He was elected to the Ottoman parliament in 1911 and was later implicated in the ‘Aley trials for his suspected role in subverting the state. He was exiled as a result. Salam was a member of the Islamic Maqasid Society and later became mayor of Beirut. He was present at the Arab Conference in Paris in 1913. As an elected representative, Salam's pro-Arab sentiment is evident,

particularly in his lobbying attempts during parliamentary sessions for better education in the Arab provinces.[84] He was also implicated in the ‘Aley trials in 1915. Sulayman al-Bustani was a prominent intellectual who was educated in Beirut and traveled extensively in Iraq, Egypt, and Turkey. Among his contributions is an Arabic translation of Homer’s *Iliad*. He was elected as an independent deputy in 1909 and became minister of trade and industry. His memoirs show his attachment to the Ottoman constitution, as well as his sophisticated political thinking.[85]

Kamil Bey’s interaction with these men of different confessions and political affiliations establishes the presence of an ‘Amili identification that is regional and clan based at this point, not religious-sectarian. He associated with them on an “equal” footing, as part of a revised Ottoman federal system, although the Bey came from a different environment. For a start, his constituency was entirely rural. He was neither an intellectual nor an urban notable in need of establishing himself or negotiating his place in a city such as Beirut. He was “the lord” and as such his presence in parliament guaranteed his loyalty to the empire. Unlike the other members of parliament, he did not present a threat or an irritant to the authorities.

Nevertheless, Kamil Bey’s social status when he became a member of parliament transformed him from a ‘Amil notable to a glorified bureaucrat of the state under the Committee of Union and Progress’s government. Kamil Bey, along with the men of culture of Jabal ‘Amil, saw in the 1908 revolution the potential for a religious and political protection that was more tolerant than the traditional sultanate toward races, sects, peoples, and cultures seeking autonomy and self-preservation.[86]

Despite creating a certain power vacuum in Jabal ‘Amil that enabled others to eventually challenge his political power, Kamil Bey’s position as an Ottoman member of parliament was a source of great pride for Jabal ‘Amil. This was reflected in the *Jabal ‘Amil Newspaper*, a short-lived newspaper of that day, published in 1911–1912, the years that Kamil Bey was in the Ottoman parliament. It is evident from the numerous entries in this newspaper how much value the ‘Amilis put on Kamil Bey’s position as the delegate for Jabal ‘Amil.

In the post-Tanzimat centralized Arab Provinces, Kamil Bey’s position was the closest contact to the center of power for the ‘Amilis. In the general atmosphere of reform and desire for change that gripped intellectuals throughout the Arab provinces, Jabal ‘Amil’s intellectuals were particularly preoccupied with improving Jabal ‘Amil’s lot, and, as such, were hopeful of what Kamil Bey could potentially do, despite

his background as a traditional *iqta'* leader. In a sense he represents the first leader in modern times to whom public demands could be made in a quest for development and equality.

This manner of political expression would dominate 'Amili society for a long time to come. One poem in particular, in the first issue of the *Jabal 'Amil Newspaper*, addressed to Kamil Bey, "*Oh, ye Sent One*," is full of demands for Kamil Bey to lift his people out of the darkness, and hints at the political rhetoric that will follow:

> Oh Chosen One, do you realize what you see?
> A people in their transgression disappearing.
> That slept in a stupidity of ignorance
> The moon's inspiration set down
> Its hope on you because
> You are a benefactor, sent to reform its [people][87]

This burgeoning self-awareness of the need for increased educational opportunity became a vital element in improving the lot of Jabal 'Amil's citizens.

Chapter 2

Jabal 'Amil and the Arab Awakening: Political Culture and Education Prior to the Mandate

Men of Culture

Shaykh Sulayman Dahir, Shaykh Ahmad Rida, and Muhammad Jabir Al Safa were part of Nabatieh's intellectual elite. All three played leading roles in the region's cultural progress. They were often referred to as the 'Amili Trio. Shaykh Ahmad 'Arif al-Zayn, an inhabitant of Saida, was closely associated to this group and was also a leading cultural figure. They were well educated, but not exceptionally so when one compares them to the ulama returning from Najaf. Their elevated status is related more to their political activism and certainly to their links with a Sunni milieu that gave them approval, in addition to their cultural and political activities. These men were also small merchants who primarily dealt with the Saida Sunni bourgeoisie. They were particularly close to the Sulh family, whose lands in Tul, Tamra, and Sharqieh were near Nabatieh, and one can argue that their position in the community can also be attributed to their urban connections. This is evident by the membership of both Sulayman Dahir and Ahmad Rida in the Arab Academy in Damascus. Both men were invited to join the Academy in 1920, at a time when the Faysal government was heavily promoting an Arab kingdom that would include Jabal 'Amil; hence the nomination can be seen as part of a propaganda effort.

The membership of Dahir and Rida was a great source of pride and prestige for them, but it did not necessarily reflect their intellectual

prowess. It demonstrated their secure social and trade relations with those men who carried influence in such milieus as Damascus, the majority of whom were Sunni. It is telling that for his nomination to the Academy, Shaykh Sulayman presented a paper entitled "The Chain of Knowledge between Jabal 'Amil and Damascus," which reveals a profound concern for integrating and exposing the role of Jabal 'Amil to the center, Damascus in this case. Such a preoccupation with approval and recognition would remain constant throughout Shaykh Sulayman's active life. It also indicates a need for the acceptance, integration, and equality that the intellectual world of Jabal 'Amil constantly sought to assert in the face of a larger and more dominant Sunni milieu. The turbulent pre-1918 period attracted Jabal 'Amil intellectuals to a political activism that their Shi'ism had repressed for centuries, as a quick glance at the table of contents of any number of issues published after 1913 in the *al-'Irfan Journal*, the main periodical of Jabal 'Amil, strongly indicates.

These men subscribed to a new formulation of Islamic identity, one based primarily on the cultural civilizational aspect of Islam as opposed to its ritualistic and liturgical dimensions. They were the first in Jabal 'Amil to speak of an Arab nation and of an Arab state; nevertheless, they were latecomers to the early nationalist Arab discourse. While Arab societies were forming as early as 1908, the intellectuals of Jabal 'Amil remained committed to the Sultanate, and it was not until the establishment of a local branch of the al-Arabiyah al-Fatah (Young Arab Society) in 1913 that more 'Amilis flocked toward the new movement unfolding in Damascus.

The intellectuals exerted an immense influence in the recording of the historical events of the early years of post-Ottoman Lebanon. They were the main narrators of their community, and had a monopoly on formulating a narrative, especially for the formative 1918–1920 period. Their contribution, although historiographically valuable, is also problematic as it represents the one major account of that period by Shi'i 'Amili authors and therefore paints a potentially skewed picture of events.[1] The picture they painted is one that is more concerned with marking 'Amili participation in a predominantly Sunni narrative than with the attitudes of the community per se. It is an account that is overinflated with loyalties to Faysal and the Arab cause, and with great opposition to the occupying powers. The reality, however, was actually quite different. One indicator of the general mood in Jabal 'Amil at the end of the war is the petitions presented to the King–Crane commission in Tyre in July 1919, which demanded regional autonomy for Jabal 'Amil, not integration with Syria.

The main characteristic of the intellectuals is that they did not form an independent cohesive group within Jabal ʻAmil. Unlike the ulama, these intellectuals are not an established category in their own right. However remote or powerless a religious scholar may be in this community, he still has a certain association with other ulama, with a larger world, which is by virtue of the fact that his knowledge is recognized among his class. The case of the intellectuals is different. As lettered men, they do not belong to a clearly defined group; nor are they defined in terms of an organic or distinct qualification within society. That they leaned toward the developing Muslim Sunni cultural milieu of the region with its pro-Arab sympathies was therefore unsurprising.

As the Ottoman constitutional experiment failed in the Arab provinces following 1912, the only other avenue available to advance themselves was within an Arab association. In an article in the short-lived *Jabal ʻAmil Newspaper*, the Nabatieh section of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) declared their dissolution:

> Due to the Unionists efforts against Arab nationalism, which is dedicated to its Ottoman-ness, and for their neglect of education in the Arab lands . . . we, of the Committee of Union and Progress present our resignation and withdraw ourselves from it, severing all ties with it.[2]

The " ʻAmiliness" as an identity was not central unless it was in contact with a larger entity that could contain it, such as the Ottoman Empire with its multiple peoples. When this option was no longer feasible, the Arab identity of Jabal ʻAmil preoccupied the minds of the intellectuals in an attempt to redefine their links of association. The problem with such an association is that their commonality as Arabs was also their dividing point.[3] As ʻAmili Arabs they were separated from the dominant urban groups that were products of the Ottoman civil service or of notable landowning Sunni families; societal groups the ʻAmilis did not share. The ʻAmiliness of these intellectuals was therefore a barrier against this potential Arab entity, but the latter was the only option they could embrace in this period of Arab national self-assertion. Their hesitance is evident in some of their by private and published papers;[4] later, it is more evident in their political disinheritance after the Franco-Syrian treaty in 1936. These intellectuals found themselves in an ideological no-man's land in Lebanon.

Nevertheless, as the writings of these men display, the public façade of this turbulent period, 1914–1936, is of an energetic Shiʻi movement fully involved in the Arab cause. The questions put forward by the intellectuals were numerous and complex, beginning with identity

and historical origin, but they approached them as if they were addressing a larger Sunni audience rather than their community. Nevertheless, they set the pace for a communal self-awareness that was previously lacking.

Ahmad Rida (1872–1953) was from Nabatieh, where he attended local religious elementary schools under the tutelage of Sayyid Muhammad Nur al-Din. He then transferred to the new modern Amiriyya School, founded by Rida al-Sulh in 1884.[5] His education was disrupted due to his father's death, and he started again a few years later with Sayyid Muhammad Ibrahim who had recently returned from Najaf. With him, Ahmad Rida studied logic, rhetoric, and philosophy, including Mulla Sadra Shirazi's works. He also studied Arabic literature. In 1891, Sayyid Hasan al-Makki founded the Hamidiyya School (named for Sultan Abdul Hamid) in the Nabatieh region, where Ahmad Rida continued his education along with several others.

Like Sulayman Dahir, Rida published several articles in different journals, most notably in *al-‘Irfan*. Among his early publications are two articles published both in *al-Muqtataf*, in 1903, and in *al-‘Irfan*: "Mitwalis and Shi‘is in Jabal ‘Amil" and "What Is the Nation?" published in 1911.[6] In both articles Rida shows a preoccupation with identity and the place of his community within a political entity. After reviewing the ingredients of a nation, he concludes that unlike the Ottoman nation, which, although problematic, could still be classified as a nation, neither the Arab nor Islamic nations can claim to be such, as they lack all the necessary criteria. The many layers of Rida's identity—an Arab in a state ruled by Turks, a Shi‘i in a Sunni Caliphate with religious ties to Iraq and Iran, a Muslim among other creeds, an ‘Amili hemmed in by a Christian and Sunni environment—are conflicting ingredients.[7] Indeed this tension accompanies Rida, Al Safa, and Dahir well into the time of the Lebanese state, despite their pro-Arab stances with Faysal.

Ahmad Rida also joined the Arab Academy in Damascus, and he published several works, including his *Lexicon of Arabic* commissioned by the Academy in 1930.[8] Politically, like his intellectual counterparts, he changed from being an Ottomanist to supporting union with Syria, and participated in the main events toward that goal until 1936, when, with the Franco-Syrian treaty, this was no longer possible.

Muhammad Jabir Al Safa (1870–1945) was also from Nabatieh and he received an education similar to the other two men.[9] His main literary contribution is a published history of Jabal ‘Amil that is still a main reference work today entitled *The History of Jabal ‘Amil*.[10] He

was heavily involved in the cultural life of the area and participated in the founding of several societies, most notably the Charitable Maqasid Society of Nabatieh based on the larger one established in Saida in 1899.[11] Al Safa followed the political trends of this tumultuous period by supporting the CUP and promoting it in Nabatieh. Like his friends, he became disillusioned with the CUP and later steered toward the secret Arab societies, presumably the al-Thawra al-Arabiyya (The Arab Revolution), which ʻAbd al-Karim al-Khalil was promoting in the area.

Jabir Al Safa was very invested in documenting the role of Jabal ʻAmil in the "Arab Awakening" following World War One and overemphasized the influence of Jabal ʻAmil on the course of the Arab Revolt and vice versa. In *The History of Jabal ʻAmil* he questioned those "who said anything of the sacrifice that Jabal ʻAmil held for the sake of the Arab Cause." He then added,

> No Syrian congress was convened or Arab Nationalist meeting without there being Amilis at the vanguard protesting their situation, demanding union with Syria. Had it not been for the harsh circumstances that were tormenting them and weakening their economy, that sent their sons and the flower of their youth to faraway lands, they would not have accepted a reality [Mandate rule] that contradicted their very nature.[12]

Al Safa was also involved in local commerce and had recognized relationships with both the Sunni and Shiʻi urban classes of Saida.

Shaykh Sulayman Dahir (1873–1960) has been historically the least prominent of the three men, partly because of his discreet political career during the early days of the Mandate and partly because many of his works are unpublished. However, Dahir's social consciousness and political astuteness are well expressed in his journal, and many of his commentaries accurately describe the overall political atmosphere of Jabal ʻAmil at the end of the Ottoman era. In his diary, he candidly records the rise of Faysal as a new power broker and the delicate position of Jabal ʻAmil as a result. One striking feature in his entries during this period is the lack of enthusiasm for, and the cautious attitude that he expresses toward, the changes taking place, though in public he was fervent in his support of Faysal and dedicated many speeches to him at public rallies in Nabatieh.

Shaykh Ahmad Arif al-Zayn (1883–1960) shared a similar background with the ʻAmili Trio, but his base was in Saida, where he played a prominent role in the cultural life of that city in the early part of the century.[13] His education was more in line with Sunni men of

that city: he attended the official government school in Saida and later joined the one founded in Nabatieh. At some point, his father, Shaykh 'Ali al-Zayn, deemed it necessary that he receive a religious education, in the course of which he also read philosophy, logic, and grammar. In 1909 he founded *al-'Irfan*, a journal that was to play a fundamental role in the Shi'i world.

The Status of Learning

In the course of the centuries of Ottoman rule, the status of learning in Jabal 'Amil was determined by two main factors: the socioeconomic isolation of the mountain, and its Shi'i cultural heritage. The rural agrarian character of 'Amili life did not present opportunities that would require an advanced level of learning to pursue. Indeed, the consideration of education could be assessed as a costly absence from manual labor. On the other hand, a tradition of valuing scholarly achievement was deeply entrenched in the Shi'i system of values, stemming in part from an established hierarchization of the ulama that allowed for continuity of religious authority and accumulation of religious learning. Also, the exclusion of the Shi'i learned elite from official functions (judges, public functionaries) directed its focus toward intellectual pursuits, a trend enhanced by the political quietism associated with Twelver Shi'ism.

These two factors exercised their influence in opposite directions, leading to a balance in which the Shi'i ulama assumed the role of custodians of learning on behalf of the community. Support for their endeavors, understood by the community at large as being praiseworthy, came through the tithing tax. The nature of Shi'i religious financial contributions—alms, charity, and the tithing—allowed the development of schools of learning despite the relative lack of expendable resources available to the community.

There were five major schools between the end of the fourteenth to the mid-seventeenth century that produced some of the most illustrious ulama of Jabal 'Amil. The Jezzine school and the Mays school were founded by Shaykh al-Maysi (d. 1526), author of a treatise on jurisprudence. This school in particular was sought by Shi'i scholars from Iraq as well as Syria. It is said that the number of students during this period reached 400. The Karak School in the Bekaa was founded by Shaykh al-Karaki, author of another treatise in jurisprudence. The Nuriyya School in Baalbek is particularly well known for its director, Zayn al-Din bin 'Ali (d. 1786), who also founded the Shaqra School, where scholarship and literature reached their peak in

Jabal ‘Amil.[14] The earliest religious schools in Jabal ‘Amil go back to the fourteenth century. They were the Jezzine School, founded by Muhammad ‘Ali Makki (A.D. 1334–1384) and the Jebaa School founded by Zayn al-Din ‘Ali (A.D. 1505–1558). The predominant school of thought was *Usuli*, which gained ground in Iran in the nineteenth century.[15] Other schools appeared in the region in Mays, ‘Aynata, Nabatieh, and Juwaya, all carrying the name of their founders, until the end of the eighteenth century when the governor of Acre, Ahmad al-Jazzar, launched a military campaign that destroyed a great deal of Jabal ‘Amil, including its schools and libraries.[16]

It is important to note that the notion of school at the time, in Jabal ‘Amil and beyond, was associated more with its central figure, the scholar or shaykh sought by disciples, than with a physical structure. Learning was acquired directly from the scholar through the granting of the right of retransmital, the *ijaza*.[17] It was a personal relationship between teacher and student. “Schools” circulated with the relocation of the religious scholar or his successor (usually his son) to another village.

Prior to 1780, Jabal ‘Amil was under the leadership of Nasif bin Nassar al-Wa‘ili (ancestor of the Assaad family). As a hinterland of the empire, it was relatively isolated from the center, and, similar to other hinterland regions, had a large degree of internal autonomy. Following this period, the region fell under direct control of the province of Acre, which marked the beginning of intellectual decline in the region. There is much in ‘Amili popular lore about this period, especially in poetry. The status of the dead Nassif has been elevated to great heights, as he is considered to have died defending his community. This period of chaos and strife lasted until 1804 and the reign of Sulayman Pasha, when the region regained peace and signs of cultural activity began to reappear. By the end of the nineteenth century, Jabal ‘Amil had a few schools functioning along the same traditions as the old ones, but they were still dependant on the founding Shaykh and often disintegrated following his death.

The closure of one school often led to the opening of another in a different area, creating mobile chains of knowledge throughout the region, but failing to establish any solid continuity. Unlike the shaykhs of the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries who received their education in Jabal ‘Amil and possibly al-Azhar, the students of the mid-nineteenth century were predominantly educated in Najaf, thus carrying with them the cultural and political climate of that city, which was precarious and dependent on events taking place in Iran.[18] Shaykh Hasan Qubaissi founded the Kawthariyya School (near Nabatieh)

around 1820. The curriculum focused on Arabic and Islamic sciences including philosophy and logic. This school in particular taught several illustrious future ulama who in turn founded schools.[19]

One of these was the Jebaa School run by Shaykh Abdullah Ni'mah, a Najaf graduate who became the Shi'i Marja' in the region. His most illustrious students were Sayyid Hasan Yusif Makki, Shaykh Musa Sharara, and Shaykh Abdallah al-Hurr, who were all important ulama in Jabal 'Amil in the late nineteenth century. The movement shifted to Hanaway with the death of Shaykh Abdullah in 1885 and later to Bint Jbail. Among the students was a group that was dominant in this period of study, it included Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin, Shaykh 'Abd al-Husayn Sadiq, and Shaykh Husayn Mughniyya.

These schools "circulated" around the hinterland areas of Jabal 'Amil, but the intellectual circles they triggered had a limited effect on the area, mainly because the most talented students eventually made their way to Najaf. In poorer and more remote villages, the standard of education did not go beyond rudimentary reading and writing. It is said that for lack of resources, the Shaykh would use reed to write with and substitute ground limestone for ink.[20] In spite of the high level of poverty, several families made great sacrifices to send their sons to the holy cities in search of learning.[21]

The founding in 1891 of the Hamidiyya School in Nabatieh, an important market town for Jabal 'Amil, had a more profound effect on the cultural and political activities of that city. It was the last religious school of its kind in Jabal 'Amil, surviving until 1906. Among its students were Sulayman Dahir, Ahmad Rida, Muhammad Jabir Al Safa, Ahmad 'Arif al-Zayn, Muhammad 'Ali al-Humani, renowned poet and founder of *al-'Uruba Journal*, and Husayn Muruwwa, an important philosopher, who later became closely associated with the Communist Parties in Iraq and Lebanon.

In 1882, Rida al-Sulh founded an official Ottoman school in Nabatieh, after he was appointed director of the district of that town as part of the empire-wide modernization attempts. Nabatieh was promoted from a directorate to a district only in 1880, and several institutions—financial, judicial, cadastral, and the police—had to be established in addition to this school. Based on a modern system of education, with teachers brought in from Beirut and Tripoli, it marked a change in curriculum from the traditional Jabal 'Amil religious schools that focused primarily on grammar, logic, and exegesis. Although this school survived only until 1891, it left its mark on a number of students, including the 'Amili Trio, among others. One can argue that their formation in this school, in addition to strengthening

their ties to the Sulh family as is shown later, also exposed them to a more accessible Ottoman world, whether through their teachers or the subjects they studied, such as Turkish.[22]

One of the reasons for founding these schools was to create a corps of bureaucrats and military to perpetuate loyalty to the empire, which they succeeded in doing until World War One. Furthermore, the importance of Nabatieh as a market town, linking the hinterland to the coast, permitted the emergence of an educated bourgeoisie in Jabal 'Amil that had a significant role in cultural and political life. The founding of this school also marks the shift in influence and power from southern Jabal 'Amil, Bilad Bisharra, to the north, nearer to the coastal towns and Beirut. This also demonstrates the waning power of the traditional leadership clan in Nabatieh, the Sa'bis (of whom the Fadl family feature in the period of this study), who could no longer dictate economic or social terms.

In effect, the new official schools disrupted the evolution of the local Shi'i tradition of learning. The modern school system, both through its founders and teachers, reoriented its pupils toward Sunni urban ideals. The impact of such a school for the 'Amilis signified a departure from their historical Shi'i autonomy in education, with all the specifities that that entailed, abdicating it to other players, in Najaf and the urban Sunni institutions.[23]

The outcome of this new form of education was to produce a group of people whose Shi'i identity was diluted in a growing institutionalized civic environment that was removed and external to Jabal 'Amil. Its attention was directed toward Saida and Beirut. The community's ability to develop its own educational structures was not to come for some time.

The Impact of the Great War

The situation in Jabal 'Amil in the last months of the war, until Faysal's arrival in October 1918, was of general confusion and poor security. Bureaucratic abuse was rampant among some notables as well as the district administrators of several posts, notably at the expense of peasants. A striking example of this, as recorded by Shaykh Sulayman, took place in the village of Ansar, near Sarafand, where the appraisal commissioner estimated the harvest tax at 300 gold pounds with the option of giving a 20 percent discount to a particular notable if he guaranteed payment.

The nineteenth century witnessed the disappearance of the feudalistic agrarian regime.[24] This resulted in a more direct involvement of

the Ottoman fiscal authorities in the tax collection process. Estimating taxes was often a negotiation between the tax collector and the tax contractor, *multazim*. The interest of the former was, in principle, to present the Ottoman fiscal authorities with as complete a tax collection as possible, and that of the *multazim* was to lower the tax burden on himself. The ability of the state to enforce the collection was naturally reduced in times of war, allowing for potential abuse. Dahir expresses suspicion about an overestimation of the tax burden as well as about who benefited from the offered discount. Dahir implies that the tax assessment was unfair, probably due to the difficult circumstances of the war. This high assessment, together with the offered discount, raised suspicion about a deal struck between the tax collector and the *multazim*, with the tax collector being "rewarded" for his appraisal and discount and the *multazim* being made liable only to the 80 percent fraction although collecting the full amount from the peasants. Several of these cases are noted in Shaykh Sulayman's journal, followed by his lamentations on the miserable state of affairs and a poignant critique of the country's leading men.[25]

A further illustration is that of the district administrator of Saida, Sadiq Bey al-Maghribi, who went to Nabatieh in early June 1918 to meet with his counterparts from Marjayoun and Jezzine in order to deal with the increasing number of bandits in the region. His other objectives, according to the Shaykh, were to obtain provisions to supply Beirut and, more importantly, to get a personal loan from the inhabitants of Nabatieh. The Shaykh writes, "He summoned some people to contribute to this loan of 1000 pounds. Those who refused to pay were taken to jail." A day later, the entry states,

> *The district administrator* is still here, threatening those who don't pay for his loan with prison and exile. What is strange about these days is how shameless the district administrator is to demand this money and the 300 pounds from Ansar where Yusuf Bey al-Zayn is *multazim* of their land. This is strange and shameful and would not have happened in Hamidian times, despite it being called an era of decay and authoritarianism. This is the result of war: corrupt government.[26]

The Shaykh's journal frequently deals with other military issues also. It regularly lists army defectors hiding in smaller villages, often in very poor conditions. It also records news of British advances south from Palestine, though Dahir refers to them as "the enemy," surprisingly, given that they were in support of the Arab Revolt. He also notes the British siege of Nablus in late June 1918, as well as news of the Sharif

of Mecca rallying support among his people. What is striking here is Dahir’s acceptance of the Sharifian movement as completely separate from any British linkage. Even more striking is the complete absence of any reference to the French at any point before the end of the war.

In another entry, Dahir’s account of Sultan Mohammad Reshad’s death in July 1918 and his entrenched notion of loyalty to the Sultan is somewhat touching. The Shaykh writes that the Sultan had a difficult life, first as his brother’s prisoner in the palace and then with several wars breaking out while he was on the throne, including World War One. Apparently, both the Sultan’s death and his son’s succession were commemorated in Nabatieh. Local administrative corruption, especially the extortionate *iltizam* taxes, was somehow seen as independent of that sacred figure enthroned in Istanbul.

Dahir’s journal details the precarious security situation of the time that pervaded the region around Lake Hula area, forming a large triangle between southwestern Jabal ‘Amil, in the Bint Jbail region, Hawran in Syria, and Hula in northeast Palestine, which was a hotbed of tribal feuding. As a result there was an increase in the number of bands, looters, and thugs. The correlation between army defectors and these men is unclear, but the Shaykh alludes to this when he describes some of the thefts that took place in market towns, such as al-Khiam, where soldiers were sighted stealing. In fact, the entire dynamic between these bands and the partisans of tribal shaykhs and notables, such as Kamil Bey, is too tangled and elaborate and confuses the lines between the abuse of power by the local leadership, lack of food, and feudal conflict over spheres of geographic influence. The diary is full of references to the poor state of public safety on the roads, which were ruled by bands of thugs. This is a particularly important detail, given that most accounts only refer to this trend in 1920, after the arrival of the French, thereby conjuring a nationalist dimension to the bands’ existence.

Sulayman Dahir’s attitude toward the leadership of the Jabal ‘Amil is troubled but loyal. Throughout the journal, he recounts many incidents of a socially disturbing nature that fall under the leadership’s sphere of influence. These not only reveal a deep social consciousness on his part, but more importantly, they also demonstrate the incompetence of such leaders who were not fit to lead:

> Due to the economic hardship of the war [from as far as sparse food supplies and bureaucratic/social abuse of power], a female servant of Kamil Bey al-Assaad went to al-Khalsa begging for money as was the custom in these days (or to offer her services) and the Khalisi men took

> her and tied her naked on the threshing floor like they tied cows and raped her. It is said that the blood she shed was heart wrenching. Look at the result of the politics of the Beys and the level of humiliation our people have reached. However, what is the solution when all the reasons we are given are but excuses for lack of astuteness and inefficiency. They do not care for their honor or their homeland . . . what happened to the woman was with the knowledge of the conceited Husayn al-Yusif. May God give him and his children what they deserve of hell's resources and remove him from the community that has become without protector or leader.[27]

The references to the local leadership as ill-qualified and apathetic are many. On another occasion, Shaykh Sulayman, with several other Nabatieh notables, pays a visit to Kamil Bey in his home in al-Taibeh. One gets the impression that he did not particularly like the Bey. In one round of discussions, when the company was bemoaning the abuse of the Golan tribes toward the Shi'is, decline in leadership surfaces as the main theme of the discussion. Again, the Shaykh bemoans the fate of the community:

> [T]he community lost its fierce men, because it lost men of opinion, direction, protection and courage. al-Kamil [in reference to Kamil Bey, but it also means "the complete"] was only a participant in this discussion as if he wasn't aware of his position or the responsibility he carried. This is typical of our leaders, to distance themselves from responsibility and blame.[28]

Despite this critical appraisal of the leadership by Dahir, there is also a sense of loyalty, or at least an acquiescent attitude to this leadership: there is no questioning of its legitimacy, only a critique of its inefficiency. The Shaykh does not ponder on alternative forms of governance, nor does he question the social position of the beys. In a specific example, we see his reaction to an incident in early June 1918, when an Ottoman government official visiting from Saida overstepped the bounds of appropriate behavior by insulting Kamil Bey in his home in al-Taibeh for no justifiable reason. This event preoccupied the Shaykh sufficiently for him to dedicate several lengthy entries to the story. In outrage, Kamil Bey took the case to the highest authorities in Beirut to demand an apology from this man and his removal from office. This, Shaykh Sulayman informs us, was done swiftly, for the government could not tolerate an official disgracing Kamil Bey in this fashion and rightly so, the Shaykh adds, for he is after all the leader of Jabal 'Amil.[29]

The Famine

The impact of World War One on Jabal 'Amil was as terrible as it was in other parts of the region, though there are far more documented accounts of its effects on Mount Lebanon, and the famine that people suffered because of a combination of limited agricultural production and lack of produce in the market. The *Safarbarlik*, the enforced and lengthy conscription by the Ottoman army, remains in the historical memory until today. Hygiene and sanitation were deplorable, and there were outbreaks of diseases such as cholera and spotted fever. Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin confirms this in his autobiography. He writes that in his small village of Shaqra, 12 people died of cholera in a few hours.[30] The dire state of the Turkish armies in Syria has been well discussed: the level of desertion and misery the soldiers faced, as well as the destruction of the habitat for the sake of the soldiers' survival.[31] The war in Lebanon was known to be particularly harrowing in terms of famine and disease.[32]

The devastation of this period remains firmly entrenched in the collective memory of the Lebanese. By the end of 1918, around 500,000 people had died of hunger in all of Syria.[33] The decline in the availability of grain in the coastal towns of Lebanon has been recognized due to the naval blockade imposed in 1915 by the Allied powers. Although there is no specific reference to the South Lebanon region, the fact that it included cities and towns on the coast as well as the hinterland suggests that the population did not escape the misery of famine, as confirmed by Dahir.

One would assume that the hinterland, near the grain-producing Hawran, would be less affected by the shortage in grain supply. However, reports in Sulayman Dahir's journal reveal that interregional/tribal relations with the Druze were extremely strained, and this understandably affected the food supply.[34] The authors of *The Province of Beirut*, ca. 1914, describe Nabatieh as an important trading post for Marjayoun, Safad, Hasbaya, and Saida, where over 150 merchants dealt with grain and cloth. Their figure on grain production, they say, is uncertain, but the region produced at least four months' supply. In their opinion, the problem was the high number of dishonest merchants and commission makers working for Beirut.[35] The shortage in grain, whether caused by natural conditions (such as locusts) or Ottoman army raids, would normally have been substituted by supplies from the Hawran, but these were siphoned directly to Beirut and Mount Lebanon, at this time.

During the famine, rural areas were even more affected than urban areas. Rural areas did not get the sufficient focus that the cities and

coastal areas received. They were also additionally burdened by the fact that they were completely deprived of any grain until the end of the war.[36]

Sulayman Dahir did blame the military authority for causing the famine. His opinion was that had the military authority left the trade of food free, and had it been satisfied with supplying the army with what was necessary, the food scarcity would not have occurred. In addition, when a major locust attack took place in 1915, it would not have had such a devastating impact. He argued that the confiscation of food crops was a permanent practice throughout the war years, and thus reduced the incentive for farmers to plant, since they could not have access to their produce. He also wrote that “the confiscation mechanism installed by the military government permitted so much abuse; it created merchants who traded in the lives of the army and people who profited from this.”[37]

There were two cases in particular that had a deep resonance as far as the dire food situation is concerned and Sulayman Dahir notes that both were investigated by the government. One case was near Damour where four children from a single family had disappeared. The police were informed and they started searching the town when they came to a poor man’s house that smelled of cooking meat. In it they discovered four severed heads in a cupboard and the cooked remains. Another incident was of a woman in Jarjou’, in the Nabatieh region, who also killed several children for food.

More poignant is Dahir’s diary entry of December 18, 1918 when he was in Beirut with Shaykh Ahmad Arif al-Zayn on the invitation of Riad al-Sulh, meeting with dignitaries such as Bishara al-Khuri, Labib and Iskandar Riyashi, Rafiq Tamimi, and Riad al-Sulh. In an exchange of poems between the Shaykh and Bishara al-Khuri during lunch, the Shaykh recounts in his diary a moving poem about the war recited by al-Khuri. The poem entitled “The Forged Riyal,” is the story of a starving woman with a very sick daughter. In desperation, the mother decides to sell her body to feed her daughter. In return she is paid a fake silver coin with which she tries to buy some things, but the shopkeeper tells her that her money is counterfeit. The poem ends with the woman collapsing on the floor from the pain of her miserable condition.[38]

Although not directly related to Jabal ‘Amil, the chronicle of the priest Antun Yammin al-Khury gives an extremely detailed picture of the horrors of the war, including famine, disease, cannibalism, social deterioration, and so forth. Most notably, he does not follow the typical pattern of laying the blame on the Ottomans alone, but rather on the rich Lebanese, the moneylenders of Beirut, who became

"merchants of souls."[39] In his account, 100,000 people perished of hunger and disease in Mount Lebanon. Jabal 'Amil experienced similar conditions of shortages and agricultural devastation resulting from locusts. It can be assumed therefore that a comparable number of people perished in Jabal 'Amil. While the population of Mount Lebanon was larger than that of Jabal 'Amil, the latter was poorer and was, according to anecdotal evidence, more vulnerable to the effects of the affliction.[40]

Conscription

The suffering of the 'Amilis was compounded by the repression exerted by the Ottoman authorities in their effort to conscript able men. In his biographical dictionary, *History of the Sharaf al-Din Family*,[41] Sayyid 'Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din writes passionately about the *Safarbarlik*, of the brutality of Jamal Pasha in conscripting men of all classes and backgrounds, as well as giving authority to low-ranking military officials to kill whomever was suspected of escaping. He also writes that the financial burden on Jabal 'Amil was intolerable and created a famine. Jamal Pasha, he says:

> decided to collect money in the name of taxes, contributions and aid through blackmail, theft and robbery . . . He threw the region into a state of unbearable famine throughout the lands of 'Amil, blocking *miri* revenue which led to dramatic price inflation. The poor did not eat, so that you saw them starving and stark-eyed as they died. The dead were everywhere, in the houses, streets and wilderness.[42]

Sulayman Dahir also confirms the abuse of local authority throughout the land: "the authority Jamal Pasha gave to his gendarme was so excessive that they publicly executed all those accused of desertion in Tyre, Nabatieh and Bint Jbail. They also killed those unfortunates who had no ransom money to pay, so that every gendarme became another Jamal Pasha in the village."[43] In addition, the locust outbreak obliterated the crops, which resulted in a spotted fever epidemic that claimed many lives.

Most distressing for Sharaf al-Din was the discrimination of the Ottoman government toward the Shi'i religious class, who were forced into conscription. This was not the case with religious men of other sects, whether Sunni, Christian, or Jewish, who were registered, salaried, and had a mandate from the government. As the Shi'i were not recognized as a separate group, this did not apply to them, so the Sayyid

bemoaned the financial deprivation they faced, especially when compared with other groups. Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin reports of his experience of going to Saida to get his exemption certificate as an imam and having to pay a bribe of four *majidis*.[44] Shaykh Sulayman also mentions that a delegation of ulama appealed to the Wali of Beirut, Abi Bakr Hazim Bey, who granted them exemption from service, given they were *imams* and muezzins. This was agreed to, on condition that these men passed a religious exam set by the government to prove qualifications.[45]

Clearly, sufficient grievances were present in Jabal 'Amil against the CUP government to envisage the possibility of change. In the context of the war, and the involvement of international players such as Britain, the pro-Arab parties saw a window of opportunity to bring about change. Much has been written about the Arab Revolt but the 'Amili involvement in this chapter of history is best viewed through the trials at 'Aley. This incident, at least, confirms Jabir al-Safa's claim to 'Amili demands of union with Syria.[46]

The 'Aley Trials

The 'Aley trials of 1915, presided over by the minister of war and Jamal Pasha, head of the Turkish Fourth army, in which a number of political figures were accused of undermining the state, were an event of particular significance in Jabal 'Amil's recent history. The trials brought to light both shifting internal political dynamics (Kamil Bey and the *wujaha*') as well as the beginnings of the integration of the 'Amili wujaha into the proto-Lebanese political society.

Arab historians[47] of the period have written a good deal on the 'Aley trials of 1915 and Jamal Pasha's harshness, and have characterized the trials as the point of no return in the breakdown of Arab–Ottoman relations.[48]

The circumstances that led to the 'Aley trials need to be considered within the larger context of the Ottoman war effort. The devastating effects of the war were felt throughout Syria. The challenge of Sharif Husayn of Mecca, his refusal to accept the Ottoman call to war as a *jihad*, as well as Jamal Pasha's failed campaign in Egypt contributed to the anxious atmosphere that developed in Greater Syria. The rapid spread of Arab societies, albeit secret, was a further cause of concern for Jamal Pasha. The rise of the Arab societies began after the Constitutional Revolution of 1908; efforts to quash them were unsuccessful, but forced them to go underground. Part of Jamal Pasha's aim in the early days of the war was to mobilize the Muslims under his control to fight the Great War for Islam.[49]

Among those that Jamal Pasha tried to win over was 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil, leader of the Jam'iyat al-Thawra al-Arabiyya (Society for Arab Revolution). Although he would later order his death on charges of treason, Jamal Pasha wrote in his memoirs that he agreed with several of the demands presented by the Arab societies, such as permitting the use of Arabic as an official language and awarding the Arabs certain administrative rights. He therefore met 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil on that basis and cultivated a friendship with him.[50] He wrote, "I wanted to participate in the festivities in Baalbek in order to show how much confidence I had in 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil as the organizer, to enhance his position among his Shi'is."[51] Jamal Pasha's tone of writing and his efforts to justify his decisions at the trial all reflect the sense of betrayal he felt by Khalil, whom he trusted, in plotting to revolt against his government.

Jabir Al Safa credited the Ottoman state with losing people's support during the war because of the harsh measures it implemented regarding conscription.[52] This, in his opinion, is one of the main reasons why the Arab movement gained ground. According to Ahmad Rida's account of his imprisonment at 'Aley, 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil came to Jabal 'Amil in October 1914 to cement the ties he had with pro-Arab sympathizers, such as Rida al-Sulh, his son Riad al-Sulh, Hajj Abdallah Yahya, Hajj Isma'il al-Khalil, Ahmad 'Arif al-Zayn, Rashid 'Usayran, Shaykh Munir 'Usayran, and the "Nabatieh Trio," among others. He held most of his meetings in Saida, to organize and plot against the CUP. His supporters were primarily urbanites, *wujaha*' and intellectuals, who also represented a threat to Kamil Bey al-Assaad's power.

'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil was a Shi'i Muslim with roots in Jabal'Amil. He differed from the 'Amilis in that his family was living in Burj al-Barajneh, an area that belonged to the *mutasarrifiyya*, on the border with the Port of Beirut. His early education and experiences took place in Beirut and were similar to that of many middle-class Sunni men in that city, whereas his later social connections in Beirut, Damascus, and Istanbul would far surpass that of any other 'Amili notable or intellectual.

Following his education at the renowned Shaykh Abbas al-Azhari's school in Beirut, where he learned Turkish, 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil went to Istanbul. There, he earned a degree in law in 1910 and also graduated from the Mülkiye School around the same time. It is during this stay in Istanbul that he became involved with the Society for Arab Brotherhood (before it was closed down by the CUP) and formed a secret Arab society in 1909, the Qahtaniyya Society. He also founded

an open society, the Arab Club, that had a more cultural and literary orientation.

It is important to note that at this point none of these societies were secessionist. While they called for decentralization and discussed nationalist ideas, they still positioned themselves within the Ottoman entity. Al-Khalil also attended the First Arab Congress in Paris in June 1913, and reaffirmed the Arab desire for full political rights and a part in the general administration of the empire, where they saw themselves as a sizable majority.[53] Among the Lebanese figures he met there were Salim ‘Ali Salam, Pedro Trad, Ahmad Tabara, Iskandar Amun, and Ahmad Bayhum.[54] The CUP reacted to the congress by being welcoming at first, but soon appeared to be unyielding on several issues. This apparent impasse led the Arab members, having assessed that open dialogue was futile, to work on a hidden agenda, developed into a plot to rebel. The result was that members, such as ‘Abd al-Karim al-Khalil, pursued cordial relations with the authorities, while secretly recruiting supporters for their cause.

The reason behind the arrest of the ‘Amili group in ‘Aley was Kamil Bey’s decision to denounce them to Jamal Pasha. This is rooted in the traditional pro-Ottoman leadership and Kamil Bey’s power struggle with the emerging pro-Arab urban pole represented by Rida al-Sulh. The established version is that Kamil Bey heard of ‘Abd al-Karim al-Khalil’s meetings in Saida and decided to inform Jamal Pasha. As we see later, the details of how Kamil Bey found out about these secret meetings is a reflection on the competing family dynamics of Saida in particular, and Jabal ‘Amil as a whole.

Misbah al-Bizri was Saida’s mayor in 1914. His main opponent in vying for this position was Muhammad Zantout, who was also pro–‘Abd al-Karim al-Khalil. Zantout was promised support for his bid for the mayorship by high authorities in the Beirut Vilayet, namely ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Ingilizi. Feeling threatened by these developments, Misbah al-Bizri used his knowledge of al-Khalil’s activities in Saida to report them to the district administrator in Saida triggering an official inquiry that undermined Zantout’s candidacy, as he was associated with al-Khalil.

According to Ahmad Rida’s account,[55] Kamil Bey’s discovery of al-Khalil’s work led him directly to the army’s mufti. In his memoirs, Jamal Pasha wrote that Shaykh Assaad al-Shuqairi came to him with news from Kamil Bey that there were signs of revolt in Syria. Kamil Bey was immediately summoned to see Jamal Pasha in Jerusalem and told him, “Sir, you have placed great trust in the reformists and you have given them absolute freedom in the country, but I fear that they

have misused this trust because at this moment Rida Bey al-Sulh, former MP, and ʿAbd al-Karim al-Khalil are organizing a group [against you] in the regions of Saida and Tyre."[56]

This meeting in May 1915 effectively led to the ʿAley trials. The importance of these trials is the platform it created as a meeting ground for the anti-Ottoman, pro-Arab political players. It was the first time that the popular political leadership and the intellectuals were unified in a political situation with Christians of the Marjayoun area, Sunnis of the Lebanese littoral, and Syrians of the interior.

Furthermore, the relationship of these intellectuals to the ʿAmili political leadership was cemented at the ʿAley trials of 1915, where several men were tried and executed for their anti-CUP Arab politics. It was at these trials, held by Jamal Pasha, that all these groups were united as anti-Turkish Arabs within a geographic space that would become Lebanon. One therefore sees that the development of a loose Lebanese association (since members of the major communities were present), or at least a vague political disassociation from the Ottoman Caliphate, included the ʿAmilis before 1920.

The outcome of this trial was the sentencing of ʿAbd al-Karim al-Khalil to death and the exiling of Rida al-Sulh. How much sectarian and personal motives were behind these different sentences is unknown. However, as far as the pro-Arab ʿAmili community is concerned, the fact that one of them died for the Arab cause gave them a stronger sense of legitimacy. It was their contribution, and it was befitting of their historical legacy as Shiʿis that it was through martyrdom that this was achieved. "The Martyr" ʿAbd al-Karim al-Khalil became yet another symbol, a confirmation of their sense of injustice, and gave them more cause to identify with the larger Arab movement.

Shaykh Sulayman Dahir mourned the death of ʿAbd al-Karim al-Khalil, executed by Jamal Pasha, at ʿAley on August 21, 1915, with the stanzas that follow. ʿAbd al-Karim al-Khalil's death elevated the Arab cause to a more sacred level. It gave them a martyr and a focal point for realizing their mission. It represented the climax of the Arabist movement in Lebanon, or, more accurately, Vilayet Beirut, at this time. The people Dahir refers to in this poem are the Arab nation who were crying out against the repression of the CUP and seeking their own future:

> Neither my killing nor my crucifixion did I heed
> If my death were to revive my people
> And death is tastier than the breeze of youth
> Whose enamored heart is primed

No person reaches that elevated meadow
if he doesn't pass through the thorny peak
My favorite thirst is my nation's quenching
And its preying is sweetest in my hunger.[57]

What is significant about this poem is that the author and subject were both from a minority that was marginalized politically and socially from both Ottoman and mainstream Arab circles. They were also a political minority within their own community in that they adhered to proto-Arab nationalist sentiments. At the same time, because al-Khalil's political vision was broader than the simply local, as one of the first martyrs in the fight against Turkey, his legacy transcends religious affiliation, and as such he belongs to the Arab cause. As for the more local dimension, al-Khalil's friendship with Rida al-Sulh and their political networks were seen as serious threats by Kamil al-Assaad. He denounced al-Khalil because he wanted to break down the new alliance that brought the second tier of notables to the limelight, especially Rida al-Sulh.

The thoroughness of the list of detainees ordered held by Jamal Pasha is a testimony to the surveillance and control exercised by the Ottoman authorities as well as evidence of the significant political presence of the *wujaha*' of Saida and Jabal 'Amil. The roster of families thus represented in Aley reads as a "who's who" of the future Lebanese political and social elite. In his memoirs written during his 'Aley imprisonment, Jabir Al Safar mentions the Shi'i families Zayn, 'Usayran, Khalil, Bazzi, Haj Hasan, and the Sunni families Sulh, Jawhari, Bizri, Zantout, Majdhub, Shatila, and Qutub, all of whom came out of urban or semi-urban centers around the littoral or with links to the coast in Saida, Tyre, Nabatieh, and Bint Jbail.[58]

The experience of the 'Aley trials for all those present would be carried into 1918 and their participation in the Arab Revolt, and would serve as a major component of a future common Lebanese patriotic narrative.

A Snapshot of 'Amili Culture: Sulayman Dahir's Journal

The general war continued, as if the four years that passed were just the beginning, in which the fire only increased in intensity. A page of humanity has been turned. In this age, where people boast about the sophisticated level of humanity and civility, it seems that the exact opposite is taking place. Even in the primitive and barbaric ages, people

> have not shown themselves to be as horrific as they are now . . . We are not looking for the effects of this grinding war in distant lands, isolated from us, since these are only predictions and assumptions that misguide the historian. Rather, we are talking about what we witness in our land, whose lot it was to receive nine-tenths of the wretchedness of this war, leaving the other tenth of misery to the rest . . .[59]

These are the opening lines of Shaykh Sulayman Dahir's diary, written in late May 1918. This unpublished diary, entitled "Diary of an 'Amili," is an intimate account of a crumbling provincial world subjected to the anarchy of a perplexing and alien war. It is particularly valuable in that it mirrors the course of events between May 1918 and December 1922.

Born in 1873 in Nabatieh, a hinterland market town in Jabal 'Amil, Shaykh Sulayman Dahir belonged to a generation of men who were caught at the edge of two worlds, unable to reconcile with, or forget, either. He grew up among a community that was politically isolated, yet geographically integrated into the larger realm of an Ottoman province, Vilayet Beirut, with a Mediterranean coastline and a Syrian hinterland. This actuality was the dominant factor in the lives of Jabal Amil's inhabitants and the tension between politics and geography, knowledge and poverty, power and wealth was to enframe the lives of this region and its people for a century to come.

Sulayman Dahir received a traditional Shi'i education for a middle-class man of his time. He attended local elementary religious schools in Nabatieh and then the more renowned religious schools in the area, under the tutelage of some Shaykhs who were disseminating knowledge they had acquired in Najaf. At the core of this education is the unshakable awareness of a distinct Shi'i religious identity. The culture he was exposed to was a Shi'i one, which was quite different from the official Sunni religious and educational milieu, whose domination was an official characteristic of the Ottoman state. Among the subjects that he was taught was the *usuli* jurisprudence literature of Shaykh Murtada al-Ansari, which had triggered an entire intellectual movement in Najaf and Qum earlier in the nineteenth century.[60]

Yet, in spite of this separation, Dahir's world was ideologically linked to the Caliphate and its legitimacy, and his intellectual and political development needs to be considered within a context of tension between opposition and affinity to the Ottoman state. Part of his formation was reading and contributing to several important Arabic journals of this period, such as *al-Muqtataf*, *al-Hilal*, and *al-Manar*. The ongoing discourses of the day, the struggle with modernity and

attempts to define it, influenced the Shaykh as his early articles in *al-'Irfan* indicate.[61] In his eclectic collection of published and unpublished works, it is clear that Shaykh Sulayman engaged in a universal and inclusive world vision that was preoccupied with change and progress.

Diary MSS starts toward the end of World War One, in May 1917, when the outcome of the war was tilting in favor of the allied powers after America's entry. To Sulayman Dahir, little of this is recognized. He describes a world where the very foundations of his society are challenged by this war through the harsh conscription laws imposed by the Ottomans, the precarious and failing economy, the lack of food, and the absence of local security.[62] The diary is a persistent attempt at capturing the destructive impact of the Great War on the lives of people. What remains fixed in the Shaykh's diary are his daily references to the weather and the price of food in each entry that guide the reader throughout.

Although his writing style is typical of the impersonal journal-keeping genre, it is particularly insightful in its candidness. The Shaykh was concerned with depicting his environment as it was in the nature of things. The most striking point is the absence of a self-definition; he never refers to himself or the community as "Shi'i." It is just "the community," whether in praise or attack. The landscape he describes is claustrophobic and isolated because of the impact of the war on movement. There is frustration in being confined to Nabatieh (where he lived during the war), and a yearning for external contact, so that a trip to Saida takes great importance.

The trip in question, to attend the funeral of a Saida notable of the 'Usayran family, permitted several days of social interaction with outsiders from Beirut, Damascus, and other communities, which the Shaykh relished. He writes on June 9 and 10, 1918:

> Today, we traveled to Saida to give our condolences to al-'Usayran. We arrived in Saida at 10 where we first headed to the deceased's grave. There we saw the departed's relatives, among them Shaykh Muhyi al-Din 'Usayran and Shaykh Munir 'Usayran. We had dinner at the departed's home and slept at Hajj Hasan 'Usayran's house . . . We met the Doctor Zahar, Yusuf Effendi Dia' and Muhammad Bey Shihhadah . . . Our dinner was again at the deceased's houses, with us were Mr. Muhammad Ibrahim and Shaykh 'Ali Halawi and 'Abd al-Karim Quwwatli, one of Beirut's notables . . . Today we met Rashid Bey 'Usayran and his brother Kamil Effendi in their house in al-Harah. It is a house situated on one of the most beautiful spots, overlooking

> glorious sights from all four corners . . . Our dinner was at Rashid Bey's house, we also met with Nasib Bey Junblat and some of his relatives came to give condolence.[63]

The subjection of the region to financial hardship is indicated by a subtle pleasure at being lodged and fed during this funeral. It also reveals that even at this advanced stage of the war, a port city such as Saida was not suffering to the same extent as the hinterland and further south. Furthermore, the Shi'i notables of that city did not seem to be as affected economically as the traditional leader Kamil Bey al-Assaad. On several meetings with him, Shaykh Sulayman notes Kamil Bey's complaints of poor harvest and insufficient funds due to the closure of markets in Hula and northern Palestine.[64]

Besides the shortage of some grains, such as barley, which caused frequent price oscillation, Dahir's diary suggests that there was an established mechanism of price speculation that originated in Beirut and affected the coastal region. Dahir's reference to fluctuating market prices indicates a rapid communication network between Beirut and the entire coast. It is interesting to note that he rarely refers to other markets outside the Lebanese coast, either in the Syrian hinterland or the cities of northern Palestine. The impression he gives is that the impact of the Beirut and Tripoli markets was greater on the coast than on the Syrian hinterland. To an extent, this dynamic suggests a certain degree of economic cohesion along the southern Syrian coast.

The Shaykh writes that there was greater availability of goods in Beirut and Saida than in Nabatieh and the smaller towns in the south. Part of the drain on goods in Jabal 'Amil during the Great War, despite it being a grain-producing region, was a result of the fact that, unlike Mount Lebanon where the terrain was more impenetrable, the Ottoman army had easy access to these harvests. In fact there is still a term extant in Jabal 'Amil that refers to the Ottoman confiscation of food, *balsa*, which roughly translates as "extortion." The impression from the Shaykh's journal is that Jabal 'Amil's suffering during World War One was as great if not greater than Mount Lebanon's, which could rely on the support from an immigrant community and the financial capital of the Maronite Church. One possibility is that Mount Lebanon did not have the same shortage of men due to the *Safarbarlik*. Although the issue had not been completely resolved, indications point to the fact that the population of Mount Lebanon was not conscripted.[65] This was not the case in the Beirut Vilayet, which suggests that it was an aggravating factor for Jabal 'Amil in comparison with Mount Lebanon.

According to the Shaykh’s journal entries, the rate of inflation and lack of produce were striking:

> The price of clothing has escalated so much that some people cannot cover themselves. We have begun to see the man of today—despite the refinement of this age—reflecting to us a simplicity and naïveté such as the prehistoric man when he covered himself with leaves. Animals, for consumption and labor, have become so expensive that people do not eat meat anymore and they walk everywhere. A cow that was sold for 350 piastres before the war is now worth 1500 or 2000. A sheep is sold for 230 when it was previously worth 50–70 piastres. The same applies for goats . . . One of the wonders of these days is the absence of chicken, and the prohibitive price of eggs.[66]

Such references are present throughout the remaining war period, to the extent that a price chart can easily be constructed from the density of price information. Besides the fact that it reflects a personal preoccupation of the Shaykh’s, revealing his economic hardship, it also demonstrates the level of suffering that people endured, which could and would affect their allegiances in later times of peace.

Dahir’s diary has significance far wider than personal expression. On the one hand, his diary provides a unique window to a place and time otherwise ignored in the contemporary literature (Jabal ‘Amil in the last days of the Ottoman Empire). In addition, as Dahir was one of the leading intellectuals, the diary also provides an important insight into the mindset of this segment of ‘Amili society.

Chapter 3

Turmoil and New Order: Jabal ʻAmil in 1920

Faysal and the Arab Revolt

Against the backdrop of the Great War, amidst the rising Turco-centric currents that had taken hold of the bureaucratic elite of the Ottoman state, the British forged an alliance with the Sharif of Mecca and an "Arab Revolt" was declared against the Ottoman forces. This was supported by the British and was in itself in support of the Allied offensive on the Ottoman provinces. The momentum of the revolt benefited both from the existence of a proto-nationalist discourse in the area, building upon the literary and cultural revival of the *Nahda*, and from the repressive actions taken by the Ottoman authorities in the time of war.[1]

The leadership of this movement was assumed by the son of Sharif Husayn, Faysal, who through his communications with the British felt that he had secured the promise of a postwar Arab kingdom extending over the Arabic-speaking province of "Turkey in Asia." The hopes of the supporters of the Arab Revolt were fulfilled in part with the establishment of the Arab government in Damascus. However this was a short-lived experience,[2] with the French claiming their due according to the Sykes–Picot agreements. As a result, Faysal's consolidation of power was thwarted, and a new order, later to be sanctioned as a mandate by the League of Nations, was put into effect.

In the first week of October 1918, British troops of the XXI Corps advanced northward along the coast from Jaffa passing through Tyre and Saida, which were taken without opposition, and arriving at Beirut on October 8, 1918. The British archives do not include

communication from these forces while passing through Jabal 'Amil probably due to the brevity and uneventful character of their stay in this region. The absence of reference to the passage of these troops in Dahir's *Diary MSS* is a further confirmation of this.[3] The impression one gets from Dahir's diary was that Jabal 'Amil, together with the rest of the areas that were to become Grand Liban, were handed to the French without much fanfare.[4] In contrast with the intense emotions surrounding the prospect of Faysal's Arab kingdom, the installation of the French administration surprisingly took place with little upheaval.

Faysal's story in Syria forms part of a turbulent episode in Jabal 'Amil's history, and although the region was peripheral to the Damascus government, the outcome of the Arab Revolt is central to 'Amili history, the impact of Faysal on Jabal 'Amil, as well as the repercussions of the 'Amili political reactions for their Jabal.

The immediate reaction of the 'Amili Beys to the Arab government's declarations of independence was caution. This initial wariness indicates a great deal about the political approach of this traditional authority and its future relations with the competing powers in the region. Shaykh Sulayman Dahir's journal bears evidence of this: he never mentions the official declaration of Arab independence at the end of World War One, nor is there any mention of Allenby's troops entering Jabal 'Amil from Palestine. By October 1918, however, the contents of Dahir's journal change and begin to reflect political events: suddenly, distant figures of the Arab government in Damascus emerge to take center stage, and there is an air of urgency and excitement as well as great confusion. On October 1, 1918, Shaykh Sulayman reported that a letter from Damascus had been received by Mahmud Bey al-Fadl in Nabatieh: "We write these lines amidst great jubilation in town. We ask God Almighty to make our new life happy, to grace our *umma* under the blessed Arab banner with progress and work." He then transcribes the text of the telegram received from Damascus:

> Declare Arab independence before anyone else's arrival so that you have effectual independence. If the English come, inform them of your independence. Contact Saida, Beirut and appendages [who have already declared their independence]. Prepare a delegation to meet the English. No one must have any authority to rule other than the Arabs. I congratulate you and thank you.
>
> Sa'id al Jaza'iri
> President of the Arab Government
> 25 Dhu al-Hujjah, 1336[5]

According to Dahir's journal, Mahmud Bey al Fadl had received the telegram earlier, but decided to conceal it from public knowledge. This is confirmed by Ahmad Rida in his serialized diary in *al-'Irfan*.[6] Al-Fadl was concerned that they were fabricated. Only after consultation with his brother Fadl Bey al-Fadl, and with Ahmad Rida and Sulayman Dahir, who confirmed that similar telegrams arrived in Marjayoun, Saida, and Tyre, did he, as the Arab government's temporary head in that town, proclaim Arab independence in Nabatieh.

Kamil Bey also received a letter written by Faysal declaring independence and asking him to support the cause by rallying his men to chase out the Ottoman army, but his reaction was similarly cautious. He certainly did not take military action. Faysal then sent Iliya Khuri, an Orthodox native of Tyre, as an emissary to Kamil Bey to ask him for his support.

Kamil al-Assaad's hesitation can be explained by several reasons. The most important is that as the traditional leader of Jabal 'Amil he did not have any substantial contacts with notables in the Arab government in Damascus or with the Arab army. This reflects the sociopolitical isolation of Jabal 'Amil within the larger Arab framework, and it is a factor that will play a determining role in the ultimate political desires of the 'Amilis. A second reason for his caution is that the Bey did not necessarily see the immediate political advantage of supporting Faysal, given that there were rumors of Allied armies taking up positions.[7] Third, the bulk of the Arab government's ideological support in Jabal 'Amil came from urban notables from the coastal cities of Saida and Tyre as well as an aspiring group of lettered semi-urban bourgeoisie in Nabatieh, who had undermined Kamil Bey's position as the legitimate leader of the Jabal.

The relevance of Jabal 'Amil to the new Arab government was more for tactical than nationalist or ideological reasons. There is no doubt that Jabal 'Amil's position was important for Damascus, because it provided a potentially strategic route to the main coastal outlets (Beirut, Saida, and Tyr). Jabal 'Amil also bordered Hawran and al-Hula to the south and east, another important route for trade and communication. However, despite the region's important position, the Arab government's ill-defined policy toward it set the stage for intricate political games by Jabal 'Amil's beys, which would eventually have serious repercussions.

When examined through the larger window of the Faysal Anglo-French dynamic in the region, this muddled policy toward Jabal 'Amil is better understood. The Arab government was made up of people other than Faysal. Damascene notables who were also in command

had their own opinions on the subject of the Syrian coast, and they were opposed to Faysal's agreements with the British that the area was to be part of the French sphere of influence. T.E. Lawrence wrote that neither Feisal nor himself approved of Arab control of Beirut. He blamed the Damascene politicians for getting embroiled in Beirut.[8]

If this is true, then the political developments in southern Lebanon are easier to understand. The Sunnis in the south, primarily Riad al-Sulh, Rida al-Sulh's son, dealt with the Damascene politicians who were appointed by Allenby, since Faysal was still only a military figure. Therefore, by the time Faysal entered Damascus on October 3, 1918, against the will of certain British personages, a new political challenge had emerged, which would be played out between the French and the Damascus governments.

Faysal's position toward the 'Amilis reveals an ambiguity in his attitude, due to his previous promises to the British not to interfere in that area.[9] However, he could not contradict the decisions of the Damascene politicians who enjoyed the support of a large part of the population. This situation was naturally undesirable to the French, who sought to control the region. There was sufficient anti-French sentiment in the urban areas to create some form of opposition that in 1920 would prove detrimental to Jabal 'Amil's security, with its resulting subjection to French military retaliation during the Nieger Campaign in 1920.

Nevertheless, the situation in Tyre in December 1918–January 1919 was "absolutely calm," according to reports of the French military governor. One report adds, "the Mitwalis come to us and are beginning to realize that there is a benefit in French protection. A signed petition by the main Mitwali notables was addressed to me some days ago."[10] This displays the fluidity of the political situation. The 'Amilis did not have a clear sense of their allegiances. It was still early days, and opposition to the French, certainly ideological, was not yet formulated. By December 19, 1919, the military governor in Tyre reports, "there is no question of a Sharifian government anymore." This is contradicted two days later when another report states that the population still desires to see Faysal in power. The differing attitudes reflect the uninformed French opinion as much as they highlight the inconsistent position of the Shi'i.[11] A combination of the untried political skills of leading 'Amili notables, along with undefined policies toward the 'Amili community, on the part of both the Arabs and the French, contributed to the Jabal becoming a scapegoat for both parties.

Understood in this light, Jabal 'Amil's importance to Faysal is clearer. It was peripheral, yet had the disadvantage in this case of being

closely linked geographically to the Syrian hinterland. This meant that the lapse in security immediately after the war, and the challenge imposed by the Bedouin Arab tribes (and, indirectly, Emir Abdullah), in terms of looting and disorder spilled over into Jabal ‘Amil's political struggle and dominated the landscape until mid-1920.

The emergence of the Arab government further exacerbated the internal tensions in the ‘Amili leadership. Although the Shi‘is expressed enthusiasm for Faysal as a descendant of the Prophet, hence from Ahl al-Bayt, political support to the Arab government's local representatives did not come from the traditional ‘Amili leadership such as the al-Assaads. Instead, it came from the coastal cities and their periphery—from the Sunni bourgeoisie and their Shi‘i supporters. Hence the new factor, of Faysal and the Arab government, triggered an unprecedented polarization in ‘Amili political circles. Allegiance to Faysal imposed a certain sociopolitical positioning in Jabal ‘Amil that could not be sustained. This was because of previous arrangements between the French and the British that had sealed the fate of the region, placing it under French control, despite the nationalist politics stemming from Damascus.

In other words, the passiveness of the traditional leadership in the face of Faysal's emergence, at the same time as the arrival of French troops, demonstrated the tenuous nature of their loyalty to Faysal. There were few direct ties between the Damascene and the ‘Amili notables and it is interesting that the main interaction, albeit limited, was directly with Faysal on two different occasions. The first was on his arrival in Damascus in the autumn of 1918 when an ‘Amili delegation composed of Kamil al-Assaad, Mahmud al-Fadl, Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin (usually a resident of Damascus), Sayyid ‘Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din, and others went to congratulate him in mid-November 1918.[12] In Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin's autobiography, there is a passage describing the meeting with Faysal that reveals the affection the Shi‘i had for him. Sayyid Muhsin quotes himself saying, “we are your grandfather's partisans—[in reference to Imam ‘Ali]—and we need special attention.”[13]

The delegation's return to Jabal ‘Amil via Beirut was politically significant in light of the visit. General Gouraud (who became high commissioner for Syria and Lebanon in 1919) requested to see the returning delegation in Beirut. Only Kamil Bey met with him, and the details of the meeting are unknown. However, they must have touched on the future of Jabal ‘Amil in relation to the Grand Liban, as Kamil Bey declared to his colleagues afterward, “I announce to you the great news: the attachment to the Grand Liban. After all, didn't

our grandfathers used to say, 'Lucky him who has a patch of grass for his goat to sleep on in Mt. Lebanon,' " in reference to the perceived and privileged position of Mount Lebanon's autonomous region.

This was evidently not the first time that Kamil Bey had been in contact with the French. His enthusiasm after the meeting indicates that he was already well connected with them, as Sulayman Dahir and other 'Amilis suspected.[14] The 'Amili delegation's reaction was one of great surprise. As one of the delegates, Shaykh Yusuf al-Faqih al-Harisi, commented to him, "We are twelve ulama here and one *za'im*. In the country [Jabal 'Amil] there are around forty ulama and over five hundred *wajih* [notables], and we cannot decide on this without consulting them."[15] Kamil Bey knew this and had to publicly support his people's desires, despite his own leanings toward the French. In a French report by Kamil Bey on the "Principal Mitwali Leaders of Nabatieh, Saida and Tyre," it states, "he is with the strongest party and the one that pays him better. Meanwhile, he does not have Arabophile principles."[16]

Despite having similar Ottoman experiences to other Sunni notables, especially during the periods of the Ottoman parliament, Kamil Bey was not part of any decision-making core within this newly emerging Arab government. Nor was there any likelihood of his participation. The invitation for Jabal 'Amil to declare independence was within the context of a province joining the center, not a direct alliance with the leaderships of both Jabal 'Amil and Damascus as equal players.

Naturally this situation was eventually manipulated by the French in their support of the traditional 'Amili leadership.[17] Military administrators in Saida, Nabatieh, and Tyre, all of which were installed by the occupying forces, eventually ensured the loss of power of those figures loyal to Faysal. This means that Jabal 'Amil could not have been a part of Syria or Faysal's Arab kingdom without major resistance. If Faysal had won the battle of Maysaloun, it might have finally been part of an Arab kingdom. But by faintly opposing such an entity to ensure their personal political survival, the traditional leadership ultimately showed themselves to be in favor of a French mandate that could meet their demands.[18]

Contest for Allegiance: Internal and External Players

Before Nabatieh's declaration of independence, the towns of Marjayoun and Tyre had already given their allegiance to the Arab government,

so that a network of pro-Arab partisans emerged. In Beirut, the mayor, 'Umar al-Da'uq, formed a temporary government at Damascus's orders, which took several administrative measures, including the appointment of Riad al-Sulh as governor of Saida. Al-Sulh immediately divided his district into several directorates and appointed officials to run them. Nabatieh was one such directorate, as was Tyre.[19] Al-Sulh's measures were welcomed in these places and people loyal to him were appointed. In Tyre, after an initial dispute, Abdullah Yahya al-Khalil became the representative of the Arab government there. In Nabatieh, the Fadl clan were the Beys, who in turn made their own appointments, which were more symbolic than effective, as they were peripheral to Saida and Beirut's nominations. However, they were official enough to present a very direct threat to Kamil al-Assaad and his hinterland.

Kamil al-Assaad was disturbed by the emergence of a new power center that demanded "his" people's loyalty without his having any say in the matter. Sulayman Dahir's diary during the last three months of 1918 is filled with Kamil al-Assaad's political intrigues and plots and he was very disturbed by Riad al-Sulh's position as a new player in his territory with connections to the Damascus government. This animosity went back to the war in 1915 and the 'Aley trials when the Sulh faction began to present a threat to the Bey.[20] Following the declaration of support of the main towns in the south to the Arab government, it was clear to the Bey that his own power was waning, since no one had consulted him on these declarations. He therefore decided to seek the support of his friends, the Fadl clan in Nabatieh, by summoning them to a private meeting on October 2, 1918, near the Litani River. He told them that he had received a messenger from "Faysal, commander of the Arab armies,"[21] inviting him to declare an independent Arab government. It is interesting that he said it was Faysal that sent him this emissary and not Sa'id al-Jaza'iri, the active head of the Arab government at this stage, who had sent the letters to everyone else. Kamil Bey then "officially" declared his support for the new government through a public meeting he called for the inhabitants of Nabatieh.[22]

The political significance of this meeting cannot be overstated, as it encapsules the interaction between the traditional leaderships and the common people. Even more significant is the fact that Kamil Bey chose to hold this meeting in Nabatieh, the home of that town's beys, the Fadls of the Al Sa'b clan and the most pro-Sulh towns in the region rather than Marjayoun or Tyre. Both Riad al-Sulh and his father Rida had strong connections to Nabatieh and were landowners

as well. Nabatieh, therefore, became the battleground for the Assaad/Sulh struggle for power. Sulayman Dahir notes that the meeting took place in the town's *husayniyya*, a building named after the martyred Imam Husayn, where every year the tragedy of Karbala was relived in 'Ashura as a constant reminder of the Shi'i sense of injustice.[23]

This resonated with the Bey's position among his people. After all, he was referred to as *hami hima al-ta'ifa* (protector of the land of the community), and his house in Taibeh was called *bayt al-ta'ifa* (the house of the community).[24] Also present at this meeting was Faysal's ambassador, Iliya Khuri, and the importance of this show of loyalty by the people to Kamil Bey in front of Khuri was immense. It was a blunt message to ensure that Kamil al-Assaad's status among his people could not be overlooked. Dahir wrote on the same day, "Kamil Bey wants to be the unrivalled ruler of the lands, as if he sees this day as his chance to regain his forefather's control of this land."[25]

Putting aside Kamil Bey's personal misgivings about the situation, it is worthwhile to examine the different actors at play. The Arab government had chosen to communicate to the 'Amilis through a budding Sunni politician mercantile bourgeois, Riad al-Sulh, by appointing him governor of Saida, while another relative, Afif al-Sulh (who played a much less visible role), was appointed governor of Tyre.[26] These choices are telling. Although it is possible that they were made by the Arab government's sense of trust, and because of a connection to Riad al-Sulh, it also reveals the attitude of this urban elite toward the Shi'i community, including its traditional leadership, as secondary political players who can be represented by a broker with certain sustained ties to them.

Kamil al-Assaad's primarily focus was, understandably, to disrupt this movement from gaining further ground. One could argue that Sulh's intended challenge to Kamil al-Assaad threw him into the arms of the French.[27] Despite Faysal's sending a messenger to Kamil Bey, the fact was that he did not have a role in any of the newly established governments in the South, and that he saw Riad al-Sulh as a direct challenge to his power, one that was far more serious than the 'Aley trials underlined: the emergence of a new Arab political association.

Muhammad Jabir Al Safa's "official" *History of Jabal 'Amil* presents itself as the unified voice of the Arab movement in Jabal 'Amil. It covers two centuries of history resulting in the climax of Jabal 'Amil's definitive Arabism through its role in the Arab movement in 1918. Jabir traces this "unquestionable" position back to the late nineteenth century and Napoleon III's idea of an Arab kingdom. A conference was held in 1877 in Damascus, which three notables of Jabal 'Amil

attended. While nothing came out of this conference and the scheme evaporated, for Jabir Al Safa it cemented the position of Jabal ‘Amil as a firm proponent of an Arab movement.[28]

After the 1908 Young Turks revolt, the activities of the secret Arab societies took ground in Jabal ‘Amil, but only among the mercantile bourgeoisie based in Saida, Tyre, and Nabatieh. This group had links to the external world. The ‘Usayran, Khalil, and Zayn families were involved, as well as individuals (which was more the case in Nabatieh), who included Shaykh Ahmad Rida, Sulayman Dahir, Muhammad Jabir, and Ahmad Arif al-Zayn. Their main window to the world outside was through the Sulh family, which had historic links to this ‘Amili sector through landownership near Nabatieh, as well as bureaucratic contacts when Rida al-Sulh was appointed director of Nabatieh.

The appeal of the pro-Arabs (especially the urban notables) was an appeal to a more modern vision of the world, away from the traditional leadership and Ottoman rule. Their lure provided an alternative to the existing option, as much as it was a political belief in an Arab entity.

The most vocal pro-Arabs within ‘Amili society were the intellectuals and some ulama, two groups that were interconnected at this point when religious education was prevalent. One ‘Amili shaykh in particular, ‘Abd al-Husayn Sadiq from Nabatieh, expressed his fervent support of Faysal at the 1919 Syrian Congress, declaring him king until death.[29] Another shaykh, Sayyid ‘Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din, was even more eloquent in front of the King–Crane Commission, which came to Tyre and Saida in July 1919 as part of its tour of the region to record the desires of the local population. In his memoirs, he wrote:

> I presented the desires of the *umma* and its wishes: Syrian unity, independent with a constitutional decentralized government with Faysal as its king. I refused that any foreign state should have a hand in governing, albeit in a mandatory capacity, including France. I asked for America’s help because it is a strong and wealthy nation distant from the greed of imperialism. This is the reason why our relation with the French deteriorated.[30]

On their side, the French also drew a lot of support from the Muslim Shi‘i population of the cazas of Tyre, Marjayoun, and Saida (in addition to the Christian support they had). The diplomatic archives are full of petitions to the high commissioner in Beirut asking for attachment to Lebanon:

> We the sons of the Shi‘i Muslim community in the caza of Tyre demand the return to Mount Lebanon of which we were part. All our economic

> and agricultural interactions were with Mount Lebanon and we cannot make do without it. The Christian sons of our caza already petitioned to rejoin Mount Lebanon both politically and administratively according to the decree issued by the Administrative Council of Lebanon within its natural and historic borders (that include us). We ask that its government be democratic safeguarding the rights of the different communities and freedom of worship.[31]

The French had exerted some effort in consolidating their position in areas of Jabal 'Amil that were under the general influence of Kamil Bey, such as Tibnin and its environs, as well as Christian populated areas in and around Tyre. They founded associations that locals could join, as a means to affect politics. One notorious association was in Tyre headed by Shaykh Habib Mughniyya, a French enthusiast who was also a relative of the quietist *mujtahid*, religious reference, Shaykh Husayn Mughniyya.[32]

The race to prepare petitions for their presentation to the King–Crane Commission began several months before its expected arrival. Sulayman Dahir, who in early 1919 became a paid agent of the Arab government in Nabatieh, received a very anxious letter from his director, Rafiq al-Tamimi, the same author of *The Province of Beirut*, on March 16, 1919, informing him of the commission's arrival in the region to verify the desires of the Syrian people for self-determination. Tamimi was very concerned with organizing petitions from everyone and thus urged Dahir to pursue this seriously with all levels of officials in local government, as well as with villagers, notables, and leaders.[33]

In reply to this request, Dahir informed his employer that the French authorities were actively pursuing their propaganda by pressuring the locals to write pro-French petitions. Dahir mentions that salaries were offered to village mayors in return for supporting the French. He also laments the ethical standards of these men who were willing to be influenced by these methods[34] and asks why they have no political principles to follow. One simple answer is that they wanted to get on with their lives after such a devastating war, and with the promise of money it did not matter who was politically in control as long as they were not persecuted.[35] On June 14, 1919, Dahir reported that Kamil Bey had done nothing to prepare people in his villages to sign pro-Arab petitions.

The correspondence between Sulayman Dahir and Muhammad al-Tamimi is very revealing of the social and political climate of Jabal 'Amil and Damascus as well as Beirut. This correspondence sheds light on the position of Dahir as a paid agent caught between frustration with, and contempt for, his own society and loyalty to it in front of

outsiders. Their excited exchange of letters went back and forth until the arrival of the Commission.

In their correspondence, Al-Tamimi was very optimistic about the Commission and its influence. His letters also reveal what he focused on and what he ignored. For example, he referred to organizing the petitioning effort in Saida in terms of logistics and thwarting French efforts there. The caza of Saida has many Shi'i villages, but the city was predominantly Sunni, and al-Tamimi's focus on Saida reveals a tacit bias in favor of its Sunni community.

Furthermore, al-Tamimi does not mention Tyre at all. It is in Dahir's reports that we learn of the rivalry between the pro-French and the pro-Arab parties there to win the maximum number of petitioners in preparation for the commission's arrival. Kamil Bey is again a problem according to Dahir, as he was suspected of developing a comfortable relationship with the French authorities who catered to all his demands, such as appointing and removing people from office according to his wishes.[36] This was to the dismay of the pro-Arab group, who saw this as direct support by the French to strengthen the Bey's position among his people.[37]

By June 26, 1919, Dahir confirms that "the Lebanese idea [creation of a Lebanese state] is now firmly instilled among some of the Beys. Muhammad Tamir and Rashid 'Usayran both tried to convince me that we should join Lebanon, on the condition that Lebanon should be linked to Syria politically and economically."[38] The challenge for the Arab government was already great, since the beys had sought the support of a stronger power, France, which had already found a language of communitarianism and local patronage to advance its cause. What it further indicated among the 'Amili notables is how removed they were from the Arab government.

To what extent the French intimidated people into signing petitions is unclear. It is clear, however, that they also engaged in a vigorous campaign in the region to produce many petitions to present to the visiting committee. In his report to the League of Nations, Charles Crane briefly mentioned French interference in certain areas he visited:

> Authentic information came to hand of threats and bribes and even imprisonment and banishment for the same purpose. The management of the sessions at Tyre, Baabda and Tripoli was so bad as to be insulting for the intelligence and almost to the dignity of the Commission, and was saved from this at other places only and the greater intelligence and natural politeness of some French officers who kept their methods out of sight.[39]

The Arab government was equally diligent in finding recruits, probably without resorting to force as a means of persuasion as the local populace was likely to be more amenable to its positions, although this is impossible to verify.

In Saida, similar petitions were submitted to the King–Crane Commission by the predominantly Sunni community. They asked for total and complete independence for Syria, as well as a constitutional government under Faysal's sovereignty. They also asked for Iraq's total independence and agreed to Saida's Christian and Jewish communities' annexation to Mount Lebanon. They also emphasized that Syria's government be separate from the Hijaz.[40]

The demands made in Tyre were less elaborate. They were specific to Jabal ‘Amil. It has been pointed out that the differences in petitions between Saida and Tyre reflect a lack of political maturity and awareness on the part of Tyre's Shi‘i community. The latter's failure to closely examine their actual position within a Syrian entity, or their relation to Iraq and Palestine, reflects an inability to grasp the situation they found themselves in and that it was beyond their imagination to anticipate their political future or to plan it.[41] Indeed, it is safe to assume that this period in modern ‘Amili history was the first time in several centuries, if ever, that this community needed to formulate a political position. The points expressed in the Tyre petition were therefore less developed and thought out than that of Saida. However, this period also marks Shi‘i emergence from the isolationism to which they had become accustomed.

The neglect in mentioning Iraq and their position toward it, as well as that of Palestine, also reflects the extent of this isolation and betrays a localized sense of identity that was defined through religion and locale, which would make it ambivalent toward an Arab-nation state. Although unconscious of the missing elements (e.g., a position on Jewish immigration, or on Hijaz and Iraqi independence), in its statement, the Shi‘i community of Tyre, through its ulama spokesmen, betrayed an acceptance of a Lebanese state designed by the French, with whom the beys were already flirting. One French report on the Sayyid's political tendencies states, "he has Sharifian and Anglophile tendencies. Currently he has Sharifian opinions but will accept France if need be."[42]

Sulayman Dahir wrote a report to Rafiq al-Tamimi on the day of the Commission's visit (July 12, 1919) in which he mentions that the commission asked the 35,000 petitioning inhabitants of Tyre to select only two spokesmen to represent them, contrary to the desires of Sharaf al-Din. However, in Saida, "the representatives were a large

number. The committee listened to ulama, members of the municipality, and members of the Maqasid Association."[43] The race to produce a great number of petitions ultimately proved futile, especially for the Arab supporters, as they did not alter the course of events. However, they continued to fight to preserve the Arab government and a potential Arab state, often resorting to more traditional means of tribal combat.

Struggle for Supremacy and Divided Loyalties

It has been pointed out that before meeting Faysal, the Arab elites were hostages to the war, like naïve prisoners. On the one hand, they were fighting the Turks for Arab independence, and on the other they were with Turkey fighting the Western forces. In either case, they lacked the backing of any major power and they failed to assess the consequences of their position on either front, since they were involved in both.[44] Faysal provided the link between these disparate groups. He was both an Arab and a Muslim, and he was a descendent of the Prophet and as such as legitimate as the Sultan, if not more, in leading the Muslim *umma*. He was also the product of Ottoman culture, having received his training in the Ottoman army and being exposed to Western customs and politics in Istanbul. Faysal's Hijazi tribal origins and formal Ottoman military training provided him with two approaches for recruiting and organizing his supporters. These were through a direct appeal to tribal loyalty and through the raising of a formal army. The core of Faysal's support was therefore among Sunni politicians and the military.[45]

In the internal rivalry within the ʿAmili *aʿyan*, between the *zuʿamaʾ* and the *wujahaʾ*, Faysal's lure was in his neutrality. He drew large support from these feuding groups for his Sharifian lineage. Furthermore, this lineage was very important to the ʿAmilis, especially the ulama who saw Faysal in the context of a member of the Prophet's family, a comforting factor for them.

For example, Sayyid ʿAbd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din, who was effectively the religious scholar of Tyre and was later commonly referred to by the French as "*Le Grand Sayyed*,"[46] as well as Tyre's leading notables, Hajj Abdullah Yahya and Hajj Ismail al-Khalil, supported Faysal, but had a deep-seated animosity toward each other that they did not seek to resolve. Their descendants today still maintain this hostility. These divisions within the second group were the result of Ottoman reforms that ultimately distinguished among tribal, historical, and religious

leadership and the rise of a new social position, the *wujaha'*, in order to better implement its authority.

The structural differences within Faysal's coalition of Hijazi Bedouin manpower and Ottoman urban elites presented a problem to the 'Amilis. In chasing out the Turkish army, Faysal sought Kamil al-Assaad's help as the head of a clan, a call that Kamil Bey ignored. In doing so, Faysal appears to be less concerned with the coastal urban component of Jabal 'Amil. The 'Amili hinterland, in places such as Tibnin and Nabatieh, was under Kamil Bey's (and the Fadl clan's) influence, mirroring the problem that the urban Damascene government had with the Sharifian army.

The army itself reflected the duality of Faysal's approaches in its composition of Bedouin tribes and an Ottoman urban officer corps. The former could extend links in the hinterland with other tribes, but could not develop the same association with its Ottoman-formed generals or with the urban elite of Damascus, which had a different notion of an Arab state. This notion was born out of an environment different from the tribal one in the Arabian Peninsula. To a large extent it was inspired by a more exposed mercantile and educated society with a substantial Christian population that believed in the union of Arab-speaking peoples; regardless of a Sharifian or Caliphate connection, General Allenby succeeded in absorbing Faysal's army into the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. As he advanced north, Faysal's need for establishing tribal alliances increased.[47]

It is unclear whether the 'Amilis appreciated the delicate balance and friction between the notables of Damascus and Faysal's men, or the distinction between them. This is not reflected in Dahir's correspondence with Tamimi. The main obstacle to 'Amili participation in Faysal's movement, besides their being outsiders to politics and mainstream Islam, was that they did not fit well into either of the two social categories—that of the Bedouin tribes or the urban notables. For example, the traditional leadership, the al-Assaad, al-Fadl, and al-Abdullah families, although composed of clans, did not lead a nomadic existence similar to the Hawran tribes. The case with the urban notables was similar, in that they were second tier to the Sunni notables with their contacts in Damascus. While they displayed the sociopolitical behavior of the urban nobility as described by Hourani,[48] they lagged behind and therefore exerted little power outside their parochial domain. The increased hostility between Damascus and the local French powers created a situation in the area that demanded firm political positions. The French considered the

position of the Arab representative in Saida as hostile, along with his indirect support for the British and suspected him of being their paid agent.[49] The blatant defiance of the pro-Arab group during the King–Crane visit, in addition to its support of the Syrian Congress in July 1919,[50] confirmed that there could be little reconciliation between the two groups. The aim of this conference was to elect new governing bodies democratically through the existing representatives of the various regions. It is unclear who from the Shi'i leadership went to this conference, if at all, because officially the littoral south representatives were Riad al-Sulh and Afif al-Sulh.[51]

With the end of the war, the appearance of armed bandits, gangs, came to dominate the military landscape of Northern Syria, Cilicia, and Southern Syria.[52] Middle Eastern peasant rebellions were few and far in between, which is one reason why no landed upper class did emerge. Revolts, therefore, did not translate into agrarian-based revolution.[53] A careful reading of the chaotic events of the transition from Ottoman to French rule places the Levantine bandits outside of Baer and Gerber's peasant revolt model, which is informed by Hobsbawm's "social bandits" as applied to the Balkan *Haiduks*.[54] Similar to the *qabadays*[55] of the Levantine urban settings, the brigands were an intrinsic component of the structure of power, albeit a marginal or shadowy one. They were subject to activation through indirect and/or direct command by other power components of that political structure[56] such as a French report on Kamil Bey, indicating that he maintained contact with a gang of brigands who robbed travelers. Moreover, the behavior of the bandits suggests the presence of a strong opportunistic component in their appeal to recruits.

Though these gangs were unconnected for the most part, they followed a similar code of behavior and achieved the same objective in inflaming the situation with the French. The roots of the gangs are uncertain, but are clearly connected to the economic devastation imposed by World War One and the dramatic administrative restructuring by the French that altered the politics and livelihood of the tribes.[57] While tribal raids on villages were a common phenomenon in the decentralized Ottoman entity and a great cause of concern for defenseless villages, they came to take on a new character in the context of the French occupation, and were of great concern to the French.[58]

World War One created a group of deserters in Jabal 'Amil, many of whom took advantage of the lapse in security to carry out highway robbery. Dahir notes the increasing number of bandits in the regions

of Marjayoun and Nabatieh in his journal entry on June 2, 1918. More than a year later (November 9, 1919) he reports in a letter to al-Tamimi,

> there is no news except the increase in the number of gangs mostly of Bedouins. Their main targets were Christian villages in the district of Tyre and Marjayoun where they steal livestock and cows. There have been attacks already on Khiam and Ibl al-Saqi [both in the caza of Marjayoun]. The French government punishes the Muslim inhabitants of those villages when they had nothing to do with it.[59]

With the arrival of the Sharifian armies, which drew substantial support from Western Syrian tribes, a new field for gangs activities emerged: a fluid, ad hoc resistance to the French, especially in zones of direct French control, such as Jabal 'Amil. These gangs were on the whole politically disorganized, but succeeded in launching low-grade guerrilla operations that provoked and troubled the French. While under the banner of "resistance," these gangs never abandoned their primary occupation of looting.

The problem of these "*bandes de pillards*" dominates the bulk of French military and diplomatic correspondence in Jabal 'Amil between mid-1919 and July 1920.[60] These gangs can best be understood as a frustrated reaction to the impact of the war on their region, which intersected with anti-French sentiment. They directed their hostility toward France as the undesired occupier. Although the gangs continued in Syria until the Jabal Druze revolt in 1925, their activities in Jabal 'Amil were not uniquely confined to French resistance. Old habits of pillage and looting from civilian villages continued, much to the chagrin of their populations.

In addition to Faysal forcing a political polarization among the 'Amili leadership, the presence of the French forced a different type of polarization. While the French forces sought to cultivate relations with the Shi'i population away from the Arab cause, the core clients of the French in the region were the Maronite Christians. What is clear from this period is that the French applied two complementary policies. The first was an as yet underdeveloped policy of sectarian divide and rule. By identifying the different communities in the Jabal, the French were better able to cultivate their friends and, almost without exception, the correspondence of French military officials speaks purely in sectarian terms.[61] The second policy, which derives from the first, was their favorization of the Maronite community in Lebanon.[62]

French and Arab pursuit of their own politics in Jabal 'Amil caused the Shi'is, particularly the masses, to pay a high price. Despite their

lack of opposition to be attached to the Grand Liban, they did not welcome French occupation of the area. But although the local population mostly objected to the occupying forces, the only alternative to them was the Arab cause. The social and political pressure to support this cause was far greater in terms of social networks and codes of loyalty. The Shi'is were caught in the line of fire between the two. This juncture in their history is significant as it marks the beginning of a new form of isolation that the Shi'i would undergo through the many political movements that would pass through this region. In a sense, it marks the beginning of their ideological alienation within the context of the modern nation state. The Shi'is were not a priority, neither for the French nor for the Arab government.

Unlike the Shi'is, Maronite villages in the South were wealthier and more developed, in part because of the role of the Church and financial support from immigrants abroad. While administratively outside Mount Lebanon, the Maronites of the South were linked socially and economically to the mountain and its flourishing capital markets and educational institutions. The Maronite nationalism of Mount Lebanon that had been emerging since 1860 was easily transmitted to Maronite populations outside the mountain. As noted earlier, the gaps in social and economic communal development between the Shi'is of Jabal 'Amil and other communities throughout Mount Lebanon and the coastal cities in general, and between the Shi'i and their immediate Maronite neighbors, were vast.

Although the conflict in the region has been primarily portrayed as sectarian, one can argue that the underlying economic factors were a more important catalyst, given that the region had just emerged from a gruesome war and famine. These factors disproportionately touched the Shi'is. Furthermore, unlike their Muslim neighbors, Christians were not conscripted into the Ottoman army, so the sense of social disruption they experienced, at least in the eyes of neighboring Shi'i villages, was less. In addition, their pro-French stance and their desire to join the Grand Liban provoked hostility among their Shi'i neighbors. There are, for example, references to Maronite villages such as Dib'al, Qulay'a, and 'Ayn Ibl celebrating French holidays as well as flying the French flag.[63] The village of Ayn Ibl celebrated the arrival of Gouraud as high commissioner to Lebanon, flying the *tricouleur* and playing the Marseillaise. They also chanted songs of praise and even banners of "Vive la France" in the streets of Tyre.

Just as the Maronites drew great support and comfort from the presence of their protector, they also acquired a level of confidence, some would say arrogance, that caused their relations with other

communities, including the Greek Orthodox around the Marjayoun region and the Shi'is, to deteriorate. Sulayman Dahir reports instances of fighting between Maronites and Greek Orthodox, in addition to fighting between Maronites and Shi'is.[64] At the same time, there were also stories of Christians directly antagonizing Shi'i villagers by chanting derogatory songs about the Prophet or burning effigies of him.[65] On the other hand, in another letter Dahir writes, "the Christians of these areas see that the gangs are targeting them and they have no means to defend themselves. They see that the government is not defending them, so we see them today fleeing with their belonging and livestock. This is the price they have to pay for supporting the occupying forces."[66]

The French vacillated, and the Shi'i felt increasingly mistreated and hostile. The French soon supplied the Christian villages with arms and even supported the formation of Christian gangs, mainly Maronite peasants, to counter the Muslim ones suspected of receiving support from Damascus. One particular gang was led by 'Id al-Hurani of Kfur and supervised by Charpentier, the military governor of Saida;[67] another was led by Ibrahim Francis, a pro-French Maronite who was decorated by the French in 1925.[68] The more tensions escalated, the more Maronites were supplied with French arms, with a clear aim to their combating the Shi'is.[69]

This situation was limited however, to the rural areas; the cities did not threaten the Maronites or provide the French, even in terms of their nationalist opposition.[70] In Saida, for example, the 'Usayran family had good relations with both the Catholic and Maronite communities, and in Tyre, the Christian population had sufficient power not to be openly provoked by the Shi'is. The neighboring villages, however, proved far more problematic.

The main criterion for forming a gang was the ability to carry arms and rally men. Unless the gang leader was a chief of a tribe, he needed to seek permission and support for his action. Families aligned themselves with specific gangs and offered their manpower. The tribes, whether they were nomads or semi-sedentarized, raided enemy convoys and villages suspected of allying with the French under the guise of economic need.[71] In particular, these gangs were able to function better in remote mountainous areas, such as Jabal Druze, Jabal al-'Alawiyyin, Jabal Sahyun, Jabal Zawiya, and the hinterland of Jabal 'Amil.[72]

How these gangs acquired their arms and maintained their effort is more telling, in light of their activity as a resistance to the French. There are no references to these gangs as an arm of the Arab army in the Arab government archives. The main evidence that the gangs were

indeed being armed by the Arab government is in the French archives, with repeated references to Faysal and, more directly, his brother, the Amir Abdullah in Transjordan.[73] There is also supporting evidence in *al-Bashir*, a pro-French Jesuit newspaper in Beirut that accompanied French troops in the South, that these gangs were directly connected with the Arab government.[74] The newspaper also reported that their main route of operation was through Hasbaya and Rashaya, which provided for a direct link to Damascus through Jabal Druze.[75] Ahmad Rida names Arab army officers, such as a certain 'Ali Khulqi, who were present in some villages with the gangs near the Khardali Bridge.[76] In presenting Faysal's difficult predicament, Antonius, in his influential book *The Arab Awakening*, mentions that he was "torn . . . between General Gouraud's hectoring messages and the heated entreaties of his followers, Faysal vacillated and temporized. He refused to declare war on the French, but winked (and even possibly connived) at the attacks by certain youthful Arab officers on the French positions near the Lebanese border."[77] In his memoirs, *Generation of Sacrifice*, Qadri Qal'aji quotes a letter to Faysal from Gouraud specifically accusing him of supporting and training gangs to fight the French, providing as proof a statement of the head of the Third Division of the Arab army near Aleppo.[78]

To this day the legacy of some of the gang leaders is still vivid in Jabal 'Amil's collective memory, partly because they exemplified courage and strength and have been attributed Robin Hood qualities. More than 12 different gangs existed in Jabal 'Amil during this period.[79] The lapse in security in the region encouraged the availability of arms, even in the marketplaces.

Three men whose gangs have left a deep mark are Adham Khanjar, Sadiq al-Hamza, and Mahmud Bazzi. It is interesting that all three came from minor branches of notable 'Amili families: Adham Khanjar was of the Darwish family of the al-Sa'b clan related to the al Fadl Beys of Nabatieh;[80] Sadiq al-Hamza,[81] although he grew up in poverty, belonged to a disinherited branch of Kamil Bey al-Assaad's clan, the al-Saghir; and Mahmud Bazzi belonged to the notable family of the same name that dominated Bint Jbail.[82] The extent to which they were engaged in a nationalist struggle is unclear: there are reports of clashes with French troops as well as stories of robbing villages and caravans. One popular story of Sadiq al-Hamza has him robbing government employees who were collecting taxes from the villages, and then redistributing the money back to the villages.[83]

The fact that the stories of the gangs remain alive suggests that these gangs enjoyed a certain popularity in Jabal 'Amil, but it is difficult

to determine their real purpose from the material available. Dahir's reference to these men undergoes a transformation over time. In November 1919, he reports that Saida's military governor traveled south to examine the issue of "these bandits." He also mentions that "Bedouin bandits are fighting French divisions, including Sadiq al-Hamza on the Khardalah Bridge."[84] By March 1920, however, Dahir's vocabulary changes and he refers to the activities of Sadiq al-Hamza, "*al-watani*" (the patriot/nationalist), against the French. On the other hand, the mouthpieces of the French in Lebanon, the newspapers *Al-Bashir* and *Lisan al-Hal*, referred to the gangs only as thieves and highway robbers. Nevertheless, the weekly French military reports from the cazas, the *Bulletins de Renseignement*, devoted many pages that display a sense of menace, alarm, and danger at the activities of the gangs. Although this suggests that the gangs' actions had an impact,[85] these reports do not give the impression that the gangs were a revolutionary movement with a mass following in Jabal 'Amil. They existed prior to the arrival of the French and, to the extent that the local population opposed the occupying French military presence, could not have functioned as they did without some local support. But how much that support was identified in terms of an Arab movement is questionable.[86]

One can understand an important reason for the rise of the gangs in Jabal 'Amil from these family disputes: the waning power of Kamil al-Assaad, allowed for a power and security vacuum to exist and remain unchecked. This also highlights the peasants' opposition to that waning power, in terms of their rejection of the status quo by refusing to pay their taxes, as the gangs leaders encouraged them to do. The motives behind Sadiq al Hamza's activities, on the other hand, can be partially explained by his opposition to Kamil al-Assaad from his position as lesser relation. Hamza's popularity and immortalizing in Jabal 'Amil's history derive from the symbolism of his defiance to the traditional leadership, despite his taking advantage of the existing atmosphere of lawlessness.

Within the politics of tribal partisanship, Kamil Bey attempted to reaffirm his position by supporting anti-Sadiq Hamza groups to assist the French in combating Sadiq al-Hamza. He met with the commanding officer, Charpentier, to decide on the formation of a national guard composed of volunteers to counterbalance the power of the gangs.[87] This plan did not take effect, however, as there was little enthusiasm for it. Rida notes three different meetings of notables, in Hawran, Nabatieh, and Saida, to resolve the sectarian conflict, the responsibility for which they placed on Sadiq Hamza's gang. In a letter addressed to Hamza, these notables call on him to stop his activities, as they are detrimental to the country. They added, "we ask them [the

gangs] in the name of God to stop because we, the Shi'is, have worn the cloth of shame in the eyes of the civilized world."[88]

Nevertheless, the distribution of arms in the area favored the Maronite Christians, which Faysal mentioned to Gouraud.[89] Sayyid 'Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din believed that it was to the advantage of the French to have poor security in the region, so as to be able to incite communitarian hatred, and accused France of distributing arms to the Muslims as well as the Christians in order to demonstrate to the world that the region was unfit for independence.[90] The conflict was forcibly defined within a sectarian context, since the Christians were so closely associated to the French, and any action by the gangs on Christian village was seen as an attack on France.

The gangs could rely more on indirect support from Damascus (through their tribal connections) than their own political leaders in Jabal 'Amil. Tribal rivalries were the most visible side of the conflict. Old enmities between the Golan Arabs headed by Amir Ahmad al-Fa'ur (who supported the Arab government and ran his own gang) and Kamil Bey best revealed the conflict.[91] It was finally as a result of the actions of the Golan Arab tribes that Kamil Bey received an ultimatum to take a political position.

By early 1920, the situation in Jabal 'Amil had become alarming. There were more attacks by the gangs, especially in the caza of Marjayoun, with its proximity to Syria. Tension between Damascus and the French was high with the San Remo Conference approaching in April 1920; and the attacks of the gangs, both against the French and against civilian populations, underscored Kamil Bey's increasingly tenuous power. Two messengers were sent to deliver an ultimatum to the Bey in Taibeh. Sa'id al-'As[92] and Ahmad Muraywid told the Bey that the "time for words had expired and now is the time for action." They added that Jabal 'Amil was either with them (the Arab government) or against them, and if it was the latter, they would have to take appropriate action.[93] Kamil al-Assaad's reply, that he was not in a position to give an immediate response without consulting the Jabal's notables and ulama, reflected his actual position at that moment, hesitant and uncertain. At the same time, this response was out of character in terms of a reaction to a challenge by a rival tribe.

The Wadi Hujayr Conference and Its Repercussions

The result of Kamil al-Assaad's action was the convening of a conference for the 'Amilis at Wadi al-Hujayr, on April 20, 1920. The importance of the Wadi al-Hujayr incident is in setting the tone for the relationship

between the 'Amilis and the French in the opening years of the Mandate. It also constituted a problematic episode for Shi'i political discourse and historiography. It demonstrated the limits of influence and control that the 'Amili *zu'ama'* had over the gangs as well as their susceptibility to being pushed toward actions that were ultimately detrimental to their interest by regional powers. Previous generations of *zu'ama'* had sided with the losing party on more than one occasion (Dahir al-'Umar, the 'Azm Pashas and the Druze leadership in 1860), and the 'Amili leadership in the aftermath of World War One repeated a similar mistake by aligning themselves with Faysal's Arab government.

There are several other significant aspects of this conference to consider. First, it was the first time that the Shi'i of Jabal 'Amil convened publicly as a group, as a community, to discuss their political fate. Second, the location of the meeting signifies an important political concession to the gangs who attended. Wadi al-Hujayr was an area controlled by the gangs, a base from which they launched their guerrilla operations. It is centrally situated between Nabatieh, Marjayoun, and Tyre and the gangs refused to attend the meeting if it was convened in Kamil Bey's base in Taibeh. Kamil Bey therefore had to go to them. Along with the Bey, the other notables failed to convince the gangs to give up their arms and to restore calm to the Jabal.[94] Third, the few extant sources confirm that the conference highlights the role of the ulama as "neutral" arbiters in this community. Fourth, Kamil Bey's inability to impose his desires betrayed his weakness to the community and suggests his loss of authority over the notables. Fifth, by convening uniquely as a sectarian community and offering allegiance only to Faysal, the Shi'is distinguished themselves from the all-encompassing "Muslim" rubric.

The Wadi al-Hujayr episode is remarkable for the complete absence of primary sources. In addition to the calculated silence of "the committee" appointed to record the minutes of the conference,[95] the French archives are empty of any detail on the meeting,[96] and the minutes recorded by those present no longer seem to exist. Sulayman Dahir's unpublished diary skips an entire year from 1919 until the Nieger Campaign in June 1920. Sayyid 'Abd al-Husayn Sharaf-al Din did not write his memoirs until several decades later, and many have suggested that he fabricated his speeches and rewrote the history of events. In any case, his rendition of events places him at the apex of the conference with hundreds of people applauding him.[97] Ahmad Rida watered down his published memoirs in *al-'Irfan*, and Muhammad Jabir's input was a short summary in his book. 'Amili political and intellectual figures seem to have engaged in a concerted

effort to rewrite the events in and around the Wadi Hujayr conference, in recognition of the problematic nature of the decision taken by the conference and the actions resulting from them, namely the massacre at ʿAyn Ibl. In the new reality of the Grand Liban, it became imperative to remove the stain on the record of the community, thus the unanimity in altering the facts.[98] Reconstructing the events leading to and surrounding the conference is thus not an easy task.

The Wadi Hujayr Conference was convened upon the invitation of Kamil Bey to "the notables, ulama and men of culture of the Shiʿi community."[99] The leaders of the gangs were also invited. The inclusiveness of the invitations was reflected in the writing of the poet Muhammad ʿAli al-Humani who indicated, with hyperbole, that every faction assembled its forces to go to this meeting so that there was not a person capable of walking that did not go to Wadi al-Hujayr.[100] Kamil Bey presided over the meeting and Sayyid ʿAbd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din gave an eloquent oration.

In their later recollection of the events, several participants in the conference have accused Sayyid ʿAbd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din of inciting sectarian sentiments by praising Sadiq al Hamza's activities, and emphasizing the latest confrontation with the Christians in Tyre, who were said to have insulted the Prophet and opened fire on the Shiʿi population with the aid of French forces. Nevertheless, according to his own account, supported by Ahmad Rida's, the Sayyid entreated his audience to give up arms, maintain religious tolerance, and commit to peace. In his words, he supported a "safety plan."[101]

Responding to the call to resistance by the Arab government,[102] the conferees decided in unison to declare their allegiance to Syrian unity while requesting local autonomy for Jabal ʿAmil, to recognize Faysal as king of Syria, and to reject any protection or control by France.[103] A decision was also made to send a delegation to Damascus to relay the decisions of the Shiʿi community of Jabal ʿAmil to the newly acclaimed king. Some of the figures selected for this delegation were Sayyid ʿAbd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din, Sayyid ʿAbd al-Husayn Nur al-Din, and Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin (who was residing in Damascus and was absent from this meeting).

The main controversy resulting from the conference is its role in instigating the subsequent events at ʿAyn Ibl. The gang of Mahmud Bazzi pillaged and burned this Christian village on May 5, 1920, killing and burning over 50 people and injuring others.[104] Clementine Khayat, a nun from ʿAyn Ibl who witnessed the massacre and fled with the rest of the village toward Palestine, wrote an account published a few months later in the journal *al-Mashriq* recounting the gruesome

events of that day.[105] Ahmad Rida mentions that, before the massacre, Kamil Bey sent a letter with a delegation of notables from Bint Jbail to Mahmud Bazzi, ordering him to remain still and to leave political matters for the leaders to resolve.[106] Rida adds that the delegation found Bazzi and a large group of people from all the neighboring villages along with Bedouins, but they failed to prevent the massacre. The magnitude of the raiding party is reflected in Clementine Khayat's descriptions in the *al-Mashriq* and *al-Bashir* newspapers,[107] which estimate the number of the attackers to be about 6,000. Although this estimate is probably exaggerated, it does reflect the dramatic impact of the attack from the perspective of its victims. French military reports put the blame for these actions on "extremists" in Damascus, who congratulated the gangs of Jabal 'Amil on these massacres.[108]

Many local Christians have accused Sayyid 'Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din of inciting *fitna* (sedition) as justification for killing them. In a letter to the French high commissioner, Maximos Sayigh of the Greek Catholic Church in Tyre details the events of Wadi al-Hujayr and states that Sayyid 'Abd al-Husayn delivered "a vehement discourse to excite the population to massacre the Christians."[109] Amin al-Rihani, in his book *Muluk al-Arab*, alludes to the Sayyid meditating over whether to massacre the Christians or not.[110]

Despite denials by the "committee" appointed to record the minutes of the Wadi Hujayr Conference, there are indications to validate the accusation. 'Abd al-Husayn al-Abdullah, a prominent 'Amili poet and social critic, later wrote acerbically of the Sayyid in a poem entitled *The Feast*:

> Throw away the turban it is cursed
> How you protected our lands of evils
> Wadi al-Hujayr, I don't remember it
> I fear revealing its hidden secret.[111]

Al-Humani, another witness to the conference, rhetorically asked the Sayyid:

> You gave speeches, inciting them to Jihad in the name of God . . . Did you feel then that anyone could answer you back or disobey you? They were all mesmerized and subservient in your hands. Your words drew the line between right and wrong. Had you wanted them to throw themselves in the sea, they would have done it, had they been lacking in attention and deference. Do you still have to apologize that the people

did not listen or obey? This is a scene that I witnessed myself . . . Do you remember sir?[112]

Several explanations have been put forward by those who believe that the Sayyid did issue a *fatwa* to explain his position. The Sayyid was known for his charisma, his astounding eloquence of speech, and volatile character. (Only a few years later, the Sayyid welcomed the merger of Jabal ʿAmil with Lebanon and cultivated good relations with the French authorities.) In a moment of great passion, he may well have been carried away enough to suggest such an action. It is also possible to understand his motivation for war against the French in the context of his education in Najaf and its influence on his world vision, as well as the anti-British atmosphere there. The 1920 revolt in Iraq had a resounding echo in Jabal ʿAmil. *Al-ʿIrfan* devoted many articles to the Iraqi situation and the different *fatwas* issued in Iraq. Although he did not necessarily refer to the French and the Christians as one, there is certainly an apparent contradiction in his position of rallying for peace and calm and simultaneously encouraging *jihad* against the French who were supporting, and were supported by, the local Christians. In carrying out the attack on ʿAyn Ibl 11 days later, it appears that the gangs responded to the call for *jihad*, and that any message calling for peace and calm was lost upon them.

Equally ambiguous is the meeting of the ʿAmili delegation sent to meet Faysal in Damascus in May 1919. Sayyid ʿAbd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din's report contradicts that of Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin. What is common to both reports is their self-aggrandizement and presenting themselves as indispensable to the discussions. In an article on the meeting with Faysal, Sayyid Muhsin wrote that Faysal advised the delegation to remain calm and moderate and to avoid confrontation with the French.[113] As revealed in this article, Sayyid Muhsin's attitude to Faysal was one of a subject seeking a sovereign's advice. He writes that he and Sharaf al-Din reported to Faysal on the situation in Jabal ʿAmil and on the need for military reinforcements and food. According to Sayyid Muhsin, Faysal's response was that ʿAmilis were too weak and ill-equipped to lead such a revolt. From this it would seem that in Faysal's mind the fate of Jabal ʿAmil was already sealed, and that it would remain under French control. He was unwilling or unable to provide them with the necessary means to launch a revolt and they would have to accept the status quo as imposed by the French.

Sayyid ʿAbd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din's rendition of events in his memoirs is different. First, he claims that he met with Faysal privately on several occasions to discuss the general situation in the region.

He quotes a speech he delivered to Faysal, beseeching him to "cleanse our kind lands of the filth of occupation and to unite the disparate parts under one banner of unity, freedom and independence."[114] He also reports that Faysal encouraged him to resist the French and to continue the battle, and that he promised to supply him with goods to assist him in this cause. The Sayyid also adds that the reception given this ‘Amili delegation was welcoming, but to what extent this is true is also questionable. According to this version, Faysal accepted Jabal ‘Amil's allegiance and their desire to be part of a Syrian unity and encouraged them to carry on with the struggle.

Faysal's elusiveness, if indeed he was elusive, and his giving two different opinions, as was reported by the two sayyids, could be a reflection of the political game played by Faysal vis-à-vis the ‘Amilis over this entire period. Faysal vacillated in his position with them from the beginning, as they did with him. However, this could also indicate Faysal's understanding of the fragile situation the ‘Amilis were in as well as his own limitations. Politically, the ‘Amilis were weak and already under French rule, and Faysal knew of their ongoing private dialogues with the French. Their gangs could keep the French off balance, but were not enough to ensure the French would lose power over the region.

Faysal's advice, whichever representation of it is accurate (possibly both), suggests the attitude that the ‘Amilis take responsibility for their own political situation. It was a realization of the limited bonds between him and them. Faysal had limited resources and was not in a position to help them. Furthermore, in the larger scale of things, they were dispensable, as they were not part of the core of his support in his battle with the French. If they were willing to inflict damage on the French, and with minimum cost to his own relationship with the French, then so be it, explaining his answer to the enthusiastic Sayyid ‘Abd al-Husayn. However, as Faysal was aware of the weight of a French retaliation, when he faced the more cautious Sayyid Muhsin, then he may have found prudence an expression of the best policy.

Faysal's reading of the situation was actually reflective of realistic understanding of the evolving situation. Two days after the ‘Ayn Ibl events, the gang of Sadiq al-Hamza, composed of over 300 men, launched an offensive on French troops in Tyre. Concerned about possible repercussions, the Shi‘i notables, headed by Shaykh Husayn Mughniyya, went to the French administrative councilor to assure him that they were seeking all means to ensure peace and calm.[115] However, the situation had escalated beyond the tolerance of the mandate authorities, and Gouraud decided to retaliate and end the

reign of the gangs in the region.[116] This decision needs to be viewed within the context of another French decision to impose direct control on Syria, as well. In a letter to Colonel Nieger, commander in Tyre, Gouraud describes the two strategies the French should follow: that the reprisal be efficient and overwhelming; and those notables responsible should be brought to justice and deported to prevent more trouble.[117] Included on the list of those to be punished were ʻAbd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din, Kamil al-Assaad, Muhammad Bazzi, Mahmud Bazzi, and Ismail al-Khalil.

On May 28, 1920, Nieger sent a letter to Gouraud informing him of Kamil Bey's flight to Palestine and indicated his complicity in the incitement of the Hujayr meeting. It was decided that his belongings would be confiscated but not pillaged.[118] A telegram sent in Kamil Bey's name to the British headquarters in Jerusalem on May 18, 1920 suggests that Kamil had not ordered the massacres, did not have firm control of the region, and was fearful of French retaliation:

> Be sure the unlucky Shaiiyeh [Shiʻis] Community has lost its honour for ever for the sake of criminals who united to some bands of Bedouins and have done actions against humanity and honour . . . It is true that the inhabitants of Ein Ibl and surroundings have lost money and souls, but the honour which the Shaiiyeh [Shiʻi] Community lost is much greater.[119]

Also on the run was Sayyid ʻAbd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din. Nieger began his campaign on Jabal ʻAmil in early June 1920.

Reprisals against Shiʻi villages for the massacre were unremitting. In addition to 3,600 troops marching in and occupying regions that had previously been inaccessible, there was an aerial attack, which left a deep impression in ʻAmili collective memory.[120] Both Sulayman Dahir and Ahmad Rida give detailed accounts of all the movements of Nieger's troops and the terror they instilled. Dahir repeats several times in his diary the fact that no one was spared the wrath of the French, guilty or not.[121]

On June 5, 1920, Nieger summoned the Christian notables of Saida who had signed a petition demanding the Shiʻis pay a reparations fine of 100,000 Syrian gold pounds. The Shiʻi notables protested, and even the head of one of the French battalions, Arlabosse, objected to the fine on the grounds that it was unjust and arbitrary, and did not take into account the interest of the entire community, which was not collectively responsible. He also argued for the right of the notables to fix the amount of their payment, as was the normal procedure.[122] Nevertheless the fine was imposed.[123]

As Ahmad Rida noted, the physical devastation wrought by the Nieger Campaign—burnt villages and lost harvests, as well as the burdensome fine that was imposed—handicapped Jabal 'Amil for many years to come. The region was completely abandoned by the Arab government, which offered no financial assistance. According to Rida, the situation of the 'Amilis was mocked even in Syrian newspapers.[124]

In light of the later Syrian defeat at Maysalun in July 1920, one can see how the Nieger Campaign on Jabal 'Amil was a harsh, necessary strategic step for France in silencing the periphery before attacking the center. Jabal 'Amil would subsequently enter the Grand Liban in September 1920, paralyzed and beaten. The already existing socioeconomic disparity between Jabal 'Amil and the other communities of Lebanon was significantly widened by the events of May–June 1920. Jabal 'Amil would only become part of the Grand Liban as an attachment to the main mountain, Mount Lebanon. In the words of 'Abd al-Husayn Sadiq, it was a case of "one mountain swallowing another."[125] Jabal 'Amil even lost its name, becoming merely the southern extension of Mount Lebanon.

Part II

In the New Lebanon: Sociocultural Transformation

Chapter 4

Jabal 'Amil Redefined: In the Nation State of Lebanon

From Jabal 'Amil to South Lebanon

The new reality of Lebanon saw a large portion of Jabal 'Amil incorporated into a redefined "South Lebanon." Within this incorporation, Jabal 'Amil was not perceived as a separate historical, geographic, or social entity, but the southern extension of and natural complement to the core (Mount Lebanon) of a state that was reclaiming its ancestral existence in the newly established Grand Liban. As such, the area was described and appreciated in terms of its natural resources and agricultural capacity. Its population was invisible except when connected to the central part that is Mount Lebanon, this connection being implicitly communitarian. This sparse population of the South is a persistent feature of the Lebanist discourse. The absence of the inhabitants of the new districts dates to before the creation of Grand Liban. The argument for the integration of the four provinces was invariably based on the "frontières naturelles" of Lebanon. This was developed earlier (in the late nineteenth century) by the various Lebanese Christian Francophile intellectual circles in the diaspora, predominantly from Mount Lebanon who promoted their vision to the French leading up to the Paris Peace settlement in 1919. These views are best examined in *La Revue Phénicienne*, first published in 1919. In an article entitled "La Question du Liban," Paul Nujaim writes,

> The Ottomans refused Lebanon its natural eastern borders that are so clear and pronounced. They arbitrarily drew an autonomous province,

> elevated to a Mutassarifiyah level, an oriental border, that follows the western mountain ledges of Lebanon . . . A notable part of Lebanon proper, the most fertile and the best administrated is inhabited by a majority of Christians originating from the mountain, find themselves removed, without any other reason than that the new province must not be too large or too powerful![1]

Michel Chiha, one of the authors of *La Revue Phénicienne*, later regarded as Greater Lebanon's most prominent ideologue, further elaborated these thoughts in his prolific publications. His writings came to distill the general philosophy of this group. In his only reference to the South, Chiha included a small section entitled "Liban Sud" in his *Politique Intérieure*. He wrote,

> The little undulating water stream at the foot of the Beaufort ruins, the aqua green waters of the Litani [river] that frame the wild rosebays, one must go see this in season . . . The history of this land is all in its landscape. Each rock has a memory, each village is a kingdom. It is true that the inhabitant today seem totally indifferent to this majesty. The place is more alive than him. But all of this is a of a "barresienne" austerity that evokes el Greco and the outskirts of Toledo.
>
> South Lebanon is not well known or sufficiently liked. It has suffered for too long in a sort of disgrace. Maybe it is tired because of its resounding past so it withdrew from the world little by little for over a thousand years that we forgot it. This country that is the eternal Lebanon extends from our mountain leading to the soft slopes of the Galilee. These areas of Tyre and Sidon that still echo sacred footsteps . . .
>
> Our march to the South seems more important and vital everyday. The populating that others want to do is ours to undertake. The orange trees we want to grow are ours to dress up along the lovely coast . . .
>
> Lebanon has obligations towards the South, as it does towards the Bekaa; both a bit too abandoned. All we need is to take the soil and the night from one province, and from the other great material and spiritual wealth. For the future of Lebanon, it is important that everyone knows this and remembers it.[2]

Chiha's writing is so disconnected from reality, so entirely foreign to its subject that these paragraphs could have come out of a nineteenth-century European travel book, whose author was in search of the Holy Land, or they could be an impassioned description of a nineteenth-century David Roberts landscape of the Upper Galilee. Chiha's first visit to the South was in 1944. By then, there was growing realization of the region's strategic position vis-à-vis Palestine, and the potential

security threat from the Zionist movement. However, interest in the region on the part of power holders in the Lebanese center was slow in coming, if it ever arrived at all.

Chiha realized the agricultural potential of the south for Lebanon, particularly in citrus cultivation. He talked of the country's obligations to this region, and admitted that it had been abandoned, while reiterating that it was an extension of "our Mountain." Yet he also suggested a need for populating it, and was seemingly oblivious to the fact that there was a population that had lived there for centuries and which by 1943 had grown to approximately 200,000.[3] His indifference to, and ignorance of, its inhabitants is a perfect example of the elite's attitude toward "Southerners," the 'Amilis in particular. The South was another provisions warehouse to service the city and mountain, as Chiha considered the Bekaa. Even after independence, Lebanon's first president, Bishara al-Khuri, is cited as saying, "the 'Lebaneseness' of the predominantly Shi'i southern region had not been finally established," thus justifying his government's neglect in developing the region.[4]

The decision to establish the Grand Liban by combining Mount Lebanon and the districts of Beirut, the Bekaa, Tripoli, and Saida, was, as Zamir argued, "the most significant act to have determined the development of modern Lebanon."[5] It was also a decision that was to be debated during several years of Mandate rule by those who wanted it, and by those who willed it, members of the Maronite community and the French administration respectively. The discussion focused on whether to maintain or reduce the southern, northern, and eastern borders. In the end, the borders remained as they had been decided in 1920.

In the context of the post–World War One peace treaty negotiations between France and Britain, the question of Palestine's northern border (hence Lebanon's southern border) was the most problematic.[6] Zones of influence decided in the Sykes–Picot agreements of 1916 were contested by the British as having been too generous to the French, particularly as concerns Palestine and Mosul.[7] The issue of Palestine was another point of contention for the French. In the Sykes–Picot agreement, France was assigned territory on the Levant coast as far south as Acre, which effectively meant control over the major water sources in this region. However, as the Sykes–Picot agreement took place prior to the November 1917 Balfour Declaration for the creation of a Jewish state, little attention was paid to the economic development of Palestine—as "Palestine, then [in 1916] having not been envisaged as a possible area of industrial development and closely settled population."[8]

The British sought to include South Lebanon to the Litani River in their Red zone, which already extended from Jaffa to Acre on the Mediterranean coast. The "Deauville Proposal," which they presented to the French in September 1919, proposed that the boundary be expanded to extend along the Litani River north of Tyre. This attempt failed, as French Foreign Minister Berthelot refused to concede to Lloyd George's demands.[9]As far as Mount Lebanon itself was concerned, there was no dispute over France's claim to it and its protective policy toward its Christian population. However, the French felt that as the guardian of Catholic interests in the Levant, it should have greater access to Palestine, that is, to its Christian communities and holy sites.[10]

The end of World War One saw the Ottoman armies defeated in Palestine and the Beirut Vilayet, and Allenby's forces moving north from Jerusalem to Beirut. On October 8, 1918, Beirut was effectively occupied by Allenby's troops along with the French Détachement of the Palestine-Syria Corps. Britain conceded to assisting France in capturing Beirut;[11] however, it would not pay great attention to France's claims further south at Acre and kept its troops there.[12] It is within this context that the settlement of the Grand Liban's southern border must be considered first and foremost.

Two competing maps, one Lebanese the other Zionist, emerged as points of reference in the struggle for creating the Grand Liban at the Paris Peace Settlement in 1919. The first map was presented by the Lebanese delegation to the conference. It had been drawn up by the French *Reconnaissance de la Brigade Topographique du Corps Expéditionnaire de Syrie* to Mount Lebanon, which went as far south as Naqoura in the Upper Galilee and served as the reference for all parties arguing for the expansion of the Petit Liban. The French commander-in-chief, General Beaufort d'Hautpoul, who had been in charge of this mission, promoted the map by giving it historic legitimacy in taking Fakhr al-Din and his expansionist attempts at creating a Lebanese state. Long before Michel Chiha referred to the Bekaa Valley as "*notre grenier*," Beaufort named it "the granary of the Mountain." This map "represented the final manifestation of a longed-for dream [for the Maronites]." It "was to become Greater Lebanon some sixty years later along with a whole legitimizing view."[13] The second map, drawn by the Jewish Agency, reflected the vision of the Zionists as to the borders of their state, this included South Lebanon all the way up to Saida.[14]

Prior to this, several works had been published by Lebanese and European scholars supporting the expansion of Mount Lebanon

south in various ways.[15] Since 1912 there had also been extensive, organized efforts by Lebanese émigrés in Egypt, France (the Lebanese League in particular), and the Americas in lobbying for the enlargement of the Mountain's boundaries.[16] At the same time, the Comité de l'Asie Française at the Quai d'Orsay, Philippe Berthelot, and Robert de Caix had all been involved in defining French policy in Syria well before the war, and they enjoyed the support of the Colonial Party and a group of French parliamentarians in committing France to an eastern Mediterranean empire. In addition to the economic benefits, a drive of a religious (Catholic) nature from figures such as Robert de Caix and later General Gouraud was central in justifying French support of Levantine Christians, given the existing Jesuit and other missionary institutions of education in the region.[17]

Despite this, the issue of Grand Liban had not been really addressed on an international scale before the Peace Settlement, where it was raised by the French-backed Lebanese delegation headed by Daoud Ammoun, president of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon. His efforts were doubled by those of the Maronite Patriarch Elias Hoyek and Monseigneur Abdallah Khuri.[18] The delegation had been commissioned by the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon to extend the borders of Mount Lebanon to its "historical and geographic borders."[19] The demands of this delegation stated the demarcation of Lebanon would include the cities of Beirut, Tripoli, Saida as well as the districts of Baalbek, Akkar, Marjayoun, Saida, Hasbaya, and Rashaya.[20]

This delegation, although nominally representative of Lebanon's major confessions, was predominantly Christian. Some Sunni and Druze figures, such as Najib ʿAbd al-Malik, Tawfiq Arslan, and ʿAbd al-Halim Hajjar also attended, as did Tamir Bey Hamadeh of the Hermel, who represented the Shiʿi community.[21] Kamil al-Assaad, although nominally part of the delegation, did not attend.[22] The inclusion of Kamil al-Assaad is most probably a symbolic gesture on the part of the organizers to reflect the multi-communitarian nature of the delegation.

Patriarch Hoyek's presentation to the committee at the peace conference concerning border demarcation details was effective, as were the petitions and letters from individuals in the Southern region that demanded attachment to the Mountain. This is confirmed by dozens of letters written to the Maronite Church by Christians in the district of Saida pleading to be considered in the new state.[23] Hoyek also stated his appreciation of France's interest in the semihistorical Phoenicia and highlighted Lebanon's Phoenician heritage.

Egypt was a French success story. The rediscovery of Pharaonic Egypt and the resurrection of its monuments enhanced the status of French scholarship, such as *La Description de L'Egypte*, and confirmed the developing notion of modern nations as heirs to civilizations of antiquity (a heritage ignored or denied in the case of contemporary Egypt, but embraced and resurrected in the case of modern Greece). In his solemnly produced *Mission de Phénicie*, Ernest Renan indicates that his mission, a long time in the planning, was initiated at the proposition of Emperor Napoleon III.[24] Despite the relatively limited resources available to Renan, it is clear throughout his report that his *Mission* was conceived as a major endeavor likely to redraw the outlines of the history of antiquity and to revive a dormant heritage. The link between this civilization of antiquity and its putative heirs had not been established yet. However, Renan's mission presents many elements that set the stage for the later appropriation of the Phoenician idea by Maronite nationalism. Renan himself notes the positive reception of his work and the outright cooperation with his efforts on the part of the Maronite population, clergy, and laymen,

> My dealing with the gentle and good Maronite population has so far been excellent, especially in the Jbeil region. Not once did we encounter objections on the part of landowners on which we were conduction research. The enthusiasm by which they communicated to me information that could be useful was a real inspiration.[25]

Renan contrasts the goodwill of the Maronites, which he attributes to their friendship toward France as their protector and the protector of their Catholicism, with the "demi sauvages ou abruities" of the Muslim inferior races "incapables de comprendre la delicatesse dont on use envers elle" (Renan places the Greek Orthodox between these two extremes).[26] Two elements in Renan's exploration are provided with a positive assessment: the Phoenician civilization that survives Muslim (Arab and Turkish) "barbarism," and the Maronite community that was not "altered" despite its contact with "Greeks, Muslims and Levantines."[27] Renan does not himself make the equation between the two. Yet his reliance on a number of Maronite clergymen for collecting and processing information prepares the way for the special relation between Maronite national consciousness and the evolving historical myth of Phoenicia. In the contest for the history of the new Lebanon, as an entity in the process of identity-forming, Muslim historians were disadvantaged in trying to claim a share in the Phoenician heritage. Their approach was often to seek alternatives

(stressing the Arab dimension of Lebanese history) or to resort to a redefinition of Phoenician identity as an early Arab one (relying on the Semitic language of the Phoenicians and their Arabian descent).[28] With the later normalization of the Phoenician component of Lebanese history in the 1970s and 1980s, it became possible for Lebanese Muslims to share the claim of Phoenician ancestry.

Though the Maronites claimed for themselves “a historical connection to the Phoenicians, and Tyre and Sidon were their outlets to the sea,”[29] they did not consider the majority of the inhabitants of those regions, predominantly Muslim, as linked to that heritage as well. The Maronite appropriation of the Phoenician past was reflective of the French interests in rediscovering Phoenicia, with France positing itself as the protector of the Maronite population. Privileged and friendly access to the French efforts in that direction allowed Maronite intellectuals to claim this heritage, at a time when intellectuals from other communities had no access to it.

The argument for extending the borders of Mount Lebanon was twofold. On the one hand it was the materialization of a Maronite nationalism, cultivated by French officials and Jesuits, Père Henri Lammens, in particular. Maronite nationalism gained ground with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and French protectionism, toward a goal of creating a Christian haven among a region of Muslims.[30] In this dream, there was little interest in the non-Christian populations of some of the contested areas, for development and investment purposes, such as for the ‘Amili Shi‘is, and this attitude was to persist.[31]

On the other hand, the case for economic independence was strong. Memory of the Great War’s horrors was still fresh and one of the lessons learnt was that Mount Lebanon’s agricultural independence had to be ensured to prevent future famines. But this could only be done with additional territory and water sources; hence, the need for the Bekaa and the coast. In addition, more land could resolve the outflow of immigrants to the Americas, allowing them more opportunities at home.

Hoyek, however, was practical, and took British and Zionist demands into consideration. He suggested that if it were impossible to define the borders at Naqoura south, then stopping at the Qassimiyieh/Leontes River would be acceptable to his people, as long as the border was linked to the southeast, to include the Christian inhabitants of the caza of Marjayoun.[32] This option divided Jabal ‘Amil in two with the southern section, Bilad Bishara, including the Litani River unclaimed by the Maronites.

The demands of the Lebanese for a state were evidently backed by France, acting as their protector. These Maronite aspirations were

being considered as far back as Napoleon III's reign.[33] However, the borders requested by the delegation, based on the expeditionary map of 1862, were further north than the borders France was assigned under the Sykes–Picot agreement. The fact that the French sphere of influence had already been reduced by concessions to the British, meant that no further allowances would be made by the French over this boundary, despite Maronite flexibility on the matter. This ensured the borders demarcated by the map of 1862, and that the Lebanese delegation would not budge on the border at Naqoura, south of the Litani. Lloyd George's claims to restoring Palestine to its "ancient confines of Dan unto Beersheba" was "out of the question at this time [February 1920]."[34]

The Franco-British convention on the Lebanon–Palestine border was signed on December 23, 1920, with both sides agreeing to form a commission that would demarcate the boundary and examine water sources.[35] This was followed by a demarcation survey that published its findings as the Newcombe–Paulet report in 1922 and the eventual transfer of seven predominantly Shi‘i villages from French to British control in Palestine.

There was little mention of the native population of these regions in the official documents of the peace conference, other than religious references to Christians and Muslims in the case of Lebanon, and Arabs and Jews in the case of Palestine. The primary concern was water, which the French conceded to by allowing Palestine access to the upper Jordan and Yarmuk rivers. As for the speeches of the Lebanese delegations, there is no mention of the inhabitants of the South.

The impact of the boundary partition was immense on the ‘Amili population. The area was not interesting either strategically or economically for Britain and France;[36] their decisions, however, imposed harsher economic conditions on the predominantly Shi‘i population. For instance, the southern town of Bint Jbail had been positioned in the middle of a hinterland trade network linked to Safad, Hula, and Acre through Tyre; the boundary now severed its connection to Safad in the south and Hula in the east and devastated its trade and artisanal industry. The same is true of Marjayoun in the east, which was severed from its hinterland in the Hula valley, which now sat on the Palestinian side of the border. The division was drawn up according to the presence of vulnerable Jewish settlements, Metula in particular, which had been the subject of attacks by Bedouin Arabs in 1920, without any reference to the needs of Jabal ‘Amil.

Despite the borders, human traffic continued, which the local French and British administrations were forced to recognize in 1926

with the "Agreement between Palestine and Syria and the Lebanon to Facilitate Good Neighborly Relations in Connection with Frontier Questions."[37] A far greater setback for Jabal 'Amil would come in 1948 with the establishment of Israel and the closing of these borders entirely. This would completely kill the economic exchange between Jabal 'Amil and its southern links creating a bottleneck of poverty, given that region had no other outlet, already being neglected by the government in Beirut.[38]

In contrast to Lebanese demands for a historic Lebanon, which had no particular design for the South, the Zionists led by Chaim Weizmann continued their efforts to include the Litani River in Palestine as an essential source of water, even after the Franco-British Convention of 1920.[39] The British were unmoved on this point as they had fulfilled their promise of creating a home for the Jews; details on economic and water rights were secondary at this stage. Similarly, correspondence between Weizmann and General Gouraud negotiating Zionist access to areas of the South proved futile.[40] Zionist security fears for their unprotected northern border as well as their limited water sources continued, which set the stage for the eventual attempted reversal of this border.[41] Like their Maronite counterparts, the Zionist leaders had no interest in the inhabitants of the region and entertained the possibility of building settlements.

When General Henri Gouraud declared the Grand Liban in 1920, the Lebanese nationalists had much to celebrate, for they had achieved a state far larger than their Mountain. However, to what extent they had taken into consideration the Muslim population that would be incorporated along with the land is unclear. The addition of the four districts to the Mountain undermined the comfortable majority status for the Christians; they were no longer an overwhelming majority, but at best 55 percent Christian to 45 percent Muslims, according to the 1921 census.[42]

In fact, by accomplishing their objective of a larger Christian state, the Lebanese nationalists undermined the nature of the very state they aspired to, making it no longer possible to ignore the non-Christian populations.[43]

According to French documents, which reveal conflicting opinions among government staff, the Grand Liban camp was advised of the repercussions of an enlarged Lebanon. Robert de Caix, who eventually became Gouraud's secretary general in Beirut, was against an enlargement of Lebanon to preserve its Christian majority. His primary concern was to ensure French interests and in his opinion a smaller but largely Christian state was therefore the best option.[44]

He was deeply influenced by Lyautey's policies in Morocco and pursued a similar line of thought regarding native policy in Syria.[45] Driven primarily by the need to weaken the Arab nationalist movement in Syria, de Caix proposed a system of autonomous states—the 'Alawi region, Jabal Druze, and the Sanjak of Alexandretta—as a counter-provision. He argued that the different religious groups would undermine the cohesion of a Lebanese state and proposed joining only the Bekaa valley and Akkar to Mount Lebanon, though he underestimated the number of Muslim inhabitants there. As for Tripoli, he appreciated its strong links with the interior and proposed making it an autonomous port city flanked by Lebanon to the south and the 'Alawi state to the north and east—which he thought would reduce Arab nationalist hostility. Beirut, he eventually suggested, should also be an "autonomous municipal city."[46] De Caix was unsure about the South and the Sanjak of Saida, and "deferred until it became clear how the first two regions, Bekaa and Akkar, had fared." He initially proposed the establishment of an autonomous "Mitwali" state like the Syrian examples, but was also aware of the boundary complications with the British and the Zionists.

However, with the success of the Grand Liban advocates, as well as Millerand's endorsement of Gouraud's desire for a Grand Liban, de Caix had to relinquish his plan at least for the time being, though it continued to resonate for some years to come. In accepting the territorial expansion of Lebanon to include the four districts, de Caix proceeded to "overcome the problems created by the heterogeneous character of Lebanon by establishing a 'Lebanese federation' comprising Mount Lebanon, with its clear Christian majority, the Sanjak of Sidon with its Mitwali inhabitants, and Beirut with its large Sunni and Greek Orthodox communities."[47]

De Caix firmly opposed drawing the boundary at the Litani, as Patriarch Hoyek had proposed at the peace conference, on the grounds that it contradicted common sense and would create political problems, as one community, the Shi'is, was effectively being divided into two sections. He also argued that it went against the community's religious and social consideration.[48] Economically, dividing this region implied depriving France of fertile land in Tyre and Marjayoun. This would furthermore provide complications for absentee landowners, with Beirutis in particular needing to deal with both Syria and Palestine. De Caix was also cautious of Zionist demands on the South. In a memorandum to Millerand on July 17, 1920, he warns of the danger of leaving the area "[which] is isolated and composed of disparate groups," exposed to Palestine and to Zionism, which he

believed had already displayed economic and territorial expansionist aims. Thus, whatever future administrative arrangement for Jabal 'Amil was eventually decided on, the region was certain to remain under French control.[49] Millerand and Gouraud took de Caix's suggestions on the boundary issue into consideration.

Millerand advised Gouraud to include the Sanjak of Saida in the new state, but left to him the final decision on determining its status, whether autonomous or fully integrated with Lebanon.[50] On September 1, 1920, Gouraud issued decree no. 318 to establish l'Etat du Grand Liban, which included the caza of Tyre, including Bilad Bishara, and the caza of Hasbaya, including Marjayoun to the Palestinian border.[51] In his speech at the French residence in Beirut, Gouraud mentioned the newly attached regions to Mount Lebanon with much jubilation. With reference to the South he said, "With Sidon and Tyre, of their famous past [in reference to their Phoenician heritage], a new youth will emerge of this union with the great homeland."[52] As this reference demonstrates, the Phoenician was ever present in references to the new Lebanese state to be created.

As can be seen, these decisions on the extent of the incorporation of Jabal 'Amil in the Grand Liban, were not at all informed by the wishes of its inhabitants. Though 'Amili desires concerning their own political future had been expressed with relative confusion by their leadership, there was a consistent demand for autonomy, whether within a French or Syrian state.[53] The 'Amilis, however, lacked the political capability, organization, contacts, and resources to present a formal case to the Paris Peace Conference and they had no parity with the developed sense of mission and identity of the Maronite community in attaining similar wishes. The 'Amili's main opportunity for expressing their demands had been via petitions presented to the King–Crane Commission and French High Commission.

In the end, the decision by the French to integrate this region into the new state of Lebanon and not give it regional autonomy was ultimately determined by a problematic border and the fluid situation in Palestine. Direct control of the region from Beirut was a feasible option: the distances were manageable. At the same time, the currents of Arab nationalism in Beirut were far less threatening than in Damascus, with which an autonomous region of Jabal 'Amil would have potentially been linked, at least in the mind of the French. De Caix in a lengthy memo to Berthelot justified his opinion on this decision as follows:

> The Muslims of the dissident Shi'i sect are peasants who obey their leaders. These have rarely expressed anti-Lebanese sentiments . . . The

> fact of being a Shi‘i is by no means incompatible with being Lebanese . . . as the Mitwalis [Shi‘is] of the Hermil attached to the Lebanon since 1860 have demonstrated. For the Shi‘is of the South, it is very much a question of local politics. Geography has negected the coastal region of Tyre: the attribution of Hula to Palestine all the way to Metelleh and to the Banias borders will not easily allow the establishment of a territorial link between Syria and the land of Tyre.[54]

Defining the Lebanese State

The establishment of the Grand Liban in 1920 triggered opposition among the Muslim populations seeking union with Syria. It also remained a debatable accomplishment for the French administration, particularly under General De Jouvenel, the fifth high commissioner who attempted to ratify the border. More importantly, it was eventually questioned by prominent Maronite politicians who lobbied for reducing the size of the Grand Liban.

The next five years in Syria and Lebanon would be trying for France in terms of securing control over these two mandates. Even after the Arab defeat at Maysalun in July 1920, pockets of opposition remained in Syria. Furthermore, the economic situation of the mandates was dire, particularly aggravated by their being linked to the weak French franc. In 1925 a nationalist revolt broke out in Jabal Druze and spread to Damascus. It would last for two years and French military casualties ran high, which threatened their entire policy in the region.[55]

Henri De Jouvenel was the first civilian high commissioner and a supporter of Robert de Caix's views on a smaller and more Christian Lebanon: he considered it wiser policy to reduce Lebanese territory to its Christian core and to join Tripoli and ‘Akkar to Syria.[56] This opinion remained within the Quai d'Orsay, but the fact that it continued to be discussed reflects the uncertainty of French policy in this region.

De Jouvenel saw the impact of the nationalists in the 1925 revolt and understood the need to change the French attitude toward them. He also believed in the need for France to apply its proper role as a protector of these mandates, which would further the native population on the road to independence as stipulated in the League of Nation classification of Mandate (A). He faced great opposition from both the Quai d'Orsay and French officials on the ground, within the Serail and intelligence services, and the majority of the Maronite community, led by the Maronite Church. Emile Eddé, a future president of Lebanon, supported De Jouvenel's vision of a smaller Lebanon, but he was in a minority[57] and believed the way to safeguard Lebanon's Christian character was to detach some predominantly Muslim areas.

Eddé presented a memorandum to the under secretary of state at the Quai d'Orsay in August 1932 calling for the reduction of Lebanon's territory. He suggested the detachment of Tripoli and South Lebanon from the Grand Liban, which would remove 140,000 Muslims. He proposed creating an autonomous state of South Lebanon, as Robert de Caix had initially suggested. He wrote,

> It could be possible to make of South Lebanon with its Shi'i majority an autonomous state headed by a French adminstrator, like in Alexandretta for the Allawis and in Tripoli.[58]

What is interesting about Eddé's choice of territory is the pragmatism. The population of the Bekaa was 79 percent Muslim, and Beirut had a considerable Muslim population. Yet both were economically imperative for Lebanon, in terms of the Bekaa's agriculture and Beirut's commerce. On the other hand, Tripoli was rendered a secondary port city to Beirut, having had its economic network with the hinterland severed; it had a strong Muslim population in opposition to the Mandate, and in support of Syrian union—while Syria claimed it as its natural port. As for the South, Eddé's willingness to detach it revealed an attitude that many more probably shared—the futility of this region in contributing anything to Lebanon, an appendage that was more burden than benefit. The fact that neither the Syrians nor the Lebanese claimed the South at this stage demonstrates its unequal footing with the rest of Lebanon and undermined its integration. As a result, many southerners were to feel a long-lasting sentiment of rejections from the Lebanese polity.

By the 1930s, when Emile Eddé was fighting Bishara al-Khuri for the presidency, he had established links with several politically prominent southerners. This was a reflection of the fact that the political leadership in Jabal 'Amil was becoming divided into two camps regarding the presidential race. Najib Osseiran, a Shi'i notable from Saida, was one of the first MPs in the Grand Liban and a staunch Eddé supporter. Despite this, the subject of Lebanese territory was not discussed at length in Lebanon in general or with MPs from the South more specifically. Despite the appearance of an article by Habib Bustani in *L'Orient* that was critical of Emile Eddé's position, there were no noted reactions to Eddé's memorandum in the Shi'i community.[59] The fact that the article was published in a French-language newspaper that catered to a Francophone Christian audience partly explains its limited impact. Indeed resorting to French was an established means, at times implicit, at others explicit, to limit the audience

of debate to the intended Francophone/Francophile mostly Christian community. This exclusion was based on hierarchization of the cultural components that overlap in Lebanon, with the perceived Phoenician-Christian-"Lebanese" continuum in evident superiority over the Muslim Arab. A relic of this view can still be seen in official maps of Lebanon that lists historical sites according to an implicit hierarchy of importance and authenticity. The list in descending order is: Lebanese, Phoenician, Roman, Crusader, Byzantine, Arab, and Natural Curiosity.[60]

Furthermore, Bustani's criticism indirectly suggests that it would not have been a welcome recommendation to the Maronites.[61] The contents of his memorandum therefore remained within the confines of the Quai d'Orsay.

Petit Liban/Grand Liban and the Ideological Disinheritance of Jabal 'Amil

A debate emerged among the intellectual elite in the newly established state of Grand Liban on the question of defining Lebanon. An enormous number of historical, political, economic, and literary works were devoted to the nature of Lebanon, by "Lebanese"[62] historians and economists, all of which reflected a profound self-consciousness.[63] The most celebrated definition of modern Lebanon is that of the city, Beirut, and the mountain, Mount Lebanon. This identity, the marrying of the ancient trading traditions of the seafaring Phoenicians with the spiritual homeland of the Lebanese, was adopted by many academics and local political figures in an attempt to explain Lebanon. Different variations of this emerged with the most eloquent being Albert Hourani's essay "Ideologies on the City and the Mountain," which describes the process as "a broadening agreement between political elites, each of which controlled its community in its own way and in the name of its own political ideologies."[64] Strictly speaking, this was the agreement between the dominant political and economic elites: Maronite in the mountain, Sunni, Greek Orthodox, and Catholic in Beirut. Hourani's apt description was indeed reflective of a cultural state. Although he might have given the dichotomy its label, the tenor of the discourse clearly indicates that it originated with the foundation of the Grand Liban.

The basis of the state of the Grand Liban was Mount Lebanon, or the Petit Liban, the geographical and spiritual home of the Maronite community of Lebanon. There is no doubt that along with the Anglo-French rivalry that influenced several final outcomes of the

post-Ottoman regional vacuum, the strong relationship with the Maronites was at the core of French policy in Lebanon. From this base stems the idea of a Lebanese nation state, which, in order to function healthily, required a viable economic base; hence, the need to attach the areas of the north, east, and south to Mount Lebanon to create the Grand Liban.

The age-old premise of the Mountain with a developed sense of identity in perennial search of a political expression has been the generally accepted view on this subject. Mount Lebanon was a mountain of refuge for religious minorities; in this case, the Maronites, who survived Islamic expansion and later Ottoman domination in the region, overcame the challenge and schisms of the Eastern Church under Byzantine rule, and established a strong and thriving church with strong links to the Western Catholic world. This dominant Maronite ideology has been dubbed by Hourani as the "ideology of the Mountain,"[65] which has developed a unique historical consciousness in Mount Lebanon dating back to the seventeenth century, which he considers unique to the region. This is in large part due to the Maronite Church leaders who were preoccupied with the political welfare of their community, which they also represented.[66]

Another viewpoint is that Lebanese nationalism, like Arab nationalism, did not exist in a mature and politically developed form prior to the mid-nineteenth century.[67] The Maronites did not form a united bloc, as differences existed among the elites, the church, and the masses, as well as the political differences between the northern and southern parts of Mount Lebanon.[68] Nevertheless, it is clear that Lebanese nationalism had developed successfully by the time the Lebanese nation state was created.[69]

Another assumption with strong political and cultural echoes, closely linked to the first, is Phoenicianism. It has been claimed, largely by Maronite ultranationalists, that they are the descendants of the Phoenicians, an ancient people whose main cities were on the eastern Mediterranean coast, thus justifying Lebanon's 5,000-year existence, with the Grand Liban as Phoenicia's modern heir. This opinion was greatly legitimized in their eyes by scholarly works arguing that Phoenician civilization had a strong impact on the West.[70] However, there are different interpretations among the advocates of this idea, such as the emphasis on the Maronites' non-Arab identity (see Charles Corm's poem, *La Montagne Inspirée*, for an extreme view), and of Lebanon's Mediterranean heritage linking it to the equally ancient Mediterranean centers of civilization, thus highlighting its cultural and economic links with the Western world.

Encouraged by France's colonial aspirations during Napoleon III's reign, the Phoenician idea received significant attention from France. In applying similar methods of assimilation to those used in Morocco on the Berber population to solidify its rule, France engaged in a large-scale cultural, scientific, and political effort to highlight the inherent Christianity of Lebanon.[71]

The Mediterranean element of the Phoenician connection was expounded on by Michel Chiha, whose Phoenicianism stemmed from his urban background as a Greek Catholic banker in Beirut and was culturally formed in Francophone Jesuit schools.[72] Chiha understood Lebanon as a fundamentally agricultural state with a geographically determined position at the crossroads of three continents. A firm believer in a free market economy, he envisioned a commercial nation in which Beirut was the gate to the mountain on one side and to the world on the other: a union of the mountain and the sea. He believed in the need for an extended Lebanon, beyond the limits of the city and the mountain, for its economic survival. This, in his view, was the purpose of the Bekaa Valley, which, as noted earlier, he described as "*notre grenier*."[73] The famine of World War One highlighted the importance of ensuring that the Mount would not be without its supply of grains. This supply implied attaching the predominantly Muslim Bekaa valley to the *Mutasarrifiyya*. In doing so, the demographic balance in favor of the Christians of Lebanon was altered so that they could not claim a comfortable majority.[74]

Chiha defined his opinion on the differences between the East and West in terms of modes of living. He argued that the East, unlike the West, was characterized by laziness (due to the weather, among other explanations), and that Lebanon, due to its Mediterranean influence, belonged to the West. The pivotal figure of Chiha has been the subject of much scholarship in Lebanon. Among the foremost scholars on Chiha, Fawaz Traboulsi, in his work *Michel Chiha and the Lebanese Ideology*, notes that Chiha's conception of Lebanon became the dominant one among Lebanese thinkers, and came to be regarded as the principal reference on defining Lebanon.[75] Chiha's writings are highly original while containing flagrant contradictions.[76] Chiha had a geographically deterministic vision that was greatly influenced by the writer Jawad Bulus.[77] This vision, in its crudest form, classified the Mediterranean as Europe and therefore civilized while the desert/Asia was barbarian. It was a "doubtful vision . . . based on colonial orientalism," founded on essentialism, a naturalism that defined people in terms of a hierarchy of cultures and ethnicities.[78]

Traboulsi's critique of Chiha's position is that his idea of a Lebanon with a liberal economy essentially catered to only one class of people. Despite his belief in a pluralistic democracy, the problem was that the economic emphasis highlighted only an urban class inspired by Chiha's own background class within this "democracy." What Chiha achieved was to enlarge the mountain state of the Maronites to include that segment of Beirut's commercial and financial class with its links to Western capital, which was at the same time predominantly Christian. It was a plutocracy of city merchants that by geographic definition excluded those outside this tight framework. A community such as the Shi'is could therefore not participate.

Nevertheless, Chiha's position on the Grand Liban was not expressed in religious terms. One could argue that he represented a more pragmatic point of view within the Christian camp. Despite occasional accusations of the Grand Liban being created to serve the interests of the Maronite community as the local French client, the inclusion of territories and populations that effectively diluted the paramountcy of the Maronites places the French creation of the new state more in the logic of colonial rivalry between France and Britain. Chiha attempted a rationalization of the de facto situation and conceived of the new Lebanon as potentially a confederation along Swiss lines with communities replacing cantons.[79] This functioned best through parliament, which provided a space for intercommunitarian exchanges on economics.

After the creation of the Grand Liban, the Maronites leaders of the mountain emerged as isolationists. Exemplified by Emile Eddé, they wanted first and foremost a Christian Lebanon with an overwhelming Christian majority. The Grand Liban that was given to them was not what they had asked for, as the Christian majority status was far from being demographically comfortable. In the end, despite French consideration for the Maronites, the Grand Liban did not really satisfy any pleading party.

Another viewpoint, elaborated on by Hourani, is of the emergence of the notion of nation, functioning within a broader political framework, established and maintained by a hierarchy of leading families, who associate with each other as a political elite. "Implicit in this idea was a certain religious pluralism, for the leading families were Sunni as well as Maronite and Druze, and the alliances between them cut across religious divisions."[80] This idea began to take shape in the early nineteenth century, but was still based in Mount Lebanon.

The urban notables, predominantly Sunni, who had a strong social basis in Beirut and who stemmed from the post-Ottoman reality, were

an outcome of Ottomanism. In effect, this idea expounds from the idea of the Arab kingdom that failed in Damascus, but still echoed in Syria's coastal cities; "it was an embodiment of the ideal formulated, in different ways, by the statement of the Tanzimat and their Syrian supporters, and then by the Ottoman liberals and their allies in the Arab cities, the Party of Decentralization and the Beirut Reform Committee of 1913."[81] Above all it was recognition of the presence and sociopolitical links of the Sunni urban elite to their coastal cities, with Beirut in the lead. Whether because of their status as a provincial community or their lack of exposure to Francophone culture, the Shi‘is of Jabal ‘Amil were largely excluded and absent from these discussions.

Ideological Disinheritance

In its focus on Mount Lebanon and Beirut, the "city and mountain" discourse highlighted the problem in the relationship between Lebanon and the Shi‘is that this formula excluded. The ‘Amili political leadership and the educated elite reacted differently to this narrative and to the reality it reflected. For pragmatic considerations, major ‘Amili political figures sought to participate in the new political reality while the ‘Amili educated elite presented an ambivalent reaction to it. ‘Amili intellectuals asserted their ability to resist a marginal integration (with Jabal ‘Amil as merely an addendum to Lebanon) by adhering to the Arabist conception of what Lebanon should be. They also sought to develop elements that would place Jabal ‘Amil on an equal footing with Mount Lebanon in the Lebanists conception, at the heart of the history of the newly created state by emphasizing their attachment to that region.

At the onset of the Mandate, two conflicting intellectual presentations competed in Lebanon: Lebanist and Arabist. The former was heir to an internalized European model that was informed by archeology as was mentioned earlier in this chapter (i.e., Lebanon as heir to Phoenicia), a conception of nation that was applied to the Christians of the Levant and in particular to the Maronites of Lebanon.[82] The latter was a syncretistic melding of the French and German conception of nation with the traditional Sunni-dominated conception of a political Muslim community.[83] ‘Amili Shi‘is were excluded from the first formulation because they were not Christian. However, in the Arabist formulation they were only accommodated in the second formulation on a tentative marginalizing (junior) basis.[84] Shi‘i intellectuals accepted the place accorded to them in the Sunni-dominated Arabist

formulation. As noted before, this has to be viewed in the context of a process of negotiation between an ideologically driven impulse toward acceptance and a pragmatically driven impulse of accommodation and integration in the new reality. This negotiation also played a role in deepening the rift between the political and the educated elites. The absence of a substantive Shiʿi voice in the ongoing Lebanist–Arabist debate is in itself reflective of an ideological disinheritance that is only somewhat being redressed today.[85]

Jabal ʿAmil in the Lebanist Perspective

In considering the contesting ideological claims to Lebanon and its people, we have observed that the Shiʿi community was badly positioned. Within the definition of Lebanon for the Christians, whether Chiha's or that of the Maronite isolationists, the ʿAmilis could not be included on any basis—religious, geographic, or economic—despite Chiha's claim that the north and south were "an extension of the Eternal Mountain."[86] The Shiʿi community was not included in the state Chiha proposed.

Chiha's vision gave politico-economic predominance to the Christians, despite his stated avoidance of communitarian definitions, which left no space for the rest of Lebanon's religiously defined minorities at the helm of the new nation state. Nevertheless, Chiha believed they could somehow cohabitate and flourish by "the will of collective living" as he called it, which was based on two elements: solidarity of minorities against the background of a regional majority and economic benefits.[87]

In Chiha's problematic logic, there was a collective interest and an advantage for minorities in protecting their status within Lebanon. However, as Trabousli points out, this opens up the debate on whether all communities in Lebanon are minorities and whether they are equal. The major counterargument to Chiha is the Sunni community, which, while it may be one minority among others within Lebanon, belongs to a larger community in the Arab world. One other flaw is the fear of the evolution of one of the minorities into an effective majority as have the Shiʿis, which are arguably the largest community demographically. The difficulty for the Shiʿi community in this equation is that although Chiha's first point can apply to them, as they were effectively a minority externally as well as internally and could thus objectively gain from being in Lebanon, two currents undermined their complete immersion: one was Sunni political hegemony; the second was the lack of economic gains, which belies Chiha's supposition.

This economic aspect was problematic for the Shiʿi ʿAmilis, as they were not part of the network of merchants that extended along the coast. Their societal composition was fundamentally rural and the Shiʿi mercantile families of Saida were few, with negligible weight in the Beirut marketplace. In addition, the overall inequality of Shiʿis when compared to the urban and mountain communities was great. This aspect of communal disparity did not feature in Chiha's analysis, although it was a glaring reality in the Lebanon he lived in. Only an economic minority that was linked to the capital could compete in such a domain, which added an unaccounted-for communitarian element to Chiha's vision. In such a world, the Shiʿis of Lebanon in general, and those of Jabal ʿAmil in particular, had no place confessionally, economically, or geographically. For Shiʿis there were in essence two negatives in the desire for collective existence: they were a political minority and did not have economic power. This would prove a great challenge to overcome.

Jabal ʿAmil in the Arabist Perspective

The development of the Arabist political currents suggested that the Lebanese Shiʿis would follow the Arabist line as defined by urban notable politics. There was a great deal of appeal to the ʿAmilis of an Arab state that was both Arab and, ideally, secular, as it could potentially allow them to embrace their Arab identity before their religious one, which had been an obstacle to political and communal equality during the Ottoman period. In an atmosphere of intense Arabness, ʿAmili intellectuals saw an opportunity to cultivate a national awareness with its roots in Jabal ʿAmil and one that was clearly defined in opposition to the Mandate.

Within a Lebanese entity, the Muslims had a sense of exclusion with regard to the Mandate's preference for the Maronite community. The general Sunni position was a rejection of the minority status they felt was imposed on them by the Lebanese structure as dictated by the French; an example of this was the inability of the pro-French Tripolitain, Shaykh Muhammad al-Jisr, to become president in 1932.[88] Within this position, the Shiʿi could navigate against the Mandate, although they did not necessarily suffer additional discrimination at this stage to what they had experienced during the Ottoman era. As a regional political minority, the Shiʿi political elites had less to lose than the Sunni elites given that they had fewer advantages to begin with.

However, upon closer examination, one discovers that to those without any established sociopolitical networks in the urban center,

Arabism in its Lebanese format was in fact exclusive in precisely the same way as Chiha's Beirut: it could only exist in terms of an unsolicited de facto political guardianship of the Sunnis representing Shi'is in the absence of a sociopolitical space for the latter. This attitude is well summed up in the diary of a Sunni from Beirut written ca. 1941:

> The Shi'a in Lebanon have a glorious history. They came [to Lebanon] after the Arab conquests and settled there, they lived in the coast and the mountain . . . There is no doubt that the interest of the Shi'i community in Lebanon is to always unite with the mother (*al-umm*) Sunni community and that it should adopt its external and internal political positions. There is no blame for the Sunni community if it takes the lead in guiding other Muslims in Lebanon because the question is not one of competition and rivalry, but one of choice, practice and social advancement . . . Hitler was a Catholic by religion, but he saw that for the good of his country he needed to embrace Protestantism, so he did. The supremacy of the Sunni community as far as external and internal politics assists those men responsible for the Shi'i community and its areas that are deprived of civilization and sophistication. Different periods in Lebanon have proved that the Mandate did not pay attention to the existence of the Shi'i community. Its sons, when they access power, become polarized and they are concerned with keeping their community backward, keeping their people ignorant in order to control it through *iqta'* to benefit their interest. However the dominance of the Sunnis in politics, if ensured, will not default on its [the Shi'i's] rights. On the contrary it will protect them and seek to realize them. And if we ask for this, we do not do it out of communitarian selfishness but out of a firm belief in what we ask and call for.[89]

As a partial consequence of the Shi'is having a negligible position in the Ottoman world order, by the 1930s they did not have a significant political or economic presence in Beirut, nor did they have firm ties with Beirut's Sunni merchant and political families—although one can note emerging changes with the establishment of the 'Amiliyya School and the transferal of 'Amili rivalries to the Beirut scene in the late 1930s and 1940s. Beirut's sociopolitical layout simply did not allow for the effective participation of the Shi'is.[90] This phenomenon was not restricted to the Shi'is only. Beirut's preeminence rendered the elite of Saida and Tripoli secondary to Beirut, and in need of establishing strong ties to the institutions of power in the city and the mountain. This is best noted in the early years of the Mandate when not only were some leading Shi'i politicians from Saida and the South receptive to a Lebanese state, but some Sunni politicians from Tripoli were as well.

The ‘Amili intellectuals followed the Ottoman–Sunni idea of the "city" in their political rhetoric, lobbying like their Sunni counterparts for Lebanon's union with Syria. This is abundantly reflected in the writings of the ‘Amili Trio and Shaykh Ahmad ‘Arif al-Zayn, as well as in their efforts to associate with the Damascene political scene as a form of rejection of the French Mandate and Lebanon. This position was also pursued by a younger generation of educated ‘Amilis recently returned from the rebellious environment of Iraq, which had become the battleground for political activism, both anti-British colonial activity and the rise of pro-Arab political parties in the 1920s and 1930s. This second generation that developed socialist and communist tendencies included Shaykh ‘Ali al-Zayn,[91] Hashim al-Amin,[92] Muhammad ‘Ali al-Humani, Husayn Muruwwa, Muhammad Jawad Shirri, Muhammad Sharara,[93] Sadr al-Din Sharaf al-Din, and Muhammad Jawad Mughniyya. They all became bitter critics of the religious and political establishment they emerged from in Najaf and Jabal ‘Amil. But in their belonging to Lebanon, they faced a serious ideological problem that could not be resolved. Despite their religious differences with the Najaf mainstream, they were still integrated in its literary and intellectual circles rather than in those of Lebanon. At the same time, they could not identify with a Lebanon that did not address them or the needs of their region, which eventually reduced them to peripheral figures demanding the basic requirements of schools, electricity, and water for Jabal ‘Amil. This disconnection was confirmed after 1936, when these Shi‘i intellectuals steered toward transnational ideological parties such as Communist and Syrian Socialist, in the absence of any indigenous ideology they could embrace or formulate.

The period of the French Mandate in Lebanon was marked by several major events: the Syrian revolt of 1925; an economic crisis and the tobacco revolts that culminated in 1936; and the Palestinian revolt that also took place in 1936. These events played a major role in asserting the nationalist/anti-French convictions of the ‘Amili intellectuals. Armed with radical views, this generation of ‘Amili intellectuals saw themselves as providing national deliverance for their people. Witnessing the demise of the mighty Ottoman Empire fed their hope that they could bring about national self-determination and an end to the rule of the *zu‘ama’*, backwardness, and authoritarianism on a societal level, notwithstanding French occupation. For this group, opposition to the French was not just a political reaction, it was more importantly a social opposition to an occupying power, which sustained and nurtured the traditional political leadership in Jabal ‘Amil.

This strong sense of opposition, bolder than that of the generation of the 'Amili Trio, spoke the same political language as the Sunnis as far as Syrian unity was concerned. They were more exposed to a Lebanese world, with greater access to Beirut, where the disparities with their south were dramatic. Muhammad 'Ali al-Humani, who was Jabal 'Amil's foremost literary export to the Arab world, called for Syrian unity, supported the 1925 revolt, and resisted the Mandate with his poignant verses and articles. He used his journal *al-'Uruba* as a platform for expressing his political views, which stemmed from the established 'Amili sentiment of disinheritance, neglect, and rejection by Lebanon. In a lecture in 1929, Humani describes himself as "a messenger of angry youth, the messenger of the Arab *Nahda*, the messenger of freedom and independence, I have no religion except the Arab emblem and no sect except love of country."[94] On first impression it is a blunt message of Arabism, yet his need to justify his position, to distance himself from his own community, is as significant as his attachment to a larger Arab cause.

Shaykh 'Ali al-Zayn held similar political views as al-Humani and was reportedly as being extremely vocal during the 1936 tobacco revolt in Bint Jbail. His League of *'Isbat al-Adab al 'Amili* ('Amili Belles Lettres) was a political grassroots effort to mobilize his compatriots with literature as the conduit. This league has yet to be recognized within the context of modern Arabic literature.[95]

The underlying theme of these positions is a rhetoric of demand, which is fundamentally preoccupied with Jabal 'Amil, but it was concealed in a token language of nationalism. Ironically, it was a similar language of demand that the 'Amili politicians used in the official world of the state institutions, particularly parliament.

The active pursuit of Syrian unity among the Sunnis of Lebanon was challenged by separate Syrian agreements with the French over Syrian independence. This caused the Lebanese Muslims to reconsider their position in Lebanon, as their Syrian brethren were doing in Syria. In 1936, this led to the final series of the *Mu'tamar al-Sahil*, Conference of the Coast, presided over by Salim 'Ali Salam. It was attended by various Arab nationalist groups with a Sunni predominance, as well as members of the Parti Populaire Syrien and observer status for the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon.[96] Significantly, there were no Syrian National Bloc representatives. It seems that the lesson they learnt from the Syrians' neglect of them was that at this stage independence from the French was a more urgent aim than union: with sovereignty, desires for union would be attained. However, the final communiqué signed and presented to the French

high commissioner was considered incomplete and problematic by many, both inside and outside the Sunni community.

The problem of this conference was in the inability of its leaders to address the Maronite community, or to reconcile with any type of Lebanese entity. It was a rejection of the very existence of Lebanon as defined by Mount Lebanon and its four districts. The conference's resolution was challenged by Muslims (both Sunni and Shi'i) and Christians alike. Furthermore, it was a sectarian resolution to the extent that the majority of the signatories were Sunnis.[97]

The strongest challenge came from Kazim al-Sulh in his noted essay of March 1936, "*Mushkilat al-Ittisal wa-l Infisal*" (The Problem of Connection and Disconnection).[98] Al-Sulh and his two brothers, together with Shafiq Lutfi, a distinguished Sunni lawyer from the South, and Adel Osseiran, a young Shi'i notable who was just emerging politically, refused to sign the resolution reached at the conference for reasons elaborated in al-Sulh's article. Al-Sulh pointed out that it was in the interest of all Lebanese parties to cooperate to secure a sound economic future for Lebanon while recognizing its position as an Arab state among other Arab states. He also wrote that because Lebanon was different from other Arab states, reaching a national consensus was the foremost priority. Al-Sulh argued that the challenge facing the Muslims was to promote a secular Arab nationalism that would appeal to the Maronites, as well as ensuring that any union with other Arab states could only be done through democratic means. The renowned Lebanese historian Kamal Salibi argues that this equation provided "the basis for a vigorous Christian-Muslim alliance, the working principles of which are . . . the National Pact."[99]

One can argue that none of the 'Amili figures who signed the conference resolution were of the Shi'i political leadership. However, inspite of the cultural prominence of the 'Amili Trio and Ahmad 'Arif al-Zayn, they did not have the political power to affect 'Amili politics. To a certain extent, the Conference of the Coast represented a line of continuity for them from the era of Arab government in Damascus and their support of it. One aspect of that continuity was the rhetorical vascillation of these Shi'i intellectuals as far as calling for Jabal 'Amil's union with Syria was concerned while voicing demands for the development of the region within the Lebanese entity.

One such example was Ahmad 'Arif al-Zayn who, although a signatory of the Conference of the Coast statement is also quoted by Kazim al-Sulh as objecting to the conclusions of the Conference.[100] In this quote, al-Zayn declared the issue of union with Syria, the core issue of the Conference, as being of secondary importance to the

principal issue for pursuit: that of the independence of Lebanon. This quoted position is in contradiction to the Conference statement that had union with Syria as its central theme. Al-Zayn's statement, which contradicts his declared political position, can be viewed as a response to the emergence of an alternative Muslim view, according to which union with Syria is no longer a priority. Al-Zayn is therefore accommodating both views.

Figures such as Zayn and the 'Amili Trio represented a generation that could not afford to change its political direction, given that their pursuit of politics gave them the perception of leaving their minority label behind. It may have been personally empowering for them, as they identified with a larger cause than just their stigmatized community; nevertheless, their conviction of the urgency of Syrian unity in 1936 ultimately forced them into a ideological corner from which they could not and did not emerge, and it was to mark the end of their political activism. In the absence of any other ideology they could embrace or that included them in the Lebanese formula, it also marked their ideological disinheritance.

Ahmad Rida and Sulayman Dahir's careers in particular can be traced through their writings. Starting with definitions of the self[101] at the beginning of the century they retreated with assertions of their 'Amiliness by writing their community's history in Jabal 'Amil in the absence of an accessible political line they could formulate.

Ahmad Rida made his intellectual debut in attempting to define *al-umma* and to establish the historical roots of his community in Jabal 'Amil. Concerned with issues of justice, reform, and rights within the Ottoman state, he was moved to write an authoritative work on the Arabic language, while at the same time promoting the Syrian cause in Jabal 'Amil.[102] In his published memoirs in *al-'Irfan* during the 1930s, he publicly noted his first disappointment with the Arab government when they did not react to the 1920 French campaign on Jabal 'Amil that inflicted such heavy damage on the region.[103] He remained in support of this dream, however, until its authors abandoned it for a pragmatic alliance with the Maronites in Lebanon.

The same can also be said of Sulayman Dahir's work, the most lasting of which concern Jabal 'Amil. He retreated into scholarship with publications such as *History of the Beaumont Castle* and his serialized *Dictionary of Jabal'Amil Villages* in *al-'Irfan*.

An important question thus arises: In the absence of a political doctrine, why were 'Amili intellectuals of both generations under the Mandate unable to formulate an alternative ideology expressing their universal vision? Several elements need to be considered.

In discussing the first generation, the ‘Amili Trio emerging from among the ulama, one can argue that they were unable to develop a substantive idea that addressed their community's issues and that would enable them to move forward. Given the overwhelming character of the shock of their exposure to modernity, including the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the experience of World War One, and European might in the Mandate years, the task was too large. An ideological innovation that would have synthesized their Islamic heritage and Western political traditions was perhaps too great and premature a challenge, particularly for a minority group that had only gained a recognized status in 1926. Discussions on this topic were central among reformist ulama in Najaf and Jabal ‘Amil starting with the 1900s. While their presence on the national cultural scene consisted of a retreat back into a familiar world of research and historical chronicles, the ‘Amili trio continued to provide their community with opinions and reflections that were later to be incorporated into the communal self-image. On this point, it can be noted that they were hardly alone; the same could be argued for the Muslim community as a whole.

There were several conditions that would have encouraged this retreat. First, as a historically isolated political minority, one can argue that the ‘Amilis lacked an active political tradition, focusing instead on intellectual pursuits in religious learning, theology, and more metaphysical questions of justice and just rule. This is best understood as a tradition of quietism, particular to the culture of Twelver Shi‘ism. Second, despite recognition from the authorities, the ‘Amilis as a community during the middle years of the Grand Liban did not yield any influence outside their own region. Any movement to emerge needed to be national, in a period of de facto nation-building.

Third, the sociopolitical structure of Jabal ‘Amil still did not permit the emergence of a powerful intelligentsia able to effect political change. In fact, the general atmosphere of the whole region in the 1930s and 1940s was directed toward secular ideas, nation building, and communitarian cooperation on the social level. Despite the communitarian component, such a group could not speak for itself in a communitarian language, as there was still no polarization of religious movements. The inclination of the lower socioeconomic strata was more towards Marxist ideology and crypto-fascism. For the younger and more frustrated generation in particular, the lure of Marxism and nationalism was too great to resist, and they embraced them fully.

Fourth, the Shi‘i religious factor was weak in this period: on the local level the ulama were engaged in the politics of integration,

somewhat removed from the religious ideologies of Najaf. In Najaf, the preoccupation was with national politics and opposing the British, whereas in Iran during Reza Khan's reign, the rule of the ulama was politically marginal.

As part of the adjustments to the new reality of being within the Lebanese state, the Shi'i community, through both its political and intellectual elites was in the process of developing its own cultural and political discourse that was a negotiation between the two poles: the pragmatic forward-looking acceptance of the new reality and the traditional culture- and religion-oriented demand for a Syrian option.

The acceptance of the Sunni leadership of a Lebanese state with "an Arab face" as a final home, and the Franco-Lebanese treaty of 1936, trumped this process for the Shi'is. The 'Amili community was therefore dislodged ideologically, and its political fate in Lebanon had been implicitly decided by the Sunni leadership. Although the 'Amili leadership had already accepted a Lebanon in which they emerged from their unrecognized status under the Ottomans, becoming an official community in the new state, their socioeconomic gains were minor compared to the Sunnis, who struck a political deal. While the Sunni leadership settled their grievances with their Maronite counterpart, the Shi'is were left behind. As Hourani notes, "The alliance of Christian and Muslim politicians did not necessarily imply a merging of the communities in whose name they spoke . . . the Sunni urban leaders [could no] longer speak in the name of the Muslim part of the population."[104]

In the absence of a viable ideology for the Shi'i intellectuals, they were left with few options. One was to retire entirely, as did the 'Amili Trio and their entourage, thus confirming their ideological disinheritance and political disempowerment, and perpetuating a Shi'i centric view of history. Another was to join ideological movements (Communist, Arab, and Syrian nationalist), which many, particularly those with a Najafi education, eventually did, predominantly after Lebanon's independence in 1943.

The appeal of the transnational ideological parties—Ba'thist, Syrian Nationalist, Communist, and eventually Nasserite—to the Shi'i of Jabal 'Amil was great.[105] They carried a larger message than just Lebanon, one in which they could attach their political demands, transporting them from the alienation of their mountain. The Communist Party had the greatest appeal of these and it had an extensive grassroots operation in the South after 1943. The appeal of such a party was its call for social change and justice through an ideological agent—two fundamental demands for the 'Amilis. Another magnet

was the party's secularism, which could again rid them of their negative communitarian identification and help them to overcome their stigma of being a religious minority.[106] Shi'i membership in the Communist Party became the largest, but not within the leadership levels of the party.

Yet another option for the 'Amilis, which had not yet emerged by 1943, was the development of their own ideology rooted in an emerging religious polarization, as would be represented much later by Sayyid Musa al-Sadr and his political vision for this community. Of the two options that were available during this period, each represented a form of alienation for the Shi'is, despite their inclusion in the Grand Liban.

In the many facets of the evolving Lebanese state—demographic, ideological, and socioeconomic—the Shi'i community made its entry as the most disadvantaged member of this association of communities.

Chapter 5

Out of the Margins: Political and Religious Integration

Matlabiyya: A Politics of Demand

During this period, the Shiʿis of Jabal ʿAmil vascillated between two political currents, one that was calling for an Arab/Syrian state and another engaging with the existing Lebanese one. In both cases, the outcome was a similar set of socioeconomic demands as a new application of the tool of *matlabiyya*, which was ultimately beneficial to their political and religious incorporation into Lebanon.

Matlabiyya, which is derived from the verb to ask, *talab*, is an important term in Lebanese Shiʿi political usage. In communicating with the state during the Mandate period, the ʿAmili Shiʿis in particular presented demands, or *matalib*, as a fundamental mode of expression of their political participation. It can indeed be said to be of a mode of discourse. The term has been in common use in social and economic demands but, until this work, has not been defined specifically in terms of a model of political lobbying.[1] *Matlabiyya* is used here to describe a model of patronage-seeking by a community, namely the ʿAmili Shiʿis; in a national context, in this instance, Lebanon.

The rhetorical style of *Matlabiyya* arguably stems from a historic Shiʿi preoccupation with the injustice and dissatisfaction at whatever existing temporal rule the community was subjugated to. In the case of the ʿAmili Shiʿis, they were dissatisfied with their unrecognized rights under the Ottoman state; therefore any attempt at self-criticism also included a demand for change, whether specific (e.g., education)

or general. This form of critique developed into a style of its own, as is demonstrated by the various poems in *JAN* (published in 1911–1912), which are aimed at different directions, ranging from centers of communitarian authority, ulama, and political leadership, to the larger Ottoman world that extended beyond the boundaries of Jabal 'Amil.

Making demands as a form of political participation took hold with the emergence of the Grand Liban and the political/legislative structures that stemmed from it. Through this dynamic, the 'Amilis—political elite, intellectuals, and ulama— generated an approach, *matlabiyya*, that aided the process of integration and institutionalization of this community within the state. The Maronite community served as the model of successful communal development and political power that the Shi'is emulated through their novel use of *matlabiyya*.

The notion of *matlabiyya* in the newly formed entity was not unique to Jabal 'Amil, now within the administrative province of South Lebanon. It was a common issue among the four districts attached to Mount Lebanon. All the communities in those areas had demands. This was the case even with the Maronites in the South (with only one assigned parliamentary seat), as they had lost their potential for political representation, and fundamentally served as appendages to the Maronites of Mount Lebanon. Inhabitants of the Bekaa, Tripoli, and Marjayoun also had demands, being part of the newly attached regions. The position of the attached districts was one of high expectation and frustration toward the French. The economy was predominantly geared toward Mount Lebanon and Beirut, and none of the other regions enjoyed prewar benefits equal to those of the Mountain. For example, Tripoli and Saida were strongly opposed to joining Greater Lebanon and expressed their position through petitions, conferences, and other means. The desire to stay in Syria was real, but the main opposition to Greater Lebanon was not entirely political. Both Tripoli and Saida were affected by Beirut's primacy as a capital and port city in the new Lebanese state. They risked being weakened economically, politically, demographically, and socially from Beirut's position as a budding Mediterranean city. Joining Greater Lebanon meant that the Sunni leaderships in the peripheral areas had to give up their power to leaderships in Beirut.

However, what distinguishes the Shi'i *matlabiyya* from that of the Sunnis, Druze, and Maronites is the political affirmation in the act of *matlabiyya* (however negative in its use) of the new state. Unlike the other communities, the Shi'is entered the state as outsiders to Mount Lebanon and the Beirut terrain. They were never part of a ruling group like the Druze, for example, who despite getting a lesser share

of power than their Maronite rivals had a historic claim, a presence in Mount Lebanon and a strong legacy for being part of the new state.

But the Shi'i community during the Mandate period should be considered within the framework of an emerging rural community entering Lebanese history. It is a peripheral community with a substantial percentage of illiteracy, on an uneven footing with the two other main communities, Maronite and Sunni. Therefore, in demanding the basics of development, such as schools, water, roads, employment, and tax reductions, the 'Amili population, despite their polarization, were effectively affirming their allegiance to the Grand Liban. It was a demonstration of their sociopolitical development, a form of transformation from a general Shi'i community to a more self-conscious local, southern Lebanese Mitawali one, that is, a more parochial identity.

This evolution did not begin with the Mandate; it was already in play during the final decade of the Ottoman Empire, when the 'Amilis, encouraged by the Constitutional Revolution of 1908, began to articulate their demands for political reform and justice within the Ottoman state. This is clearly expressed in the early issues of *al-'Irfan* by articles that tackled notions of governance and reform.[2] The 'Amili men of culture had caught the wave of constitutionalism along with other groups within the empire. As Ottoman subjects with a representation at the Mab'uthan, along with others, they were addressing the Porte with demands for change. Therefore, one can argue that the 'Amili community had already started its process of political assimilation by emerging from the isolated position it occupied since al-Jazzar's campaign in 1780. This integration or acknowledgment of belonging during the Ottoman period was also expressed through a rhetoric of *matlabiyya*, but in a less concrete manner.

Despite the outward polarization of the 'Amilis at the outset of the Mandate between those in support of union with Syria and those who supported integration with Lebanon, the underlying position remained the same: The unionists strongly expressed dissatisfaction with the economic and developmental status quo of the South but also called for further French involvement and improvement. The integrists expressed their belonging through strong demands for infrastructure investment in the South, in the form of schools, roads, electricity, and so on. In both cases, *matlabiyya* was a sign of integration, despite the Syrian unionists' stance toward the Grand Liban. The positions of the pro-Syria camp need to be considered as part of the fluid internal political dialogue of this community in its attempt to negotiate a space in Lebanon until 1936.

Matlabiyya as Participation

Representing the Community

The ceremony for the declaration of the Grand Liban in September 1920 was captured in a photograph of Gouraud on the steps of the Residence de Pins, the French High Commission in Beirut flanked by local leading figures.[3] It is a crowded scene of men standing on both sides of the steps leading to the entrance of the building, with Gouraud sitting in the center. To his right is the Maronite Patriarch and to his left is the Sunni Mufti of Beirut. No doubt there were representative figures of the other communities of the annexed territories of the Grand Liban, but none features so prominently or are mentioned by name in reference to this historic photograph. This is reflective of the place of these communities in the new polity and their relationship with the French.

As far as 'Amili representation is concerned, though documentation is unclear, many people assert that Hajj Husayn al-Zayn, a landowner from the district of Nabatieh who was later appointed representative to the Administrative Council, was in this picture.[4] Although he represented a notable family with substantial landholdings, Hajj Husayn was not a leading political figure of Jabal 'Amil. In the absence of Kamil al-Assaad who had left Jabal 'Amil on the heels of the devastating Nieger campaign in 1920 and remained away for over a year, the French took advantage to promote a politically ambitious figure with an uncritical attitude toward them, Yusuf al-Zayn.

The situation in Jabal 'Amil in the autumn of 1920, following the Nieger Campaign of June, was desolate. In addition to the difficult economic situation, the heavy fine imposed by the French only served to further impoverish the people while strengthening landowner influence.[5] Even more important was the power vacuum created by the absence of Kamil al-Assaad. This marked a change in the traditional political landscape, in which one figure dominated, and permitted the emergence of several others, such as pro-Mandate notables like Najib Osseiran and Yusuf al-Zayn, who took part in the politics of *Matlabiyya*.[6]

Petitions and the Press

Matlabiyya, as the means of communication with the state authorities, was internalized and manifested itself through petitions and press articles. The importance of the petition process in Jabal 'Amil was in its ability to mobilize the community and establish *matlabiyya* as an

integral part of the system of governance. Once presented, the responsibility of acting on the petition lies with the state. The 'Amilis learned to use the mechanism of the new state through both the public sphere and political-institutional channels. In the public sphere, this is best illustrated through the press, in *al-'Irfan* and non-'Amili newspapers such as *al-Barq* and *al Ma'rad*, and even in pro-Mandate papers such as *al-Bashir* and *Lisan al-Hal*. During the first few years of the Mandate, the demands of the "new Lebanese" (those newly attached to Lebanon) were clearly expressed in the local press as well as in French records. In an article in *al-Ma'rad* in 1927, a headline reads "The new sons of Lebanon demand reform." The article summarizes the position of these regions who demand one united nation, equal throughout its regions. The theme of the article is the demands of those from the North, the East, and the South for schools in their regions. He noted that there were more than one or two schools in the smallest of villages in Mount Lebanon. Similar demands came from the Bekaa in the form of letters to the high commissioner throughout this period.[7]

The particular demands of the Shi'i 'Amilis were also supported by the Greek Orthodox communities of the South, who were now part of the same administrative unit, whose political participation was interconnected with that of the 'Amilis. An example of this is the position of the Marjayoun newspaper *Jaridat al-Qalam al-Sarih* (The Frank Pen), which was published between 1931 and 1975. Its founder, Alfred Abu Samra, regularly asked the government and the politicians when they would pay attention to the South.[8] In the first year of publication, leading articles addressed the position of the South in Lebanon with titles such as "Are We Lebanese or What" and "South Lebanon: Angry, Resentful and Bitter." In an opening article to the high commissioner titled "Governor of Lebanon, Save the South," Abu Samra writes:

> Your Excellency, we have resorted to different roles, and the different governments have turned on us and we are still in the role of experimentation, watching with a vigilant eye your final position on the South. This South that has not rightly enjoyed since joining (your Lebanon) any of the luxuries of the old [Mount Lebanon], so if you acted on realizing its demands, you would be doing a sacred duty . . .[9]

Abu Samra then elaborates a list of demands that are general to the South and specific to Marjayoun. He refers to the many demands voiced and written in Lebanese papers of the day; such as the reduction

of taxes, the establishment of a farmers' union, the building of roads, and the nationalization of schools.

In the *al-'Irfan* there was a semi-regular paragraph in its news and opinion section that focused on the demands of Jabal 'Amil, which demonstrated the scope of involvement of the 'Amilis in the affairs of their region and confirmed their acquiescence to being part of the Grand Liban, despite some of their own claims to the contrary.

As early as December 1921, a group of ulama from Jabal 'Amil presented a petition with the following points to General Gouraud, Commandant Trabaud, and the *Mutasarrif* of South Lebanon, a Druze notable, Tawfiq Arslan, and his advisor, Albert Shidyaq:

> They [the Shi'i] form the largest or second largest group of the inhabitants of the Grand Liban, and they pay nearly fifty percent of taxes, and despite this, the benefits go to others and the burden goes to them. There is not a single 'Amili civil servant in the capital. There are also very few in their district of South Lebanon for no justifiable reason. The state of education, the condition of the roads is very poor given what they [the 'Amilis] pay in terms of taxes. The increase in taxes is extortionate and cannot be supported by the state of the country [Jabal 'Amil]. The wrongdoings of a few ignorant have become the burden of the many innocent [this is in reference to the fines imposed by the French following the Christian massacres in May 1920].
>
> Mercy for justice and equality because the 'Amili people, is a vigorous people with beneficence in their hearts.[10]

The demands, in expressing an understanding of what state responsibility was, clearly reflect a level of engagement with the state that is proactive and in line with other non-'Amili groups. It demonstrates their awareness of their justified (yet ignored) links to their capital city and their rights to participate in the administration as equal members of a multi-communitarian system. Their reference to taxation, a theme that continues for the next decade, also indicates their understanding of their position as one of several communities, with the potential power leverage of a community in a communitarian system, to oppose the status quo and lobby for change.[11] The fact that they do not succeed in the short term is due to a combination of initial French indifference toward the area, a traditional leadership of limited scope supported by the Mandate to run the affairs of its community, and an undeveloped and inactive political culture that resulted from previous discrimination. For example, the official response to Shi'i protests of neglect and defavorization is that there were not enough educated Shi'is to assume public service employment. The standard reply is that

there were not enough schools in Jabal ʿAmil, a responsibility of the government.

Ahmad Rida presented a petition to the high commissioner during the latter's visit to Saida in August 1923. It was published in *al-ʿIrfan* with a foreword that emphasized the warm welcome the commissioner was given by the ʿAmilis and wondered whether their demands would ever be met.[12] What makes Rida's petition particularly interesting is the way he describes his "mountain," in a way similar to that done by the Maronites. He appeals to the commissioner with references to nature, beauty, and the Phoenician past. The steps toward integration in Rida's approach demonstrate a conscious level of involvement in the Grand Liban, despite the author's professed pro-Syrian sentiments, through a listing of themes popular with the French and promoted by the Maronites:

> We welcome your gracious presence that has rejuvenated us with a spirit of hope after despair was about to overtake the people of this mountain.
>
> You have seen during your visit the hilltops of this mountain where the Phoenicians reached their glory and the kingdoms of Afqa and Kadmus, of the prophets of Bani Isra'il flourished and where their tombs and that of King Hiram are. This is the mountain where castles and fortresses were built when it was a pathway for the glorious and the ancient. [This is] where knowledge was easily attainable and the knowledgeable were sent to all over the Mashriq. [This is] the land where agriculture produced goods and riches, its vines flowery with its grapes and its olives shined without touching fire.[13]

Another example of this ʿAmili consciousness is a petition written by "the inhabitants of Jabal ʿAmil to the high commissioner on November 9, 1922, which presents a detailed report of the agricultural and economic problems of Jabal ʿAmil since the establishment of the French Mandate. The authors then present an elaborate agenda for resolving the problems and a detailed review of the socioeconomic situation during the Ottoman period, which was less severe than was often expressed, suggesting a reconsideration of the accepted anti-Ottoman version of events. What it also achieved is a direct critique of the current regime and its "unjust" system of taxation in a detailed and systematic manner. The petition concludes by urging Gouraud to treat Jabal ʿAmil and Mount Lebanon equally.[14]

Another form of *matlabiyya* exercised was through speeches to French officials visiting Jabal ʿAmil, usually made by ʿAmili politicians, fulfilling a double function of *matlabiyya* and the reaffirmation of the patron–client relationship that was at the core of political leadership in

the region. Both Kamil Bey al-Assaad, after his return from exile, and Yusuf Bey al-Zayn presented their demands to the French in public speeches in their villages. One such incident is Trabaud's invitation by Kamil Bey in 'Adlun and Taibeh, and later by Yusuf Bey al-Zayn in Kfar Rumman, in which both notables and ulama expressed their demands in a joint effort of *matlabiyya*.[15] *Al-'Irfan* reported,

> A group of ulama and distinguished men addressed the Commandant [Traubaut] with the 'Amili's indubitable rights. He acknowledged their demands and promised a response. The 'Amilis have in recent times gained very few of their rights in the Gendarmerie, Education and other departments . . . Why can't the government search for such people . . . if [it] wanted to equate between the various communities in this land.[16]

Delegations to the high commissioner were also a common means of *matlabiyya* for all communities. The 'Amilis had several delegations, the most significant of which was that of the ulama who lobbied for fairness and equal employment rights for 'Amilis, particularly in governmental posts.[17] This is significant as the ulama were traditionally politically inactive, and, when they did develop a mild form of activism, it was in support of Faysal and union with Syria. The fact that the ulama delegation particularly addressed the subject of government employment as opposed to general questions of equality demonstrates the extent of their acceptance of Lebanon and their potential within the state. Nor is it accidental that some of the first 'Amilis to enter the administration came from religious families. Among these were leading families such as the al-Amin, Sharaf al-Din, al-Faqih, and Mughniyya. This can be explained by the fact that their educational background within the religious heritage enabled them to compete for these positions and their previous marginalization under the Ottomans pushed them to compensate by seeking official participation in the new state.

The years 1920–1926 were dynamic for 'Amili integration as far as laying out the model for their political maneuverings was concerned. In 1920, the 'Amilis were subdued and beaten, but by early 1926 they gained legal recognition of their religious sect through the creation of a Ja'fari Court by the Mandate government. This aim would arguably have been achieved anyway given French communitarian politics; nevertheless, the 'Amilis, through their elites, embraced all (albeit limited) legislative means available to them through their inclusion in the Grand Liban to push for full and equal integration in the state. Their participation and inclusion in point of fact implied their endorsement of the French status quo.[18]

Competing Models of Political Leadership and Parliamentary Politics

After the establishment of the Grand Liban, Gouraud issued a decree to form the Administrative Council of the Grand Liban, which comprised 15 appointed members from the various communities. Hajj Husayn al-Zayn was appointed on behalf of the Southern Shi‘is.[19] Another decree issued on March 8, 1922, called for an elected Representative Council to be set up (and for the dissolution of the Administrative Council) following a population census to establish proportionate representation. Much controversy surrounded the census on the grounds that it was inaccurate due to the pro-Maronite agenda.[20]

Nevertheless, the Representative Council was formed and first met on May 25, 1922, with 16 seats (10 Maronite, 2 Greek Catholic, 4 Greek Orthodox, 6 Sunni, 3 Shi‘i, 2 Druze, and 1 for other minorities). Habib Pasha al-Saad (who had been previous head of the Council of the *Mutasarrifiyya* of Mount Lebanon) was head of the council. Of the five Shi‘i deputies, three were from South Lebanon, one was from the Bekaa, and one from Mount Lebanon.[21]

What is significant about the ‘Amili candidates is that they represented the first social tier of Shi‘i families in the South.[22] Except Kamil al-Assaad, who was exiled and then pardoned but not included in the new political structure, all the main families of the South entered into the parliamentary game, including secondary members of the Assaad family. This is in contrast to the Sunnis, whose representatives at this point were not from leading political families; the Salam, Sulh, and Karami families, for example, were still committed to the Syrian option. This Shi‘i engagement can be taken as a measure of the level of Shi‘i desire for integration in Lebanon. Notwithstanding, the elections throughout the country were staged and carefully controlled by the French to ensure that those friendly to the Mandate won. However, the participation of these leading ‘Amili families, in addition to demonstrating support for the Grand Liban, also reflected the political vacuum in the South. Their position was different from that of Ahmad al-Husayni in Jbail, who occupied the earliest governmental posts as a Shi‘i with an established power base in Jbeil that extended back to the *Mutasarrifiyya* days. This position goes back to the historic relations that linked the Shi‘is of the *Mutasarrifiyya* to the body politic of Mount Lebanon when 1 of 12 members of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon was a Shi‘i. This distinguishes the Shi‘is there as part of an already integrated Grand Liban in which *matlabiyya* does not play such a necessary role.[23]

At this early stage of 'Amili Shi'i political participation, the pool of parliamentary candidates did not reflect a developed political ideology or defined program for the community besides the general demands for schools and the like that the region had been making for decades. Nor was this leadership diverse in its representation, since these candidates, Yusuf al-Zayn, Najib Osseiran, Fadl al-Fadl, and 'Abd al-Latif al-Assaad were all notables. Despite their pro-Mandate positions, they still needed a political link in harmony with the 'Amili position that was nominally pro-Syrian, and thus presented themselves under "unité syrienne" during the 1925 elections.[24]

Yusuf Bey al-Zayn (1879–1962)[25] was the prominent 'Amili politician of the Mandate, because of his pro-French position and vocal role in parliament. He led the electoral lists and occupied the position of deputy president of the chamber several times. He continued to run for parliament until 1960. He represented an alternate model of political leadership to Kamil al-Assaad. Al-Zayn needed to depend far more on cultivating his constituency because he did not have the established political legacy of al-Assaad. His emergence coincides with the weakening of the Assaad power base in Jabal 'Amil. Nevertheless, some elements of the Mandate government viewed him with suspicion; one report states that "having played the French Mandate card, [Y.Z] is the master of the South. He does what he wants; no one can do anything to him . . . He is fond of his attitude of unrelenting hatreds in South Lebanon. He will always be master of the hour."[26]

Strategically situated in the Nabatieh region, al-Zayn's power base linked the interior of the Jabal with the coast. His extensive relations with the ulama (through his family connections), as well as with Maronite figures also gave him influence. As an integrationist leader, al-Zayn satisfied *Matlabiyya* criteria, by using his alliance with the French to meet some of the demands of his people.

Yusuf al-Zayn came from a generation of traditionally educated men based in a semi-rural setting and remained conservative in his loyalty to the established power, in this case the French. He distinguished himself from other 'Amili leaders by his capitalist pursuits, similar to businessmen from Beirut and Mount Lebanon. One particular project that Yusuf al-Zayn was able to undertake as a result of his pro-French position was that of water irrigation in the area of Nabatieh, which had a significant impact on the local agriculture. The first part of the Tassi Water Project was completed in March 1925 with an initial investment of 25,000 pounds.[27] Yusuf al-Zayn received a concession from the Mandate to undertake this project a few years earlier giving him rights to 1,200 cubic meters of water. The scarcity

of water in the Nabatieh region had been a problem and this provided a breakthrough. Individual access to the water was by paying membership in order to finance the project. Nevertheless, the funding was insufficient. The project suffered technical problems, which led to serious financial difficulties for Yusuf al-Zayn.

In 1935, individuals from Nabatieh, the Sabah and Shahin families, as well as Adel Osseiran, made contributions for the continuation and expansion of the project. A second concession to expand the project was awarded in 1938. Ultimately, this project consolidated Yusuf al-Zayn's leadership in the South and demonstrated his ability to transcend the pattern of a traditional leadership and engage with a large context—as his various investments and partnerships with different groups, including Christian investors, demonstrate.[28] The ʻAmili leadership lacked experience in ventures tied to the modern capitalist system as compared to the Christian and Sunni elites, but they slowly began to make their appearance in that domain.

Yusuf al-Zayn broke this mold and used all the benefits that the French Mandate in Lebanon offered in terms of communitarian links and economic opportunities, albeit limited for the South, to develop his independent power base. However, the problems encountered by the Nabʻ al-Tassi project demonstrated the inexperience of Southerners in undertaking such a development project, as far as professional, technical, and managerial expertise was concerned. It was a first attempt and, as such, a process of trial and error that ultimately led to the Lebanese government taking back Yusuf al-Zayn's concession in 1954 for financial compensation.[29]

Yusuf al-Zayn's relationship with the French was a client–patron one, in which patronage was withdrawn more than once, demonstrating the limits of such a relationship. Patronage was withdrawn periodically from al-Zayn because of contending leaderships' pursuit of this patronage, such as al-Fadl in Nabatieh, who received strong support from Pechkoff, effectively the military governor (conseiller administrative) of the South in the 1930s. There was also a clash of personalities between al-Zayn and Pechkoff. The result was that al-Zayn was alienated by Pechkoff, who caused him to lose the parliamentary elections in 1935 as well as his own money through a temporary seizure of his lands.

Najib Osseiran (1866–1951) was born in Saida and received a basic education there. He was primarily occupied with running his lands in the South. His urban base helped him gain prominence with the French, and the absence of a strong Sunni political rival assured him preeminence in that city, despite the fact that he was a Shiʻi. Osseiran's

political career was marked by his pro-Mandate position, which according to the French, he served loyally. He had a close alliance with Fadl al-Fadl,[30] and he was also a supporter of Emile Eddé throughout his political career, which lasted until 1938.[31] However he was also described as being "without inclination and political ideas."[32]

Fadl al-Fadl's (1865–1934) base was in Nabatieh. He received a rudimentary education in Saida. He was the head of the Sa'bi clan, and was thus a traditional *muqati'ji* leader. His power base in Nabatieh was not solid because of the anti-French sentiment among the growing "bourgeois" and educated component of that town's population. His own position was conciliatory toward the French, who described him in a report as being "shrewd rather than intelligent . . . does not miss any occasion to please the government and the mandate power."[33] Nevertheless, French support of Fadl al-Fadl continued, particularly after the Druze revolt, during which he preached caution and calm to his constituents, and "during the 1925/26 events, he opened his door to Christian refugees, to whom he did a lot of good." He was appointed to the senate that was established after the constitution of 1926. His brother, Bahij al-Fadl, succeeded him as deputy after his death in 1934.

One can consider the political isolation of the Assaad family in 1920 during Kamil al-Assaad's flight and exile as a sign of their miscalculation in transcending their Ottoman political practice and adapting to the Mandate. It was Kamil's miscalculated decision to side with Faysal at the Hujayr Conference that cost him the rest of his political career under the Mandate. It was Kamil's noteworthy absence from politics that permitted the new notables to cultivate relations with the French.

The Assaad family was not completely unrepresented on the political front. The weakened Fadl leadership did allow for Kamil's younger and uneducated brother, 'Abd al-Latif (1873–1936), to enter the political arena with French assistance, although his power base was weak and he was unable to restore his family's influence. He ran on electoral lists with Yusuf al-Zayn in 1925 and with Riad al-Sulh in 1931. In addition to a weakened political stature, the family's prestige suffered a heavy blow in the South with the sale of their land in Taibeh to 'Abbud 'Abd al-Razzaq, a notable and MP from Tripoli.[34] However, unlike the Fadl clan, the Assaads eventually succeeded in emerging from political isolation; therefore, one can consider 'Abd al-Latif, despite his political limitations, to be a Mandate politician. This subsequently permitted the emergence of his son Ahmad al-Assaad (1900–1961) in 1936, who shaped himself on a national scale as a

"Lebanese" politician. The success of Ahmad al-Assaad is predominantly due to his wife, Fatima. She was Kamil Bey's daughter, he did not have sons. She decided to marry her cousin Ahmad to ensure the family's political continuity and position. Her personality and political sagacity transformed her husband, who had modest means and little education, into a major political figure. His first accountability often seemed to be to his wife, not to his constituency, and not to the political class. Many of the anecdotes serialized in *al-Shira'* (from October 1994 to August 1995) confirm her clout and power and her involvement in managing the political and personal life of her husband, from ensuring that he performed his daily prayers at their appropriate time to questioning members of his electoral team in the aftermath of elections. He cultivated a Lebanese image due to his adoption of particular causes: his engagement in the Eddé/Khuri political rivalry on the side of Khuri through his involvement in Hizb al-Tala'i' (The Vanguard Party). This short-lived political formation transported the Southern political rivalry to Beirut and the party rivalry to the South, but it was also an attempt at endowing the Shi'i community with a paramilitary political group similar to the Phallanges and the Najjada, which were respectively Maronite and Sunni. Part of the Tala'i' Party's importance is that it demonstrates the desire within the Shi'i community to emulate successful models used on the wider Lebanese scene.[35]

The legitimacy of Ahmad al-Assaad's political leadership stemmed from his family's legacy. His career reinforced the traditional elements of that leadership, but within a Lebanese framework—centered on electoral alliances and navigating the rivalries of the top leadership of the state.[36] He did not have any consistent ideological stand with regard to issues related to Jabal 'Amil. The main concern was the preservation of what he considered his natural right to leadership. As the preeminent member of a family that held the traditional leadership of the community, his election to parliament is understood as recognition of his leadership status. His legitimacy as a leader is not derived from his actual position as an elected member of parliament. From his point of view, he was not elected on the basis of serving his constituency but on entitlement, a view shared by many of his constituents.

However, this traditional entitlement was no longer sufficient. Al-Assaad's political position presents a conflict between two models of leadership that of the official elected to serve his constituency, and that of the traditional leader who might bestow favors on his base as a reflection of his magnanimity, and not out of duty. His career corresponds to a shift in the political culture of Jabal 'Amil away from

the traditional model and further acceptance of the modern model. Ahmad al-Assaad was therefore increasingly expected to deliver, at least by some quarters in Jabal 'Amil. He justified his inability to deliver through a populist discourse of disempowerment vis-à-vis the Beirut leadership.

For example, when al-Assaad's constituency expressed demands for basic amenities such as water and electricity and he was unable to deliver, he complained that his demands to the central power were not heeded. A demonstration of the different models of leadership in opposition to Ahmad al-Assaad is evident in the sarcastic rhymed slogan against his inability to deliver basic services to the community:

> Hula, Shakra and Markaba [towns in Jabal 'Amil]
> Are content with a hello
> Where is the promise, oh Ahmad Talal
> Of health, water and electricity?

Framed as a populist call for solidarity, this display of helplessness, rather than weakening his position, enhanced it. Ahmad al-Assaad had repeated recourse to his populist leadership style in justifying the failure of *matlabiyya*.

The outward signs of this traditional leadership were not opulence and luxury, but moral and communal authority in the form of the respect and obedience that the leader commanded from his supporters. Ahmad al-Assaad had, as such, a relatively modest way of life. His residence in Taibeh, often referred to as *Bayt al Ta'ifa* (The House of the Community), was understated in terms of material comforts. Whereas his son, Kamil, who was schooled in an urban Christian culture, displayed the expected material trappings of his social status, Ahmad al-Assaad preserved a considerable part of the Jabal 'Amil rural ethos in mannerism, speech, and social mores, including the relatively limited focus on education in contradistinction to the Lebanese political class. Ahmad al-Assaad judging from both his actions and anecdotes reported about him, did not see much value in emphasizing or promoting educational reform in Jabal 'Amil. There is a commonly reported anecdote about 'Amilis asking Ahmad al-Assaad for more schools in their region and him candidly replying "I am educating Kamil [his son] for you, so why the need for more schools?"

Consolidating Parliamentary Practice

The one demand the 'Amili community systematically lobbied for from the inception of the first representative council was the official

recognition of the Twelver Shi'i sect in Lebanon. This was pursued by the Shi'i deputies, so that in 1923,[37] it was voted and agreed upon by all members except for one Sunni representative, but it was not implemented until 1926.[38] The turning point was the controlled 'Amili position in the Syrian Revolt of 1925, during which the French presence in Syria was sufficiently undermined so as to potentially affect Lebanon as well.

There was little active anti-French participation among the 'Amilis, who were not particularly supportive of the revolt. Two events—one in 1925 the other in early 1926—display ambivalent 'Amili positions and ultimately underline their interest in joining Lebanon. The first was a petition signed by several hundred 'Amilis, including the leading politicians of the day, with the exception of Yusuf Bey al-Zayn, in reaction to a questionnaire circulated by the Mandate on setting the Lebanese Constitution in 1926.[39] Following the overwhelming rejection of Beirut and Saida's Sunni community's participation in such an event because they were pro-Syrian, the 'Amilis presented a petition to the new high commissioner, Henri de Jouvenel, stating,

> We the people of Jabal 'Amil since our attachment to the Petit Liban, continue to see fines imposed on us and profits to it [Petit Liban]. We pay taxes and only a minimal amount is spent on us so that we see our rights eaten by it [Petit Liban]. We are not given enough governmental appointments and it is known that this reprisal is heavy on people therefore we ask from the doyen of the Mandate authority, M. Henri de Jouvenel of realizing our sincere desires which are:
>
> Our detachment from Lebanon to establish a separate independent administration under the supervision of a Mandate authority, we have faith in the justice of the High Commissioner and in his fairness in granting us our request that is just and fair.[40]

A demand for union with Syria was not clearly stated, but what was hinted at was an autonomous model similar to that of Jabal Druze or the 'Alawi States that would imply more direct French rule for the Shi'i and in their view greater guarantees for development. This point of view persists into the 1930s. During a visit to the French Officer for Special Services in Tyr in 1931, the Mufti of Tyr Sayyid Muhammad Jawad Sharaf al-Din, son of 'Abd al-Husayn, expressed his community's desire in calling for the creation of an autonomous state for Jabal 'Amil in order to rectify the problem of neglect by the government on all socioeconomic and political levels.[41] It is significant that such a petition was presented at a vulnerable phase of French rule during the Druze insurrection. Nevertheless it summarizes the Shi'i political position well and is a thinly veiled protest that is distinct from the

Sunni response, which simply states a refusal to participate in constitutional matters.[42]

The second event took place when the Shi‘is gained recognition as a religious sect by official decree no. 3503 on January 27, 1926,[43] when the ‘Amilis paid a visit to the delegate of High Commissioner M. Solomiac. The delegation was composed of ‘Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din, Yusuf Bey al-Zayn, Najib Osseiran, and ‘Abd al-Latif al-Assaad, who came to thank the Mandate for granting recognition to their community. Sharaf al-Din spoke of how happy his coreligionists were with this decree, and the deputies assured the French that the separatist movement in Jabal ‘Amil had been subdued and that all Shi‘is would rally behind the territorial unity of the Grand Liban.[44]

As far as parliamentary participation was concerned, the ‘Amili deputies had a weak presence, during the years following the parliament's establishment in 1926. They were overshadowed by more powerful representations from Mount Lebanon, in particular, and Beirut. The principles of the ‘Amili deputies were in the form of the *matlabiyya* demands mentioned earlier. The themes remained the same, with variations based on the specific question of a particular session.[45]

Yusuf Bey al-Zayn's speeches in 1926–1931 reflect complete immersion in the Lebanese state through his interjections on the budget and the Tobacco Régie, in addition to particular demands on the South.[46] His use of terms such as *watan*, homeland, in referring to the Grand Liban as he does, and "republic," indicate a perception of shared belonging and participation in a process of rehabilitation and construction, which he suggested the government should carry out in the South. He also referred to the recently established constitution in seeking legislative support for calls of "equality" between the regions.

This form of participation for the Shi‘i deputies of the South became increasingly refined with time as their demands came to include a greater share of power for this region in addition to their persistent demands for basic services. In January 1928, al-Zayn complained about the lack of a Shi‘i minister in the cabinet, and Sabri Hamadeh (Shi‘i MP for the Bekaa) withdrew from the session in protest.[47]

By 1929 all six deputies from the South (including the non-Shi‘is) presented a request to the president of the parliament, Muhammad al-Jisr, for increasing the share of Shi‘i political participation:

> The Shi‘i community numbers over 75,000. This community is important, as was taken account of in the Constitution.There are five provinces, so should it not have a share in one of them?

> The Constitution, the laws of relative representation, the number of population and logic support this [a Shi'i post in the Province] and not [the reverse] to deprive the South its true right of appointing a governor from one of its men . . .[48]

French reaction to these demands varied. The assessments of officers posted in the South were not all reflective of a good grasp of the situation; however, one particular official, Commandant Zinovi Pechkoff, "conseiller administratif" to the South, and said to be the natural son of Maxim Gorky, had a profound understanding of 'Amili society and its internal dynamics.[49] He produced several reports for the High Commission warning them of the potential dangers of continued neglect of the South. He too recommended more governmental investment and recognized the growing socioeconomic power of the Shi'i community. However, his suggestions, for the most part, fell on deaf ears:

> I can say that there is great disatisfaction in this region against the Lebanese Government and against Beirut. The Shi'is who form the majority of the population of the South are continously sidelined of all functions of the Lebanese state and its administration. There are among them a large number of people who have been educated at the American University or at the University of St. Joseph in Beirut, or at the University of Damascus. The Shi'is remain for many years after completing their education . . . without employment. They see themselves superceeded especially by the Christians in all administrative posts and functions of the state . . . As for the simple inhabitants of small towns and villages in South Lebanon, they feel their rights to be completely neglected: the lack of schools and roads, the disproportionate taxes given their low income . . . Since 1929, I can certify that there is one one road that has been constructed from Tyre to Bint Jbail . . . It would be too long to list all the reasons of disgruntlement of the population of the South.[50]

Continued demands by the Shi'i also resulted in French cynicism. A report as late as 1944 to the Délégué Général stated,

> The disatisfaction of the Shi'is community is not new. It emerges periodically . . . It would be excessive to place much importance on their demands, but one cannot deny that it can be an irritant to the government.[51]

The 'Amili community was in fact subjected to a polarization generated by political competition at the center of authority. The

presidential race between Bishara al-Khuri and Emile Eddé, which dominated in the first half of the 1930s, greatly affected the Lebanese political scene and created a polarized situation among all communities.[52] In the South, this translated into parliamentary elections that were divided along the Khuri/Eddé line, which gave the 'Amili political leadership an opening to exercise their influence and integrate into the political system.

The electoral game with all its partisanship reflected the larger Lebanese political competition and by doing so, reflected back on the Shi'is, who began to look at their community within a Lebanese identity-context while remaining at the margins of interest to the main players at the center. This started with the 1935 elections when the French supported the nominations of Najib Osseiran and Fadl al-Fadl against Yusuf al-Zayn and 'Abd al-Latif al-Assaad. Yusuf al-Zayn had fallen out of favor, particularly with Pechkoff.[53]

The local political rivalry between these figures transformed Jabal 'Amil into a bipolar stage attached to a larger agenda, Osseiran and Fadl were pro-Eddé and al-Assaad pro-Khuri through Riad al-Sulh's electoral list in 1935. Furthermore, through his links to the Syrian National Bloc, Riad al-Sulh proceeded to rally 'Amili support against the French.[54] What this also indicates is the individual weakness of 'Amili deputies in parliament and the need to seek support from larger players.

The Limits of *Matlabiyya* and the Revolt of 1936

The year 1936 ushered in several significant events in the Mandates of Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine. Both the Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese treaties were signed that year, marking a public declaration on the part of Syrian and Lebanese nationals to abandon the call for Syrian unity. In Palestine, the nationalist revolts of Izz al-Din Qassam and later Hajj Amin al-Husayni resounded throughout the region, arousing nationalist sentiments against the Mandate powers. In South Lebanon these events coalesced with local circumstances to trigger the tobacco revolts. These marked a political transition and introduced a new set of local political players integrated in the national network. More important it represented a large-scale declaration of *matlabiyya* for national integration and change for the 'Amilis.

One outcome of the tobacco revolt in the South was the populist interaction between different communities in opposition to the monopoly earlier in 1935. A significant aspect of this was the direct involvement of the Maronite Patriarch Antoine Arida against this concession

that was against the tobacco cultivators in the northern Batroun region. Arida's position dismayed the French, as he established a communication network with local uprising organizers of other communities, Muslim and Christian, as in Bint Jbail.[55]

The immediate reason for the uprising was the government's concession of a monopoly (*le monopole des tabacs et tombacs*) to the tobacco régie, the Companie Libano Syrienne des Tabacs, in February 1935, which caused a crisis in February and March of that year on a nationwide level; however, it has been interpreted as an organized political campaign of the Syrian National Bloc through Riad al-Sulh's local efforts of the French Mandate.[56] Opposition to this concession was already loudly voiced in parliament in 1934 by petitions from all tobacco cultivator groups including those in Jabal 'Amil.[57] The reaction to the actual concession was dramatic. Opposition to de Martel, the sixth French high commissioner was not limited to voices in the parliament. Patriarch Arida became a prominent figure in the opposition, its efforts included strikes and demonstrations of a nationalist character against the French exploitation of the local economy. The protesters included people from all walks of life, from workers and taxi drivers to financiers such as Michel Chiha and Henri Pharaon.[58]

Although the French did reduce custom duties in order to diffuse the crisis, local peasants lashed out in opposition, demanding better payment for their crops. Decline in Lebanese agriculture was already underway, but due to a combination of French neglect of this sector (excluding a concerted effort to boost the silk industry in Mount Lebanon) and French recession, tobacco cultivators in South Lebanon and the Bekaa regions in particular suffered from a decline in prices.[59] The outbreak in the South can also be perceived as part of the National Bloc's effort to undermine French power. However, it is also important to examine it through the local perspective as a popular reaction against the traditional leadership and the French power that sustained it; in the Bint Jbail case it was Mayor Muhammad Said Bazzi[60] and the exploitation of peasants. Peasants viewed *iqta'* as exploitation through means such as forced payment of the tithe tax even after it was outlawed by the French.[61]

The uprising of 1936, commonly known as the Tobacco Revolt of 1936, broke out in the town of Bint Jbail following the killing of three protesters by the gendarmes. The town was politically polarized between two families friendly to the French: one landowning *muqati'ji* family, Bazzi, and a merchant family, Beydoun. Bint Jbail was the largest town in the south, near Palestine and Southern Syria, where intraregional commerce dominated. Bint Jbail also had the distinguishing

characteristic of a large concentration of educated men of ulama family stock, such as the Sharara family who were nationalist and anti-French. As part of the caza of Tyre, Bint Jbail distinguished itself, like Nabatieh, by having an intellectual milieu. More important, Bint Jbail and its environs were large producers of tobacco in Lebanon, around 40,000 kilograms a year by 1936.[62]

The leaders of the tobacco revolt in Bint Jbail were notably representative of a younger generation of 'Amilis, the group of men educated in Najaf and disillusioned with their own societies. Represented by members of the League of 'Amili Belle Lettres and dismissed as unimportant by the French, they expressed their dissatisfaction at the traditional leadership and their pro-Mandate politics.[63] Characteristic of their opposition were the slogans of protest during this period that brought 'Amili intellectuals such as Musa al-Zayn Sharara from Bint Jbail (who later became mayor of that town), 'Abd al-Husayn al-Abdallah from al-Khiam, Alfred Abu Samra for Marjayoun, and Muhsin Sharara from Bint Jbail to the limelight. It also provided an opportunity for political newcomers to enter the scene, such as Adel Osseiran, Kazim al-Khalil, and 'Ali Bazzi, whereas the influence of figures such as Yusuf al-Zayn was waning.

In addition, the opposition confirmed for the first time the tensions underlying the relationship between the religious leadership and a new generation of political activists. This religious leadership was represented by 'Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din, who supported the return of Muhammad Said Bazzi when he fled his town of Bint Jbail for fear of his life. Opposition to Bazzi's pro-French position was strong,– especially because of his closeness to the much despised qa'immagam of Tyre, Jean Aziz.[64] The opposition was against Sharaf al-Din as he was a religious scholar who supported the traditional leadership of the Assaads; this foreshadows the later attraction of the masses to organized ideologies of protest. Sayyid 'Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din decided to personally bring back Muhammad Said Bazzi to Bint Jbail from his place of refuge in the Christian village of 'Ayn Ibl. On his way back, he was attacked by a mob of youngsters who managed to take off his turban. This inspired several mocking verses about the Sayyid:

> Oh Sayyid where is your turban, unfortunately it flew in the wind
> We have honoured you; you came together with the traitor.[65]

The Bint Jbail revolt in the summer of 1936 raised the possibility of common interests between the 'Amili political community and other players to the national Lebanese scene, who up until then were

more or less unaware of the potential for common national action.[66] Previously, the ‘Amilis were largely absent from the collective Lebanese self-image as expressed in Beirut circles. More importantly, this episode demonstrated the limit of *matlabiyya* as it had been exercised. With the tobacco revolt, *matlabiyya* as an approach for soliciting the fulfillment of demands had reached the limits of its use, and the result was a confrontation. The limitations of *matlabiyya* were repeatedly encountered in subsequent phases of the Shi‘i history in Lebanon, and these recurrent failures promoted the development of a new politics of protest (as opposed to the politics of demand), which was predominantly expressed by ideological parties. An example was the popular reception of the establishment of Antun Saadeh’s Parti Populaire Syrien when a local branch was established in Tyre in 1936.[67]

Restoration of Parliamentary *Matlabiyya* and Assertion of a New Leadership Model

The years 1937–1946 marked an increased participation of the Southern Shi‘i community in parliament and in the public sphere. In the December 1937 session of parliament, all the Shi‘i deputies withdrew in objection to the continuing poor treatment of their community by the government, no longer believing in assurances that conditions would improve.[68] Yusuf al-Zayn gave a speech demanding greater rights for the Shi‘i community, which occupied one of the government’s three leading positions (president, prime minister, and speaker of the chamber). The response of the rest of the MPs to al-Zayn’s speech was negative. No concession was given beyond the reelection of Najib Osseiran as a deputy speaker of the chamber.[69]

By far the most zealous effort of the Shi‘i deputies, with support from the Shi‘i community at large, were the protests organized during 1946 to lobby for a Shi‘i presidency of the parliament. These events demonstrated the full integration of the Shi‘is in Lebanon by this point in time. When Greek Orthodox Habib Abu Chahla was appointed as speaker of the Parliament, Shi‘i deputies strongly protested and major violent demonstrations took place both in the South and the Bekaa “protesting against the woven conspiracy for the rights of the Shi‘i community, this incident demonstrates that the political and communitarian equilibrium in Lebanon has become precarious.”[70]

As for the community at large, during both the Druze Revolt in 1925–1927, when French control in Syria was being challenged, and during World War Two on the home front, the demands of the Shi‘i community in Lebanon were stepped up. Petitions by organized

groups such as "La Jeunesse Chiites" were presented to General Catroux with regard to local elections and nominations.[71] The significance of this goes back to the communitarian system created by France and its need to pacify discontented groups so as to maintain order in the face of greater challenge to its local control. The benefits for the Shi'i were great: they first received recognition as a sect; and then they succeeded in getting the presidency of the parliament by 1943. The 1937 elections demonstrated yet another development that indicated complete involvement in the Lebanese scene following the 1936 tobacco crisis in Bint Jbail with the appearance of the first electoral political program presented by Adel Osseiran, who ran alone.

This program used a heretofore unprecedented style of political rhetoric for the South in terms of form and content. The author addressed his audience as mature, integrated Lebanese citizens with the right of choice, a sense of national responsibility in terms of seeking independence for Lebanon, as voting citizens and elected politicians, and highlighted the patron–client relation in a progressive way: "I present myself to the voters of the South asking them to study this program with concentration and deliberation, if they see that it is in their interest and the interest of the nation to support me, then I am thankful to them."[72]

Osseiran's program also reflected a national vision that included *matlabiyya*, but extended beyond it. It called for a free and democratic state that upheld the tenets of liberal democracy with equality for all, "the responsibility of the future that all the sons of this country open their hearts to . . . does not fall on one individual or particular group, but on all groups, in relation to their realization, principles and qualification because general rights are for all."[73]

The program was addressed to "the sons of this dear homeland." It is an elaborate, eight-page document divided into nine sections, each of which addresses a specific issue with a set of suggested solutions, such as constitutional reform, taxation, trade, economic development, education, social life, culture, and tourism. It starts with a general reference to Lebanon and the new expanded role of the Lebanese citizen, and then gradually shifts to the specific concerns of the South. Demands for the South are clearly specified, such as creating agricultural training colleges for farmers to develop their skills, and empowering peasants with land while curbing the power of the large landowners, as well as reforming the tax system.

This program did not mobilize a sufficient following, and Osseiran was defeated by a joint electoral list.[74] The readership of such a manifesto was probably limited and the style was novel in that it reflected local leadership and not nationalist ideological parties. His opposition

to the French would in any case have prevented him from winning; however, the emergence of a local political figure with a national scheme marks a shift in the Shi'i 'Amili community, which transcends the traditional, localized pattern of *matlabiyya*-seeking.

His electoral defeat notwithstanding, Adel Osseiran's entry to visible political life marks a considerable change in 'Amili politics.[75] As discussed earlier, the new Mandate setting had led to the juxtaposition of two models of political leadership, the traditional and the modern. The traditional model of leadership was characterized by a sense of entitlement by the leader, a political family, economic power, and social clout, with the electoral process being viewed as a further sanction of the leadership status; whereas in the modern model, getting elected is the result of an implicit pact with the electorate, which expects services to be delivered. Adel Osseiran, as a modern politician, still did benefit from his belonging to a family of notables, but he distinguished himself from the traditional leadership through his educated discourse and progressive ideas. While he was the nephew of Munir Osseiran, Najib Osseiran, and Rashid Osseiran, his political career was initiated through a different route. He needed to distinguish himself from his relatives, particularly Najib, who was a pro-Mandate politician.

Adel Osseiran attended the Jesuit Frères Maristes in Saida followed by the International College in Beirut. He received a B.A. in Political Science from the American University of Beirut (AUB) in 1928 and later an M.A. in 1937.[76] He also started a degree in Law at the Université St. Joseph in 1938 but did not finish it due to his political engagements. Compared to the educational background of a traditional leader, which was often limited, Adel Osseiran exemplifies the new cosmopolitanism of a more integrated Lebanese society.

The time Osseiran spent at AUB coincided with the gestation period for Syrian and Arab nationalist thought. At AUB he met nationalist thinkers such as Constantine Zureiq. Arab nationalism in its liberal version remained a major component of Osseiran's concerns and intellectual discourse. In addition, Osseiran's repeated focus on progress and development and the importance of education distinguished his political speech. Whereas his ideological outlook with regard to nationalism was tempered by realism, his insistence on the need for systematic training toward progress remained and was demonstrated by his involvement in international aid programs as well as local initiatives.[77]

It is important to note that the evolution of Adel Osseiran into a "modern" leader was gradual. His early involvement in electoral campaigns conformed with the established patterns of polemical tone.

However, Osseiran tried also to present a formal program, as stated earlier, and did not limit his electoral appeal to his family background. In fact, building upon this background to advance his "modern" outlook was a recurrent theme in his career.[78]

Osseiran's political visibility intensified with his participation in anti-French activism. He emerged on the 'Amili scene during the Tobacco Crisis in 1936 when he was arrested and later tried for giving an anti-French public speech in support of the tobacco farmers against the French Régie in Nabatieh. He famous words that led to his arrest were "we will swallow these forty million Frenchmen." Arrested and tried with him were Salim Abu Jamrah and Alfred Abu Samra from Marjayoun.[79] Their trial took on a national dimension that gave them all exposure, but particularly Osseiran.[80]

Osseiran was thus the archetype of a new Lebanese politician who transcended community. This is also evident in his alliance in the Saida context with Kazim al-Sulh and Shafiq Lutfi within the Hizb al-Nida' al-Qawmi, the National Call Party, an alliance that embodied Osseiran's nationalist outlook. Osseiran's broad vision, which transcended the local, was apparent in his close contacts with General Spears[81] and other British officials. His national stature was to be sealed through his participation in the events leading to independence in 1943, including his arrest with other national leaders and his triumphant speech in the aftermath of their release. Osseiran was later to become speaker of the parliament and to play a central role in the resolution of the 1958 civil war. In the subsequent decades, he was viewed and respected as one of the founding fathers of the Lebanese state.

To summarize, two models of political behavior on the part of leaders in Jabal 'Amil emerged during the Mandate period. They were a function of the particular situation or need. The first model was traditional loyalty to the established power, whether Ottoman or French, in order to make passive, compliant, and rhetorical *matlabiyya* fruitful. This was a deceivingly docile conservative model that was rural based. The second model was one of active integration and *matlabiyya*, which attempts to leverage local assets (natural, human) to supersede patron–client dynamics. It achieved its maximum goal when it was in touch with urban elements. In character, it was hybrid rural–urban, with links to the city in order to use the tools available to it to advance itself. Ahmad al-Assaad's leadership relied mostly on the first model, Yusuf al-Zayn's oscillated between the two, and Adel Osseiran adhered largely to the second model.

Chapter 6

Venues for Integration: Religion and Education

The Strengthening of the Shi'i Religious Personality

Shi'i religious leadership lacked the institutional structure that existed for the Maronite community and to a lesser degree for the Sunni community. However, one can argue that the 'Amilis did exert pressure during the Mandate period to seek religious equality that led to the development of institutions, initially the Ja'fari Court. The success of this can be viewed through a trajectory that began with the official recognition of the sect in 1926 and led in 1961 to the creation of the Higher Islamic Shi'i Council (*al-Majlis-al-Islami al- Shi'i al-A'la*). The latter was achieved predominantly through the efforts of Sayyid Musa al-Sadr, who clearly understood the nature of Lebanese communitarianism. This trajectory includes the institutionalization of religious posts (judges, muftis, teachers), making Sunni and Shi'i religious officials' salaries equal, as well as the establishment of Shi'i funded schools such as al-Ja'fariyya in Tyre. The establishment of this Council marks the concluding phase of official Shi'i communitarian integration modeled on the Maronite Church. The progression was made from a purely community-based religious title to sectarian religious leaders.

The Mandate period witnessed the first recognition of the Ja'fari Shi'i sect, as a fully independent denomination in Lebanon. 'Amilis were still viewed by the Sunni leadership as their younger siblings,[1] but at least a distinct Shi'i religious identity was now officially acknowledged.[2] Indeed the movement of rapprochement between the Islamic sects had fostered an environment of mutual recognition,

which had reduced the recourse to *taqiyya*, religiously sanctioned dissemblement, on the part of minority communities. It was therefore more possible for members of a minority Muslim community to assert their religious distinctiveness, while at the same time seeking to expand the common Islamic space. As a result a significant transformation in the Shi'i religious leadership personality occurred in this period.[3] A pamphlet reproducing Sharaf al-Din's reaction to the "Law of Communities" (*Qanun al-Tawa'if*), addressed to the High Commissioner De Martel through Jean Darché and dated March 25, 1939, illustrates the transformation that Sharaf al-Din underwent, from a traditional scholar whose religious authority was derived from the clerical institution to a religious communal leader, who went on to negotiate his religious standing with the political authority. In this memorandum, Sharaf al-Din objected to different aspects of the new law of personal affairs, which he considered as being in contradiction to Islamic regulations. His arguments are formulated to show the utmost respect to the French authorities, while asserting a fundamental disagreement with the contested laws. This incident demonstrates further his position as an "official" religious persona, but acting within the established system, that is, the Mandate authority.

Religious Office

Perhaps surprisingly, the position of the 'Amili ulama toward the French authority and Lebanon was actually more one of accommodation than opposition. Despite the existence of internal tensions among the community between the traditional quietist attitude and political activism, the overall outlook of the ulama in the Mandate period was one of integration in Lebanon. In addition, 'Amili Shi'i ulama provide an interesting contrast to the reaction of the Shi'i ulama of Iraq to the British Mandate during 1920–1925.[4] The 'Amili ulama were influenced by events in Iraq because a substantial number of them had been educated and lived there and communal links extended to intermarriage and cultural and social exchanges between the two. However, the differing sociopolitical and demographic situations in the two countries led to different approaches.

The 'Amili ulama in Lebanon faced a remarkable predicament: they were citizens of a predominantly Christian nation with a Christian ruler at a time when a January 1919 fatwa issued in Najaf by Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Shirazi stated that no Muslim could elect a non-Muslim to rule. Their affinity to Faysal can be understood within this situation. The Syrian option was still feasible in 1919 and was

supported by the ulama as demonstrated by the meetings of the King–Crane Commission and the Wadi al-Hujayr conference. Another option, that of autonomy for Jabal ʿAmil, was also demanded at certain points, but without great insistence.

Given that the ulama had little influence in determining the nature of the state, they sought to advance themselves within the existing order, thus ultimately ignoring any recommended doctrinal opposition. Furthermore, the strong influence of the traditional ʿAmili political leadership on the ulama provided a system of patronage and submission that could not permit large-scale dissent, as was the case in Iraq. The attachment of the ulama to the traditional *zuʿama* was a key factor in determining their political attitudes, which in this case, were effectively pro-French, or at the very least not actively anti-French.

Popular historiography on modern Jabal ʿAmil is filled with tales of resistance to and rejection of the French.[5] The role of the ulama in the early period is described as one of opposition, as a perpetuation of the cultural Shiʿi legacy, modeled, whether consciously or not, on the Najaf revolt of 1920. Furthermore, the dominant position of the ulama in the history of Jabal ʿAmil permitted a highly subjective narration of events in a conscious effort to perpetuate their religious dynasties, such as the prolific publications of the Sharaf al-Din and al-Amin families.

In reality, however, the impact of these figures on the local ʿAmili historiography of the Mandate period is significant; the large majority of ulama accommodated the Mandate and drew whatever communitarian and personal benefits available to them through *matlabiyya*. Even Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin, who left his mark as a staunch pro-Syrian, had relations with the French in Damascus and in Beirut.[6] Furthermore, one can argue that the Mandate period in Lebanon saw an active involvement of the ulama of Jabal ʿAmil in the new socio-political order. The impact of a figure such as ʿAbd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din, for instance, was more significant politically than religiously.

The recognition of the Jaʿfari sect on January 17, 1926, along with the creation of a court of cassation and a public religious office, was predominantly due to the effort of ʿAmili politicians in parliament.[7] Shiʿi ulama came into ideological conflict with the political authority, highlighting a recurrent problem in the relationship of Shiʿism and power. The tension complicated the official appointment of the president of the Jaʿfari court, which took time. In 1924–1925, the secretary general of the High Commission commented that it was irrelevant who the government appointed officially, since the ulama sought recognition and acceptance from the people first and foremost.[8]

Furthermore, another fatwa by Ayatollah Shirazi in March 1920 called for the *takfir*: excommunication of all Muslims accepting posts in the administration and government.[9] This was more significant for the 'Amili ulama as it had a direct individual bearing. The result was the refusal of any French appointment to the Ja'fari Court.

The *marja*' of Jabal 'Amil, Shaykh Husayn Mughniyya, who had followed a quietist path, was the first to be nominated. He rejected it. Following him was Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin, who also declined; Sayyid 'Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din was the third to reject the nomination. A mixture of disdain for a post that would curb their independence combined with the burden of the Shirazi fatwa prevented leading mujtahids from accepting such an appointment, but without denouncing the actual position on offer itself.

The final choice went to Shaykh Munir Osseiran, whose renowned political skills were probably more significant than his religious knowledge. While Osseiran did not represent the first tier of ulama in either prestige or knowledge, his notable family background helped him exploit political ties and his relations with the French were good. His residence in Beirut marked the first official Shi'i representation in that city and served as a meeting place for the community. The Shaykh's knowledge of French and Persian also extended his social links to include French luminaries such as Louis Massignon and Persian notables residing in Beirut such as Abbas Huwaydah, a student at the American University in Beirut.[10]

Nevertheless, the effects of the fatwa on the ulama community were lasting. Major *mujtahids* shunned official employment. Shaykh Yusuf al-Faqih al-Harisi who was the first to break this restriction became advisor to the Ja'fari court in 1930 and later succeeded Munir Osseiran as president.[11] This move on the part of al-Harissi opened the door for a more public expression of *matlabiyya* for the ulama as far as seeking communal equality and official employment is concerned, particularly in the case of their sons. In a petition presented to the high commissioner from the "ulama of the Shi'i Muslim Community of the South" on July 12, 1930, the following is stated, "our community is unsatisfied of its rights. It pays more taxes than its numeric capacity. It has received far less positions that it is entitled to. The fact that it is been further deprived of newly created positions given to gangs has deeply wounded it . . ."[12]

The transformation of the ulama's attitude to the state and a mark of their integration was best shown through Sayyid 'Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din's lobbying for his sons to obtain official posts. In his pursuit of *matlabiyya*, the Sayyid sought to emulate established customs

in the Sunni juridical field as well the Maronite Church. In November 1931 he addressed the government with a request for a mufti and *mudarris* (teacher) for the newly constructed mosque in Tyre (with the community's money) to serve the Shi'is. He then suggested his son, Muhammad Rida Sharaf al-Din, be nominated.[13] This was approved by the French and his son became Mufti of Tyre. In another attempt for the same son, the Sayyid wrote a letter to the Comte de Martel, high commissioner in 1936, asking that his son be appointed to the post of judge in Baalbek.[14]

The interplay between 'Amili politicians running for elections and the ulama serves to demonstrate the complex level of patronage and clientship between the two. In early 1934, Fadl al-Fadl and Najib Osseiran, deputies for the South, and Shaykh 'Abd al-Husayn Sadiq visited Pechkoff to demand the nomination of a Shi'i mufti in Saida as that *caza* had many more Shi'is than Sunnis, who already had their own mufti. This was followed by a formal written demand by the deputies to the high commissioner.[15] Based on the factual evidence of the numerical advantage of the Shi'is, De Martel took "the necessary measures to ensure that a favorable conclusion be given to the justified requests of the Shi'is of Saida."[16]

As a result, Shaykh Hasan Sadiq, son of Shaykh 'Abd al-Husayn Sadiq of Nabatieh, was appointed on May 14, 1934. This nomination had a great deal to do with Shaykh 'Abd al-Husayn Sadiq's friendly relations with the French.[17] Numerous telegrams from notables and minor politicians were sent thanking the government in a unified display of gratitude.[18] The general reaction among the other ulama was one of objecting on the basis that there was no such function as mufti in Shi'i jurisprudence, but they did not seriously oppose this nomination.

Once the Ja'fari court was established and the Shirazi fatwa ceased to have much significance, the ulama began to lobby for equality in salaries for Shi'i religious officials. The salaries of the Ja'fari court officials were lower than those of the Sunnis, and Shaykh Munir Osseiran, president of the court, led a campaign for change on the basis of constitutional rights and equality of the courts and the services they conducted.[19] His demands were supported by mujtahids, such as the quietists Shaykh Husayn Mughniyya and 'Abd al-Husayn Nur al-Din.[20] A decision was reached nearly two years later in late 1937, and salaries were adjusted to equal amounts between the Sunni and Shi'i courts.

Although these efforts did not dramatically alter the neglected state of the South in terms of infrastructural development and overall equality, they did highlight a process of national integration of this

politically marginal group that had started with the creation of the Mandate. The significance of *matlabiyya* in this can be seen from the bulk of the documents on the Shi'i community in the French archives that are entitled "Demands of the Shi'i Community."

Three Models of Religious Leadership

If the process of political integration of the 'Amili community into the new Lebanese entity through the use of political *matlabiyya* led to the emergence of new paradigms of political leadership, the image and role of the religious authority within the community also underwent considerable evolution and, occasionally, revolution. This evolution did not however encompass all of the ulama. The traditional model of the religious figure was one who bestows legitimacy to and derives authority from the political leader. This model did persist, as exemplified by Shaykh Husayn Mughniyya, Sayyid 'Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din, Shaykh 'Abd al-Husayn Sadiq, and Sayyid 'Abd al-Husayn Nur al-Din.

The traditional model can be characterized as being both passive and conservative. In the context of this model, the ulama, until the Mandate period, monopolized popular access to the masses through education and civil affairs. They yielded sufficient influence to sway the populace politically, this was traditionally a pro-Assaad position in which the ulama were considered to be a political *marja'iyya*. The rhetorical excesses in describing this relationship of patronage are illustrated by the appropriation of a Qur'anic reference of praise to the Ka'abah for praising Ahmad al-Assaad's home in Taibeh:

> This is a paraphrase of the Qu'ran, 106, 34: "Let them adore the Lord of this house who provides them with food against hunger and with security against fear."

According to a report by the delegate to the High Commission in Lebanon to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs dated August 21, 1936,

> In what concerns the religious element, it remains considerable among the backward populations. We can say, from their activities [the ulama] that they are entirely in support of the cause of integrity and Lebanese independence. The local leaders, who have a more or less feudal tendency and the notables all follow the religious leaders, in addition to the entire peasant population that instinctively follow and with their hearts their spiritual and temporal leaders.[21]

The attitudes of the ulama to political leadership beyond the Assaad base are vital to understanding the position of these leaders. In the case of Yusuf al-Zayn, his power base in the region of Nabatieh meant a certain dependence on the approval of ulama for enhancing his career. While pursuing integration, he also sought to cultivate the ulama and involved them in matters of education. On the other hand, Adel Osseiran, as a Shi'i national leader with a modern education was a threat to the ulama positions and did not receive widespread support from them or sufficiently indulge them in the traditional manner.

The traditional relationship between the political and religious leadership benefited from an endorsement from the Mandate authorities. The Mandate powers did not need to challenge this authority, therefore an understanding with them was reached. The fact that these two groups were the most responsive as far their position toward the Mandate was concerned, encouraged the latter to support their position of authority and provide them with benefits, as demonstrated by the appointment of both Sharaf al-Din's and Sadiq's sons to desired positions and in the relationship between Sharaf al-Din and the administrative councilor to the South, Zinovi Pechkoff, in the period between 1931 and 1937 in general.[22]

In fact, the pursuit of official appointments by sons of religious families in the early stages of the Mandate was not only limited to those families with associations with the traditional political leadership. On the one hand, this ulama group represented an educated elite in Jabal 'Amil, albeit religious, that could fill these positions. On the other hand, the attitude to government employment was positive in that it was considered a secure position given that this group was excluded from such participation during the Ottoman period. This was a further pursuit of integration.

In addition to the traditional religious leadership, a new Shi'i religious personality emerged. During the *Nahda* and increasingly during the Mandate, this new model repositioned itself with regard to the collective Shi'i identity in terms of reconciliation and unity in the wider Arab and pan-Islamic context. A distinguishing feature between the traditional and the new models was the latter's consciousness of its role beyond the local. The archetype of this model is undoubtedly Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin.

In 1924, Sayyid Muhsin engaged in a notorious religious battle over the commemoration of 'Ashura. Throughout history and across the Shi'i world, the tenth of the hijri month of Muharram is commemorated by reenactments of the historical episode that saw the death of Imam Husayn, the grandson of the Prophet, and his companions in

Karbala. The origin of the commemoration in Jabal 'Amil is a subject of debate.[23] However, by the nineteenth century 'Ashura and the days preceding it were highly ritualized with practices ranging from the passion play to self-mortification. By the early twentieth century, these celebrations came to the limelight and were viewed as shocking or abhorrent by a non-Shi'i audience, causing a certain level of embarrassment for some in the Shi'i community.

Sayyid Muhsin, himself a resident of Damascus, was particularly sensitive to these feelings. His reformist position, seeking to rid the commemoration of what he considered its "extreme" aspects such as self-mortification, can be viewed as reflective of both his preference for moderation in religious matters and his desire to "normalize" the Twelver Shi'i sect in a Sunni-informed Muslim context. He published his position in a series of articles in *al-'Irfan* culminating in a book entitled *The Treatise of Purification*.[24] However, the reception of his ideas was mixed in the Shi'i religious world. Some likeminded religious progressive thinkers welcomed his call for reform, whereas many conservative clerics considered it a compromising innovation.

In addition to the reactions emanating from Jabal 'Amil in opposition to Sayyid Mushin's call for moderation, particularly that of Sayyid 'Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din and his supporters,[25] a larger opposition among leading Shi'i clerics in Najaf erupted. *The Treatise of Purification* is the culmination, or at least the most visible outcome, of Muhsin al-Amin's reform agenda through which he tried to move the Ja'fari Shi'i sect away from its isolation into the mainstream of Islamic life. For that purpose al-Amin uses arguments derived from the basic principles of Ja'fari Islamic jurisprudence, such as the no harm rule (*la darar wa-la dirar*). In doing so however al-Amin ignored centuries of accumulated tradition and rituals that had become a focal point of Shi'i distinctiveness. People's reaction to him stemmed largely from the perception that his reform was aimed at this distinctiveness. Al-Amin's agenda can be viewed as parallel to and complementary of the evolution that the 'Amili community was undergoing. For both al-Amin and the 'Amilis, there was an implicit attempt at integrating with the greater Lebanese whole.

Paradoxically, Sayyid Muhsin's reformist position triggered a reinvigoration of a conservative attachment to the rites of 'Ashura. Al-Amin's unstated agenda was a reversal of the historical alienation of the Shi'i 'Amili community relegated to separateness in the form of a "Mitwali" community. Sayyid Muhsin deliberately sought to make the Shi'ism of the community more in line with the Islamic (Sunni) mainstream, turning it into a cultural component compatible with a pan-Arab/pan-Islamic vision.

In Sayyid Muhsin's pro-Arab nationalist conception, Shi'ism was no longer confrontational or incompatible with the Lebanese Muslim (Sunni) mainstream. One anecdote to illustrate this is when a Damascene Sunni sought the Sayyid with the desire to convert to Shi'ism. Sayyid Muhsin instructed the man to recite the *Shahada*. Then the Sayyid declared the man a Shi'i. By this action, Muhsin al-Amin was explicitly underlining an equation between Shi'ism and mainstream Islam.[26] However, the Sayyid's formula omitted the 'Amili traditional polemical addition at that time to the *shahada* attacking the first three caliphs. This triangle, *muthalathiyya*, was recited at the end of the prayer to include: "May God curse Abu Bakr and 'Umar, and also curse 'Uthman and 'Umar and a thousand thousand curses on 'Umar."[27] One can also argue that al-Amin's conciliatory position involved a distancing of the traditional Shi'i 'Amili position.

If Muhsin al-Amin's attitude can be described as being both active and conciliatory, another group of fellow clerics displayed positions that were indeed active, but in rejection the established order. These were Najafi graduates of the 1920s and 1930s who were influenced by the charged atmosphere in Najaf, which was critical of the traditional religious establishment. This group included Shaykh Muhammad Jawad Mughniyya, Shaykh 'Ali al-Zayn, Muhammad Sharara, Sayyid Hashim al-Amin, and Husayn Muruwwa. As noted earlier, with the exception of Shaykh Muhammad Jawad Mughniyya, their dissent led them to abandon clerical life. Whereas some among them even became declared atheists, others engaged in literary pursuits, including Muhammad 'Ali Humani, whose erotic poetry, *Mudhakkarat Khali'* (Memoirs of the Obscene) and *Ma Ba'd Nisf al Layl* (After Midnight), was probably the first in the genre of erotic literature to be published in Lebanon. Both the traditional and active conciliatory model were used to enhance the politics of *Matlabiyya* during this period and beyond, and the third model provided the seeds for revolutionary ideologies.

The clearest means of communitarian integration with the nation state was through the development of institutional structures. The Shi'is adapted, even emulated, other communities, specifically with respect to religious office and education, and in adapting existing structures or creating new ones to ensure maximum participation in the state. Given their unequal communal basis, this was not an easy task, but was aided by the overall communitarian system the French nurtured. Theoretically this system could rectify questions of inequality on the basis of community, not region, the reality was not altered.

The development of the various Lebanese communities was an uneven process, especially among the Shi'is who started off further behind that the rest. Unlike the Maronite or the Druze, the Shi'i in Lebanon did not undergo any sociopolitical development, whereas the Sunnis, as largely urban-based Ottomans, benefited from the state reforms and urban commerce. Therefore, at the onset of the Grand Liban, the communities started at different levels. This was most obvious for the Shi'is on the communal level, with regard to education and income.

Integration through Education

Education, traditionally the realm of the ulama, an unofficial hierarchy without political or economic power, had been in great decline for over a century. Despite administrative reforms, Ottoman government schools were few in Jabal 'Amil, which perpetuated a high level of illiteracy there.[28] The number of private schools was limited and the majority of the population had little access to them, unlike the case of missionary and national (Maronite) schools in Mount Lebanon.[29]

The standards of education for the Shi'i 'Amili population remained poor in comparison to other communities, particularly the Christian and coastal Sunni. This was not merely the result of neglect by the Mandate government. Rivalries in the area of educational development within the 'Amili community also hampered this development. In addition, this kind of modern institution-building was an alien and novel concept to Jabal 'Amil, and it was implemented from the top–down in emulation of other communities, rather than in response to changing local socioeconomic conditions.[30]

In particular, the absence of *waqf* usage in the Sunni sense removed one structural possibility of institution building. Therefore, for ulamas, such as Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin and Sayyid 'Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din, involvement in education was a more personal matter and the stakes, in terms of personal reputation and position, were high. Their aim was the same, to establish schools as a means of extending their personal influence and prestige within the community. This was also a regional rivalry between Shi'i strongholds—Nabatieh and Tyre.[31] This polarization of the ulama and their enduring self-definition through disagreements on educational reform was an important highlight of the internal political situation of the South throughout the Mandate. It demonstrated a desire to integrate with an established Lebanese status quo, where education was a valued commodity among the dominant communities and was therefore a means to power.

The establishment of educational institutions demonstrates the communitarian evolution of Shi‘i institutional structures.

The ‘Amiliyya College, Beirut

The Beydoun family, originally from Damascus, were benefactors of Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin’s project in Damascus, the Muhsiniyya School.[32] Yusuf Beydoun relocated in the late nineteenth century to Beirut. Principally due to the efforts of his son Rashid Beydoun, The Charitable Islamic ‘Amili Society (*al-Jam‘iyya al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya al-‘Amiliyya*) was established in 1923.[33] It was to provide an educational and cultural forum for the Shi‘i residents of Beirut, who were largely poor immigrants from the South with menial jobs. The Society began with a modern elementary school in 1929 in a central neighborhood of Beirut, Ras al-Naba‘, where a large number of Shi‘is resided, including the president of the Ja‘fari Court. The ‘Amiliyya, still an active coeducational institution today, placed itself explicitly in the context of Muhsin al-Amin’s reform of religious customs and devoted special attention to a modern enframing of the commemoration of ‘Ashura along the lines suggested by Muhsin al-Amin’s *Risalat al-Tanzih*.

According to the Society’s report in 1929, 300 students were taught “religious and scientific studies.” There was also an emphasis on instilling a patriotic spirit in the students.[34] Subjects were taught in Arabic and French while English was introduced much later in 1962. Extracurricular activities included theatre and scouting associations. The Society exerted a consistent effort to develop the school along modern educational principles and viewed the Beirut school as a blueprint for an educational network to span the South. Between 1937 and 1948, fundraising activities became more organized, allowing the Society to expand substantially to include a secondary school in Beirut as well as obtain permits for 48 new schools in the South.[35]

Viewed as a potential political asset for the president of the ‘Amili society, these schools were opposed by the local political leadership, namely the al-Assaads. The ‘Amiliyya’s expansion to the South was halted in 1944 and the existing structures were eventually appropriated by the government for use by state schools.[36] Despite the fact that this project did not reach its intended goal of creating a lasting educational system, it reified the desire to endow the community with institutional assets that address the needs of its members on par with other communities.

The failure of the school experiment in the South stemmed partly from the suspicion of the al-Assaads of the political ambition of

Rashid Beydoun, the president of the 'Amili Society. Beydoun became a member of parliament in 1937, first for the South (as no Shi'i seats were allocated for Beirut), and later for Beirut. After 1943 he committed himself to the 'Amiliyya for the remainder of his life. His ability to enlarge the school and establish a presence for the 'Amili Shi'is in Beirut was a significant step for the 'Amilis, as far as declaring a communitarian institutional commitment in the center of power was concerned. Beirut's increasingly dominant position as the center of government and of finance made it necessary for the community to create links to ensure its integration on a national level. The 'Amiliyya represented an attempt of a private 'Amili institution building in Beirut. It also demonstrated that the 'Amili community could empower itself.[37]

The funding for the 'Amiliyya came from the Shi'i immigrant communities of West Africa, a fact that was highlighted by Beydoun's fundraising trips.[38] Kamil Muruwwa accompanied Beydoun on a second fundraising trip in 1938 and published one of the first accounts of the Lebanese communities in West Africa.[39] Although their contribution was at this time still modest, this fundraising dynamic that was set in motion for the 'Amiliyya hinted at the future economic potential of the Shi'i diaspora community. The Maronites had already successfully developed migrant communities in the Americas, who were a source of support for Maronite institutions.

The success of the 'Amiliyya greatly aided Rashid Beydoun's political career. The presence of the 'Amiliyya in Beirut gave him considerable prestige and demonstrates a shift in the center of gravity from the South to Beirut. Beydoun, due to the 'Amiliyya and the support he received from Adel Osseiran, as well as his relationships with Beirut's political elite, helped him to acquire a political base in the South.

The example set by the 'Amiliyya encouraged 'Amilis to pursue other educational projects. In June 1928, leading ulama and notables met in Beirut to raise funds for a similar project in the South, and this time the notables contributed money: Najib Osseiran (400 pounds), Yusuf al-Zayn (250), and Ali Fayyad (200) to begin with, over a period of six years.[40] Furthermore, Shaykh Yusuf al-Faqih was chosen by the ulama to collect funds throughout Jabal 'Amil for this project, which was adopted by the Association for 'Amili Ulama.

However, due to intra-ulama rivalry, Sayyid 'Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din and Shaykh 'Abd al-Husayn Sadiq were not members of this association, and a dramatic showdown ensued over the attempted establishment of a school in Tyre, Sharaf al-Din's city. Nothing came of this project, and the money was eventually donated to the 'Amiliyya

Society in Beirut.[41] Nevertheless, the later founding of the Ja'fariyya School by Sharaf al-Din in Tyre can be seen as having been influenced, albeit indirectly, by the 'Amiliyya. The proceedings of the Association meetings were published in *al-'Irfan*, which subjected the participants to scrutiny and criticism from 'Amilis everywhere. A critical reaction published in *al-'Irfan* was voiced in particular by the radical group of 'Amili students in Najaf, which included Husayn Muruwwa and Muhammad Sharara, demanding accountability of the senior ulama in Jabal 'Amil.[42]

The Ja'fariyya School, Tyre

For Sayyid 'Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din, founding a school in Tyre was a long-pursued goal. He sought the support of the Mandate authority for this project against his local political rivals. His Tyre school was an emulation of the 'Amiliyya project. Whereas the establishment of the Ja'fariyya was justified as being a response to the influence of Western education on the local population,[43] the actual evolution of the school in terms of its pedagogical program and fundraising approach places it more in competition with the 'Amiliyya than with Christian missionary schools.

While the religious dimension was not neglected, as demonstrated by the yearly 'Ashura commemoration and the religious nomenclature attached to its activities, such as the Ja'far al-Sadiq Scouts and the Zahra' School,[44] the curriculum, the teaching staff, and even the student body were virtually indistinguishable from those of other schools.[45]

The conflict over the land on which al-Ja'fariyya would be built on is in itself significant. A heated confrontation took place in Tyre between supporters of Sharaf al-Din and the Khalil family over ownership of the land and the nature of the school *waqf*.[46] This lasted for several years during which *waqf* property was carefully examined by the Ja'fari Court and an attempt was made to organize the structure of such holdings for the first time as separate from Sunni *waqf*.[47] The school provided Sharaf al-Din with another dimension to his power, beyond the strictly religious, allowing him to challenge the Khalil family's claim to exclusive political control of Tyre.

Sharaf al-Din's memoirs report the difficulties he underwent to establish the Ja'fariyya.[48] The boys' school officially opened in 1938, followed by a girls' school, Madrasat al-Zahra' in 1941. The school today is coeducational. Like al-'Amiliyya, al-Ja'fariyya had the ambition of expanding its school system to the hinterland of Jabal 'Amil. It eventually opened a branch in Naqoura, and it created and expanded

a boarding section to accommodate pupils from remote village and children of expatriates.[49]

The al-‘Amiliyya and al-Ja‘fariyya schools represent institutional assets that the Shi‘i community of Lebanon was able to acquire in the process of its re-formation as a community in the new Lebanese societal framework. The process of the development of these two institutions along with the formalization of a religious office is a clear manifestation of the evolution of the ‘Amili community, and its movement toward integrating with the Lebanese system.

Chapter 7

History and Culture: Constructing a Lebanese Identity

Toward a Historical Equality

The most important critical assessment of Lebanese historiography was done by the prominent Lebanese sociologist Ahmad Beydoun in his defining *Identité confessionnelle et temps social chez les historiens libanais contemporains.* He treats the question of the multi-communitarian historical narrative and its denouement on the political and national space in a chronological and horizontal time period in a series of case studies. His first historiographical case study was of the contested episode of the Mamluk suppression of a Shi'i community in Mount Lebanon and the resulting devastation of Kisrawan. A quasi-consensus had emerged among Lebanese Maronite historians to appropriate this event for their own community, presented as a beleaguered mountain community surrounded by a hostile hinterland.

Debate about this historical event was in actual fact a proxy for the ideological conflict about the definition of Lebanon, whether in harmony with or in struggle against its Arab environment. This tension that accompanies the individual historians mentioned in Beydoun's work is also prevalent among 'Amili historians attempting to reconcile their position within these two poles. Beydoun's second case study was about the origin of the Mardaites and the Jarajima (who are claimed by the Maronites as their ancestors), and his third was about the formation of the Lebanese state from Fakhr al-Din onward. It is in this third case study that Beydoun, himself from Jabal 'Amil, introduces Lebanese Shi'i voices into his debate about the history of Lebanon.

Having in his previous discussion adopted a generational model for Maronite and Sunni historians, Beydoun introduces two Shi'i historians, 'Ali al-Zayn and Muhammad 'Ali Makki, who adhere to his working model. His interest in both al-Zayn and Makki is in their contribution to the debate on the Mount Lebanon–centric history of Lebanon. Beydoun is largely silent about 'Amili and Shi'i historiography outside the Lebanist context.

The question of identity and history was actually central to the thinking of the many generations of historians from Jabal 'Amil. Furthermore, Beydoun implicitly presents a chronology of model adoption with the Shi'is as latecomers in developing their own national historical model as a fully integrated Lebanese community. In Beydoun's narrative, the "Maronite" model comes first, emulated by the Sunnis, and the Sunni model is later adopted by Shi'i historians. This order of historical model adoption is demonstrably false. As this section shows, the 'Amili reconciliation of the nation-community model, previously adopted by the Maronite historians, precedes that of the Sunnis and can be traced to the early phase of the Mandate. The full development of the Sunni Lebanese version of this model had to wait until the 1970s.[1]

The creation of the state of the Grand Liban in 1920 signifies a landmark in the formulation of a novel political and cultural identity for the attached districts, and within them the newly incorporated communities. Just as the fabrication of Phoenician history was woven into the definition of the Grand Liban, so the development of other "Lebanese" historical myths became necessary for national participation. The Shi'is of Jabal 'Amil offer one such case.

What took place after 1920 in the domain of history-writing is arguably a form of secularization of 'Amili history, away from the universal religious dimension, to a localized Lebanese one in contest with other communities for a historic space. It marks a key aspect of national integration for the 'Amili community. When the Shi'is of Lebanon became part of Lebanon in 1920 they acquired a new identity that was fundamentally different and more self-aware than the previous more global Ottoman identity. As such, they also needed to find a way to include themselves in the historical narrative of the new entity, its mythical character notwithstanding. This marked a vital step in terms of redefining their identity from their traditional vision of self as a fragment of a larger encompassing Shi'i Islamic world, extending from the time of 'Ali bin Abi Talib, the first Imam, to the waiting for the return of the Mahdi, the twelfth Imam in occultation.

The problem in rewriting their communal narrative in order to situate themselves within the new Lebanese national context historically

is that the Shi‘is of Jabal ‘Amil were a marginal community, in a marginal region. Moreover, not only were they one of many communities, but several of these communities—Druze, Maronite, and Sunnis—had in the past dominated the area that was to become Lebanon, and directly or indirectly dominated the Shi‘is.

The Maronite Model: Application of the Nationalist History in the Lebanese Context

Lebanese historiography as a whole cannot be divorced from that of the Maronite community, which served as the basis for the various other communitarian narratives.[2] As the self-proclaimed heir of the Phoenician legacy and raison d’être of the Grand Liban, the Maronite community, with the support of the French, embarked on nation-building with an established historical narrative that was to their advantage. The Maronites’ success was a model for other communities to emulate to claim their share of their “heritage” in a Lebanese nation state. In so doing, they adapted their histories to suit a Maronite prototype that has wider political-cultural ramifications than simply self-expression. The Maronite prototype itself has to be assessed in the context of the emergence in the nineteenth century of a nationalist historiography, which itself emulated its European antecedents. Early examples of this formula often came from minority communities, and the Arab nationalist discourse also represents such an application.

Communitarian politics took root in Mount Lebanon with the advent of European capitalism in the region and the preferential treatment given to the Maronite community. This was firmly established during the last Shihabi reign of Bashir II (1788–1840) whose family converted from Sunni Islam to Maronite Christianity early in his reign. Bashir managed to extend his control over the entire region of Mount Lebanon and unite it administratively.[3]

The Maronite Church succeeded in its attempt to unify the community in an atmosphere of social flux, economic development, and political tension, locally and with the Ottoman state, by establishing itself as a powerful and independent balance between the political families, such as the Khazins of the mountain, and encroaching Western power.[4] The impact of Western capitalism also infiltrated the cultural life of the mountain, of which the Maronite church was the guardian.[5] The cohesion of the community, however, was achieved at the most local level: in the village where the role of the local priest was

central. Their communal unity was preserved through their clergy, who provided a base for their community after it had lost its tribal characteristics.[6]

The Druze community of the mountain, on the other hand, did not have an elaborate communal network and an established religious institution, and prior to the outbreak of the civil war in 1858 they were not engaged in similar exercises of cultural self-preservation. Their political authority in the mountain, which was tribal in nature, was their source of strength.[7] Their exposure to the Western capital market in Beirut and the Mountain was limited, though they did welcome the Protestant missionaries, who were shunned by the Maronites and other Catholics.[8] Although viewed as useful, the presence of these missionaries, whose mission was predominantly pedagogical, did not induce an educational revolution within the Druze community, nor did it affect its tight societal links or its means of self-identification.

Cultural production for the Maronite Church was one of the instrumental tools of self-preservation and perpetuation.[9] In following patterns of cultural expression similar to that of the Roman Catholic Church, the Maronite Church became the guardian of the Maronite heritage, so that the first historians of the community were men of the cloth who recorded their community's dogma and local history. This was a time when the earliest printing presses belonged solely to the church.[10] Ibn al-Qila'i (d. 1516), described as "a Catholic propagandist,"[11] was the first Maronite to study at the Vatican, before the establishment of the Maronite school at the Vatican. He was "also the first to collect and record information about the history of his people from the beginning of the Crusades to his own day,"[12] and his largely fanciful and mythical material formed the basis of future Maronite historians in terms of information and theme. By his account, the Maronites were the true faithful whereas others, even other Christian sects, were heretics. Their land, Mount Lebanon, was a holy land for the community, protected by God. Ibn al-Qila'i was preoccupied with rebuking any accusations made toward the community, suspecting their orthodoxy and loyalty to the Catholic Church. Following him was Istifan al-Duwayhi (d. 1704) whose work, *History of the Ages* and *History of the Maronite Community*, was wider in scope than Ibn al-Qila'i, but carried through the same preoccupation with his community in defending its orthodoxy. He nevertheless examined the larger geographic region and non-Maronite communities, such as the Druze.[13]

Such histories continued to be written sporadically within the confines of the Church through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,

becoming its explicit monopoly and with the continuous purpose of defending the Maronite faith.[14]

By the late eighteenth century, access to printing presses facilitated the appearance of newspapers and books, which encouraged an intellectual flourishing that was a link with the age of the *Nahda*. Maronite historians became more active outside of the confines of the Church and their awareness of a multi-communitarian society expanded the themes they covered. Eventually, by the late nineteenth century, European orientalists based at the Université St. Joseph, founded in 1883, played a major role in heightening the debate on the origins of the Maronite community.

A new theoretical framework appeared in the last two decades of the Mount Lebanon autonomy province, parallel to the emergence of a nationalist historiography in Europe.[15] Jesuits writing for the Catholic revue *al-Machriq*, from Père Louis Cheikho to Père Henri Lammens, played an important role in affecting a change in terms of historical versions regarding the seminal question on the origin of the Maronites, their relationship to the Mardaites and to the Jarajima, as well as their relation to the Byzantines, the Mamluks, and Muslim history in general. This was applied to the production of multiple historic texts.[16] But reference to the origins of the Maronites and their relationship to the Mardaites and the Jarajima remained at the core of the debate for Muslims and other Christian communities as well.

Beydoun gives a thorough exposé of the development of Maronite history, its progression over time, particularly the period of its evolution from being an isolated community to its gradual encounter with a larger multi-communitarian audience competing for the same geographical space and eventually the same national entity.[17] The multi-communitarian state emerged in place of the isolated community retreating from hostile external forces; however, this multi-communitarian state was understood as first and foremost serving the interests of the Maronites. The themes expressed by the Maronite historians about their community were specific. In his *History of the Ages*, a general history of the Near East with emphasis on the Maronites in Lebanon, Duwayhi refers to the Maronite community as *al-Umma al-Maruniyya* (the Maronite Nation) when discussing its origin.[18] A generalized model can be distilled from Beydoun's treatment of Maronite historiography, with the following tenets used to define the history of a community:

1. *The singular source of origin for the community.* Communal historical writings refer to one and the same historic father or tribe

that every community originates from. The history of the community is based on a historic value that precedes its birth, what Beydoun refers to as a "resurrection of origin."[19] This is despite the fact that the same communities contradict this claim in their popular lore and family history, for example, the region of Mount Lebanon and Kisrawan witnessed many conversions to Maronite Christianity from Shi'i Islam as well as Sunni and Druze, including the ruling Shihab family. This was can only be privately acknowledged, however, due to the delicate communitarian balance.

2. *The singular religious source of the community*. This means that in religious terms the community has at its source an exceptional figure. For the Maronites, Saint John Marun is a saint like no other: he is the "pinnacle of christian spirituality."[20] He is the most pious, self-effacing, and sacrificing of the saints. The exceptional quality of this core figure confers by extension exceptionality on all members of the community.

3. *The geographical claim of the community.* This means that the community has historical claims to geographic areas larger than their own currently. This claim links the community's history to a territory, deriving a connection to the first settlement of this territory. For the Maronites, this is the Phoenician link as well as the Mardaite and Jarajima link.

Due to the unequal stature of various communities vis-à-vis the Maronite community in the Grand Liban, there was a need for the other communities to establish their relationship to this geographic entity, as well as to the Maronites. Their relationship to Mount Lebanon was therefore at the core of any examination of their history. "The viewpoint of Muslim historians has only been examined in its confrontation with the Maronite vision of their origins."[21] Other communities had to develop narratives that paralleled that of the Maronites on the three principles listed above.

From a Maronite historiographic viewpoint, there were two stages to their existence: one was a prehistoric phase, that is, the Phoenician age; the second stage was the actual history of the Maronite community defined through its resistance to Muslim invaders, and its isolation in its mountain haven, where it was in danger of extinction. "Lebanese" history is therefore rendered in terms of a "golden age" with the Phoenicians,[22] followed by a "decline," the Islamic Conquests, and redemption with the Grand Liban. While the periodization of this pseudo-mythical narrative is implicitly debated, its formula is largely accepted. The Muslim, especially the Sunni, reaction to this is

identification with the Islamic conquests of Lebanese territory, subverting the "continuity" of the "durée libanaise"[23] as viewed by the Maronites.

The Shi'i Adaptation to the Model

While Beydoun does not discuss the application of his model beyond the context of the Lebanist perspective, it can be demonstrated that an elaborate adaptation was developed in the Shi'i 'Amili context. The achievement of the Maronite Church in transforming its religious identity into a political one was necessary to advance and impose a national identity. In trying to follow this model, the Shi'i community faced a challenge, as their experience in political participation and "national" identification was weak. This was despite the fact that both communities had stories of persecution first at the hands of the Mamluks and eventually the Druze, which was central to the Maronite narrative. The problem with this position for the first generation of 'Amili historians was that it represented an attack on a Sunni cultural narrative that they had claims in sharing via the Ottoman Caliphate and, briefly, the Arab kingdom. Furthermore, in emphasizing their presence in Kisrawan, the Shi'i historians risked weakening their claim to a timeless existence in Jabal 'Amil.

In addition to following in the Arab-Muslim tradition of history writing as far as annals, chronicles, and biographical dictionaries are concerned, 'Amilis were also influenced by the existing Arabic literature from Mount Lebanon. Journals in particular, throughout the nineteenth century, followed a similar prototype of history already popular in Mount Lebanon. One therefore witnesses a variety of texts published in al-'Irfan that were produced prior to the Mandate period, and which were motivated by a desire to mark a place in Lebanon's history.[24] Similar texts also remained unpublished due to a variety of reasons, especially the fear of this opinionated material being expressed to public view. This is a reflection of a sense of discomfort with regard to authority, whether local or national, a specific 'Amili historic idiosyncrasy, which led to the creation of private libraries of manuscripts, some of which still exist today. *The Essence of Wisdom* is an important manuscript of more than 700 pages of text written in the mid-nineteenth century by a local shaykh from Tyre, Shaykh Muhammad Mughniyya. The document treats the history of the contemporary 'ulama of Jabal 'Amil and its environs as well as the history of the region at this time, including the arrival of Napoleon to the shores of the eastern Mediterranean, on the coast of Jabal 'Amil.

The index is elaborate with historical reference to al Jazzar's and Ibrahim Pasha's campaign. This document has been compared in relevance to 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti's chronicles of the French Occupation in 1798, *Napoleon in Egypt*, but differs in terms of the geographic reference, considered peripheral at that stage. Shaykh 'Abd al-Muhsin Dahir's five-volume dictionary of the Al-Saghir/Assaad family, *History of the Wa'ili Family*, is perhaps the best example of adaptation to the Maronite historic model through his wholehearted subscription to the myth of the origin and qualities of this family. It is also useful for its collection and reproduction of popular tales of events relevant to Jabal 'Amil during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It was written for the family and as such adheres to all the necessary panegyric rules of bravery, generosity, virility, honor, and brilliance. The author's constant reference to the physical attributes and virility of every biographical entry he makes, 164 of them, is particularly entertaining. All the men are tall and handsome with large eyes and are virile, even those who do not have children.

To fully appreciate the evolution of 'Amili Shi'i historiography during the period under study, one needs to view it as a convergence of two narratives—a wider Shi'i Islamic one, and a narrower local 'Amili Ottoman/Syrian/Mount Lebanese one—which result in serving a specific Lebanese historical agenda. Contributions to both narratives in a modern context, that is, in the wake of general reformist atmosphere after the 1908 constitutional revolution, came from several figures, dominant among them the men of culture who partook in shaping early Lebanese 'Amili history, starting with the 'Aley trials of 1915. Al-'Irfan, founded in 1909, is a primary source that served as the vehicle for transmitting both narratives.

The General Shi'i Narrative

The 'Amili understanding of their identity cannot be divorced from a Shi'i conception of history cultivated throughout time.[25] The evolution of Twelver Shi'i Islam is outside the scope of this book, only the major events that have defined its universal awareness, specifically the martyrdom of Imam Husayn at Karbala, and the Occultation of the Twelfth Imam, the Mahdi, are discussed.[26]

The martyrdom of Husayn, as the son of Imam 'Ali, the grandson of the Prophet, whose lineage was thus holy, marked the Shi'i psyche with a profound sense of devastation. It signified for them the suppression of the essence of truth and justice, a break, which could never be surmounted. The Qu'ran and the prophetic message, followed by

the lives of the Imams (who all died in mysterious circumstances, either murdered or poisoned), provided a framework for Shiʿi consciousness and thought.

The occultation of the Twelfth Imam, the Mahdi, as a metaphysically mysterious event promises to redress the injustice through his reappearance to spread justice and to signal the end of the world.[27] In other words, history in its wider Shiʿi version is chaotic and needs a metaphysical intervention, a *deus ex machina*, to define, objectify, and support it. This vision is based on an interpretation of history through drama and pain, suffering and oppression, all enacted in the ritual of ʿAshura during the month of Muharram.[28] The historic dialectic is a constant battle of good and evil seen through a prism of individuals and specific events that coalesce to present a universal lesson.

In essence, the Shiʿi conception of history consists of a lamentation about a traumatic past and an expectation of a triumphant future, with the present noticeably absent. The ideological tenor of the community oscillates between a position of quietism (more prevalent) and active opposition to injustice in the name of good. The problematique lies in a fundamental ideological conflict with temporal rule, rendered ephemeral due to the millenarian perspective, but which is nevertheless central in an attempt to pursue justice. There is therefore a dualism: a retreat from political responsibility, so that events are imposed on the Shiʿis as instruments free of any responsibility, and the second position is a pursuit of truth and justice, to parallel the legacy of ʿAli and Husayn.

In the ʿAmili perspective, this dualism is clearly reflected in the historical representation of Jabal ʿAmil, first recorded by religious men.[29] In ʿAmili history, the two leading ulama of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries parallel the lives of the imams: they were both killed by an "unrighteous" state, while pursuing justice and truth, hence their titles, of the First Martyr and the Second Martyr. This victimized notion of self was encouraged by their existence in a diverse and competitive environment in the ʿAmili Shiʿi community among Maronites, Sunnis, Druze, and others. This situation encouraged the development of a defensive, introverted reaction with occasional exceptions that were not represented positively by the historians. For example, the ʿAmili alliance with Dahir al-ʿUmar in the eighteenth century was not considered from the angle of rebellion or dissent to Ottoman authority, which might have explained al-Jazzar's campaign around 1780—not its severity, but from the perspective of Shiʿi victimization.

Regardless of the reasons, the historical experience of the Twelver Shiʿis inhabiting what is now modern Lebanon has indeed included

persecution and demographic flux, perpetuating the sense of suffering that was already their historical legacy. Following the establishment of the Fatimids in Egypt, Shi'ism in Lebanon flourished with a local dynasty emerging in the eleventh century A.D., Bani Mirdas, which founded two emirates in Lebanon—Bani 'Ammar (1058–1109) based in Tripoli, and Bani 'Uqayl (1058–1126) in Tyre. Shi'is inhabited the littoral north and south, Tripoli, al-Danniyya, parts of the Bekaa, Kisrawan, and Mount Lebanon. Their downfall came with the Mamluk conquests in the thirteenth century.

Massacres of the Shi'i inhabitants of Kisrawan and the north took place at the hands of the Mamluks, and were sanctioned by Ibn Taymiyya. The outcome was a massive movement of Shi'is southward toward Jabal 'Amil, emptying the north of their presence; however, some Shi'i communities remain in the regions of Jbail and Hermel. According to the historian al-Maqrizi, only after Kisrawan was emptied of Shi'is did Maronite cultivators settle there. The Mamluk massacres in Kisrawan remain a potent element in the communitarian narratives in Lebanon. The event as a metaphor is appropriated by the Maronite political discourse as the assault of Arab-Islamic mores on the Lebanese Maronite sanctuary.

The sixteenth century in Jabal 'Amil is portrayed in the same dramatic light, during the time of the political prominence of the Nasif/al-Saghir family. Thus, according to popular history later recorded by 'Amili historians such as Muhammad Jabir, massacres took place twice in the village of Nsar, in 1638 and in 1743, when a few thousand were killed. This was followed by Ibrahim Pasha's campaign along with the belligerent governors of Damascus and Acre. Although other factors were at play, these episodes were seen as victimization of the Shi'is as Shi'is. The memory of Jazzar Pasha's brutal campaign on Jabal 'Amil is still vivid to this day, particularly among those who suffered the most, the ulama, whose libraries al-Jazzar burnt and destroyed, effectively destroying their heritage.[30] This episode in particular befits the theme of Karbala. As one leading 'Amili historian, Munzer Jaber, put it,[31]

> 'Amili historians make abstract the historic dimension of internal factors. This negation has distorted all research, observation and analysis. These internal factors were never considered as an illustrating departure point of a social reality. This approach consists of giving immense value to external factors [such as the tragedy at Karbala] of pure contingencies, which is in one sense a history of chance and a hodgepodge of events which makes of their historic production quite a catalogue.[32]

The Specific 'Amili Shi'i Narrative

In addition to chronicling major events experienced by these historians first hand, post-1920 Shi'i historiography reinforced existing 'Amili oral history on paper. The three principles followed by the Maronite communal historians discussed earlier were adhered to closely by the 'Amili historians. This confirms that the methodology of writing Lebanese history remained Maronite, despite some variations. While many 'Amilis were involved in this project, the most significant work came from Mohammad Jabir Al Safa, who wrote the first modern history of Jabal 'Amil during the Mandate; Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin, who can be considered the first historian of modern Jabal 'Amil; and Shaykh 'Ali al-Zayn, who questioned absolute truths, only to reconfirm them. The contributions of Ahmad Rida, Sulayman Dahir, and Ahmad 'Arif al-Zayn, as the first generation of 'Amili thinkers in the Grand Liban, cannot be neglected either, particularly in their early articles in *al-'Irfan* and other journals, such as *al-Muqtataf*. Ahmad Rida's early attempts were crucial in setting a parameter of identity for the 'Amili Shi'is in his article in *al-'Irfan*, "The Shi'i or the Mitwalis of Jabal 'Amil" in April 1910. Rida also, in a style similar to that employed by Mount Lebanon historians, published his journal *Memoirs for History*, which covered the crucial 1920 period, in *al-'Irfan* in the mid-1930s. Sulayman Dahir's unpublished journal is a vital example of a historical consciousness that was also influenced by the Mountain in its mundane detail and focus on local events in Jabal 'Amil. In the same vein, his published serialized dictionary of 'Amili villages is yet another example of placing the region at the center of the narrative, as is his published book *History of Beaufort Fortress*. His awareness of presenting Jabal 'Amil as an organic entity with Syria also led him to publish an article "The Link of Knowledge between Jabal 'Amil and Damascus" in *al-'Irfan*. Likewise, Ahmad 'Arif al-Zayn's perseverance as founder, owner, and editor of *al-'Irfan* and his catholic capacity to publish a diversity of articles from differing points of view indicates a sense of historical responsibility. Al-Zayn also wrote a comprehensive history of Saida with a full awareness of Western historical methods and various references including French ones, as he expresses in his introduction, as well as an attempt to explain history with the aid of Ibn Khaldun's *Muqaddima*. He also published a history of Shi'ism that is no longer available. Many others also participated in this exercise, to form a second and eventually third generation of Lebanese 'Amili historians in search of communitarian equilibrium.

It is Shaykh 'Ali al-Zayn's work that needs to be considered as the culmination of other 'Amili historians' efforts at integrating a Shi'i narrative within a Lebanese discourse. Following the Maronite model, the themes covered by these historians are:

1. *The singular source of origin of the 'Amilis.* The entire community places great emphasis on their descent from the Banu 'Amila tribe. This is at the core of their identity as evidenced by the overwhelming support of the 'Amili historians on this point. There are also strong allusions to the 'Amilis' Arab 'Alid linkage, a religious reference to secure their prominence as one of the oldest Shi'i communities in the world, as well as a refutation of various statements as to their non-Arab particularly Persian origin, which they reject.[33]

This claim cannot be confirmed, and in fact is unlikely, as it assumes the absolute isolation of the community since Banu 'Amila left Yemen and settled, supposedly in Jabal 'Amil, before the advent of Islam.[34] The presence of other Shi'i groups in Lebanon in the north littoral mountain and in the east makes it all the more unlikely that all Imami Shi'is came from Banu 'Amila.[35] Within this context, the Shi'i massacres in Kisrawan at the hands of the Mamluks cannot be appropriated. Furthermore, it ignores the origins of certain families within Jabal 'Amil, such as the Fadls of the Sa'bi clan who claim Kurdish descent.[36]

Yet in doing so, the 'Amilis succeeded in ensuring their political place in post-1920 Lebanese history. They fulfilled the criteria of an apparently unified homogenous community in terms of origin divided from other non-Shi'i communities in Lebanon. The absolute "truth" that secured the excellence of Jabal 'Amil over other areas found a new impetus and power with the entrance of the Shi'is in the state of Grand Liban in 1920. The Shi'i 'Amilis had to place themselves at this stage in a new historic, geographic, and political "reality," in a state with all the cultural and ideological institutions that this suggests.

2. *The singular religious source of the community.* The spiritual father of the 'Amili Shi'i community is the Arab Abu Dharr al-Ghifari, one of the prophet's companions. He is also one of the first four partisans of 'Ali, who brought Shi'ism to Syria under the third caliph 'Uthman's reign. It is then that he converted the Banu 'Amila to Imami Shi'ism.[37] He fell out with Mu'awiya due to his criticism of the mode of distribution of alms, which has allowed him to be appropriated as an early Islamic socialist.[38] He was then banished to Medina. It was Jamal al-Din al-Afghani who resurrected him as an example of the modernity of Islam.[39] Like Saint John Marun for the Maronites,

Abu Dharr is an exemplary figure for the ʿAmilis with extraordinary attributes—courage, goodness, and honesty.

In choosing Abu Dharr as their saint, the ʿAmilis positioned themselves second only to the Muslims of Medina in their loyalty to Ahl al-Bayt, since they claim Abu Dharr was regarded as a companion of the Prophet. He confirms their Arab origin. This is also a statement of their superiority to all other Imami/Twelver Shiʿis, particularly the larger Iraqi Shiʿi community and the more politically powerful Iranian one.

3. *The geographical claim of the community.* As discussed earlier, ʿAmili historians succeeded in according Jabal ʿAmil a distinguished place among other Shiʿi regions, whether in Lebanon or Syria. At the same time, in asserting the early presence of Banu ʿAmila (as Arabs before Muslims or Shiʿis) in Jabal ʿAmil, they surpass even the Maronite claim to an ancient presence in Mount Lebanon, while also immunizing themselves against possible accusations of sectarianism from Arab nationalists, heirs to Sunni political prominence.

Although the purpose here is not to analyze the historical narratives of all of the Lebanese communities, it is useful to see how the Sunni and Druze communities went through the same process in adapting the Maronite historical models to their own situations. The dominant Sunni narrative in Lebanon is initiated from a point of strength, reflective of the Sunni self-image as the ruling class that came to dominate this region from the time of the Crusaders to the demise of the Ottoman Empire. This was irrespective of the perceived origin of the Sunnis as being from outside of the territory of Lebanon, since they had not internalized "Lebanon" as a separate entity from the rest of the region.[40] The implicit origin of the Lebanese Sunnis is the community of the Prophet in seventh-century Medina. However, in an attempt to redress this imbalance, Sunni historians, such as Naqqach, also fall into the trap of negating Maronite history by excluding the Maronites.[41] Beydoun argues that Naqqach's position is one of a sociocultural definition of identity, through power, that is, the power of the emirs who were Arabs. Power was accorded to the language and the culture it transported, which was Arab.

Nevertheless, Sunni historians also assigned themselves an exceptional religious figure, and their choice is telling. They identified with al-Imam al-Awzaʿi, who was a local saint, rather than a more imposing figure such as Ibn Taymiyya, whose hostile attitude toward unorthodox Islam would have been problematic in a collective space that included both Druze and Shiʿis. Such a fact already highlights a "Lebanese" feature to this dialogue. Despite the recourse to al-Imam

al-Awza‘i as a counterpoint to St. John Marun, there was no developed Sunni Lebanese narrative.

The Druze resolved identification with their communal space with the Maronites by assigning Mount Lebanon as their political entity, the Emirate of the Druze Mountain.[42] They posit themselves as the source of this geographic unit taking on a political dimension. Their attitude toward the Maronite community was one of an opponent in a struggle for domination, a struggle in which the Druze were successful. Their conception of Mount Lebanon is that it represents their bastion and haven. Despite the existence of other Druze communities in Syria and northern Palestine, their presence as political potentates in Mount Lebanon is unquestionable.

However, as far as their historiography is concerned, the Druze were more interested in the history of their religious community than their political history.[43]

On the source of their origin, the Druze as Bani Ma‘ruf traced their ancestry to the Arab Yemeni tribal coalition of the Tanukhis. On the point of origin, their veneration of Hamza bin ‘Ali was similar to the Maronite community's attitude toward St. John Marun. It was possible for the Druze to identify with a more general Arabo-Islamic heritage, despite being religiously rejected, while being firmly rooted in Mount Lebanon.[44]

For the non-Maronite Christian communities such as the Muslims, the point of origin exists outside Lebanon, whether religious or political, adding an external dimension to their Lebanese nationhood (in the Maronite/Druze interpretation). Even in cases of communities with no association with Islam, the Arab identity is strong and can be identified in pre-Islam and, socially, in a tribal context, the Ghassanides, for example, in the case of the Greek Orthodox.[45]

The multi-communitarian dimension exposes these groups, forces them out of isolation, and renders them vulnerable to each other. The historic formula therefore becomes imperative for self-protection, however mythical it may be. After 1920, the awareness of a communitarian balance and the reality of an imbalance presented a perennial dilemma in Lebanon. The Maronites, aware of their dominance, held differing views on redressing the balance by reinterpreting their history for a non-Maronite public. Furthermore, they prompted the notion of a Lebanese nationalism that is secular, based on the need for coexistence. This of course was met with a diversity of reactions from the different communities that continue to the present. However, as far as historical self-representation is concerned, particularly under the Mandate period, it is impossible to transcend a Maronite-influenced discourse.

In considering the contributions of particular figures such as Muhammad Jabir Al Safa, Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin, and Shaykh ʿAli al-Zayn to the modern history of the Lebanese South, to Jabal ʿAmil, and its Shiʿi heritage, it is relevant to examine them within their community's social composition.[46] All three men received a religious education, albeit of different levels. Muhammad Jabir had a primary religious education, Sayyid Muhsin was a learned *mujtahid*, and Shaykh ʿAli was a student at Najaf in the 1920–1930s before throwing off his clerical cloak. They are representative of different segments of the ulama, a group in ʿAmili society that has persisted through the centuries and remained the guardian of Jabal ʿAmil's heritage.

Thus, even in the modern context of a French-backed Lebanese state, the ulama's role in integrating their community's heritage into a conformist mainstream is fundamental, particularly in the absence of an established infrastructure. It is also reflective of the nature of the political culture of this region that has politically marginalized Arab Shiʿi Muslims—first due to the Ottoman–Safavid rivalry and later the emergence of Arab Sunni hegemony and colonial nation-building—that this is one of the few fields accessible to Shiʿi men of culture.

Jabir Al Safa assigned himself the role of ideological guardian of ʿAmili history by writing the ʿAmili narrative on his community's behalf in his *History of Jabal ʿAmil*. He was the first of his generation to undertake the history of Jabal ʿAmil as a public act. It was as much a political statement as a cultural one, as it engaged with a "Lebanese reality." His documentation of history was a conscious effort at including the communitarian implications of a Lebanese Shiʿi identity. It is in this context that the popularity of this book should to be considered. The time of Jabir Al Safa's writing was in the early days of Jabal ʿAmil's incorporation in the Grand Liban, hence it was too early to apply a critical approach. Therefore the search for the truth needed to wait for the more urgent task of securing a history in the Lebanese narrative.

Although renowned as a leading religious scholar of the Levant during the French Mandate period in Syria and Lebanon, Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin's contribution to the history of Jabal ʿAmil was invaluable. His works, *Notables of the Shiʿis* and *Description of Jabal ʿAmil* among others, furnishes the Shiʿis of South Lebanon with an authoritative source on their heritage that is compatible in the multi-communitarian historical space of the Lebanese state.

Shaykh ʿAli al-Zayn (ca. 1900–1984) was a leading Shiʿi historian from Jabal ʿAmil. He was also an important historian of Lebanon, having written *In Search of Our History in Lebanon*, *Customs and*

Traditions of Our Feudal History, and *Chapters of Shiʿi History in Lebanon*. He represents a generation of intellectuals—historians formed out of the experience of birth of the Lebanese state in 1920—who tackled the delicate question of the historical supremacy of the Lebanese national narrative.[47] Therefore, his work needs to be assessed from the perspective of both communitarian and national history.

Despite the systematic approach, an established curriculum of ʿAmili history did not exist, and the Shaykh chose random moments in its history to analyze. Although he remains silent toward the ethnic and religious origin of the community, the Shaykh fulfils the role of the Lebanese historian by promoting a national communitarian complicity through the most basic point of national membership, as a religious community (Shiʿi). This silence can also be interpreted as a mode of integration with Lebanon, despite the Shaykh's political reservations. It is also especially significant that for him the community became the last and only group of identification, greater than that of religion, which he harshly critiqued.

ʿAmili Alter Ego: *Al-ʿIrfan* and the Press

The cultural revival in Jabal ʿAmil in the first half of the twentieth century is thoroughly chronicled in *al-ʿIrfan*. Founded in 1909, it became the main journal of the Shiʿi world until the 1950s, and was published regularly until 1973.[48] It is the first journal to appear in Jabal ʿAmil.[49] Its founder, Ahmad ʿArif al-Zayn, although not a native of Nabatieh, was closely associated with the educated circle there that was the main pillar of support for the journal and contributed heavily to it throughout their lives.

The role of *al-ʿIrfan* as a journal of culture, politics, and society cannot be overestimated, given its pioneering position as the first of its kind. What the journal undertook as its task in 1909 was a multilayered effort, not only to reclaim Jabal ʿAmil's history and people back from oblivion, as a result of the destructive campaign of Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar in 1780, and to put it on the regional map, but also to engage the fundamental questions of the day that plagued this region: definitions of nation, the nature of political rule, urbanity, and modernity. As the pivotal intellectual platform of ʿAmili society, it wielded far more influence than is generally attributed to a journal. The richness of *al-ʿIrfan* is in its crowded columns full of the opinions of its contributors, which were often contradictory, in an effort to finally speak out as members of a community. *Al-ʿIrfan* not only provided the umbrella under which the budding intellectuals of Jabal ʿAmil

expressed themselves, it was also a vehicle for intellectual transformation, for the formation of a new generation of thinkers who were principally educated through its world vision.

It is also important to note the foresight of Shaykh Arif al-Zayn in transmitting the journal to a larger audience in the region than just Jabal ʻAmil. He wrote, "*al-ʻIrfan* started out to spread knowledge and to form a link of introduction between the scholar and literati of Iraq and Jabal ʻAmil, and between the ulama and literati of the world." With this statement, Ahmad Arif al-Zayn defined his vision and his audience by creating a sectarian grouping linked to geography and a culture.[50]

However, as with other Arab men of culture at this time dealing with Islamic history and exercises of reconciliation between the Orient and Occident, the ʻAmili group displayed an inability to link the general to the particular. While discussing the benefits of modernization, and citing Japan as a good example, they highlighted precisely the problems of the Ottoman state, such as the need for political and moral reforms. Very few of their own societal issues, namely *iqta*ʻ, questions of local political legitimacy and economic disadvantage, were addressed at length early on. Whether this is a question of subtlety, that the critique of the whole implicates the parts as well, or a form of self-censorship, or both, is unclear.

Even as far as the geographic identity of these intellectuals was concerned, their positions were conflicting. For example, in 1911 Ahmad Arif al-Zayn wrote a history of Saida, the city he had come to reside in, when it was not considered part of Jabal ʻAmil. *Al-ʻIrfan* was the first journal to publish in full the text of the Iranian constitutional revolution and it congratulated the presidents of "free" Iran, Khurasani and Mazandarani, on their achievements. The intellectuals saw this as an achievement for the Persian nation, carefully distinguishing them, the Iranians, from the ʻAmilis. It is clear that their definition of Persian here is ethnic, unlike that of the Ottoman nation to which the intellectuals belonged,[51]and that they did not see this as a momentous event for the Shiʻis as a whole.

Al-ʻIrfan served both as a reflection of the emerging cultural revival of the Shiʻi community, and as an agent in this revival. With the advent of the Mandate, *al-ʻIrfan* became a vehicle of integration for the ʻAmili community in the new nation state of Lebanon. In addition to serving as a primary source of information for South Lebanon during the period of the Mandate, it was also a school that institutionalized ʻAmili historiography and shaped ʻAmili identity.[52] The influence of *al-ʻIrfan* in Jabal ʻAmil can be weighed by the fact that among the masses the name was synonymous with "book."

An examination of the articles published by *al-'Irfan* during the Mandate reflects the multiple political positions of the 'Amili community. It is important to note that the fundamental importance of *al-'Irfan* lies in its accurate reflection of the political mentality of the Shi'is of Jabal 'Amil in a period of great political flux. Therefore, the journal reproduces the convergence of the 'Amili political identity and its development between the journal's inception and the independence of Lebanon in 1943. Despite attempts to attach *al-'Irfan* under one political umbrella, this identity is multilayered but fixed at the core level: it is a Shi'i 'Amili identity.

Al-'Irfan marks a turning point for Jabal 'Amil's public sphere; it declares its resurrection/remodeling in a modern context.[53] This process was not unique to Jabal 'Amil, but was part of a larger momentum taking place in the Arab East (and in other non-western regions) that can be understood due to the impact of the Industrial Revolution in the West, colonial expansion, and the liberal intellectual movement, predominantly in Egypt, Beirut, and Mount Lebanon of the nineteenth century.

There were two processes that contributed to the birth of *al-'Irfan*, one local and one regional. The first is directly linked to the Tanzimat policies of the mid-nineteenth century, particularly Syria, in institutionalizing changes such as land reform and administrative restructuring that incorporated the traditional leadership into a bureaucratic mainstream and allowed for the emergence of a landed bourgeoisie with capital to fund such a journalistic endeavor.[54] Ahmad 'Arif al-Zayn's capital for his journal came from his family, who had benefited from these reforms. Furthermore, Ahmad 'Arif al-Zayn attended the newly established, albeit short-lived, official school in Nabatieh, along with the 'Amili Trio—Ahmad Rida, Sulayman Dahir, and Muhammad Jabir Al Safa—who formed the core of the editorship of *al-'Irfan* throughout their lives.

The second process was the *Nahda* as it was experienced in Mount Lebanon and Beirut. It was the combination of the influx of European capital to the silk industry in the mountain and the growth of Beirut as a mercantile port city with extensive links to cities such as Alexandria in Egypt, where the *Nahda* had had a deep impact on the pubic sphere, and whose effects spread to regions such as Jabal 'Amil. The fact that by 1864 Beirut Vilayet included Jabal 'Amil was not insignificant as far as the dissemination of culture was concerned, given that Beirut served as the central point and that the geographic delineation of this province created one administrative unit.

The development of the print industry, of the Arabic printing presses in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, was a component in national

formation.[55] Consequently, the circulation of newspapers stimulated a local ʻAmili consciousness, along with the Ottoman constitutional reforms. The role of *al-ʻIrfan* can be considered as a catalyst for this subnational identity.

In such an atmosphere, *al-ʻIrfan* was an initial step of integration, a forum within a fluid sociopolitical environment that was undergoing change. It defined itself as a "literary, scientific, monthly and illustrated" journal. Therefore, whether the journal expressed desire for change, while affirming loyalty to the sultan in 1909, or hailed Faysal as king in 1920, the essential motives of its contributors remained unchanged. The editor remained consistent in his stress on knowledge through education and development.[56] Nevertheless, the pursuit of reform at a sociopolitical level was, first and foremost, directed toward the ʻAmili community, and only then to others. This fact has been understated when considering *al-ʻIrfan* as another product of the *Nahda*.

Al-ʻIrfan was the clear communitarian vehicle of self-image. It may not have used a language betraying a sense of political or social minority,[57] but the need to redress a socioreligious imbalance remained at the core of *al-ʻIrfan*'s mission, particularly with regard to the Sunnis. The scale reference in Middle Eastern societies was hierarchical, especially with reference to non-Muslims and their status as *dhimmis.* The Sunni majority assumed for themselves the highest position on the political ladder, so the need to define itself as a majority with regard to other groups was unnecessary. This, however, does not translate into a parallel attitude for other groups, especially non-Sunni Muslim groups such as the ʻAmili Shiʻis. Their endeavor of reflecting a self-image, as in *al-ʻIrfan*, was a demand for recognition by the Sunnis as equal Muslims. Yet the method by which this was undertaken was subtle and had to be integrated into a larger pan-Islamic reformist dimension, in line with al-Afghani's vision.

In its statement of purpose, published in 1935 under the title "*The New Year, so where the Happy Era?*" *al-ʻIrfan* lists six principles that served as its guideline. The title alone suggests a position of discontent for the status quo, the Grand Liban, which lends itself to *matlabiyya*. As such, the six principles are listed as follows: (1) serving the Arab cause; (2) serving people of the East in general and Muslims in particular; (3) diffusing culture, encouraging the *Nahda*, science, and learning; (4) supporting the literati, poets, and writers; (5) focusing particularly on Shiʻi questions; and (6) encouraging Jabal ʻAmil's inhabitants to compete with other nations.[58]

The fact that, from the journal's first issue, articles concerned with Shiʻism were published reaffirms the first concern of the journal.[59]

The subtlety of the editorship in expressing a Shi'i identity can be understood against a background of political marginalization; therefore the establishment of the journal given the founder's identity is a statement in itself. The first issue had articles concerning Shi'ism. The text of the new Iranian constitution was published in translation. There was an article on the Shi'is and their beliefs from the dawn of Islam, another on the 'Amili figure, al-Shahid al-Awwal, as well as one article on Karbala.[60] Furthermore, the engagement with Shi'i and, specifically, 'Amili historiography in 1910 with Ahmad Rida's articles "What Is the Nation?" and "Mitwalis and Shi'is in Jabal 'Amil" are bold indications of the journal's position.[61] These articles mark the beginning of a public discussion of a local identity and lay the foundations for an 'Amili history that is Arab Shi'i but which, after 1920, finds common ground with a Maronite historiography.[62]

The articles draw out the relations between the community and an external world, in Iraq, Iran, and India for the audience of the journal—both Shi'i and other. This is effective for the image of the community because it allows a balance with a Sunni Ottoman world by highlighting its international religious extension. Through its continuity, *al-'Irfan* established itself as a platform for intellectual exchange between leading religious Shi'i scholars, all of whom contributed to the journal. The fundraising dimension of *al-'Irfan* created a unit for this common cause, especially in Iraq. However, it is also important to note that the links with this external world are overpowered by a local involvement with the establishment of Lebanon.[63]

Early on, *al-'Irfan* engaged its readership on a national-secular level. For example, it printed serialized articles on Syrian poets as well as cities in Syria (e.g., Bilad al-Sham).[64] In this manner, the journal extended itself in dialogue and self-promotion to other communities and areas, creating a link with the 'Amilis and cultivating a South Lebanese characteristic. It is also telling that the *al-'Irfan* printing press also published books and journals by non-Shi'i southern authors.[65] A number of articles written by Christian contributors as well as academic authors, often anonymous, with affiliations to universities such as the AUB, also suggest this. As early as 1913, an article entitled "A Glimpse on Einstein's Theory of Relativity" was signed by professors of the AUB, Among these were Mansur Jurdaq (AUB professor in Mathematics from Marjayoun), Fuad Jurdak, Salma Sayigh, Jabr Damut, Amin al-Rihani, Ma'ruf al-Rasafi, and Father Anastaz al-Karmali.[66]

The number of demands and petitions published during the 1920s and 1930s in *al-'Irfan* to the French High Commission for greater

rights and support for the Syrian cause are strong indications of involvement in the communitarian identity construction in Lebanon. Point six of *al-'Irfan*'s statement of purpose, "encouraging 'Amilis to compete with other nations," also indicates the journal's perception of the 'Amilis as a nation. In sum, the journal's affirmations of an Arabist line need to be considered as part of a de facto cultural and regional reference in line with other Arab-speaking and Muslim publications, whereas the Shi'i references are more political in focus and are continuous from the journal's inception. Following Lebanon's formation, the terrain in which *al-'Irfan* operated was redefined, independent of the journal, with the transfer of large parts of Jabal 'Amil to the province of South Lebanon. Consequently, new dynamics came into play that influenced *al-'Irfan*, regardless of its consistently open "editorial ideology."[67] Ultimately, the distinguishing factor for *al-'Irfan* was not its innovative intellectual input, but its identity as an 'Amili Shi'i journal.

In the Lebanese context, the literary platform *al-'Irfan* offered for 'Amili authors as their first public exposure, due to the diversity of the journal's content and its geographic relevance, was significant. This defined a journalistic atmosphere for 'Amilis and Southerners that permitted them to expand into the national Lebanese scene. *Al-'Irfan* provided the initial springboard for figures such as Muhammad 'Ali al-Humani who eventually founded his own newspaper *al-'Uruba*, 'Abd al-Husayn al-Abdallah,[68] and Musa al-Zayn Sharara, anti-French poets and sociopolitical critics, whose notoriety went beyond the South, the poet 'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Amin (a.k.a. the Mountain Lad),[69] who became the first educational inspector from Jabal 'Amil' and Kamil Muruwwa, who founded the influential newspaper *al-Hayat* in 1946 and became a leading journalistic figure in Lebanon and the Arab world.

Al-'Irfan's politics throughout the period of the Mandate maintained an anti-French tone that was in line with Muslim publications of the time. The journal was closed down twice (in 1931 and 1936) due to provocative articles published against the French and to 'Arif al-Zayn's pro-Syrian political activities.[70] During World War Two censorship was even more stringent. The anti-French stance needs to be seen in two phases: before and after 1936. Before 1936, the political position of *al-'Irfan*'s principal authors had already been established as pro-union with Syria, but was seeking equal rights for their community in the Lebanese scene through *matlabiyya*. The situation after 1936 changed such that Lebanese reality become more secure and led the way for a nationalist desire for independence from French rule. This position was shared by Christians and Muslims alike. In

this dimension, *al-'Irfan* also expressed its desire for Lebanon's independence.

In conclusion, *al-'Irfan* presented a multifaceted picture of 'Amili community, simultaneously playing an integral role in cultivating that identity. It is through the pages of *al-'Irfan* that the Shi'is of Jabal 'Amil claimed their local and global history. *Al-'Irfan* also provided a space for literary experimentation through the sections it devoted to past and present poetry. In all instances, the journal's relationship with the political status quo—whether Ottoman or Lebanese—was constantly redefined, mirroring the Shi'i community's search for a greater share. As such, the journal served as a proactive catalyst for integration.

Notes

1 In the Beirut Vilayet

1. See the works of Abbé de Binos, *Voyage au Mont-Liban* (Paris, 1809); Henry Charles Churchill, *Mount Lebanon: A Ten Years' Residence, from 1842 to 1852: Describing the Manners, Customs, and Religion of Its Inhabitants, with a Full & Correct Account of the Druze Religion, and Containing Historical Records of the Mountain Tribes* (Reading, 1994); Comte de Louis-Philippe-Albert d'Orléans, *Damas et le Liban: extraits du journal d'un voyage en Syrie au printemps de 1860* (Londres, 1861); Constantin Volney, *Voyage en Égypte et en Syrie* (Paris, 1959); Vicomte de Marcellus, *Souvenirs de l'Orient*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1839); Alphonse de Lamartine, *Voyage en Orient*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1835); Ernest Renan, *Correspondances 1856–1861; Mission de Phénicie* (Brest, 1994); Valerie Boisser de Gaspirin, *Voyage en Levant* (Paris, 1878).
2. Sulayman Dahir, *Dictionary of Jabal 'Amil Villages*, "Mu'jam Qura Jabal 'Amil," in *al-'Irfan*, vol. 20, no. 1 (1930), p. 25.
3. David Urquhart, *The Lebanon (Mount Souria): A History and a Diary* (London, 1860), pp. 95–96.
4. Muhammad Bahjat and Rafiq al-Tamimi, *Wilayat Bayrut* (Beirut, 1916), pp. 292–295.
5. *Mut'a* or "pleasure" marriage is a temporary marriage that is contracted for a fixed period of time. It is practiced in Twelver Shi'i Islam, particularly in Iran. According to the Sunni legal schools, it is considered no more than legalized prostitution and therefore forbidden. Cf. *Mut'a*, *Encyclopedia of Islam*, VII, p. 757a.
6. Bahjat and Tamimi, *Wilayat Bayrut.*
7. Ibid., p. 315.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 316.
10. Ibid., p. 317.
11. Ibid., p. 317.

12. Proverb quoted to author by a multitude of people from different generations. Also see Ferdinand Abela, *Proverbes populaires du Liban Sud: Saida et ses environs* (Paris, 1981–1985).
13. "Yawmiyyat 'Amili" (Diary of an 'Amili), manuscript (hereafter cited as Diary MSS), June 3/4, 1918.
14. Cf. E. Robinson, *Séjour au Liban* (Beirut, 1947); Louis Lortet, *La Syrie d'aujourd'hui, voyages dans la Phénicie, le Liban et la Judée, 1875–1880* (Paris, 1884).
15. Al-Zayn, *Ma' al-Tarikh al-'Amili*, p. 44.
16. *Jaridat Jabal 'Amil*, March 14, 1912. *Jabal 'Amil Newspaper* was a daily newspaper that Ahmad 'Arif al-Zayn published for two years, 1911–1912, when the Ottoman authorities banned *al-'Irfan* for a period. It had a more political propagandist nature and represented more clearly the opinions of the intellectuals, who only used to initial their articles not sign them. Herewith to be referred to as *JAN*.
17. Ibid.
18. Bahjat and Tamimi, *Wilayat Bayrut*, p. 40.
19. Jaber, "Pouvoir et société au Jabal 'Amil de 1749 a 1920 dans la conscience des chroniqueurs chiites et dans un essai d'interprétation" (Ph.D. thesis, Paris IV, 1978), p. 10.
20. This is also mentioned in Dahir's "Mu'jam Qura Jabal 'Amil."
21. Jaber, "Pouvoir," pp. 169–172.
22. Bahjat and Tamimi, *Wilayat Bayrut*, pp. 286, 291.
23. Victor Guérin, *Description géographique et archéologique de la Palestine, Part 3: Galilée* (Paris, 1880), pp. 86–283; he mentions that the villages without any water reserve were rare.
24. Bahjat and Tamimi, *Wilayat Bayrut*, pp. 286–328.
25. Martha Mundy, "Village Authority and the Legal Order of Property (the Southern Hawran, 1876–1922)," in Roger Owen, ed., *New Perspectives on Property and Land in the Middle East* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), p. 67.
26. Quotes from A. al-Husayni, *Tarikh Suriya al-Iqtisadi* (Damascus, 1932) in Jaber, "Pouvoir," p. 175.
27. Henri Guys, *Esquisse de l'état politique et commercial de la Syrie* (Paris, 1862), p. 38.
28. *Al-'Irfan*, vol. 2 (1910), p. 235.
29. Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy 1800–1914* (London, 1993), p. 164.
30. April 4, 1912, *JAN*.
31. Lortet, *La Syrie d'aujourd'hui*, p. 152.
32. Bahjat and Tamimi, *Wilayat Bayrut*, p. 322.
33. Michael Gilsenan, "Land and Labour in North Lebanon 1858–1950," in Tarif Khalidi, ed., *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East* (Beirut, 1984), p. 453.
34. Jaber, "Pouvoir," p. 220. See also Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett, "The Application of the 1858 Land Code in Greater

Syria: Some Preliminary Observations," in Tarif Khalidi, ed., *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East* (Beirut, 1984).

35. Jaber, "Pouvoir," p. 217.
36. Fawaz Traboulsi, "Identités et solidarités croisés dans les conflits du Liban contemporain" (Ph.D. thesis, Paris, VIII, 1993), p. 102.
37. *'Urf* is customary law as was practiced with regard to land ownership, both throughout the French Mandate period and earlier.
38. Jaber, "Pouvoir," p. 216.
39. André Latron, *La vie rurale en Syrie et au Liban: étude d'économie sociale* (Beirut, 1936), chapter 4.
40. Jaber, "Pouvoir," p. 214.
41. For a discussion of the sharecropping situation in Palestine, cf. Ya'akov Firestone, "Crop-Sharing Economies in Mandatory Palestine," in Elie Kedourie and Sylvia Haim, eds., *Palestine and Israel in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (London, 1983).
42. Jacques Weulersse, *Paysans de Syrie et du Proche-Orient* (Paris, 1946), p. 195.
43. On the 1858 Ottoman Land Law, see Haim Gerber, *The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder and London, 1987); Tarif Khalidi, ed., *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East* (Beirut, 1984); Roger Owen, ed., *New Perspectives on Property and Land in the Middle East* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001).
44. Muhammad Jabir Al Safa, "Safahat min Tarikh Jabal 'Amil: Jabal 'Amil Ba'd Zawal al-hukm al-'Iqta'i," in *al-'Irfan*, vol. 27 (1937), pp. 385–390.
45. Lortet, *La Syrie d'aujourd'hui*, p. 134.
46. Jabir al-Safa, "Safahat min Tarikh Jabal 'Amil."
47. Cf. Albert Hourani, "From Jabal 'Amil to Persia," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, 49, 1986; Rula Jurdi, "Migration and Social Change: The 'Ulama of Ottoman Jabal 'Amil in Safavid Iran, 1501–1736" (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1998); Ja' far al-Muhajir, al-Hijra al-Amiliyya ila Iran: fi al-Asr al-Safawi: asbabuha al-Tarikhiyya wa-nata'ijuha al-thaqafiyya wa-al-siyasiyya (Beirut, 1988).
48. Roger Lescot, *Les Chiites du Liban-Sud*, Report to the Centre des Hautes Études de l'Asie Moderne, Paris (CHEAM, 1936).
49. Cf. Muhsin al-Amin, *A'yan al-Shi'a*, vol. 40 (Beirut, 1957) ; Waddah Charara, *Al-Umma al-Qaliqa* (Beirut, 1996); Muhammad Jawad Mughniyya, *Ma' 'Ulama' al-Najaf al-Ashraf*; Husayn Muruwwa, "Walidtu Shaykhan wa-Amutu Tiflan"; Ibrahim Baydun, ed., *Safahat min Tarikh Jabal 'Amil*; 'Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din, "Al-Amiliyun fi al-Najaf," in *Amal* (Beirut, 1987), serialized.
50. Rafiq and Bahjat, *Wilayat Bayrut*, p. 294. Tarif al-Khalidi, "Shaykh Ahmad 'Arif al-Zayn and al-'Irfan," in Marwan Buheiry, ed., *Intellectual Life in the Arab East, 1890–1939* (Beirut, 1981), pp. 119–121.
51. Lescot in 1936 wrote that until very recently the Assaads dominated the entire Jabal from their castle in Tibnin. He adds that they were

driven to sell their lands in order to maintain their image of wealth and generosity, but that their descendents actually lived more modest lives. *Les Chiites*, 1936, pp. 9–10. Also see Arnold Hottinger, "Zu'ama' in Historical Perspective," in Leonard Binder, ed., *Politics in Lebanon* (New York, 1966).

52. Gilsenan, "Land and Labour," p. 456.
53. The Ottoman parliament was created during the first constitutional period in 1877, following the reorganization of the Ottoman provinces in 1860. Its aim was to bridge the distance between the provinces and the center so that "every Ottoman male above the age of thirty with ability in Turkish and enjoying civil rights could be elected deputy"; Hasan Kayal', "Elections in the Ottoman Empire," in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 27 (1995), p. 266; and "Greater Syria under Ottoman Constitutional Rule: Ottomanism, Arabism, Regionalism," in Philipp Thomas, ed., *The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th Century: The Common and the Specific in the Historical Experience* (Stuttgart, 1992).
54. Charara, *Al-Umma*, p. 71. For a discussion of these speculations, see Gerber in *Social Origins of the Modern Middle East*, pp. 75–76.
55. Cf. Amnon Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century: Patterns of Government and Administration* (Jerusalem, 1973), chapter one.
56. Jaber, "Pouvoir," pp. 199–201.
57. This is according to Muhsin al-Amin's account of Ahmad 'Usayran, *A'yan al-Shi'a*, vol. 54 (Beirut, 1968), pp. 16–18.
58. Th. Zarcone and F. Zarinebaf-Shahr, *Les Iraniens d'Istanbul* (Paris, 1993), p. 29.
59. Ali Effendi (d. 1908), Abdullah Bey (d. 1918), Rashid Bey (d. ca. 1962), Najib Bey (d. 1951), and Adil Bey (d. 1998).
60. Public Record Office, PRO 371/ 4184, "General Report on Western Syria," Beirut, July 1919.
61. Ahmad Abu Said, *Mu'jam al-Usar wa-l-Ashkhas* (Beirut, 1997), pp. 400–402.
62. 'Abd al-Karim Hubballah, "Yusuf al-Zayn 1879–1962, Hayatuhu al-Siyasiyya wa-l-Ijtima'iyya" (M.A. thesis, Lebanese University, 1989), chapter one.
63. Abu Said, *Mu'jam al-Usar wa-l-Ashkhas*, pp. 298–299.
64. Shaykh Ibrahim Al Sulayman, unpublished papers (n.d.).
65. For a definition of *'asabiyya* , see Ibn Khaldun in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, p. 681.
66. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York, 1973), pp. 255–310.
67. Charara, *Al-Umma*, pp. 126–127.
68. Ibid.
69. Jaber, "Pouvoir," p. 17.
70. Ibid., p. 221; *JAN*, July 4, 1912.

71. Dominique Chevallier, *La société du Mont Liban à l'époque de la révolution industrielle en Europe* (Paris, 1971), p. 210.
72. Cf. Dahir, *Mu'jam Qura Jabal 'Amil*, *Yawmiyyat 'Amili*, manuscript; and Jabir Al Safa, *Tarikh Jabal 'Amil* (Beirut, 1996).
73. Jaber, "Pouvoir," p. 237.
74. Jabir Al Safa, *Tarikh*, p. 36.
75. Munzer Jaber, "Al-Shi'a fi Jabal 'Amil bayn al-Mabda'iyya wal-hifaz ala al-dat," in *al-Muntalaq*, vol. 105 (1993), p. 66.
76. *Amal al-Amil* is also the name of the famous work of Baha' al-Din al 'Amili.
77. Muhsin al-Amin, *A'yan al-Shi'a,* vol. 9 (Beirut, 1957), pp. 22–24.
78. Ibid., pp. 21–22.
79. Aykut Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey* (Leiden, 1997), pp. 228–229. Kansu mentions that Kamil al-Assaad changed political sides during his Mab'uthan career.
80. Ibid.
81. According to a profile of the Bey in the political reports of the French, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, is referred to from now on as MAE, Beyrouth, Cabinet Politique (CP), Kamil Bey changed from the Entente Party back to the Union and Progress Party in 1912 after he was harassed by the Turkish government. However he got into a quarrel with his colleagues from Beirut of the Reformist party over land in Hula that the government had agreed to cede. Kamil Bey wanted part of that land. During World War One, the Turks accused him of aiding the Arab revolt, but Enver and Talaat Pasha defended him.
82. 'Abd al-Muhsin Dahir, *Al-Dalalah al-'Amiliyyah lil Usra al-Wa'iliyyah,* vol. 2, p. 169.
83. Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables," in William Polk and Richard Chambers, eds., *The Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East* (Chicago, 1968), p. 46.
84. Hassan Hallaq, ed., *Mudhakkarat Salim 'Ali Salam* (Beirut, 1982), pp. 192–209.
85. Sulayman al-Bustani, *'Ibra wa-Dhikra* (Beirut, 1978).
86. Charara, *Al-Umma*, p. 115.
87. H. Humani, "Ya Ayyuha al-Mab'uth," in *JAN*, December 2, 1911. The poem is in six long stanzas revolving around the same theme.

2 Jabal 'Amil and the Arab Awakening

1. Cf. Jabir Al Safa, *Tarikh*; Ahmad Rida, "Mudhakkarati Lil-Tarikh," serialized in *al-'Irfan*; Sulayman Dahir, "Jabal 'Amil fil Harb al-Kawniyya" (Beirut, 1986), among others.
2. *JAN*, January 11, 1912.
3. Charara, *Al-Umma* (1996), chapter 3.
4. Cf. Sulayman Dahir's *Diary MSS*, Al Safa's "Tarikh Jabal 'Amil Manuscript," and Rida's "Mudhakkarat" in *al-'Irfan,* vol. 34, no. 2 (1945), pp. 202–205.

5. Hani Farhat, *al-Thulath al-ʿAmili fi ʿAsr al-Nahda* (Beirut, 1981), p. 45. Cf. also Fawiz Tarhini, *al-Shaykh Ahmad Rida wa-l-Fikr al-ʿAmili* (Beirut, 1983), and ʿAbd al-Latif Sharara, "al-Shaykh Ahmad Rida," in *Wujuh Tarikhiyya min al-Janub* (Beirut, 1983).
6. "Al Matawila wal-Shi'a fil-Tarikh" (The Mitwalis and the Shiʿis in History), in *al-ʿIrfan*, vol. 2, no. 5 (1911); and "Ma Hiya al-Umma?" (What Is a Nation?), *al-ʿIrfan*, vol. 2, no. 9 (1910).
7. Cf. Charara, *Al-Umma*, pp. 32–35.
8. Tarhini, *al-Shaykh Ahmad Rida wa-l-Fikr al-ʿAmili*, p. 69.
9. Farhat, *al-Thulath al-ʿAmili fi ʿAsr al-Nahda*, p. 175.
10. Jabir Al Safa, *Tarikh*, p. 63.
11. Ibid., p. 77.
12. Jabir Al Safa, *Tarikh*, pp. 229–230.
13. Shafiq al-Arna'ut, "Adib Mujahid wa-Majallat *Ra'id*," in *Wujuh Thaqafiyya min al-Janub* (Beirut, 1981).
14. Jabir Al Safa, *Tarikh*, p. 245.
15. Cf. Abbas Amanat, *Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran* (Ithaca and London, 1989), chapter one.
16. Jaber, "Pouvoir," p. 43.
17. Cf. Idjaza, *Encyclopedia of Islam*, III: 1020b. See also Rula Jurdi, "Migration and Social Change," pp. 26ff.
18. Cf. Meir Litvak, *Shiʿi Scholars of Nineteenth Century Iraq* (Cambridge, 1998); Pierre-Jean Luizard, *La formation de l'Iraq contemporain* (Paris, 1991); Yitzhak Nakash, *The Shiʿis of Iraq* (Princeton, 1994).
19. Jabir Al Safa, *Tarikh*, pp. 241–246, Muhammad Kazim Makki, *Muntalaq al-Hayat al-Thaqafiyya fi Jabal Amil* (Beirut, 1991).
20. Muhammad Jawad Rida, "Tatwir al-Ilm fi Qada' Sour" (M.A. thesis, Lebanese University, 1980), p. 13.
21. Cf. Muhsin al-Amin's autobiography in *Ayan al-Shiʿa*, vol. 40 (Beirut, 1957).
22. Jabir Al Safa, *Tarikh*, pp. 264–266; and ʿAli Mazraani, *al-Nabatieh fil-Dhakira* (Beirut, 1999), p. 270.
23. Charara, *Al-Umma*, pp. 87–88.
24. Gerber, *The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East*, p. 176.
25. Cf. Dahir, *Diary MSS*, pp. 2–43
26. Ibid., June 4, 1918, pp. 9–10.
27. Ibid., p. 28.
28. Ibid., p. 37.
29. Ibid., p. 40.
30. Al-Amin, *Aʿyan al-Shiʿa*, vol. 40, p. 86.
31. Stephen Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate* (Oxford, 1958), p. 48.
32. Ibid., pp. 48–49.
33. Linda. S Schilcher, "The Famine of 1915–1918 in Greater Syria," in John Spagnolo, ed., *Problems of the Middle East in Historical Perspective* (Oxford, 1992).

34. Dahir, *Diary MSS*, p. 6.
35. Bahjat and Tamimi, *Wilayat Bayrut*, p. 322.
36. Schilcher, *Famine*, pp. 230–250.
37. Dahir, *Jabal ʿAmil*, p. 43.
38. Dahir, *Diary MSS*, December 18, 1918, pp. 212–213.
39. Fawaz Traboulsi, "Identités et solidarité croisés dans les conflits du Liban contemporain" (Ph.D. thesis, Paris, VIII, 1993), pp. 225–226.
40. Dahir, *Jabal ʿAmil*; ʿAbd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din, *Bughyat al-Raghibin fi Silsilat Al Sharaf al-Din* (Beirut, 1991).
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., pp. 139–143.
43. Dahir, *Jabal ʿAmil*, p. 43.
44. Muhsin al-Amin, *Ayan al-Shiʿa*, vol. 40, p. 85.
45. Dahir, *Diary MSS*, p. 32.
46. Jabir Al Safa, *Tarikh*, p. 229.
47. Some of these are: Muhammad Jamil Bayhum, *Qawafil al-Arab wa-Mawakibuha khilal-al-ʿUsur* (Beirut, 1937); Satiʿ al-Husri, *Nushu' al-Fikra al-Qawmiyya* (Beirut, 1956); *al-Mu'tamar al ʿArabi al-Awwal* (Proceedings of the First Arab Conference, Cairo, 1913); Asʿad Dagher, *Mudhakkarati ʿHamish al-Qadiyya al-Arabiyya* (Cairo, 1959); Amin Said, *al-Thawra al-Arabiyya al-Kubra,* 3 vols. (Cairo, 1934).
48. George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London, 1945), p. 187.
49. Ibid., p. 186.
50. Ahmad Jamal Pasha, *Memoirs* (Cairo, 1923), pp. 206–207.
51. Ibid.
52. Jabir Al Safa, *Tarikh*, p. 211.
53. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 115. See also Elizer Tauber, *The Emergence of the Arab Movements* (London, 1993).
54. Jabir Al Safa, *Tarikh*; and Issam Shubaru, *ʿAbd al-Karim al-Khalil, al-Zaim al-Sirri lil-Haraka al-Arabiya* (Beirut, 1996), p. 57.
55. Ahmad Rida, "Mudhakkarat Ahmad Rida fi Sijn ʿAley," in *al-ʿIrfan*, vol. 58 (1970), pp. 606–706.
56. Ahmad Jamal Pasha, in *al-ʿIrfan*, vol. 58 (1970), p. 207; "Min Tarikh al-Bakawat fi Jabal ʿAmil," *al-ʿIrfan*, vol. 49, p. 258.
57. Excerpts from a poem entitled "Death Is Life to the Homeland" written by Sulayman Dahir in memory of his friend ʿAbd al-Karim al-Khalil. Published in *al-ʿIrfan*, vol. 33 (1946), p. 733.
58. Muhammad Jabir Al Safa, "Mudhakkarat Siyasiyya khilal al-Iʿtiqal fi ʿAley 1915," photocopy.
59. Dahir, *Diary MSS*, p. 1.
60. Cf. Amanat, *Resurrection and Renewal.*
61. Among the Shaykh's many unpublished works are "Political History of the Shiʿis," "An Ancient and Modern History of Jabal ʿAmil," "Iraqi Travels," "Iranian Travels," several volumes of poetry, as well as a "Critique of Darwinism."

62. This last point regarding poor security is reiterated several times earlier in 1912 in *JAN*. It appears to have been a major cause of concern for ‘Amilis.
63. Dahir, *Diary MSS*, June 9/10, 1918.
64. Ibid., July 26, 1918, pp. 39–40.
65. Owen mentions that “Mount Lebanon’s special status meant that its inhabitants were not conscripted into the Ottoman army nor liable to pay the special taxes which were levied in time of war,” in *The Middle East in the World Economy 1800–1914* (London, 1993), p. 164.
66. Dahir, *Diary MSS*, p. 17.

3 Turmoil and New Order

1. A good description of the formative phase of the Arab nationalist movement is provided by George Antonius in *The Arab Awakening*. See in particular, pp. 101–125.
2. See Khayriyya Qasimiyya’s survey of the institutions and evolution of Faysal’s government, *al-Hukuma al-‘Arabiyya fi Dimashq* (Beirut, 1982).
3. Cf. Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate*, pp. 64–65.
4. Ibid.
5. Sulayman Dahir, *Diary MSS*, p. 109.
6. Ahmad Rida, “Mudhakkarat lil-Tarikh,” *al-‘Irfan*, vols. 7–9 (1933) and vols. 2, 3 (1934).
7. Antonius in *The Arab Awakening* writes that the British troops had advanced from Haifa to Tyre, Saida, and Beirut by October 3, and that no Arab troops accompanied them (p. 238).
8. Jeremy Wilson, *Lawrence of Arabia* (London, 1989), p. 570.
9. Ibid.
10. Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre (SHAT) 4H 58, Rapport Hebdomadaire, December 28, 1918.
11. December 21, 1919, SHAT, 4H 58.
12. MAE Archives, Beyrouth, no. 2432, November 17, 1918.
13. Muhsin al-Amin, *A‘yan al-Shi’a*, vol. 40 (Beirut, 1957), pp. 91–92.
14. MAE, Beyrouth, no, 2432, October 29, 1918; Lescot, *Les Chiites*, p. 6. Cf. also Sabrina Mervin, *Un Réformisme Chiite* (Paris, 2000), pp. 14, 344; SHAT 4H 143.
15. Quoted from Munzer Jaber, “Mu’tamar Wadi al Hujayr Wa-Atharuhu” (M.A. thesis, Lebanese University, Beirut, 1973), p. 13.
16. MAE, Beyrouth, No. 2373, Saida-Tyr, 1920.
17. Roger Lescot wrote in his report that “in 1920 the authority of the al-Assaads on the Jabal remained considerable,” *Les Chiites*.
18. Cf. Charara, *Al-Umma*, chapter 7.
19. Qadri Qal‘aji, *Jil al-Fida’* (Beirut, n.d), chapter 18; Muhammad Said Bassam, “al-Tawajjuhat al-Siyasiyya fi Jabal ‘Amil bayn 1918–1926” (Ph.D. thesis, Université de St. Joseph, Beirut, 1986), chapter one.

20. Dahir, *Diary MSS*, Friday, October 4, 1918.
21. Ibid., p. 106.
22. Ibid., pp. 101–125.
23. Ibid., p. 114.
24. Conversation with Munzer Jaber, September 21, 1999.
25. Dahir, *Diary MSS*, p. 103.
26. Qal'aji, *Jil al-Fida'*, p. 303.
27. Nadine Meouchy, "Les formes de conscience politique et communautaire au Liban et en Syrie à l'époque du Mandat Français 1920–1939" (Ph.D. thesis, Paris IV, 1989).
28. Jabir Al Safa, *Tarikh*, p. 208. In reference to one of the 'Amilis attending this conference, Jabir wrote that "Sayyid Muhammad al-Amin was extreme in his Arabism, struggling for this political ideology, enticing the Amilis to revolution . . . "
29. Report by Sulayman Dahir to the Arab government representative in Beirut, Rafiq al-Tamimi, March 8, 1919.
30. 'Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din, *Bughiyyat al-Raghibin* (Beirut, 1991), pp. 148–149. Sharaf al-Din also presented this request in writing to the King–Crane Commission, the text of which is published in this book, pp. 453–454.
31. MAE, Beyrouth, vol. 42, Serie E-Levant 1918–1929, dossier: pétitions.
32. Shaykh Husayn Mughniyya; cf. Muhsin al-Amin, *A'yan al Shi'a*, vol. 6.
33. *Dahir–Tamimi Correspondence* (hereafter referred as *DTC*), unpublished, March 16, 1919.
34. *DTC*, June 18, 1919.
35. Ibid., April 10, 1919.
36. Ibid., June 10, 1919; June 18, 1919; and June 22, 1919.
37. Ibid., March 15, 1919.
38. Ibid., June 26, 1919.
39. First publication of the King–Crane Report on the Near East, December 2, 1922, Appendix section entitled "Confidential."
40. MAE, Beyrouth, vol. 42, Serie E-Levant 1918–1929, dossier 1: pétitions.
41. Mervin, *Un Réformisme Chiite*, pp. 345–346.
42. MAE, Beyrouth, CP, 2373, January 1920.
43. *DTC*, July 12, 1919.
44. Charara, *Al-Umma*, pp. 136–137.
45. Ibid., also see T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (London, 1989).
46. According to French documents, Sayyid 'Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din received a monthly salary from the Damascus government. MAE, Beyrouth, CP 163, no. 2373, January 1920.
47. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 174.
48. Hourani, "Ottoman Reform," p. 45.
49. MAE, Beyrouth, no. 2432, October 21, 1918 and MAE, Beyrouth, no. 2432, November 15, 1918.

50. Qal'aji's *Jil al-Fida'*, pp. 300–305.
51. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 369.
52. Cf. Yücel Güçlü, "The Struggle for Mastery in Cilicia: Turkey, France, and the Ankara Agreement of 1921," in *International History Review*, vol. 23, no. 3 (September 2001). Güçlü mentions the rise of "organized armed resistance throughout Turkish Territory . . . a series of hit-and-run attacks on French outposts between the Mediterranean and the Euphrates and east of the river," however she does not discuss the nature of this resistance, pp. 586–587.
53. Gerber, *The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East*, pp. 135–136.
54. Eric Hobsbawm, *Bandits* (New York, 1981), pp. 70–74.
55. For a discussion of qabadays, cf. Michael Johnson's *Class and Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State, 1840–1985* (London, 1986).
56. MAE, Beyrouth, dossier 2373, *Rapport sur Kamel Bey al-Asaad*, January 1920.
57. Meouchy, "Les formes de conscience politique et communautaire," chapter 4; she writes that "the phenomenon of the *'isabat* is not particular to the Arabs, nor to any specific community nor to a precise political leaning. It is a general mode of grouping in the region," p. 142.
58. Cf. also Elias Sadir, "Thawrat Sanat al-'Ishrin" (M.A. thesis, Lebanese University, 1972).
59. Dahir, *Diary MSS*, June 2, 1918; and *DTC*, November 9, 1919.
60. SHAT, dossier 4H 143 and MAE, Beyrouth, dossier 2432, Beyrouth, 1918–1922.
61. Cf. dossier 2432, MAE, Beyrouth, 1918–1922.
62. Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate*, pp. 117–118.
63. Cf. Munzer Jaber, "Pouvoir et société au Jabal Amil de 1790 à 1920 dans la conscience des chroniqueurs chiites et dans un essai d'interprétation" (Ph.D. thesis, Paris IV, 1978), p. 150.
64. *DTC*, April 6, 1919.
65. Dahir, *Diary MSS*; Ahmad Rida, 'Mudhakkarat lil-Tarikh', *al-'Irfan,* vol. 33, no. 8 (1944), p. 990.
66. Dahir, *Diary MSS*, November 9, 1919.
67. Jaber, "Mu'tamar Wadi al-Hujayr," p. 29; Rida, "Mudhakkarat lil-Tarikh," p. 991.
68. Mervin, *Un Réformisme Chiite*, p. 351.
69. Philip Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate* (London, 1987), p. 99.
70. Meouchy, "Les formes de conscience politique et communautaire," p. 138.
71. Ibid., pp. 143–144.
72. MAE, Beyrouth, Cabinet Politique, nos. 2432 and 2358.
73. Cf. Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims* (New York, 1999).
74. *Al-Bashir Newspaper*, October 22, 1919; Sader, "Thawrat Jabal Amil Sanat 1920," (M.A. thesis Lebanese University, 1972), p. 23.

75. Rida, "Mudhakkarat lil-Tarikh," p. 256.
76. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, p. 306.
78. Qal'aji, *Jil al-Fida'*, p. 386.
79. Jaber, "Pouvoir," p. 126.
80. Cf. Jihad Bannout, *Adham Khanjar 1895–1923* (Antilyas, 1998).
81. Cf. 'Ali Murtada al-Amin, *Tha'ir Min Biladi: Sadiq Hamza al-Fa'ur,* Haruf, S. Lebanon (n.p., n.d.); also Jaber, "Mu'tamar Wadi al Hujayr," pp. 24–28.
82. Jaber, "Pouvoir," p. 25.
83. Ibid., p. 130.
84. *DTC*, November 9, 1919.
85. MAE, Beyrouth, Bulletin de Renseignment, no. 1675, no. 2432 and no. 2487: Liban Sud 1918–1923, 1921. Amin Said in his *Thawrat al-Arab fil-Qarn al-'Ishrin* (Cairo, n.d), p. 107 reports on guerrilla operations against the French in early January 1920 where 70 soldiers were killed and 17 injured.
86. Jaber, "Pouvoir," p. 135.
87. Ibid., p. 138.
88. Rida, "Mudhakarat," *al-'Irfan*, vol. 34, no. 3 (1945), p. 354.
89. Mervin, *Un Réformisme Chiite*, p. 351.
90. Sharaf al-Din, *Bughyat*, p. 151.
91. Jaber, "Pouvoir," p. 140.
92. An early member of the 'Ahd Party and active in the Arab government. Cf. Qal'aji, *Jil al-Fida'*, pp. 91, 301.
93. Rida, "Mudhakkarat lil-Tarikh," p. 989.
94. Jaber, "Pouvoir," p. 144. Sadiq al-Hamza agreed to avoid attacking Christians except those who conspired with the French against them.
95. Jabir Al Safa notes that Ahmad Rida, Sulayman Dahir, Ismail al-Khalil, Shaykh Izz al-Din Ali Izz al Din, and the author wrote the minutes of the meeting, *Tarikh*, p. 226.
96. Reference to Wadi al-Hujayr is only after the Christian massacres, and not in the details of the conference.
97. Sharaf al-Din, *Bughiyyat*, p. 442.
98. Several elderly figures that I met in Lebanon still remember the conference, and the rewriting of the events at different intervals in *al-'Irfan*.
99. Sharaf al-Din, *Bughyat*, pp. 153–155.
100. Jaber, "Pouvoir," p. 141.
101. Sharaf al-Din, *Bughyat*, p. 154.
102. Charara, *Al-Umma*, pp. 193–195.
103. Statement of the Wadi Hujayr Conference as quoted by Muhammad Jabir Al Safa, *Tarikh*, p. 226.
104. MAE, a telegram from Gouraud states the death of over 50 people in "the greatest savagery committed by the Mitwalis," Série E-Levant, 313, no. 1019, May 15, 1920.
105. Clementine Khayat believed that the Shi'i notables and 'ulama met at Wadi Hujayr and decided to attack Christian villages. She adds

that the conferees concealed the true intention of their meeting by claiming to stop the activities of the gangs, *al-Mashriq Newspaper,* no. 1 (1920).

106. Rida, "Mudhakkarat lil-Tarikh," vol. 33, p. 993.
107. *Al-Bashir Newspaper*, May 18, 1920. This number may be excessive for an attack on a village and would have probably meant a higher number of casualties than what was claimed.
108. SHAT 4H 143, May 25, 1920.
109. MAE, Série E-Levant, no. 313, May 15, 1920.
110. Amin al-Rihani, *Muluk al-Arab* in Jaber, "Mu'tamar Wadi al Hujayr," p. 80. Hasan al-Amin, Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin's son, in an interview on April 13, 1999, told me that he was present at the conference, a boy of 12, and remembered Sayyid 'Abd al-Husayn inflaming the audience to violence. Mervin cites a cousin of the Sayyid, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, who refers to the Sayyid's *fatwa* in a book entitled *al Nass wal-Ijtihad*, *Un Réformisme Chiite*, p. 356.
111. 'Abd al-Husayn al-Abdullah, *Hassad al-Ashwaq* (Saida, 1960), p. 157.
112. Muhammad 'Ali-Humani, in *al-'Uruba*, no. 20 (1934).
113. Muhsin al-Amin, "Faysal al-Muhsin," *al-'Uruba*, no. 5 (1947), p. 85
114. Sharaf al-Din, *Bughiyyat*, p. 443.
115. SHAT 4H 143, Weekly report May 11–17, 1920.
116. SHAT 4H 143, May 25, 1920, Gouraud to Nieger.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid., May 28, 1920, Nieger to Gouraud.
119. Foreign Office, FO371/5120, Telegram from Kamil al-Assaad to Naif Effendi Soubeh, Headquarters, Occupied Enemy Territory, Jerusalem.
120. These soldiers were predominantly from French colonial Africa—Algeria and Senegal.
121. Dahir, *Diary MSS*, June 4, 1920.
122. SHAT 4H 143, June 15, 1920: Bulletin de Renseignement Militaires.
123. This is also confirmed by the British archives, FO 371/5036, Letter from British Consulate in Beirut to the Foreign Office, London, June 12, 1920.
124. Rida, *al-'Irfan*, vol. 34, no. 2 (1944), pp. 202–205.
125. 'Abd al-Husayn Sadiq, *Saqat al-Muta'a* (Saida, 1971), p. 149.

4 Jabal 'Amil Redefined

1. Paul Nujaim, "La Question du Liban," *La Revue Phenicienne*, 1919.
2. Michel Chiha, *Politique Intérieure* (Beirut, 1964), pp. 49–51. Chiha wrote this as late as 1944 in summation of the evolving Lebano-centric thought that was reified with the creation of the Grand Liban.
3. Albert Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay* (London, 1946), p. 85.

4. Quoted in Fredrick Hof, *Galilee Divided* (Boulder, 1985), p. 25.
5. Meir Zamir, "Smaller and Greater Lebanon—The Squaring of a Circle?," *Jerusalem Quarterly*, vol. 23 (1982), p. 34.
6. David Lloyd George, *Memories of the Peace Conference* (London, 1939), p. 758.
7. Cf. Jukka Nevakivi, *Britain, France and the Arab Middle East 1914–1920* (London, 1969); Christopher Andrew and Alexander Kanya-Forstner, *France Overseas* (Stanford, 1981); Kedourie, *England and the Middle East* (Stanford, Calif., 1981); and John Spagnolo, *France and Ottoman Lebanon, 1861–1914* (London, 1977).
8. H.W.V. Temperley, ed., *A History of the Peace Conferences of Paris*, vol. 6 (London, 1924), p. 164.
9. Hof, *Galilee Divided*, p. 9.
10. This is in addition to the protective claims the French made over the Assyrian population in the Mosul Vilayet.
11. Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate*, pp. 62–66. John Spagnolo, "Franco-British Rivalry in the Middle East," in Nadim Shehadi and Dana Haffar Mills, eds., *Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus* (London, 1988), p. 117.
12. Jean Pichon, *Le partage du Proche Orient* (Paris, 1938), in Hof, *Galilee Divided*, p. 15.
13. Hakim-Dowek, "The Origins of the Lebanese National Idea 1840–1914" (Ph.D. thesis, Oxford University, 1997), pp. 132–148.
14. Martin Gilbert, *Atlas of Jewish History* (Dorset, U.K., 1984), p. 85.
15. Cf. Yusuf Sawda, *Fi Sabil Lubnan* (Alexandria, 1919); August Adib, *Lubnan Baʿd al-Harb* (Cairo, 1919); Ferdinand Tyan, *France et Liban* (Paris, 1917); M. Jouplain, *La question du Liban* (Paris, 1908).
16. Cf. Hakim-Dowek, "The Origin of the Lebanese National Idea"; Asher Kaufman, "Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for an Identity in Lebanon," chapters 2 and 3. Zamir, "Smaller and Greater Lebanon."
17. Cf. Paul Huvelin, "Que vaut la Syrie'" in *Supplément to L'Asie Française*, no. 1 (December 1921); "La Syrie," *Revue du Monde Musulman* (Paris, 1912), pp. 32–68; E. Morel, *L'influence Française dans le Levant et notamment en Syrie* (Lyon, 1900); Jean Psichari, *La Syrie* (Paris, 1920); Baron de Comité, "En Turquie d'Asie," in *L'Asie Française*, no. 145 (April 1913).
18. Lynn Lohéac, *Daoud Ammoun et La création de l'état Libanais* (Paris, 1978).
19. Issam Khalifa, *al-Hudud al-Janubiyya li-Lubnan bayna Mawaqif Nukhab al-Tawaʿif wa-l-Siraʿ al-Dawli* (Beirut, 1985), p. 41.
20. Lohéac, *Daoud Ammoun*, p. 74.
21. Dahir, *Diary MSS*, December 18, 1918.
22. Khalifa, *al-Hudud al-Janubiyya li-Lubnan bayna Mawaqif Nukhab al-Tawaʿif wa-l-Siraʿ al-Dawli*.

23. Papers of Patriarch Elias Hoyek, Folder 31, Maronite Church Archives, Bkarki.
24. Ernest Renan, *Mission de Phénicie* (Paris, 1864), p. 1.
25. Ibid., p. 13.
26. Ibid., p. 14.
27. Ibid.
28. Cf. note 21 in chapter 7, in this book.
29. Kaufman, "Reviving Phoenicia," p. 142.
30. Kamal Salibi, "Islam and Syria in the Writings of Henri Lammens," in Bernard Lewis, ed., *Historians of the Middle East* (London, 1962).
31. Hof, *Galilee Divided*, p. 2.
32. Bassam, "al-Tawajjuhat al-Siyasiyya fi Jabal ʻAmil bayn 1918–1926," p. 177.
33. Hakim-Dowek, "The Origin of the Lebanese National Idea," pp. 148–157.
34. Temperley, *History of the Peace Conferences*, pp. 164–165.
35. Ibid.
36. Hof, *Galilee Divided*, chapter 2.
37. Ibid., p. 21.
38. Ibid., p. 19. Cf. also Laura Eisenberg, *My Enemy's Enemy: Lebanon in the Early Zionist Imagination 1900–1948* (Detroit, 1994); and Karen Schultze, *Israel's Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon* (London, 1998).
39. Hof, *Galilee Divided*, p. 24.
40. Ibid., p. 25.
41. It is commonly agreed that the security vacuum in the South was fundamentally due to the Lebanese central authority's neglect of the region. The vulnerability of the area was evident with every Palestinian Jewish/Israeli confrontation that disrupted the local economy. This was the case from 1936 through the late 1960s when Palestinian militias took quasi-control of the South as a base to attack Israel in their war of liberation, resulting in the occupation of the South by Israel for more than two decades, 1978–2000.
42. Meir Zamir, *The Formation of Modern Lebanon* (London, 1985), p. 98. Census found in the MAE, E-Levant, vol. 39, p. 56. Zamir argues that the Muslims were underrepresented as many boycotted the census.
43. Ibid., p. 97.
44. Zamir, *The Formation of Modern Lebanon*, p. 76.
45. Cf. Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, *The Climax of French Imperial Expansion 1914–1924*; Kaufman, "Reviving Phoenicia," pp. 24–27; Philip Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate* (London, 1987), p. 74.
46. Zamir, *The Formation of Modern Lebanon*, pp. 91–92.
47. Ibid., p. 93.
48. MAE, E-Levant, vol. 31, "Rapport de de Caix a Millerand," July 17, 1920, in Bassam, "al-Tawajjuhat al-Siyasiyya fi Jabal ʻAmil bayn 1918–1926," p. 176.

49. Ibid.
50. MAE, E-Levant, vol. 32, "Rapport de Millerand a Gouraud," August 6, 1920.
51. MAE, E-Levant, vol. 125, p. 277.
52. Phillipe Gouraud, *Le General Henri Gouraud au Liban et en Syrie 1919–1923* (Paris, 1993), p. 81.
53. Cf. *Report of the King–Crane Commission*, December 2, 1922, Appendix section entitled "Confidential." Archives MAE, Beyrouth, vol. 42, Serie E-Levant 1918–1929, dossier 1: pétitions.
54. MAE, Série E, Carton 412, Syrie-Liban, Politique Intérieure, 200, September25–November 30, 1926, Memoradum from Robert de Caix to Philippe Berthelot, "l'organisation donne a la Syrie et au Liban de 1920 a 1923 et la crise actuelle."
55. Meir Zamir, *Lebanon's Quest for Statehood 1926–1939* (London, 1997), p. 9.
56. Zamir, "Smaller and Greater Lebanon," pp. 34–53.
57. Ibid., p. 72.
58. Meir Zamir, "Emile Eddé and the Territorial Integrity of Lebanon," in *Middle East Studies*, vol. 14, no. 2 (1978), pp. 232–235.
59. Zamir, *Lebanon's Quest*, p. 114.
60. *Map of Lebanon*, 1974, published by the National Defense Ministry.
61. Eisenberg, *My Enemy's Enemy*, p. 49.
62. Among these participators were Sa'id 'Aql, Muhammad Jamil Bayhum, Fu'ad Ifram al-Bustani, Jawad Bulus, Michel Chiha, Charles Corm, Georges Karam, Yusuf al-Sawda, Edmond Rabbath, Amin al-Rihani, and Taqi al-Din al-Sulh. With the exception of Rabbath who was a Greek Orthodox Damascene, the rest of these authors came from Mount Lebanon or Beirut and were already paving way for the dominance of these two centers of Lebanon.
63. This is in addition to the large body of secondary literature on Lebanon where the focus was principally on Mount Lebanon and Beirut. Cf. Kamal Salibi, *Modern History of Lebanon* (London, 1965); Zamir, *The Formation of Modern Lebanon*; Spagnolo, *France and Ottoman Lebanon*.
64. Hourani, "Lebanon: Ideologies of the Mountain and the City," in *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (Oxford, 1981), p. 173.
65. Ibid., p. 171.
66. Albert Hourani, "Lebanon: The Historians and the Formation of a National Image," in *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (Oxford, 1981), p. 151.
67. Hakim-Dowek, "The Origin of the Lebanese National Idea."
68. Ibid., p. 8.
69. Ibid., p. 10.
70. Cf. Kaufman, "Reviving Phoenicia," chapter one.
71. Ibid.

72. The minority “Greek” (Antiochian Melkite) Catholic community in Lebanon is an urban community largely based in Beirut. Chiha came from its *haute bourgeoisie,* which had strong cultural links to France and a strong financial power base in Beirut.
73. Fawaz Traboulsi, “Identités et solidarité croisés dans les conflits du Liban contemporain” (Ph.D. thesis, Paris, VIII, 1993), pp. 312–313.
74. Fawaz Traboulsi, *Silat Bila Wasl: Michel Chiha wa-l-Idyulujiyya al-Lubnaniyya* (Beirut, 1999), p. 184.
75. Ibid., chapter 7.
76. Trabousli, “Identités,” p. 299.
77. Bulus wrote that “politics was the daughter of history, history was the daughter of geography, and geography was almost immutable” in Traboulsi, “Identités,” p. 305.
78. Ibid., chapter 7.
79. Chiha, *Politique intérieure.*
80. Hourani, *Lebanon*, p. 174.
81. Ibid., p. 175.
82. Cf. Kaufmann, “Reviving Phoenicia.” Also see discussion on Renan in notes. 24–28 in this chapter, in this book.
83. Cf., e.g., Bassam Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry* (New York, 1981), pp. 101ff.
84. The effect of this marginalization was the constant drive among nationalist Shi‘i writers to dilute or reduce with the mainstream and to underline the commonality with it. See, e.g., the chapter on Matawila in Isma‘il Haqqi, *Lubnan: Mabahith Ijtima‘iyya* (Beirut, 1975).
85. Cf. chapter 5 in this book.
86. Traboulsi, “Identités,” p. 312.
87. Arguably other peripheral communities of Lebanon were not mentioned either, including the Sunnis of Akkar and the mixed Muslim population of the Bekaa.
88. Cf. Raghid Solh, “Lebanon and Arab Nationalism, 1936–1945” (Ph.D. thesis, Oxford University, 1986), unpaginated, section on Conferences of the Coast.
89. ‘Itani, *Mudhakkarat Bayruti* (Beirut, 1977), p. 24.
90. A telling example of this is Rashid Beydoun, the Beiruti Shi‘i politician and entrepreneur, who in order to stand for election as MP had to do so in the South as there were no electoral seats for the Shi‘is in Beirut until 1943.
91. Shaykh Ali al-Zayn, from Jibshit can be considered one of the principal intellectual figures of Lebanese ‘Amili history and literature. Although educated in Najaf, he was a critic of the establishment, particularly the education system. His position did not change when he returned to his village and he continued his literary and political efforts to effect change in Jabal ‘Amil. His work on the history of Jabal ‘Amil can be considered as a solid foundation and the first scientific attempt to tackle this vague subject. In his life and work, he symbolizes the predicament of ‘Amili intellectuals in the early decades of the

Lebanese Republic. He was vocal in his critique of the Najaf schools publishing several articles on the subject, such as "Bawadir al-Islah fi Jamiyyat al-Najaf aw Nahdat Kashif al-Ghita' " (Glimpses of Reform at the Najaf University or the *Nahda* of Kashif al-Ghita'), in *al-'Irfan*, vol. 29 (1939), pp. 179–185.

92. Hashim al-Amin, a poet, was one of Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin's several sons who threw off his clerical cloak and became a harsh critique of his father's world.
93. Muhammad Sharara was born ca. 1906 in Bint Jbail to an ulama family. He traveled to Najaf to pursue religious studies, but was instead attracted to literary and political activities. Sharara remained in Iraq for most of his life, but contributed to the 'Amili cultural scene, notably as a poet and literary critic.
94. Muhammad al-Faqih, "Muhammad Ali al-Humani," in *Wujuh Thaqafiyya min al-Janub* (Beirut, 1984), p. 80.
95. Tarif Khalid, "Shaykh Ahmad 'Arif al-Zayn and Al-'Irfan," in Marwan Buheiri, ed., *Intellectual Life in the Arab East 1890–1939,* Beirut, 1981, p. 116.
96. Several works have dealt with the conferences and their impact, namely Hassan Hallaq, *Mu'tamar al-Sahil wa-l-Aqdiya al-Arba'a* (Beirut, 1983); Raghid Solh, "Lebanon and Arab Nationalism, 1936–1945" (Ph.D. thesis, Oxford University, 1986); and Najwa Atiyah, "The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis towards the State of Lebanon" (Ph.D. thesis, London University, 1973).
97. Solh, "Lebanon and Arab Nationalism," chapter 1.
98. The essay is published in Hallaq's *Mu'tamar al-Sahil*, pp. 75–89.
99. Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (London, 1965), p. 187.
100. Hallaq, *Mu'tamar al-Sahil*, p. 81.
101. Cf. Rida's article, "Al Matawila wal-Shi'a fil-Tarikh," and "Ma Hiya al-Umma?" (What Is a Nation?), vol. 2, no. 9 (1910).
102. His publications included *Mu'jam al-Lugha,* 5 vols. (Beirut, 1958–1961); *Risalat al-Khatt* (Saida, n.d.); *Da'irat al Mu'allimin* (Saida, n.d.); *Qamus Radd al-'Ammi 'ala al-Fasih* (Saida, 1957).
103. Rida, "Mudhakkarat lil-Tarikh," pp. 202–205.
104. Hourani, *Lebanon*, p. 174ff.
105. As several retired members of these parties mentioned in interviews, the South represented a human reservoir for all political parties; however, this was not reflected in any leadership position within these parties.
106. Abbas Kelidar, "The Shi'i Imami Community and Politics in the Arab East," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 19, no. 1 (1983), p. 15.

5 Out of the Margins

1. It features in political slogans, in journal articles (in *al-'Irfan* and more contemporary newspapers), as well as in books and dissertations

such as Bassam, "al-Tawajjuhat al-Siyasiyah li Jabal 'Amil bayn 1918–1926," and Ali Shuyab, *Matalib Jabal 'Amil.*

2. Cf. *al-'Irfan,* vol. 17 (1929), p. 60; vol. 18 (1929), pp. 273, 405; vol. 20 (1930), pp. 43, 172; vol. 21 (1931), p. 441.
3. For photographs, see Pierre Fournié and Jean-Louis Riccioli, *La France et le Proche-Orient 1916–1946* (Paris, 1997), p. 81.
4. Interviews with Munzer Jaber, Ali Shuyab, Muhammad Bassam, Beirut, spring 2000.
5. SHAT, "groupement Sud, situation politique du Djebel Amel," June 23, 1920.
6. SHAT, Levant sous serie 4H, carton 4H9 dossier: "colonne Liban-Sun." Also see Mervin, *Un Réformisme Chiite*, pp. 363–364.
7. MAE, Levant-E, vol. 149, August–November 1924.
8. Another Marjayoun newspaper, Jaridat al-Marj (60% readership in America) also complained of the government's neglect of the South and called for action, October 21, 1931.
9. Alfred Abu Samra, *Iftitahiyyat al-Qalam al-Sarih 1931–1975* (Beirut, n.d), pp. 9–27.
10. Published also in *al-'Irfan*, vol. 7, no. 3 (December 1921).
11. For example, a petition from the inhabitants of Tyre was forwarded to the High Commission to reduce the extortionate taxes levied, *al-'Irfan*, vol. 8, no. 1 (November 1922).
12. *Al-'Irfan*, vol. 9, no. 1 (October 1923), p. 100.
13. Ibid.
14. MAE, Serie E-Levant, 412, Dossier 1, November 22, 1922, pp. 251–255.
15. MAE, Beyrouth, 2432, "Lettre au Gouverneur du Grand Liban," July 29, 1922.
16. *Al-'Irfan*, vol. 8, no. 6 (March 1923), p. 478.
17. *Al-'Irfan*, vol. 9 (1923), p. 715.
18. Roger Owen, *Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon* (London, 1976), p. 24.
19. Two more Sunni representatives, one from Saida and one from Beirut, were added on September 22, 1920, following protests of under-representation by Muslim representatives; see Shafiq Juha, *Ma'rakat Masir Lubnan*, vol. 1 (Beirut, 1995), pp. 236–258.
20. Ibid. Also see Masud Dahir, *Tarikh Lubnan al-Ijtima'i* (Beirut, 1974), pp. 55–60.
21. The Province of the South was allotted six seats, three Shi'is, one Sunni, one Greek Catholic, and one Maronite.
22. Cf. Hani Fahs, *al-Shi'a wa-al-Dawlah fi Lubnan: Malamih fi al-Ru'ya wa-al-Dhakirah* (Beirut, 1996).
23. The Husayni and Hamadeh families (originally from the Hermel) had similar positions and proximity to Mount Lebanon and presented a similar social outlook on Lebanon.

24. MAE, E-Levant, 412–2A-Politique Interieure-Exercise du Mandat, vol. 263, June 1925.
25. Born in Kfar Rumman, Nabatieh (1879–1962), he received his schooling in Saida. He began his career by cultivating his lands and then expanded his activities to other investments and politics.
26. MAE, Beyrouth, CP, Service de Renseignement, Youssef Bey Zein, June 18, 1929.
27. ‘Abd al-Karim Hubballah, “Yusuf al-Zayn 1879–1962, Hayatuhu al-Siyasiyya wal-Ijtima‘iyya” (M.A. thesis, Lebanese University, 1989), pp. 56–61.
28. Ibid., p. 96.
29. Ibid., p. 68.
30. He was related to both men through marriage. MAE, Beyrouth, CP, no. 396, Service de Renseignement, “Negib Bey Osseiran,” June 16, 1929.
31. He was elected to a number of committees in Parliament: Labor, Agriculture, Education, Health, and Industry. Between 1934 and 1936 he served as deputy president to the chamber.
32. MAE, Beyrouth, CP, no. 396, “Service de Renseignement, Députes du Liban Sud, Negib Esseyron,” n.d.
33. MAE, Beyrouth, CP, no. 396, Service de Renseignement, “Fadl Bey Fadl,” June 16, 1929.
34. MAE, Syrie-Liban, no. 1662, Bulletin d’information hebdomadaire (BIH), August 13, 1930.
35. In 1944, the Mandate Sûreté Genérale was monitoring the activities of at least three such Shi‘i formations—“Jeunesse Instruite,” “Jeunesse Chiites,” and “Tala’I‘”—MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban, série de la Sûreté générale, no. 67: dossier J/6, March 18, 1944; April 5, 1944, and December 10, 1945.
36. *Al-Shira‘*, December 5, 1994.
37. Cf. *Al-‘Irfan*, vol. 7, no. 5 (February 1922), p. 637.
38. Pierre Rondot, *Les institutions politiques du Liban* (Paris, 1947), p. 66.
39. Yusuf al-Zayn was one of two Shi‘i deputies, the other was Subhi Haidar from Baalbek, who sat on the preparatory committee for establishing the basic regulations of the constitution. Juha, *Ma‘rakat Masir Lubnan*, p. 265.
40. Petition published in Amin Said, *Al-Thawra al-Arabiyya al-Kubra*, vol. 3 (Cairo, n.d.), p. 415.
41. MAE, Beyrouth, no. 1670, July 1–8, 1931.
42. Juha, *Ma‘rakat Masir Lubnan*, p. 270. Also see MAE, Syrie-Liban, CP, “Dossier Unité Syrienne Saida,” Several lists of petitions by the various trades in Saida calling for union with Syria.
43. *Journal Officiel du la République Libanaise*, January 1926, p. 3. The decree stated that the Muslim Shi‘i of Lebanon were an independent

community whose internal affairs were regulated by the laws of the Ja'fari Sect.

44. MAE, Syrie-Liban, vol. 197, BIH. no. 4, Beyrouth, February 15, 1926. Also see Antoine Hokayem, *La Gènese de la Constitution Libanaise de 1926* (Beirut, 1996), p. 233.
45. For example, when discussing a budget for reconstruction of some monuments, a southern deputy lobbied for funds to be spent on a particular building in the South. Another example was compensation measures to be taken by reducing taxes for villages affected by raids during the Druze revolt such as Marjayoun. Yusuf al-Zayn also suggested adding al-Khiam to the list because it hosted thousands of refugees, *Mahadir Majlis al-Nuwwab*, Session 4, November 17, 1927. Another example is when Fadl al-Fadl on December 17, 1929, lobbied for the annulment of the *a'shar* tax that was imposed in the South, but not throughout Lebanon. He demanded for Nabatieh to be made a *qa'immaqamiyya* for its central position and commercial importance for the region. In 1935, Bahij al-Fadl was still, in a lengthy request, demanding for an increase in schools in the South and the government's responsibility toward one of its regions, December 11, 1935.
46. Mahadir Majlis al-Nuwab (Lebanese Parliamentary Records), December 1927.
47. Yusuf Khuri, *Al-Bayanat al-Wizariyya*, vol. 1 (Beirut, 1986), pp. 11–13.
48. Mahadir Majlis al-Nuwab, December 16, 1929.
49. Pechkoff was a notorious character in the South and is still remembered by many today as a ruler with an iron fist. There are several proverbs with references to him that were chanted during the early 1930s. He joined the French Foreign Legion and his early career was in Morocco. His sojourn in South Lebanon lasted nearly a decade: 1931–1940. Cf. Mervin, *Un Réformisme Chiite*, p. 436.
50. MAE, Syrie-Liban, CP, no. 397, "Note du Commandant Pechkoff, 16 December 1933." Pechkoff further adds that this frustrated situation gave good ammunition for the Sunnis for inciting the Shi'is against the French, particularly the educated youth. However, he notes that although there is historic disagreement between the two sects, the government should ensure that no common cause be found between the two, as this would also destabilize the Palestinian border.
51. MAE, Syrie-Liban, CP, no. 785, "Information Secret, March 1944, 23 December 1943."
52. Cf. Zamir, *Lebanon's Quest*, chapter 4.
53. Ibid., chapter 4, fn. 144.
54. Ibid., p. 155.
55. Zamir, *Lebanon's Quest*, p. 171.
56. Ibid., p. 155. Also see *Dirasa iqtisadiyya wa-tanzimiyya li-idarat hasr al tabgh wa-l- tunbak al-lubnaniyya* (Beirut, 1972).
57. Zamir, *Lebanon's Quest*, p. 164.

58. Ibid., p. 166.
59. Ibid., p. 86.
60. Abbas Bazzi, "Bint Jbail 1936, al-Intifada wal-Iqta'," in *Dirasat 'Arabiyya*, vol. 11, September 1969.
61. Ibid., p. 77.
62. Cf. Bazzi, "Bint Jbail 1936, al-Intifada wal-Iqta'," for a detailed narrative of the revolt in Bint Jbail. Also Nahla al-Faqih, "Ziraat al-Tabgh, al-Rukhas, Tatwir Jughrafiyatiha, Tarikhuha, 'Ilaqat Zira'at al-Tabgh bi "Idarat Hasr al-Tabgh wal-Tunbak al-Lubnaniyya" (M.A. thesis, Lebanese University, Beirut, 1981).
63. MAE, Syrie-Liban 413–2, Dossier No. 501, Politique intérieure—Exercice du Mandat, Letter no. 824 from M. Meyrier, Delegate to the HC in Lebanon to Minister of FA, August 21, 1936.
64. Jean Aziz was understandably critical of the activists. In a report to the governor of South Lebanon, he wrote: "These people who resisted M.S. Bazzi and his followers for their opposition to Syrian Unity, and their [Bazzi] attachment and defense of Lebanon—do not leave an opportunity without undermining Bazzi and spreading their corrupt message to Bint Jbail and surroundings." Papers of the Tyre Qa'immaqamiyya, August 25, 1936.
65. Cf. Bazzi, "Bint Jbail 1936, al-Intifada wal-Iqta'."
66. The pages of *al-Nahar* during this period are dominated by this crisis.
67. Hasan Qubaysi, *Tatawwur Madinat Sur 1900–1975* (Beirut, 1986), p. 137.
68. Khuri, *Al-Bayanat al-Wizariyya*, pp. 113–114.
69. Faris Sa'dah, *al-Mawsu'a al-Lubnaniyya*, vol. 3, 1934–1943 (Beirut, 1995).
70. MAE, Syrie-Liban, Cabinet Politique, no. 785, October 29, 1946, "Revendication de la Communauté Chiites," Lettre de Armand de Cayla ministre de France au Liban a Bidault, président du gouvernement provisoire de la République Française.
71. MAE, Syria-Liban, CP, no. 785, December 1, 1941.
72. Electoral program presented by Adel Osseiran, nominated to South Lebanon, 1937, p. 3.
73. Ibid., p. 1.
74. This list was composed of Najib Osseiran, Yusuf al-Zayn, Rashid Beydoun, Khalid Shahab, Kazim al-Khalil, Ahmad al-Assaad, Yusuf Salim, and Marun Kan'an.
75. Much of the information in the following paragraphs is derived from a series of interviews conducted in Lebanon in 1999–2000 with the Osseiran family.
76. Adil 'Usayran, *1905–1998: Kalam 'al-Watan* (Beirut, 1999), p. 13.
77. Osseiran was engaged with the US Point Four (International Cooperation Act of 1949) for developing schools in the South. He later founded and funded an agricultural college in Shukin, South Lebanon, in 1969. While the political potential of this and other

projects cannot be dismissed, it is noteworthy that few leaders in positions of power engaged in such activities.

78. Osseiran would later be asked by the Lebanese government to go to Iran in 1947 to secure support for the Arab position on the Palestinian question. This mission was partially due to the historic relations between the Iranian government and his family, which had been granted Iranian consular status in the late nineteenth century. Also, in 1947, Osseiran negotiated a settlement between Iran and Saudi Arabia on the issue of Iranian pilgrims going to Mecca.
79. His relations with the Christians in Jabal ʻAmil were strong, particularly with the Greek Orthodox of Marjayoun.
80. *Al Nahar*, throughout April 1936.
81. This is evident from the personal tone of the correspondence between the two, Spears File, V/4, St. Anthony's College, Middle East Library.

6 Venues for Integration

1. Cf. ʻItani's text on the Shiʻis of Lebanon in his *Mudhakkarat Bayruti*, p. 24. ʻItani's work is part of a long tradition of diminishing the presence and importance of the Shi'is in a Sunni environment. An example from the end of the nineteenth century is Muhammad ʻAbd al-Jawwad al-Qayati's *Nafhat al-Basham fi Rihlat al-Sham* (Beirut, 1981). Al-Qayati visits Saida and its environs, inventories its sites and holy places, and succeeds nevertheless in avoiding any mention of its Shiʻis.
2. The complete separation of the Shiʻi sect from the authority of the Sunni Dar al-Fatwa had to wait until Sayyid Musa al-Sadr's initiative to create al-Majlis al-Islami al-Shiʻi al-Aʻla.
3. ʻAbd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din, *Ihtijaj ʻala Qanun al Tawa'if*, photocopy of pamphlet (Tyre, 1939).
4. Cf. Ali al-Wardi, *Lamhat Ijtimaʻiyya min Tarikh al-ʻIraq al-Hadith* (Baghdad, 1969); as well as the work of Luizard, *La formation de l'Irak contemporain*, which provides a detailed and discerning analysis on the nature of Shiʻism in Iraq and its role in that state.
5. Jabir Al Safa, *Tarikh*; Muhammad Kurani, *al-Judhur al-Tarikhiyya lil-muqawama al-Islamiyya fi Jabal ʻAmil* (Beirut, 1993); Jihad Bannut, *Harakat al-Nidal Fi Jabal Amil* (Beirut, 1993); Hasan al-Amin, *Sarab al-Istiqlal fi Bilad al-Sham 1918–1920* (Beirut, 1998).
6. He is said to have participated along with Yusuf al-Zayn in official discussions on the constitution in 1925, Bassam, "al-Tawajjuhat al-Siyasiyya fi Jabal ʻAmil bayn 1918–1926," pp. 213–232.
7. Ibid.
8. Mervin, *Un Réformisme Chiite*, p. 394.
9. Luizard, *La formation de l'Iraq contemporain*, p. 519.
10. Interview with Zaynab Osseiran, daughter of Munir, June 1999.
11. Cf. Mervin, *Un Réformisme Chiite*, p. 424 and Munzer Jaber, "Mu'tamar Wadi al-Hujayr," pp. 123–124.

12. MAE, Beyrouth, CP, dossier no. 607.
13. MAE, Beyrouth, CP, dossier no. 607, "Services Speciaux, Tyre, Le Capitaine Pechkoff au Haut Commissaire," November 5, 1931.
14. MAE, Beyrouth, CP, dossier no. 607, "Demande de Nomination," February 13, 1936.
15. MAE, Beyrouth, CP, dossier no. 607, "Requête présentée par les deux députés chiites à Monsieur le Conseiller Administratif du Liban-Sud," March 8, 1934.
16. MAE, Beyrouth, CP, dossier no. 607, "Nomination d'un moufti chiite à Saida."
17. Ibid., Letter from Pechkoff to the Secretary of the High Commission on the choice of nomination of a Shi'i Mufti in Saida, March 30, 1934.
18. Ibid., "Remerciements," June 11–15, 1934.
19. MAE, Beyrouth, CP, no. 456: "Revendications de la Communauté Chiite, Démarche du Cheikh Munir Osseyran au sujet des traitements des magistrates des juridictions chiites de statut personnel," January 27, 1936.
20. Mervin, *Un Réformisme Chiite*, p. 397.
21. MAE, dossier no. 501, Syrie-Liban 413–2 Politique interieure—Exercise du Mandat, Letter no. 824 from M. Meyrier, Delegate to the HC in Lebanon to Minister of Foreigh Affairs, August 21, 1936.
22. In addition, the Sayyid ultimately gained French support for establishing his school, al-Ja'fariyya, against the mounted opposition of the Tyre notables.
23. Cf. Waddah Charara, *Transformations d'une manifestation religieuse dans un village du Liban-Sud (Ashura)* (Beirut, 1968).
24. *Al-'Irfan*, vol. 12 (1927), p. 583; Muhsin al-Amin, *Risalat al-Tanzih li-A'mal al-Shabih* (Saida, 1928).
25. Shaykh Abdallah al-Subayti had a dramatic reply to Sayyid Muhsin's position in a book entitled *Rannat al-Asa, Nazra fi risalat al-Tanzih li-A'mal al-Shabih* (Baghdad, 1929), in which al-Amin's position is portrayed as a betrayal of the community.
26. During a meeting on July 9, 1999, the late Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din expressed a similar view to al-Amin, when a person present expressed an interest in converting from Sunni to Shi'i Islam. His reaction to her was, "You are already a Shi'i," clearly indicating his opinion that the differences between the sects is merely in form.
27. Interview with Munzer Jaber, January 23, 2000.
28. For a detailed review of the status of education during the Ottoman period, see Tamara Chalabi, "Community and Nation State: The Shi'is of Jabal 'Amil and the New Lebanon 1918–1943" (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 2003), Chapter 6.
29. Masud Dahir, *Tarikh Lubnan al-Ijtima'i, 1914–1926* (Beirut, 1974), p. 187.

30. Mervin, *Un Réformisme Chiite*, pp. 178–179.
31. Ibid., p. 180.
32. For details on the activities of Sayyid Muhsin and the Shi'i community in Damascus, see Muhsin Al-Amin, *A'yan al-Shi'a, Siratuhu bi- Qalamihi wa-Qalam al-Akharin*, vol. 40 (Beirut, 1957); Adib Rumani, *Sira wa-Tarikh* (Beirut, 1993); Mervin, *Un Réformisme Chiite*.
33. Rashid Beydoun, *Qawl wa-F'il* (Beirut, n.d.).
34. Introduction, Bayan 'Amal al-Jam'iyya al-Khairiyya al-'Amiliyya, 1929.
35. E. Early, "The 'Amiliyya Society in Beirut: A Case Study of an Emerging Urban Za'im" (M.A. thesis, AUB, 1971), p. 48.
36. Interviews with officials from al-'Amiliyya College, Spring 2000.
37. Most accounts of the Shi'is' presence in Beirut spoke of the bad treatment they received from many Sunnis to the extent that they were denied access to their mosques and were referred to as Mitwalis, a derogatory connotation. One well-known story is that upon hearing that some Shi'is were kicked out of a mosque, Rashid Beydoun barged into the mosque with these men and challenged anyone to prevent them from praying. This gained him respect from the Shi'is and established him in their minds as their patron in Beirut.
38. The 'Amili Society published yearly reports of its educational and fundraising activities. It reported at length on the expatriate 'Amilis' donations to the Society.
39. Kamil Muruwwa, *Nahnu fi Afriqiya* (Beirut, 1938).
40. Mervin, *Un Réformisme Chiite*, p. 180.
41. Ibid., p. 182.
42. *Al-'Irfan*, vol. 26, no. 4 (November 1928), pp. 410–413; *al-'Irfan*, vol. 28, no. 4 (November 1929), pp. 441–446.
43. Mervin, *Un Réformisme Chiite*, p. 187.
44. Al-Madrasa al-Ja'fariyya fi Sur, *Al-Bayan al-Sanawi 1938–1939*.
45. Similar to many other schools in Lebanon, al-Ja'fariyya became a center of political activity with nationalist and leftist tendencies, competing to organize students for various causes such as the Palestinian and the Algerian ones; Al-Madrasa al-Ja'fariyya fi Sur, *Risalat al-Ja'fariyya* (March 1983).
46. Official documents issued by state authorities provided by Dr. Ali Sharaf al-Din, current director of the school, clearly indicate that the property is a *waqf* for the "Shi'i Islamic Community" with Sharaf al-Din's sons as its *walis* (trustees). A *shar'ai* document also provided by Dr. Ali Sharaf al-Din consisting of a binding religious agreement witnessed by ten notables lists the land as having been originally *muwat*, dead land, a form of *musha'* land.
47. There is an entire dossier on the piece of land in question that would later house al-Ja'fariyya school, MAE, Beyrouth, No. 2958.
48. Sharaf-al-Din, *Bughyat*, pp. 120–124.

49. Al-Kulliyya al-Ja'fariyya, *Min al-Mahd ila al-Lahd, Kifah wa Najah* (1953), p. 13.

7 HISTORY AND CULTURE

1. On this subject, see the works of Hassan Hallaq, 'Umar 'Abd al-Salam Tadmuri and the journal published by Dar al-Fatwa, *al-Fikr al-Islami*.
2. Beydoun, *Identité confessionnelle et temps social chez les historiens libanais contemporains* (Beirut, 1984), chapter 1.
3. Cf. Kamal Salibi, *Lebanon* (London, 1965).
4. This contact was multilayered from Western investment in land cultivation belonging to the church to the establishment of schools through religious orders.
5. Cf. Dominique Chevallier, *La société du Mont Liban a l'époque de la révolution industrielle en Europe* (Paris, 1971).
6. Kamal Salibi, *House of Many Mansions: A History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (London, 1988), p. 113.
7. "Traditional authority, at the Druze level, by far transcended the powers they [Druze tribal chiefs] enjoyed as heads of cantons under the Shihabi system"; ibid., p. 112.
8. Ibid., p. 162.
9. Salibi writes, "traditional Maronite historiography seems to have originated as an expression of national pride. As a small and closely-knit community surrounded by enemies, the Maronites tended to be deeply interested in their history, taking pride in having retained their identity through many changes of fortune. Their church, perhaps the smallest of the Eastern Christian communions and by no means the oldest, was the first to begin a tradition of attachment to Rome. More important still, it was never subject to the same degree of Moslem tutelage as the other Eastern Christian churches . . . A related factor which also contributed to the development of a Maronite history writing was the determination of the Maronites to refute all evidence pointing to their origin and all the denials of their original and unbroken orthodoxy and union with Rome"; *Maronite Historians of Medieval Lebanon* (Beirut, 1959), pp. 15–16.
10. The historic canons of the Maronite community were predominantly written by religious men, among which are *Tarikh al-Ta'ifa al-Maruniyya* (History of the Maronite Community) by Patriarch Istifan Duwayhi (d. 1704); *Al-Jami' al-Mufassal fi Tawarikh al-Mawarina al-Mu'assal* (1905) (Original Collection of Maronite Histories) by Bishop Yusuf al-Dibs (d. 1907); *Ta'rikh al-Rihbaniya al-Maruniya* (History of the Maronite Clergy) by Father Butros Fahd; *Tarikh sl-Mawarina sl-Dini Wa Al-Siyasi wa Al-hadari* (Religious, Political and Cultural History of the Maronites), and *Ta'rikh Kisrawan* (The History of Kisrawan) by Father Philippe al-Khazin.
11. Salibi, *Maronite Historians*, p. 32.

12. Salibi, *Maronite Historians*, p. 23.
13. Ibid., 17.
14. Ibid. The Druze, e.g., were never challenged doctrinally on their faith. Their position with regard to orthodox Islam was well defined: they were outsiders and functioned as such. They were not therefore compelled, like the Maronites, to defend their faith in the face of competing faiths.
15. "le nouveau cadre théorique libanais a commencé a se former dans les deux dernières décennies du Mutasarifat." Beydoun, *Identité confessionnelle*, pp. 209–210.
16. Lammens, in particular, was concerned with establishing the existence of a Syrian nation that had withstood foreign invasions including that of the desert Arabs carrying Islam. He was notorious for his anti-Islamic positions and devoted many studies to his cause. He considered Mount Lebanon, or what he called *L'Asile du Liban*, to be part of Syria, but "a refuge for those Syrians who valued their freedom," thus nurturing the communitarian dimension with the French Mandate; see Kamal Salibi, "Islam and Syria in the Writings of Henri Lammens" in Bernard Lewis and P.M. Holt, eds., *Historians of the Middle East*, vol. 4 (London, 1962); also Beydoun, *Identité confessionnelle.*
17. Beydoun, *Identité confessionnelle*, p. 209.
18. Unpublished lecture on Lebanese historiography, Munzer Jaber, 1979, 10pp.
19. Beydoun, *Identité confessionnelle*, p. 302.
20. Ibid., on Butrus Daw's interpretation of St. Marun, p. 265.
21. Ibid., p. 302.
22. This is not at odds with Josephus's reference to the inhabitants of the region of Tyre as Arabs during Alexander's siege (whether they were ethnically Arabs or not); *Works of Josephus*, vol. II (1864).
23. Ibid., p. 310.
24. Among these are *Jabal 'Amil fi Qarn* (Jabal 'Amil in a Century) by Rida al-Rukayni. They are journals that deal with the events of daily life starting in the early eighteenth century, which the author either experienced or heard of. It was continued by his son, Haydar Rida (d. 1832) who also wrote of the time he lived in, in a similar style. What distinguishes it is the naïveté of the recordings, their simplicity and frankness, which was not altered to suit a specifically desired conclusion.
25. Among such work is al Hurr al-'Amili's (d. 1693) work, *Amal al-Amil fi Tarikh Jabal 'Amil* (Hope of the Hopeful in the History of Jabal 'Amil).
26. This mentality extends beyond the reaction to the victory of the Umayyads over Ahl al-Bayt.
27. Cf. Amanat, *Resurrection and Renewal*, chapter one.
28. Ibid., p. 319.
29. It is important to note here the significance of these men writing their community's history, as sayyids in the first degree (i.e., as descendents

of the Prophet and the Imams), and as ‘ulama and shaykhs presenting a cohesive narrative that is politically motivated to ensure them good relations with the ruling notables, Jaber, “Pouvoir,” pp. 323–325.

30. Mervin, *Un Réformisme Chiite*, p. 388.
31. Cf. Waddah Charara, *Transformations d’une manifestation religieuse*, chapter one.
32. Jaber, “Pouvoir,” p. 326.
33. Henri Lammens’s article “Les Perses du Liban ou les origines des Metoualis,” examines the assertion of various scholars on the origin of the Syrian/Lebanese Shi‘is; Persian brought by Mu‘awiya, Isma‘ili, and Kurds and concludes that in fact the Mitwalis are Arabs, descending from the Banu ‘Amila tribe, *Mélanges de la Faculté Orientale*, Université St. Joseph (Beirut, 1929).
34. Lammens mentions that according to the historian Ya‘qubi, the Banu ‘Amili, converted to Shi‘i Islam in the third century A.H.; ibid., p. 39.
35. It also has the result of marginalizing these other Shi‘is from the emerging Lebanese Shi‘i identity being taken over by its ‘Amil component.
36. Jaber, “Pouvoir,” p. 335.
37. This relates back to al-Hurr al-‘Amili’s knowledge of Jabal ‘Amil’s conversion, in Mervin, *Un Réformisme Chiite*, p. 387.
38. Ulrich Haarmann, “Abu Dharr-Muhammad’s Revolutionary Companion,” *Muslim World*, no. 4 (1978), p. 285. Haarmann also states that there is little information on Abu Dharr’s career.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., p. 306.
41. Beydoun explains this point through the ideological debates of Lebanese historians, specifically Sunni, on the origins of the Maronite. In response to Kamal Salibi’s statement that the “Lebanese Idea” was developed through Maronite group solidarity, Zaki Naqqach, a Sunni historian, retorts that the “Lebanese Idea” was born thanks to the Arabs, and thanks to those exercising power, starting with Imam al-‘Awza’i to the Tanukhs, to ‘Alam al-Din to the Ma‘ans then to the Chihabs. Beydoun elaborates that while refuting the Maronite historical hegemony to Lebanon, Naqqach is also prescribing to the Maronite position of origin, by leaning on those in power, the Sunnis; *Identité confessionnelle*, p. 66.
42. Cf. Muhammad Amin Tulay‘, *Asl al-Muwahhidin al-Duruz wa-Usuluhum* (The Origin of the Druze Unitarists and Their Origins) (Beirut, 1961); and Abdullah Najjar, *Madhab al-Muwahhidin al-Duruz* (The Doctrine of the Druze Unitarians) (Beirut, n.d.), in Beydoun, *Identité confessionnelle*, pp. 58–59. The main historian of the Druze community is Salih ibn Yahya, whose works include *Tarikh Bayrut wa-akhbar al-Umara’ al- Buhturiyyin min Bani al-Gharb* (History of Beirut and the Buhtur Emirs of Gharb) (Beirut, 1927).
43. Ibid., pp. 577–578.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., p. 305. It is important to note of the least “Western-oriented” Christian communities, the Greek Orthodox have been the most

prolific at embracing Western ideologies, Marxism, National Socialism, Nationalism, with advocates such as Antun Saadeh, Michel 'Aflaq, and Farah Antun.

46. For a detailed analysis of the work of these writers, see Chalabi, "Community and Nation State," pp. 312–335.
47. Cf. Beydoun, *Identité confessionnelle*, pp. 66–76, 229–233.
48. Another publication, a newspaper by the title, *Majallat al-Marj* was also founded in 1909 by As'ad Rahhal and Daniel Za'rabin, from Marjayoun. However it was more of a bulletin board that served as a link between Marjayoun and its predominantly Greek Orthodox immigrant populations.
49. There were some other journals that emerged in Iraq, most notably *al-Ghari* in Najaf, but they did not acquire the same number of readers or have the longevity that *al-'Irfan* sustained.
50. Kazim Shiri, *Majallat al-'Irfan wa Takwin Muthaqafi Jabal 'Amil* (Diplome, Lebanese University, 1983), chapter 3.
51. *Al-'Irfan*, vol. 1 (August 8, 1909), pp. 398–401.
52. Tarif Khalidi, "Shaykh Ahmad 'Arif al-Zayn and *Al-'Irfan*," in Marwan Buheiry, ed., *Intellectual Life from the Arab East* (Beirut, 1981), p. 112.
53. The distribution rate of *al-'Irfan* has not been established due to the fact that the printing press and offices of the journal in Saida were burnt during the recent Civil War. However, Naef mentions that 1,000 issues were in circulation (date unspecified), "Les Chiites Du Liban et le Mandat Francais: La Position de La Revue *Al-'Irfan*," in *Actes de la Troisieme Rencontre des Etudes sur la Presse du Moyen Orient*, CNRS, Aix-en-Provence, July 2–5, 1996, p. 12.
54. Halil Inalcik, "Application of the Tanzimat and Its Social Effects," in *Archivum Ottomanicum*, vol. 5 (1973), pp. 97–127; Moshe Maoz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840–1861; The Impact of the Tanzimat on Politics and Society* (London, 1968).
55. Cf. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London, 1983), chapters 3 and 5.
56. Khalidi, "Shaykh Ahmad 'Arif al-Zayn and *Al-'Irfan*," pp. 111–112.
57. Ibid.
58. "al-'am al jaded, fa ayna al 'Ahd al sa'id," *al-'Irfan*, vol. 25 (1934/1935), p. 1.
59. Silvia Naef, "La presse en tant que moteur du renouveau culturel et litteraire: la revue chiite Libanaise *al-'Irfan*," in *Asiatiche Studien/Études Asiatiques* (Bern, L.2. 1996), p. 393. Also see Kazim Shiri, *Majallat al-'Irfan wa-Takwin Muthaqqafi Jabal 'Amil* (Diplôme, Lebanese University, 1983).
60. *Al-'Irfan*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 52, 321, 351, 372, 382, 393, 418, 510, 513, 559.
61. Ahmad Rida, *al-'Irfan*, vol. 2 (1910), pp. 237–242, 286–330, 337, 381–392.

62. The history of the Phoenicians, a pivotal point of reference in the post-1920 Lebanon is published in *al-'Irfan*, vol. 10 (1925); vol. 11, 12 (1926–1927). The history of Alexander the Great is also serialized throughout 1926. Furthermore, 'Ali al-Zayn, e.g., claims 'Amili descent from the citizens of Tyre who resisted Alexander the Great's siege in the third century B.C., *Lil-Bahth 'An Tarikhina Fi Lubnan* (Beirut, 1973), p. 81.
63. For example, the relation with Najaf of a prominent group of 'Amili scholars began disintegrating in the 1930s when local events took over. The Lebanese option eventually provided a cultural/intellectual alternative to the Shi'i world of Najaf. The press is one tool that facilitates this.
64. "Shu'ara' Suriya," "Bayrut," "Tarablus al-Gharb," "Hama," "Hums," *al-'Irfan*, vol. 13, 14, 15 (1911–1914).
65. One example is *Majallat al-Marj* that was published by the *al-'Irfan* printing press starting from 1930; Naef, "La presse en tant que moteur du renouveau culturel et litteraire," p. 391. Another is Alfred Abu Samra's *al-Qalam al-Sarih*, founded in 1931 also in Marjayoun.
66. See articles by Mansur Jurdak (AUB professor in Mathematics from Marjayoun) in *al-'Irfan*, vol. 6, also references in Naef, "La presse en tant que moteur du renouveau culturel et litteraire," p. 396.
67. Khalidi, "Shaykh Ahmad 'Arif al-Zayn and *Al-'Irfan*," p. 112.
68. 'Abd al-Husayn-Abdallah, *Hasad al-Ashwaq* (Saida, 1960).
69. Adnan al-Amin, *Diwan 'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Amin* (Beirut, 1988).
70. MAE, Beyrouth, Service de Renseignement, Article 1679, November 7, 1931. The first closure was due to the journal's praise of the bandit Adham Khanjar. The second closure was due to *al-'Irfan* support of the Tobacco Revolts.

This page intentionally left blank

Select Bibliography

Primary Sources: Miscellaneous Unpublished Manuscripts, Private Papers, Memoirs, Political Manifestos

Al-Abdullah, Abdul Husayn. *Hasad al Ashwak*. Saida: n.p., n.d.

Al-Amin, Hasan et al. *Min Daftar al-Dhikrayat al-Janubiyya*. 2 Vols. Notebook of Southern Memories. Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Lubnani, 1981–1984.

Al-Amin, Muhsin. *Ayan al- Shi'a*. 10 Vols. Shi'i Notables. Beirut: Matba'at al-Insaf, 1957–1962.

———. *Khitat Jabal 'Amil*. History of Jabal 'Amil. Beirut: al-Dar al-'Alamiyya, 1961.

Bahjat, Muhammad and al-Tamimi, Muhammad Rafiq. *Wilayat Bayrut*. Province of Beirut. Beirut: Matba'at al Iqbal, 1914–1916.

Dahir, Sulayman. Min Yawmiyyat 'Amili: Mudhakarat al sheikh Sulayman Dahir. Diary of an 'Amili: Memoirs of Shaykh Sulayman Dahir, MS, 1918–1922 [Nabatieh], 560pp.

———. Private Letters and Reports to the Arab Government Representative, 1918–1922, 280pp.

———. *Tarikh Qal'at al-Shaqif*. History of Beauford Castle. Saida: n.p., 1977.

———. *Jabal 'Amil fi-l-Harb al-Kawniyya*. Jabal 'Amil during the Great War. Beirut: Dar al-Matbu'at al-Sharqiyya, 1986.

———. "Mu'jam Qura Jabal 'Amil." Dictionary of Jabal 'Amil Villages, Serialized, *al-'Irfan*.

Al-Dahir, Abdul Muhsin. Al-Dalala al-'Amiliyya fi-il-Usra al-Wa'iliyya. 5 Vols. History of the Wa'ili Family, MS, 642pp.

Dirasa iqtisadiyya wa-tanzimiyya li-idarat hasr al tabgh wa-l- tunbak al-lubnaniyya. Economic Study of the Lebanon Tobacco Monopoly, Beirut 1972.

Howard, Harry N. *The King–Crane Commission. An American Inquiry in the Middle East*. Beirut: [Khayat], 1963.

Al-Ja'fariyya fi Sur wa-Jabal 'Amil: Mu'assasa wa-Imam. Al-Ja'fariyya in Tyre and Jabal 'Amil: Institution and Iman. Tyre: 1938.

Al-Jam'iyya al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya al-'Amiliyah, Beirut. *Bayan A'mal li-Sanatiha al-Rabi'a wa-l-Khamisa 'Ashar, 1937–1939*. Annual Report 1937–1939 of the 'Amiliyya Islamic Association. Damascus: 1939.

Al-Kulliyya al-Ja'fariyya. *Thanawiyya Dakhiliyya: Bayan wa Ta?limat 1949–1951*. Al Ja'fariyya College, Rules and Regulations, Tyre.

Mugniyyah, Muhammad Jawad. *Al-Wad' al-Hadir fi Jabal 'Amil*. Present Situation in Jabal 'Amil. Saida: Dar al-Jawad, 1947.

Mu'tamar al-Sahil wa-l-Aqdiya al-Arba'a (1936: Beirut, Lebanon). *Mu'tamar al Sahil wa-l-Aqdiya al-Arba'a, 1936: Munaqashat Jalsat al- Mu'tamar wa-l-qararat, ma' nusus wa-watha'iq al-Mu'tamarat al-wahdawiyya, mundhu 'am 1920 ila 'am 1936*. Conference of the Coast and the Four Provinces: Discussions of the Sessions and Decisions with Texts of the Unity Conferences 1920–1936, Beirut, 1983.

Osseiran, Adel. Private papers. Saida, Lebanon.

Report of the Commissioner of Education for June 1916. Department of the Interior, US Government, Washington, 1916.

Al Safa, Muhammad Jabir al-'Amili. Mudhakkarat Siyasiyya Duwwinat Khilal al- I'tiqal al-'Urfi al-'Askari, 53 Yawman fi Aley. Political Memoires Written during 53 Days of Military Incarceration in Aley, MS, 1915, 18pp.

———. *Tarikh Jabal 'Amil*. History of Jabal 'Amil. Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1996.

———. *Tarikh Jabal 'Amil*. History of Jabal 'Amil, MS, 7 Vols., 456pp.

Sharaf al Din, Abdul Husayn. *Al-Majalis al-Fakhira*. The Lavish Gatherings. Najaf: Dar al-Nu'man, 1967.

———. *Bughyat al-Raghibin fi Silsilat Al Sharaf al-Din* [History of the Sharaf al-Din Family], 2 Vols. Beirut: Al-Dar al-Islamiyya, 1991.

———. Min Khitab wa-Mudhakkarat wa-Rasa'il. Lectures, Diaries and Letters, Unedited MS, Tyre, 73pp.

Sulayman, Shaykh Ibrahim. Umara' Jabal 'Amil wa-'Asha'iruha. Princes and Tribes of Jabal 'Amil, 8 Vols., MS, Shaykh Ibrahim Sulayman personal library, 250pp.

———. Miscellaneous papers (correspondences, manifestos, articles), Shaykh Ibrahim Sulayman personal library, 102pp.

Zayn, Ali. *Ma' al-Adab al-'Amili: Dirasah wa-Naqd wa-Tahlil*. With 'Amili Literature: Study, Critique and Analysis. Beirut: Matba'at Samiya, 196?.

———. *Lil-bahth 'an Tarikhina fi Lubnan*. In Search of Our History in Lebanon. Beirut: n.p., 1973.

———. *Al-'Adat wa-l-taqalid fi al-'uhud al-iqta'iyya*. Customs and Traditions during the Feudal Ages. Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Lubnani, 1977.

———. *Fusul min Tarikh al-Shi'a fi Lubnan*. Chapters of the History of the Shi'is in Lebanon. Beirut: Dar al-Kalima, 1979.

———. *Min Awraqi*. From My Papers. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr al-Hadith, 1988.

Al-Zayn, Ahmad 'Arif. *Ta'rikh Saida*. History of Saida. Saida: Matba'at al-'Irfan, 1913.

Books and Articles

Abela, Ferdinand-Joseph. *Proverbes populaires du Liban Sud: Saida et ses environs*. Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1981–1985.

Abu Said, Ahmad. *Mu'jam al-Asma' wa-l-Ashkhass*. Lexicon of Names and People. Beirut: Dar al-'Ilm lil-Malayin, 1997.

Abu Samra, Alfred. *Iftitahiyyat al-Qalam al-Sarih 1931–1975*. Openings of the Frank Pen Newspaper, 1931–1975. Beirut: n.p, n.d.

Adib, Auguste. *Liban d'après guerre*. Paris: Leroux, 1918.

Ahmad Jamal Pasha. *Memoires*. Cairo: Lebanese University, 1923.

Ajami, Fouad. *The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986.

Akarli, Engin. *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861–1920*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Albord, Maurice. *L'Armée française et les états du levant 1936–1946*. Paris: CNRS, 2000.

Ali, Murtada. *Tha'ir min Biladi, Sadiq Hamza al-Fa'ur, 1894–1926*. A Revolutionary from My Lands, Sadiq Hamza al-Fa'ur, 1894–1926. Harouf: Dar Haydar, 1977.

Al-Amin, Hasan. *Dairat al-Maarif al-Islamiyya al-Shi'iyya*. Shi'i Encyclopaedia, Beirut: Dar al-Ta'aruf, 1972.

———. *Mustadrakat Ayan al-Shi'a*. 10 Vols. Supplement to Biographies of Shi'i Notables. Beirut: Dar al-Ta'aruf, 1987.

———. *Malahiq Ayan al-Shi'a*. Shi'i Notables Annex. Beirut: Dar al-Ta'aruf, 1993.

———. *Sirab al-istiqlal fi bilad al-Sham, 1918–1920*. Mirage of Independence in Greater Syria, 1918–1920. Beirut: Riad al-Rayyes, 1998.

Amanat, Abbas. *Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran, 1844–1850*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989.

Al-Amin, Haitham and Mervin, Sabrina, eds. *Sirat al Sayyid Mushin al-Amin*. Damascus: Institut Francais de Damas, 1998.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and New York: Verso, 1991.

Andrew Christopher M. and Kanya-Forstner, A.S. *The Climax of French Imperial Expansion 1914–1924*. Stanford: Standford University Press, 1981.

Antonius, George. *Syria and the French Mandate* [address given at Chatham house on March 6, 1934].

———. *The Arab Awakening*. London: H. Hamilton, 1945.

Arjomand, Said. *Authority and Political Culture in Shiism*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983.

Banut, Jihad. *Adham Khanjar 1895–1923*. Adham Khanjar 1895–1923. Antilyas: Al-Haraka al Thafiya: 1998.

Bassam, Muhammad Said. "al-Ittijahat al-Siyasiyya fi Jabal 'Amil, 1918–1926." Political Oreintations in Jabal 'Amil. Ph.D. thesis, University of St. Joseph, Beirut, 1983.

Bassam, Muhammad Jami. *Suriyah wa-Lubnan, 1918–1922.* Syria and Lebanon, 1918–1922. Beirut: Dar al-Rihani lil-Tiba'ah wa-al-Nashr [1968].

———. *Urubat Lubnan: Tatawwuruha fi al-Qadim wa-al-Hadith.* Lebanon's Arabness: Developments during Ancient and Modern Times. Beirut: Dar al-Rihani lil-Tiba'ah wa-al-Nashr, 1969.

Bazzi, Abbas. "Bint Jbail: 1936 al-Intifada wa-l-Iqta'." Bint Jbail: 1936 Uprising and Feudalism, *Dirassat Arabiya*, Vol. 11, 1969, pp. 72–88.

Bazzi, Hikmat, *Min Haqibati al-Tarikhiya, Jabal 'Amil fil Tarikh wa Qisasih al Tarikhiyya.* From My Historical Briefcase, Jabal 'Amil in History. Michigan, 1998.

Bazzi, Mustafa Muhammad. *Bint Jbail Hadirat Jabal 'Amil: Bint Jabil bayna al-Madi wa-al-Hadir wa-Tatawwurat al-Siyasiyah, wa-al-Ijtimaiyah, wa-al-Iqtisadiyah, wa-al-Thaqafiyah.* Bint Jbail, Jabal 'Amil's Present: Between Past and Present, Its Political, Social, Economic, and Cultural Development. Beirut: Dar al-Amir, 1998.

Beydoun, Ahmad. *Identité confessionnelle et temps social chez les historiens libanais contemporains.* Beirut: Lebanese University, 1984.

———. *Bint Jbail Mishighan.* Bint Jbail Michigan. Beirut: Dar, 1989.

Bin Yahya, Salih. *Tarikh Bayrut wa-Akhbar al-Umara' al-Buhturiyyin min Bani Gharb.* History of Beirut and the Buhturid Princes of Bani Gharb. Beirut: Matba'a al-Katulikiyya, 1927.

Binder, Leonard, ed. *Politics in Lebanon.* New York: Wiley, 1966.

Boulanger, Robert. *Liban.* Paris, Hachette, 1955.

Browne, Walter L. *The Political History of Lebanon, 1920–1950.* Salisbury: North Carolina, 1976.

Brunner, Rainer and Ende, Werner. *The Twelver Shi'a in Modern times: Religious Culture and Political History.* Leiden: Brill, 2000.

Buheiry, Marwan R., ed. *Intellectual Life in the Arab East, 1890–1939.* Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1981.

———. "Beirut's Role in the Political Economy of the French Mandate, 1919–39." Papers on Lebanon: 4. Centre for Lebanese Studies, Oxford [1986].

Bustani, Sulayman Khattar. *Ibrah wa-dhikra, aw, al-Dawlah al-Uthmaniyah qabl al-Dustur wa-Badahu.* Lessons and Memory or the Ottoman State before and after the Constitution. [Beirut]: Dar al-Tali'yya, 1978.

Chabry. *Politique et minorités au Moyen Orient, les raisons d'une explosion.* Paris: Maisonneuve et Larosse, 1984.

Charara, Waddah. *Transformations d'une manifestation religieuse dans un village du Liban-Sud (Ashura).* Universite libanaise, Institut des sciences sociales, Centre de recherches [Beyrouth], 1968.

———. *Al-Umma al-Qaliqa: al-'Amiliyun wa al-'Asabiyya al-'Amiliyya 'ala 'Utbat al-Dawlah al-Lubnaniyya.* The Anxious Nation: The 'Amilis and the 'Amili Kinship on the Eve of the Lebanese State. Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1996.

———. *Dawlat Hizballah, Lubnan Mujtama'an Islamiyan*. The State of Hizbollah, Lebanon: An Islamic Society. Beirut, Dar al-Nahar, 1998.

Chevallier, Dominique. *La Société du Mont Liban a l'époque de la révolution industrielle en Europe*. Paris: Librarie Orientalist P. Geuthner, 1971.

———. "Comment l'état a-t-il été compris au Liban?," in Shehadi, Nadim and Mills, Dana Haffar, eds., *Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1988.

Chiha, Michel. *Politique intérieure*. Beirut: Editions du Trident, 1964.

Cobban, Helena. *The Shia Community and the Future of Lebanon*, in *Muslim World Today*, Occasional Paper No. 2, 1985, pp. 1–12.

Cohen, Amnon. *Palestine in the 18th Century, Patterns of Government and Adminstration*. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1973.

Du Comité, Baron. "En Turquie d'Asie," in *L'Asie Française*, No. 145, 13th year, Paris, April 1913.

De Contenson, Ludovic. *Les réformes en Turquie d'Asie : La question arménienne et la question syrienne*. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1913.

Dagher, Joseph. *L'orient dans la littérature Française de l'après-guerre 1919–1933*. Beirut: n.p., 1937.

Dahir, Masud. *Tarikh Lubnan al-Ijtima'i, 1914–1926*. Social History of Lebanon, 1914–1926. Beirut: Dar al-Farabi, 1974.

———, ed. Mu'arrikhun A'lam min Lubnan. Illustrious Historians from Lebanon. Beirut: Dar al-Nidal, 1997.

Doumani, Beshara. "Rediscovering Ottoman Palestine: Writing Palestinians into History," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 21, 1989.

———. *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700–1900*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.

Ecole Supérieure des Lettres. *Cahiers des Lettres No. 5, Colloque 'Ashura*, Beirut, 1974.

Eisenberg, Laura Zittrain. *My Enemy's Enemy: Lebanon in the Early Zionist Imagination, 1900–1948*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1994.

Fahs, Hani. *al-Shi'a wa-l-Dawla fi Lubnan: Malamih fi al-Ru'ya wa-al-Dhakira*. The Shi's and the State in Lebanon: Glimpses of Observation and Memory. Beirut: Dar al-Andalus, 1996.

Farhat, Hani. *al-Thulathi al-'Amili fi 'Asr al-Nahda: al-Shaykh Ahmad Rida, al-Shaykh Sulayman Dahir, Muhammad Jabir al Safa*. The 'Amili Trio during the Nahda: Shaykh Ahmad Rida, Shaykh Sulayman Dahir, Muhammad Jabir Al Safa. Beirut: al-Dar al-'Alamiyya lil-Tiba'a wa-l-Nashr wa-al-Tawzi', 1981.

Fournie, Pierre and Riccioli. *La France et le Proche-Orient: 1916–1946: une chronique photographique de la présence française en Syrie et au Liban, en Palestine, au Hedjaz et en Cilicie*. Paris: Castermann, 1996.

Garfinkle, Adam. *War, Water and Negotiation in the Middle East: The Case of the Palestine-Syria Border 1916–1923*. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1994.

Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Culture: Selected Essays*. United States: Perseus Books, 1973.

Gelvin, James. "The Social Origins of Popular Nationalism in Syria: Evidence for a New Framework," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, No. 26, 1994.

Gerber, Haim. *The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East*. London: Mansell Publishing, 1987.

Gilbert Martin. *Atlas of Jewish History*. Dorset: Dorset Press: 1984.

Gouraud, Henri. *La France en Syrie*. n.p., n.d.

Güçlü, Yücel. "The Struggle for Mastery in Cilicia: Turkey, France, and the Ankara Agreement of 1921," *International History Review*, Vol. 23, No. 3, September 2001.

Hairi, Shahla. *Shiism and Constitutionalism in Iran*. Leiden: Brill, 1977.

Hakim-Dowek, Carol. "The Origins of the Lebanese National Idea 1840–1914," Ph.D. thesis, Oxford, 1997.

Halaq, Hasan, ed. *Mudhakarat Salim Ali Salam*. Memoirs of Salim Ali Salam. Beirut: Dar al-Jam'iya, 1982.

Hammoud, Mohammad. "Les Dogmes shi'ites a travers l'oeuvre de sayed Mohsin al-Amine," Ph.D. thesis, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1980.

Haqqi, Isma'il. *Lubnan: Mabahith Ijtima'iyya*. Lebanon, Beirut: Social Research, 1975.

Haut-Commissariat de la République Française en Syrie et au Liban. *La Syrie et le Liban sous l'occupation et Mandat Français 1919–1927*. Paris: 1920–1928.

Hasani, Salim. *Dawr ulama al-Shi'a fi-Muwajahat al-Istimar 1900–1920*. The Role of the Shi'is in Confronting Imperialism 1900–1920. Beirut: Dar al-Ghadir, 1995.

Hitti, Philip. *Lebanon in History, from the Earliest Times to the Present*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962.

Hobsbawm, Eric. *Primitive Rebels, Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movements in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1959.

———. *Bandits*. New York: Delacort Press, 1969.

Hobsbawn, Eric and Ranger, Terence, eds. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Hof, Frederic C. *Galilee Divided: The Israel-Lebanon Frontier, 1916–1984*. Boulder: Westview, 1985.

Hokayem, Antoine. *La genèse de la constitution libanaise de 1926*. Antelias: Editions Universitaires du Liban, 1996.

Hourani, Albert. *Syria and Lebanon, a Political Essay*. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.

———. *The Ottoman Background of the Modern Middle East*. Harlow: Longmans for the University of Essex, 1969.

———. *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981.

———. *Minorities in the Arab World*. New York: AMS Press, 1982.

———. *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939*. Cambridge, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

———. "From Jabal 'Amil to Persia," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, No. 49, University of London, 1986.

———. *Political Society in Lebanon: A Historical Introduction*. Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1986.

———, in Khoury, Philip, and Wilson, Mary, eds. *The Modern Middle East: A Reader*. London and New York: Tauris, 1993.

Hourani, Albert and Shehadi. *The Lebanese in the World: A Century of Emigration*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1992.

Huballah, Abdul Karim. "Yusuf Zein 1879–1962," Diplome, Lebanese University, Saida, 1989.

Hudson, Michael. *The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon*. Boulder: Westview, 1985.

Humaid, Ayoub. "Ahmad 'Arif al-Zayn wa 'Irfanih." Ahmad 'Arif al-Zayn and His 'Irfan. *Majallat Amal*, n.d.

Humani, Muhammad 'Ali. *Ma'a al-Nass*. With People. Cairo: Maktabat al-Anjlu al-Misriyya, 1948.

Hunter, W. Patison. *Narrative of the Late Expedition to Syria, under the Command of Admiral the Hon. Sir Robert Stopford. Comprising an Account of the Capture of Gebail, Tripoli, and Tyre; Storming of Sidon; Battle of Calat-Meidan; Bombardment and Capture of St. Jean d'Acre*. London: H. Colburn, 1842.

Husayn, Muhammad Kamil. *Ta'ifat al Duruz: Tarikhuha wa-'Aqa'iduha*. The Druze Community: Its History and Beliefs. Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1962.

Huvelin, Paul. "Que vaut la Syrie?" *L'Asie française* (Documents économiques, politiques et scientifiques), No. 1, December 1921, pp. 1–50.

Issawi, Charles. *The Economic History of the Middle East 1800–1914*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1966.

'Itani. *Mudhakarat Bayruti*. Memoirs of a Beiruti. Beirut: Jamiyat Bayrut al-'Arabiyya, 1977.

Jaber, Munzer. Mu'tamar Wadi al-Hujayr wa-Atharuh," The Wadi Hujayr Conference and Its Repercussions, M.A. thesis, Lebanese University, Beirut, 1973.

———. "Pouvoir et société au Jabal Amil de 1790 a 1920 dans la conscience des chroniqueurs chiites et dans un essai d'interprétation," Ph.D. thesis, 3e cycle, Paris IV, 1978.

———."al-Kiyan al-Siyasi li-Jabal 'Amil qabl 1920," Political Structure in Jabal 'Amil before 1920, in Beydoun, Ibrahim, ed., *Safahat min Tarikh Jabal 'Amil*, Pages from the History of Jabal 'Amil. Beirut: Dar al-Farabi, 1979.

———. "al-Shi'i fi Jabal 'Amil Bayn al-Mabda'iyat wa-l- hifadh 'ala al-dhat," Shi'is in Jabal 'Amil, between Principles and Self-Preservation, in *al-Muntalaq*, Vol. 105, 1993.

———. *al-Sharit al-Lubnani al-Muhtall: Masalikal Ihtilal, Masarat al Muwajaha, Masa'ir al-Ahali*. The Occupied Lebanese Zone: Methods of Occupation, Means of Confrontation and Lives of its Inhabitants. Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya, 1999.

Jallul, Fatima Ibrahim. "Fihrist al-Irfan," Index of al-'Irfan, Lebanese University, Beirut, 1963.

Jamali, Fadil. "The Theological Colleges of Najaf," *Muslim World*, Vol. 50/1, January 1960.

Jamil, Sayyar. *Takwin al-Arab al-Hadith.* The Modern Formation of the Arabs. Amman: Dar al-Shuruq, 1997.

Johnson, Michael. *Class and Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State*. London: Ithaca Press, 1986.

Jouplain, M. (Bulus Njaym). *La question du Liban: étude d'histoire Diplomatique et de droit International.* Rousseau, 1908.

Juha, Shafiq. *Maarakat Masir Lubnan fi Ahd al Intidab al Faransi 1918–1946.* The Struggle for Lebanon's Fate during the French Mandate Period 1918–1946. 2 Vols. Beirut: Maktabat Ras Beirut, 1995.

Jurdi, Rula. "Migration and Social Change: The 'Ulama of Ottoman Jabal 'Amil in Safavid Iran, 1501–1736," Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1998.

Kafadar, Cemal, "Self and Others: The Diary of a Dervish in Seventeenth Century Istanbul and the First Person Narratives in Ottoman Literature," in *Studia Islamcia*, Vol. 69, 1989.

Kalam ala Watan, Adel Osseiran 1905–1998. About a Homeland: Adel Osseiran, 1905–1998. Lebanon: 1999.

Kansu, Ayuk. *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey.* Leiden: Brill, 1997.

Kaufmann, Asher. "Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for an Identity in Lebanon," Ph.D. thesis, Brandeis University, 2000.

Kayalı, Hasan. "Greater Syria under Ottoman Constitutional Rule: Ottomanism, Arabism, Regionalism," in Thomas, Philipp, ed., *The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th Century: The Common and the Specific in the Historical Experience*, Stuttgart: Steiner, 1992.

———. "Elections and the Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1919," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 27, 1995.

———. *Arabs and Youngs Turks, Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

Karpat Kemal. "Reinterpreting Ottoman History: A Note on the Condition of Education in 1874," *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol. 6, 1981–1982.

Kawtharani, Wajih. *Bilad al-Sham: al-Sukkan, al-Iqtisad, wa-al-Siyasah al-Faransiyah fi Matla al-Qarn al-Ishrin: Qiraah fi al-Wathaiq. al-Tarikh al-Ijtimai lil-Watan al-Arabi.* Greater Syria: Population, Economy and French Politics at the Turn of the 20th Century: A Study of Documents. Beirut: Ma'had al-Inma al-'Arabi, 1980.

Khairallah, K.T. "La Syrie," in *Revue du Monde Musulman*, Vol. 19, 1912.

Kedourie, Elie. *England and the Middle East.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981.

Keddie, Nikki. *Shi'ism and Social Protest.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.

Kelidar, Abbas. "The Shi'i Imami Community and Politics in the Arab East," *Middle East Journal*, January 1983.

Khalidi, Tarif, ed. *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East.* Beirut: AUB, 1984.

———. “Shaykh Ahmad ‘Arif al Zayn and al ‘Irfan,” in Buheiry, Marwan, ed., *Intellectual Life of the Arab East, 1890–1939.* Beirut: AUB, 1969.

Khalifa, Issam. *Al-Hudud al-Janubiyya li-Lubnan Bayn Mawaqif Nakhb al-Tawa’if wa al-Sira’ al-Dawli, 1908–1936.* The Southern Borders of Lebanon between Sectarian Elites and International Struggle, 1908–1936. Beirut: Dar al-Jil, 1985.

Khalifa, Nabil. *al-Shi‘a fi Lubnan: Thawrat al-Dimughrafiyah wa-al-Hirman.* The Shi‘is in Lebanon: A Demographic Revolution and Disinheritance. Beirut: n.p., 1984.

El-Khazen, Farid. *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967–1976.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000.

Khoury, Philip. *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920–1945.* Princeton: Princeton University, 1987.

———, ed. *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East.* London: I.B. Tauris, 1991.

Khuri, Yusuf. *Al-Bayanat al-Wizariyya.* 2 Vols. Ministerial Statements. Beirut: Mu’asasat al-Dirasat al-Lubnaniyya, 1986.

Kramer, Martin. *Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.

———, ed. *Shi‘ism, Resistance and Revolution.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.

Kupferschmidt, Uri. “The General Muslim Congress of 1931 in Jerusalem,” in *African-Asian Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1978.

Kushner, David. “The Ottoman Governors of Palestine, 1864–1914,” in *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1987, pp. 258–285.

Labaki, Boutros. *Education et mobilité sociale dans la société multicommunautaire du Liban, approche socio-historique.* N.p., 1988.

———. *Introduction à l’histoire économique du Liban: soie et commerce extérieur en fin de période ottomane (1840–1914).* Beirut: Université Libanaise, 1984.

Lammens, Henri. *La Syrie, précis historique.* 2 Vols. Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique,1921.

———. *Les Perse du Liban et l’origine des métoualis.* Beirut: Mélanges Université Saint Joseph, 1929.

Latron, Andre. *La Vie Rurale en Syrie at au Liban, etude d’economie sociale.* Beirut: Mémoires de l’Institut Français de Damas,1936.

Lewis, Bernard. *History—Remembered, Recovered, Invented.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Lewis, Bernard and Holt, P.M. *Historians of the Middle East.* London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

Litvak, Meir. *Shi‘i Scholars of Nineteenth Century Iraq. The Ulama of Najaf and Karbala.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Lloyd George, David. *The Truth about Peace Treaties.* London: Gollancz, 1931.

Longrigg, Stephen. *Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate*. London, 1958.

Lortet, Louis. *La Syrie d'aujourd'hui, voyages dans la Phénicie, le Liban, et la Judée, 1875–1880*. Paris: Hachette, 1884.

Luizard, Pierre-Jean. *La Formation de l'Irak Contemporain*. Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1991.

Majid, Majid. *Tarikh al-Hukuumat al-Lubnaniya 1926–1996*. The History of the Lebanese Governments 1926–1996. Beirut: n.p., 1997.

Al-Majlis al-Thaqafi li-Lubnan al-Janubi. *Wujuh Thaqafiyya min al-Janub*. Cultural Faces from the South. Beirut: Al-Majlis al-Thaqafi li-Lubnan al-Janubi, 1979.

———. *Al-Dalil, Ma'rad Janub Lubnan*. Guide to Publications on South Lebanon. Beirut: Al-Majlis al-Thaqafi li-Lubnan al-Janubi, 1981.

———. *Min Daftar al-Dhikrayat al-Janubiyyah*. From the Notebook of Southern Memories. Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi, 1981.

Mallat, Chibli. *Shi'i Thought from the South of Lebanon*. Papers on Lebanon 7, Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1988.

Matuk, Khalil. *La question du monopole des tabacs et tombacs en Syrie et au Liban*. Beirut: n.p., 1936.

Meouchy, Nadine. "Les Formes de conscience politique et communautaire au Liban et en Syrie a l'époque du Mandat Français 1920–1939," Ph.D. thesis, Paris-Sorbonne, 1989.

Mervin, Sabrina. *Un Réformisme chiite, les ulémas du Gabal Amil (Liban-Sud) de la fin de l'empire Ottoman a l'indépendance du Liban*. Paris: Karthala, 2000.

Mervin, Sabrina and Al-Amin, Haitham. *Autobiographie d'un clerc chiite du Gabal 'Amil*. Damascus: Institut Français d'Etudes Arabes, 1998.

Millard, W.G. "Aspects of Modernism in Shi'a Islam," in *Studia Islamica*, Vol. 37, 1973.

Momen, Moojan. *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985.

Mottahedeh, Roy P. *The Mantle of the Prophet*. New York: Pantheon, 1985.

Moutran, Nadra. *Reflexions d'un vieux jeune turc*. Constantinople: 1908.

Mughniyya, Muhammad Jawad. *al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyah*. Law of Family Affairs, Beirut: Dar al-'Ilm lil- Malayin, 1964.

———. *Ma'a Ulama al-Najaf al-Ashraf*. With the Scholars of Holy Najaf, Beirut, Dar Maktabat al-Hilal, 1984.

———. *Al-Wad' al-Hadir Fi Jabal 'Amil fi Matla' al Istiqlal: Bidayat al-Qahr wa-l-Hirman*. The Present Situation in Jabal 'Amil at the Start of Independence: The Beginning of Wretchedness and Disinheritance. Beirut: Dar al-Jawad, 1984.

Muhajir, Jafar. *al-Hijra al-'Amiliyya ila Iran fi al-'Asr al-Safawi: Asbabuha al-Tarikhiyya wa-Nataijuha al-Thaqafiyya wa-al-Siyasiyya*. 'Amili Immigration to Iran in the Safavid Period: Historic Reasons and Cultural and Political Results. Beirut: Dar al-Rawah, 1989.

———. *Al-Ta'sis li-Tarikh al Shia fi-Lubnan wa-Suriya*. Foundations for Shi'i History in Lebanon and Syria, Beirut, Dar al-Malak, 1992.

Naef, Silvia. "Al-'Irfan, la presse en tant que moteur du renouveau culturel et litteraire: une revue chiite," in *Etudes Asiatiques, Revue de la Societe Suisse-Asie*, L.2., 1996.

———. "Les chiites du Liban et le Mandat Francais: la position de la revue *Al-'Irfan*," in *Actes de la Troisieme Rencontre des Etudes sur la Presse du Moyen Orient*, CNRS, Aix-en-Provence, July 2–5, 1996.

———. "Un réformiste chiite-Muhammad Husayn Kâšif Âl-Gitâ,' " in *Die Welt Orients*, Vol. 27, 1996.

———. "Communisme athée ou démocratie imperialiste? Le choix difficile d'un 'alim chiite dans les premières années de la guerre froide," *Proceedings of the 17th Congress of the Union européenne des arabisants et islamisants* (*UEAI*), St. Petersburg, 1997.

Al-Najafi, Muhammad Najafi al-Husayni. *Thawrat al-Tanzih*. Beirut: Dar al-Jadid, 1996.

Nakash, Yitzhak. *The Shi'is of Iraq*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Naqqash, Zaki. *Dawr al-'Uruba fi Tarikhuna al-Lubnani*. The Role of Arabness in Our Lebanese History. Beirut: Dar Lubnan, 1974.

Nasr, Salim and Dubar, Claude. *Les classes sociales au Liban*. Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1976.

Nevakivi, Jukka. *Britain, France and the Arab Middle East 1914–1920*. London: Athlone, 1969.

Norton, Augustus R. *Amal and the Shi'a: The Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon*. Austin: University of Texas, 1987.

O'Zoux, Raymond. *Les états du Levant*. Paris: Librairie Larosse, 1931.

Owen, Roger. *Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon*. London: Ithaca, 1976.

———. *The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800–1914*. London: Methuen, 1981.

———. *State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*. London: Routledge, 1992.

Roger, Owen and Şevket, Pamuk. *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.

Pichon, Jean. *Le partage du Proche-Orient*. Paris: Peyronnet, 1938.

Polk, William Roe. *The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788–1840: A Study of the Impact of the West on the Middle East*. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1963.

Psichari, Jean. *La Syrie*. Paris: 1920.

Qalaji, Qadri. *Jil al-Fida, Qissat al-Thawrah al-Kubra wa-Nahdat al-Arab*. Generation of Sacrifice: The Story of the Great Revolt and the Arab Awakening. Beirut: Dar al-Katib al-'Arabi, 1937.

Qassimiyya, Khairiyya. *Al-Hukumah al-'Arabiyya fi Dimashq Bayn 1918–1920*. The Arab Government in Damascus 1918–1920. Beirut: al-Mu'asasa al-'Arabiyya lil-Dirasat al-Nashr, n.d.

Qawuqji, Fawzi. *Mudhakkirat Fawzi al-Qawuqji, 1912–1932*. Memoirs of Fawzi Qawuji. Beirut: Dar al-Quds, 1975.

Rashid Beydoun, Qawl wa Fi'l. Rashid Beydoun, Words and Action. Beirut: 1967.

Rasi, Salam. *Fi-l-Zawaya Khabaya*. Secrets in the Corners. Beirut: Mu'assasat Nawfal, 1974.

Republic of Lebanon. *Nizam al-Mahakim al-Shariyah*. Regulations of the Shari'ah Courts, Beirut [1942].

———. *al-Tarikh al-Ijtimai wa-al-Iqtisadi wa-al-Siyasi fi Bayrut wa-al-Wilayat al-Uthmaniyah fi al-Qarn al-Tasi Ashar*. Social and Economic History in Beirut and the Ottoman Provinces in the 20th Century, Beirut, 1987–.

———. *al-Wathaiq al-Dusturiyah al-Lubnaniyah Mundhu Sanat 1860*. Lebanese Constitutional Documents since 1860 [Beirut, 1996].

———. *Majmuat Qawanin al-Matbuat fi Lubnan min 1865 li-Ghayat 1979*, Index of Printed Texts in Lebanon 1865–1979, Lebanon, n.d.

Riyashi, Iskandar. *Qabl wa-ba'd, 1918–1941*. Before and After, 1918–1941. Beirut: Maktabat al-'Irfan, 1955.

Rondot, Pierre. *Les institutions politiques du Liban, des communautés traditionnelles à l'etat moderne*. Paris: Institutions d'études de l'Orient Contemporain, 1947.

———. "Les chrétiens d'Orient," in *Cahiers de l'Afrique et l'Asie, 4, Paris* [1955].

———. "Destin du Proche-Orient," in *Collection "Le Poids du jour" [Paris]* [1959].

Rukayni, Haydar Rida. *Jabal 'Amil fi qarn*. Jabal 'Amil in a Century. Beirut: Dar al-Jaman, 1998.

Sader, Elias. "Thawrat Jabal Amil Sanat 1920." The Jabal 'Amil Revolt, 1920, Diplôme, Lebanese University, 1972.

Said, Amin. *Thawrat al-'Arab fil Qarn al-'Ishrin*. 3 Vols. The Arab Revolt in the 20th Century. Cairo: 'Issa al-Babi al-Halabi, n.d.

Salibi, Kamal. *Maronite Historians of Mediaeval Lebanon*. Beirut: AUB Press, 1959.

———. "Islam and Syria in the writings of Henri Lammens," in Lewis, Bernard and Holt, P.M., eds., *Historians of the Middle East*. London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

———. "The Traditional Historiography of the Maronites," in Lewis, Bernard and Holt, P.M., eds., *Historians of the Middle East*, London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

———. *The Modern History Of Lebanon*. London: Praeger, 1965.

———. "The Lebanese Identity," in *The Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 6, 1971, pp. 76–87.

———. *Muntalaq Tarikh Lubnan*. Beirut: Mu'assasat Nawfal, 1979.

———. *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.

———. "Tribal Origins of the Religious Sects in the Arab East," in Barakat, Halim, ed., *Toward a Viable Lebanon*, Washington: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1988.

———. *Tarikh Lubnan al-Hadith*. Beirut: Dar al-Nahar lil-Nashr, 1991.
Sarah, Fayez. *Sa'id al-'Ass 1889–1936*. Sa'id al-'Ass 1889–1936. Damascus: 1993.
Sawda, Yusuf. *Fil Sabil Lubnan*. For Lebanon's Sake. Alexandria: Madrasat al-Farir, 1919.
Seguin, Jacques. *Le Liban-Sud, espace périphérique, espace convoité*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1989.
Schabler, Birgit. *Rebels, Shaykhs, and State(s): The Integration of the Druzes and the Struggle for Social Control in Syria in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. Beirut: German Orient Institute, 1998.
Schabler, Birgit and Philip, Thomas, ed. *The Syrian Land: Processes of Integration and Fragmentation: Bilad Al-Sham from the 18th to the 20th Century*. Stuttgart: Steiner, 1998.
———. "Practicing Musha': Common Lands and the Common Good in Southern Syria under the Ottomans and the French," in Owen, R., ed., *New Perspectives on Property*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001.
Schilcher, Linda S. "The Famine of 1915–1918 in Greater Syria," in Spagnolo, John, ed., *Problems of the Middle East in Historical Perspective*. Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1992.
Sharaf al-Din, Abd al-Husayn. *Ila al-Majma' al-'Ilmi fi Dimashq*. To the Arab Academy in Damascus. Najaf, 1967.
Shiri, Khalil. "Majallat *al-Irfan* wa Takwin Muthaqafi Jabal 'Amil," *Al-'Irfan* Journal and the Formation of Jabal 'Amil's Intellectuals, Thesis Diplome, Lebanese University, 1983.
Shuayb, Ali. *Matalib Jabal 'Amil: Al-Wuhda al-Musawwa fi Lubnan al-Kabir 1900–1936*. Jabal 'Amil's Demands: Unity and Equality in Greater Lebanon 1900–1936. Beirut: Al-Mu'assassa al-Jami'yya lil Dirasat wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi', 1987.
Shubaru, Issam Muhammad. *'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil, al-Zaim al-Sirri lil-Haraka al Arabiya*. 'Abd al-Karim ak-Khalil, The Secret Leader of the Arab Movement. Beirut: n.p., 1996.
Solh, Hilal. *Tarikh Rajul wa-Qadiya: Riad al Solh 1894–1951*. The History of a Man and a Mission: Riad al-Solh 1894–1951. Beirut: n.p., 1994.
Solh, Raghid. "Lebanon and Arab Nationalism, 1936—1945," Ph.D. thesis, Oxford University, 1986.
Spagnolo, John. *France and Ottoman Lebanon, 1861–1914*. London: Ithaca Press, 1977.
———. "Franco-British Rivalry in the Middle East," in Shehadi, Nadim and Haffar Mills, Dana, eds., *Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1988.
———, ed. *Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective: Essays in Honour of Albert Hourani*. Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1992.
Subayti, 'Abdullah. *Rannat al-Asa, Nazra fi Risalat al-Tanzih li Amal al-Shabih*. The Arguments against the Purification Revolution. Baghdad: 1929.
———. *Abu Dharr al-Ghifari*. Abu Dharr al-Ghifari. Sur: Matba'at Sur al-Haditha, 1945.

Al Sulayman, Ibrahim. *Buldan Jabal ʿAmil: QilaʿI wa-Madarisuh wa-Jusuruh wa-Murujuh wa Matahinu wa Jibaluh wa Mashahiduh.* The Lands of Jabal ʿAmil: Its Castles, Bridges, Fields, Mills, Mountains and Views. Beirut: Mu'asasat al-Da'irah, 1995.

Suleiman, Michael. *Political Parties in Lebanon: The Challenge of a Fragmented Political Culture.* London: Ithaca, 1967.

Taraf-Najib, Souha. *Zrariye, village chiite du Liban-sud: de 1900 à nos jours*, Les Cahiers du CERMOC, No. 4, Beyrouth, ca. 1992.

Tarhini, Fayiz. *al-Shaykh Ahmad Rida wa-al-Fikr al-Amili.* Shaykh Ahmad Rida and ʿAmili Thought. Beirut: Dar al-Afaq al-Jadida, 1983.

Tarhini, Mariam Hamzee. "al-Humani, poète chiite de Gabal Amil," Ph.D. thesis, Université de Provence, 1984.

Tauber, Eliezer. "The Press and the Journalist as a Vehicule in Spreading National Ideas in the Late Ottoman Period," in *Die Welt des Islams* Vol. 30, 1990, pp. 163–177.

———. *The Origins of the Arab Movements.* London: Frank Cass, 1993.

Temperley, H.W.V., ed., *A History of the Peace Conferences of Paris.* London, Frowde, Hodder & Stoughton, 1924.

Tibi Bassam. *Arab Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981.

Traboulsi, Fawaz , "Identités et solidarités croisées dans les conflits du Liban contemporain," Ph.D. thesis, Paris VIII, 1993.

———. *Silat Bila Wasl: Michel Chiha w-al-Idiulujiyya al-Lubnaniyya.* Leads without Links: Michel Chiha and the Lebanese Ideology. Beirut: Riad al-Rayyes, 1999.

Tulayʿ, Amin. *Asl al-Muwahidin al-Duruz wa-Asluhim.* The Unitary Druze and Their Origins. Beirut: Dar al-Andalus, 1961.

Ubaydat, Mahmud. *Ahmad Maraywid, 1886–1926: Qaid Thawrat al-Jawlan wa-Janub Lubnan wa-Sharq al-Urdun.* Ahmad Murrawid 1886–1926: Leader of the Golan, South Lebanon and East Jordan Revolt. Beirut: Rias al-Rayyes, 1997.

Urquhard, David. *The Lebanon (Mount Souria): A History and a Diary.* London: TC Newby, 1860.

De Vogue, Melchior. *Les événements de Syrie.* Paris, 1860.

Walbrige, Linda. *Without Forgetting the Imam: Lebanese Shiʿism in an American Community.* Detroit: Wayne State University, 1997.

Wardi, ʿAli. *Lamahat Ijtimaʿiyya min Tarikh al-ʿIraq al-Hadith.* A Social Glimpse of Iraq's Modern History. Baghdad: Matbaʿat al-Irshad, 1969.

Weulersse, Jacques. *Paysans de Syrie et du Proche-Orient.* Paris: Gallimard, 1946.

Wilson, Jeremy. *T.E. Lawrence.* London: Heineman, 1989.

Zamir, Meir. "Emile Eddé and the Territorial Integrity of Lebanon," in *Middle East Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1978, pp. 232–235.

———. "Smaller and Greater Lebanon—The Squaring of a Circle?" in *Jerusalem Quarterly*, Vol. 23, 1982, pp. 34–53.

———. *The Formation of Modern Lebanon.* London: Croom Helm, 1985.

———. “Faisal and the Lebanese Question, 1918–1920,” in *Middle East Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1991.

———. *Lebanon’s Quest: The Road to Statehood, 1926–39.* London: I.B. Tauris, 1997.

Zarcone, F. and Zarinbaf, Th. *Les Iraniens d’Istanbul.* Paris: Institut Français de Recherches en Iran, 1993.

al-Zayn, Raghda Nahhas. “al-Shaykh Ahmad ‘Arif al-Zayn, Ra’id Islahi fi Jabal ‘Amil Awa’il al-Qarn al-Ishrin.” Shaykh Ahmad ‘Arif al-Zayn Reformist Pioneer in Jabal ‘Amil in the 20th Century, M.A. thesis, American University of Beirut, 1996.

This page intentionally left blank

Index